Book Description
From Yorkshire to the sleepy village of Thornton Lacey is only a morning's drive, but for Detective Sergeant Peter Pascoe, the distance will close off part of his life forever. Motoring down for a reunion with old friends, he arrives to find not a welcome but a grisly triple murder. Out of his jurisdiction, Pascoe is in an untenable position: one of his oldest friends is wanted for murder, his boss is ordering him back to Yorkshire, and his instincts are telling him that the local constabulary will never suspect that the crime's true motive lies not in the obvious places, but in the unexplored zones of passion within a twisted heart.
Customer Reviews:
Great English Detective Writing!.......2006-08-18
Reginald Hill has the English detective genre locked up, and that is apparent with this, the third book in the Dalziel and Pascoe sereis. This is a complex book, and it has a lot of characters, so it's sometimes hard to keep them straight as well as all the plots and counterplots. The book is an example of two separate plot strings that come, ineveitably together. Make no mistake. Hill is a clever writer, and his books need to be read a little differently than a lot of others in this genre. Otherwise, you will get lost in the complexity. This book gives us an up-close and personal look at Peter Pascoe as murder touches him and the ones he cares about. I highly recommend this book.
The 3rd Dalziel and Pascoe novel.......2003-01-26
Having renewed his relationship with college girlfriend Ellie Soper, Detective Peter Pascoe re-establishes contact with other school friends, who invite Ellie and Peter to spend a long weekend in the country with them. Work detains Peter, so that when Ellie and Peter arrive at the cottage, they find all their frinds brutally murdered, except for their host, who is missing.
Peter is out of his jurisdiction and on the other side of the witness table, trying desperately to convince his colleagues that his friend can't be the murderer.
Meanwhile Ellie does some investigating of her own, in which she finds an unexpected ally, the cop she detests, Superintendent Andy Dalziel.
If you have enjoyed later Dalziel and Pascoe books, don't miss this earlier effort. There are some great character developing scenes in this book, especially for Ellie and Dalziel.
Hill's Writing Is A Joy To Experience.......2000-11-15
Pascoe and Ellie arrive in Thorton Lacey for a reunion with four old friends. They discover three of their friends brutally murdered and the fourth gone missing. Is he dead also, or a suspect in the murders? Hill's descriptive powers are exceptional and they put you squarely into each scene. One of my favorites was, "Above the thatched roof a flock of television aerials parted the morning breeze and serenely sang their triumph over charm and Tudory". Intelligence and subtle humor infuse the whole story. The mystery spins irresistibly to the final pages and the ending leaves you with a smile.
Plot twists and English village intrigue.......2000-05-02
Reginald Hill's detective stories are always an enjoyable combination of complex plots, well-developed characters, and lots of gossipy details of contemporary English village life. The only thing that keeps this from being a 5-star rating is that Pascoe is so closely linked to the victims and suspects that it is darker and lacks some of the humor of other books in this series. It's probably not the best of Hill's books for someone new to his detectives. Read another Reginald Hill first (you can't go wrong with any of them), then come back to this one when you know the main characters a little better.
Book Description
Simon Blackburn puts forward a compelling original philosophy of human motivation and morality. He maintains that we cannot get clear about ethics until we get clear about human nature. So these are the sorts of questions he addresses: Why do we behave as we do? Can we improve? Is our ethics at war with our passions, or is it an upshot of those passions? Blackburn seeks the answers in an exploration of guilt, shame, disgust, and other moral emotions; he draws also on game theory and cognitive science in his account of the structures of human motivation. Many philosophers have wanted a naturalistic ethics a theory that integrates our understanding of human morality with the rest of our understanding of the world we live in. What is special about Blackburn's naturalistic ethics is that it does not debunk the ethical by reducing it to the non-ethical. At the same time he banishes the spectres of scepticism and relativism that have haunted recent moral philosophy. Ruling Passions sets ethics in the context of human nature: it offers a solution to the puzzle of how ethics can maintain its authority even though it is rooted in the very emotions and motivations that it exists to control.
Customer Reviews:
Interesting, but Not Provocative.......2005-07-23
"Ruling Passions" is an intelligent, witty, ambitious, and erudite examination and defense of sentimentalist ethics as proposed by David Hume and Adam Smith against the background of virtue, deontological, and consequentialist ethics as proposed by Aristotle, Kant, and Bentham, respectively. It is a complicated affair, definitely not for beginners.
It begins easily enough, placing the locus of practical reasoning in the emotions rather than in ratiocination. The Dionysian and Apollonian dichotomy persist throughout the book. But the chapters take a contorted twist around a variety of subjects (theory of language, modal logic, theory of mind, prisoner's dilemma, choice theory, etc.) before once again resuming in Chapter Seven to the focus adumbrated in Chapter One. Those interested in a highly Anglo-American analysis will not want to miss these intervening chapters; those less inclined may omit chapters 3-6 without detriment.
I came to the book already disposed to sentimentalist ethics, and I come away all the more convinced. But if one is not already familiar with Hume's and Smith's theories, not to mention Aristotle, Kant, and at least Mill, one will feel a definite disadvantage. Everything needed for Blackburn's arguments are fully entailed, but not in the nice, crisp, lean fashion I like. He's too chatty and redundant for my tastes. Indeed, the book could easily be reduced by half, making a more coherent case.
One of the clear deficits of the book is Blackburn's failure to distinguish how "utility" plays an important role in Hume's account, but is deliberately denied in Smith's account. I think there is much for fruitful discussion on this distinction that goes entirely unnoticed. Besides the mentors, there are plenty of devotees: Wittgenstein, Ryle, Koorsgard, Rorty, Hare, Moore, Ramsey, Sidgwick, et alia. And, besides choice theory, sociobiology makes an appearance (where Dawkins gets scored). All in all, in interesting, but hardly, provocative work.
Blackburn's Approach to Metaethics Summarized.......2004-04-30
Blackburn is one of the main figures in contemporary metaethics, and this is his big book on the issues. He tries to lay out the general details of his approach to ethics here, so it's a book that's essential reading for anyone interesting in metaethics. And it's a book that's slowly grown on me as I've studied it.
That said, it's evasive and frustrating at places, and it's longer than it needs to be. Blackburn spends too much time on extraneous stuff, and provides too little detail about the absolutely crucial material in the first, third, and ninth chapters. These are the chapters in which Blackburn lays out the fundamentals of his favored form of noncognitivism, explains the nature of the quasi-realist project, and attempts to answer the objection that his views lead to subjectivism or relativism. Furthermore, there's just not enough engagement with the literature in large parts of this book--the obvious exception being chapter 4, which may be the book's best chapter. (For those who'd like a better introduction to Blackburn's views in ethics, I'd recommend chapters 5 and 6 in his earlier Spreading the Word; and the essays on metaethics in Essays in Quasi-Realism are probably provide a better account for the expert.)
Here's a recap of what goes on in the main chapters here. Not much of signal importance happens in chapter 1, but Blackburn very briefly explains why he thinks ethics is essentially practical and tries to say a bit about the sort of emotional and attitudinal states that are relevant to ethics. Chapter 3, which is the heart of the book, gives us the basics of Blackburn's expressivism, introduces quasi-realism, and takes up some challenges to it (e.g. unasserted contexts, motivational externalism, moral truth and moral facts, etc.). Chapter 4 is Blackburn's attack on all forms of cognitivism and moral realism; he argues against reductivist realisms, Cornell realism, and McDowell's and Wiggins's views. Chapters 7 and 8 are concerned with the respective places of reason and sentiment in ethics; Blackburn's on the side of sentiment. Chapter 9 is his attempt to answer challenges to expressivism alleging that it leads to subjectivism or relativism. And there is a very helpful appendix that clarifies what Blackburn takes his quasi-realist project to be and why he thinks expressivism is preferable to other metaethical views.
The remaining chapters are interesting, but inessential. The discussion of issues in normative ethics in chapter 2 is underdeveloped and largely unnecessary. Blackburn comes out in favor of consequentialism on the grounds that virtue theories and deontological theories need to appeal to consequentialist considerations in order to make sense of virtues and duties. The material about egoism and game theory in chapters 5 and 6 is true and important--though none of it is terribly original and it's hard to see why it plays a crucial role here.
With all that out of the way, I'll try to put some philosophical meat on the bone by outlining what I take to be Blackburn's central metaethical views. First, Blackburn's expressivism. Blackburn's expressivism is a noncognitivist account of moral language; it claims that moral language is (primarily) used to express attitudes. If theory is correct, our moral practice is guided by the aim of expressing our own attitudes about parts of the natural world and coordinating our attitudes with those of other people. Consequently, we do not need to posit moral facts, nor do we need to posit any special faculty for arriving at moral knowledge.
The aim of Blackburn's project is pretty straightforward: Blackburn's is a project of naturalizing ethics. He wants to understand ethical thought and language as part of a naturalistic conception of human nature. The most obvious way to naturalize ethics would be to attempt a reduction of the moral to the natural. But this isn't the route that Blackburn takes. Indeed, his expressivism is inconsistent with taking this approach to reconciling moralizing with his naturalism. Blackburn thinks we ought to "synthesize" moral propositions in order to understand moralizing naturalistically. And synthesizing the moral proposition is not a matter of reducing it to anything else; it is a matter of understanding its place within a broader naturalistic account of human beings and of moralizing as a human activity.
For Blackburn, then, the emphasis is on explanation rather than reduction. In this explanation the expressivist starts with the activity of moralizing. Why do we have an activity like this? What naturalistic explanation do we have for the practice of moralizing and for the existence of moral language and thought? Starting with answers to these questions amounts to synthesizing the moral proposition rather than analyzing it. We don't begin with ordinary moral claims and try to find some natural facts that make them true or false. Rather, we begin with a naturalistic account of the world and our place within it, and we try to explain why we think morally and why we use moral language in the way we do.
Now, it's not that those who aren't expressivists cannot offer any explanation of moralizing. The problem for cognitivists is that there's a central and essential element of morality they simply cannot explain. According to Blackburn, the cognitivist's explanation cannot account for the practical dimension of morality. Moralizing is a practical activity: that is, it's an activity that leads to and coordinates action in a group of people. There's an essential tie between moralizing and acting, and the cognitivist's explanation appears to leave this out of the picture. Why is it left out? It's open to a person to simply not care about the moral facts. Some people might care about these moral facts but that turns out to be a contingent fact about human psychology.
The fundamental virtue of expressivism, Blackburn thinks, is that it alone succeeds in explaining moralizing in a way that is consistent with naturalism, that it alone makes sense of why we moralize in a way that is consistent with the best account of the world and of human beings that is provided by the natural sciences. Expressivism accounts for the essential practicality of moralizing. For moralizing, if the expressivist is right, is primarily a matter of expressing one's attitudes, and attitudes possess a necessary connection to action.
The Horses drive the Chariot.......2003-01-29
First there was Plato, who argued that Reason must keep a check on all our unruly passions and emotions; then there were the Middle Eastern religions which said moral rules are given to us from on high - they are, for instance, inscribed on tablets of stone brought down from mountains, independent of human minds or involvement; somewhere along the line came Kant who said the application of reason and reason alone will provide us with clear rules for living.
Against these traditions of ethical values and moral rules as being somewhow objective, and deriving from reason or an independent authority is (to my taste, anyway) a more common sensical tradition that sees these rules and values as being inextricably human, as deriving from our human conerns, expressed through our emotions, and represented in our social life and practices. We are appalled by the pictures of towers falling, of humans jumping, and we feel great anger even as we feel pity, and we want to do something about it. We don't say to ourselves "how very unreasonable of them". Hume was the great expositor of the importance of the passions and sentiments in ethical thinking, and Blackburn is a worthy defender of our complete humanity.
This is an extraordinarily fine book - learned, witty, elegantly written and as thorough a demolition job on the opposition as one could imagine.
But it can't be said it is "an easy read". It is hard philosophy in the best post-analytic tradition and, by neccesity, takes on many able modern philsophers who have argued for different versions of the objectivity of moral value. Read it slowly and carefully, however and, perhaps like me, you will learn a great deal as well as equip yourself for an intelligent defense of the place of emotions in our ethical life.
Can Passions Rule?.......2002-10-01
The book is accessible to the lay person and keeps the reader's attention. Perhaps the strongest element of the book is the sense one gets that Blackburn is wrestling with ethical matters in a direct way. That is, he doesn't let scholarship (though when necessary he does cite the relevant materials) get in the way of his analysis. He is at a point in his career where he no longer has to hide behind explication of other philosophers' views and he can simply speak in his own refreshing voice. I especially liked his critique of McDowell (pp. 92-104). His linking of the affective and the intellective is usually well done (throughout but esp. 129).
I would like to note a few minor misgivings followed by one major criticism:
1. With precious few exceptions when Blackburn has a point to make it is always in terms of a philosopher from Great Britain. His criticisms of McDowell, Korsgaard and Kant are the almost singular (because unavoidable?) exceptions. Surely his background isn't limited to Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Smith, Hutcheson, Butler, Mill, Hare, Bradley, Moore, Ramsey, Ryle, Wittgenstein, Rhees, Sidgwick, Mackie, Wiggins, Parfit, Dancy, McGinn, Singer, Williams and Rushdie. We frown on French navel gazing. Surely thinkers like Hegel or Nietzsche or Heidegger or Bergson or Sartre have weighed in on any number of topics Blackburn addresses.
2. If the second half of chapter 4 and all of chapter 5 were excised the book would form a tighter argument (or just skip these or read them separately).
3. Blackburn's criticism of Rorty is weak (much like his TNR review of Brandom's book on Rorty). Philosophically, Rorty and Blackburn have far more in common than Blackburn is willing to let on. They are both anti-realists. Where they part company is in their differing assessments of the wisdom of what I call the antirealist's appropriation of the real. Basically, what this project amounts to is an attempt to defang realist critics by saying whatever we arrive at by (at least what used to be called) antirealist means is as "real" as it gets (cf. Arthur Fine). In ethics this reclamation of the real (now "quasi-real") manifests itself in Blackburn's willingness to speak of "truth." But note how deflationary his account of truth gets (p. 318). "Applied to ethics, this means that I can deem us to know, for example, that kicking babies for fun is wrong, because I rule out the chance of any improvement reversing that view" (p. 319). "I believe that the primary function of talking of 'knowledge' is to indicate that a judgement is beyond revision" (p. 318). So Rorty is a "weightless aesthete" because he isn't willing to be as belligerent as Blackburn (though Rorty's endorsement of what he perhaps more accurately calls "frank ethnocentrism" and his endorsement of the cautionary uses for truth undercut even this putative difference). One suspects Blackburn is merely bent out of shape over Rorty's flouting of Oxbridge gentility and is letting his passions rule.
My main difficulty with the book is already there in the title. How can passions rule? Hume who (along with Smith and Gibbard) for most of the book is Blackburn's hero had a different take on the passions. Briefly, Hume in his metaphysical and epistemological writings was (like his pre-Kantian predecessors) wedded to a vocabulary of mental contents. Hume's epistemological and metaphysical project on his own admission fell apart when he recognized he had to account for mental ACTIVITIES. A similar difficulty besets Hume's account of sentiments (Blackburn acknowledges this in a footnote but then in the narrative blithely ignores the footnote p. 259 n37). Unlike Hume, Blackburn has his passions ACT! For Blackburn the Neurathian ship of practical reason "is worked by a crew, each representing a passion or inclination or sentiment, and where the ship goes is determined by the resolution of conflicting pressures among the crew" p 245. The key issue is how to characterize such a resolution. In a backlash against a spectral Kantian/Korsgaardian Captain that rules the passions from some occult otherworldly perch, Blackburn wants to show how the passions rule. Note Blackburn's use of verbs. His passions/concerns/perspectives/values "contend," "deploy," "correct," "evaluate" "take up" (240, 262, 263, 267, 304, 313). Traditionally, that which does the contending or deploying or taking up or correcting or evaluating or, well, thinking is the self or the "I" or practical reason. Blackburn's reiteration of the argument against an ethereal Kantian 'Ich' doesn't by itself legitimate his distinctive understanding of the passions as active.
This tension is present when Blackburn says "The self is no more passive when our concerns are contending for a controlling say in our direction, than a parliament is passive when it debates a law." The question arises, what in this example is the relationship between "the self" and "our concerns"? Blackburn's point against Kant is that such a self can't be totally divorced from its concerns. Again and again he says THE mistake is to objectify the passions and thereby make them passive. Instead of treating the passions as passive objects Blackburn claims they act, they RULE. What role remains for the self? Does the unitary self devolve into a "parliament" and when civility breaks down into a Hobbesian/Nietzschean war of erupting drives? This issue keeps popping up as you read Blackburn. "I can take up a critical perspective on any of my own basic desires and concerns, in the light of my other basic desires and concerns" (p. 267). Here again we have an "I" that performs a verb ("takes up a critical perspective on") on desires and concerns. Is this activity itself just one more passion? Does this "I" (or the earlier parliamentary "self") reduce without remainder to our inventory of concerns? I don't think it quite does. The "I" or "self" or practical reason seems to be the arena within which and by means of which the passions contend. Parliamentary debate is importantly different from rule by referenda, i.e., _Ruling Passions_.
Important Reading on Practical Reason.......2001-11-24
I highly recommend this text, especially for those interested in moral psychology, action, and practical reason. The first three chapters especially are written in thoughtful and elegant prose. Superb examples. Blackburn is careful to establish just what the normative issues are in ethics.
The final chapters are most interesting in centering debate on relativism, subjectivism, and projectivism. Blackburn adopts a broadly Humean theory of moral motivation.
This is one of the most interesting, creatively written, and masterful texts written on this subject in years.
Book Description
How should politicians act? When should they try to lead public opinion and when should they follow it? Should politicians see themselves as experts, whose opinions have greater authority than other people's, or as participants in a common dialogue with ordinary citizens? When do virtues like toleration and willingness to compromise deteriorate into moral weakness? In this innovative work, Andrew Sabl answers these questions by exploring what a democratic polity needs from its leaders. He concludes that there are systematic, principled reasons for the holders of divergent political offices or roles to act differently.
Sabl argues that the morally committed civil rights activist, the elected representative pursuing legislative results, and the grassroots organizer determined to empower ordinary citizens all have crucial democratic functions. But they are different functions, calling for different practices and different qualities of political character. To make this case, he draws on political theory, moral philosophy, leadership studies, and biographical examples ranging from Everett Dirksen to Ella Baker, Frances Willard to Stokely Carmichael, Martin Luther King Jr. to Joe McCarthy.
Ruling Passions asks democratic theorists to pay more attention to the "governing pluralism" that characterizes a diverse, complex democracy. It challenges moral philosophy to adapt its prescriptions to the real requirements of democratic life, to pay more attention to the virtues of political compromise and the varieties of human character. And it calls on all democratic citizens to appreciate "democratic constancy": the limited yet serious standard of ethical character to which imperfect democratic citizens may rightly hold their leaders--and themselves.
Customer Reviews:
A Breath of Fresh Air.......2002-03-25
Andrew Sabl has written that most unusual of documents: a book on political theory that will be of real use to those who actually practice politics, including those of us who exercise the supreme office of citizen and voter. Facing squarely the problems set by the existence of real moral disagreements and the real contention of interests, he asks how the holders of what he calls "offices" (which others of a more sociological turn might call "roles") ought to act if the project of democratic self-rule is to be carried through. He argues -- convicingly, at least to me -- that different offices imply different sets of moral guidelines: that a good senator and a good community organizer are good in different ways, and that neither one can fulfill his office simply by acting out in public some version (any version) of what private ethics defines as a good person.
As a bonus, Sabl writes clearly and elegantly; Ruling Passions is a pleasure to read. A must for the scholar, the book is completely accessible to the general reader who is willing to stretch his mind just a little.
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Ruling Passions: Political Economy in Nineteenth-century America (Issues in Policy History)
Manufacturer: Pennsylvania State University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
 Economic Conditions | Economics | Business & Investing | Subjects | Books
Economic Conditions | International | Business & Investing | Subjects | Books
General | 19th Century | United States | Americas | History | Subjects | Books
General | Americas | History | Subjects | Books
General | Politics | Nonfiction | Subjects | Books
History & Theory | Politics | Nonfiction | Subjects | Books
Federal Government | Government | Nonfiction | Subjects | Books
ASIN: 0271028971 |
Book Description
In recent years, the Journal of Policy History has emerged as a major venue for scholarship on American policy history in the period after 1900. Indeed, it is for this reason that it is often praised as the leading outlet for scholarship on American political history in the world. Only occasionally, however, has it featured essays on the early republic, the Civil War, or the post-Civil War era. And when it has, the essays have often focused on partisan electioneering rather than on governmental institutions. The rationale for this special issue of the Journal of Policy History is to expand the intellectual agenda of policy history backward in time so as to embrace more fully the history of governmental institutions in the period before 1900. The six essays that follow contain much that will be new even for specialists in nineteenth-century American policy history, yet they are written in a style that is intended to be accessible to college undergraduates and historians unfamiliar with the period.
Customer Reviews:
From Back Cover.......2005-02-06
Crown Prince Alexander Thorne's honorable intentions were overturned when he rescued a red-haired siren from the seas and gave in to the chemistry raging between them. Alex had sworn he would never again be ruled by a woman, yet lovely Sophia Dunhill might be carrying his heir, and duty required she be kept very close at hand.
Sophia valued her freedom and had no intention of remaining in Prince Alex's island kingdom for longer than it took to repair her boat - royal command or no. Despite his fiery kisses and their heated nights, Sophia wanted more. Could her love transform her duty-bound prince into a man ruled by his passions?
3rd in trilogy
I savored every minute!.......2004-10-27
A delicious seduction between a prince and an uncommon commoner! If you've ever had a fantasy about meeting the prince of your dreams, this is the book for you! From the mysterious shores of an island paradise, to the steamy love scenes, this book is highly recommended for all romance fans...and for anyone ready to take a chance on romance.
Book Description
Judith Michael creates unforgettable characters and a vivid, richly textured world -- where passions can be stronger than love -- in this splendid bestseller.
Pampered socialite Valerie Sterling is shattered by her husband's death and the mysterious loss of her wealth. But she finds within herself the will to build a new life, and rekindles a romance with television network head Nicholas Fielding. Valerie is utterly unaware of the dangerous passions she is stirring up in Sybille Enderby, her childhood friend and daughter of a seamstress on one of Valerie's estates. Clawing her way up in the television industry, Sybille has always longed to possess all that Valerie has. Yet success, marriage, and the glittering whirl of society cannot quench Sybille's envy of her friend...an envy that grows into a powerful obsession: to destroy Valerie.
Customer Reviews:
I couldn't put it down.......2003-06-19
The story started with a plane crash and how Valerie, a socialite who never really work, helped to save the survivors, found herself widowed and lost her wealth. Then it flashed back to 13 years earlier, to the college days of the 3 main characters, Valerie, Nick and Sybille. It took about half the book to tell the story from their school days right up to the plane crash. I found myself impatient to know the story after the crash, how the fate of Valerie, Nick and Sybille would met again.
Valerie was beautiful, rich and intelligent. She had no goals in live other than travelling to places she had not been, flying all over the world to attend parties, indulging in pleasures in life. She got bored and restless easily but generally she was kind and had a great human touch. It was easy to be jealous with someone like Valerie, who appeared to have everything without any effort. So Sybille was extremely jealous of Valerie. Sybille grew up with Valerie and strived to outdo everything about Valerie, going to the same school, getting the same men, gaining the same wealth and living in the same estate. Nick was Valerie's boyfriend till his proposal frightened Valerie away and Sybille found her ways to marry him. Thankfully, Nick finally waked up and divorced Sybille.
The story fascinated me right from the beginning and the plot was pretty good. It had very good character development, which often reflected how people around us probably reacted or felt the some way in different degree. For example, Sybille never really lived life at present but waiting for her life to begin after a future milestone, like after she left college, after she got a job at a TV station, after she moved to New York City, after her marriage, after her husband's death, after moving to the exclusive estate etc. She was often resenting her present life. She was unable to love and always lonely and angry. Don't we often find ourselves wishing that something is over or something would happen so that our life would really begin? Too often people spend the best time of their life waiting for the best time of their life. The story also told Valerie's and Nick's fair share of weaknesses and how they overcame it.
All in all, an engaging read.
A Ruling Passion.......2000-01-26
I am a huge fan of Judith Michael. This husband/wife team has brought a great deal of style, mystery, romance and intrigue to the genre which I appreciate and eagerly await...most of the time! With A Ruling Passion, however, I am terribly dissapointed. It had the great "long book" look I love (which usually means wonderful depth and detail) but is completely disappointing from the start. I kept reading, thinking..surely it would get to their usual style...but, alas, no. This is a wholely disappointing novel. The characters lack depth, the plot is thin and the devlopment is vague and repetitive with one boring scenario emphasizing the same facet of character or plot over and over and over. I surely hope the dynamic team of Judith Michael will be back up to speed soon! I need summer reading!
You can't put this book down, you gotta keep reading........1999-09-10
Since the first page this book makes it very interesting, at about the first pages you want to keep reading more. You can't put this book down, you gotta keep reading. The characters each are very different, yet, they are the same in some ways. Sometimes it makes you want to be like them.
entertaining.......1996-06-27
Always a pleasure to read a Judith Michael book.I like the fact that it's written by a couple; you getboth a woman and a man's perspective. The Sybille character is evil but the other two, Valerie and Nick, aren't perfect either. It gives the reader the opportunity to make it's own mind on wether they will like these people or not. This option is not dictated to us by the authors.
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Ruling Passion
Author unknown
Manufacturer: harlequin
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
Contemporary | General | Literature & Fiction | Subjects | Books
ASIN: 0373106793 |
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