Customer Reviews:
The Manual For Mobile Warfare.......2003-06-26
This book by the late Heinz Guderian is a manual for tank and mabile armored warfare. It is relevant today in the sense that tanks are still in use in 90% of the countries. The Indians, the British, the Americans, they all have tanks today in the age of copmuputer-aided nuclear warfare.
Personally, from the book, I learn of all the firsthand hardships of war as witnessed and fely by General Guderian. He went on to become one of Germany's greatest soldiers whio knew the real art of war. This book is a must for all War Story buffs...
Inspired and insightful work.......2000-04-23
This book shows just how intelligent and far-seeing Guderian was. Initially the book provides an overview on weapons and tactics in the first world war, before moving on to Guderian's own ideas for the needs and tactics needed for a successful tank force. What suprised me most was how relevant his thoughts are in a modern context. This is a very interesting read for anyone interested in the late (1916-'18) WWI or tank tactics. Although I enjoyed it, I was rather put off at first as I was not expecting the in-depth analysis of WWI, however this was only momentary and I soon got really into the book.
The Primer of Armored Warfare.......2000-03-18
Colonel-General (final rank) Guderian's insight into the lessons of WWI tank tactics is a must read for anyone who wants to understand German combined arms tactics employed from 1939-42. He praises British and French use of tanks and critically presents the lessons to be derived from the "war to end all wars" to current (1937)tactics. These lessons are just as applicable today. Heinz Guderian practiced what he preached as well. He was known as "schnelle Heinz" (fast Heinz). I would recommend this as a classic textbook.
Magnifico.......2000-01-30
Es una de las principales fuentes para el desarrollo de mi pagina sobre la Segunda Guerra Mundial; para una persona dedicada el estudio de la estrategia del empleo de las unidades acorazadas, llena plenamente las expectativas.
Very interesting.......1999-07-25
"Achtung Panzer" is THE definitive book about German panzer theory development, tactics, and strategy by a man who should know, Heinz Guderian. Only the new WWII novel "The Triumph and the Glory" held my interest with such elan as this study of armored warfare by a master of the game. If you think this is a dry, technical book you couldn't be more mistaken, it is very well written and eminently readable. I recommend it highly!
Average customer rating:
- Courage, and brains, are not the property of one side...
- Good inside story of the German military
- Heavy duty tactical stuff
- A Must Read but Turgid at Times
- One of the best Books on the German Army in WW2
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Panzer Leader
Heinz Guderian , and
General Heinz Guderian
Manufacturer: Da Capo Press
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ASIN: 0306811014 |
Book Description
The 50th-anniversary edition of the German general's legendary memoir. When published in 1952, Panzer Leader quickly became a best seller, but over the half-decade that followed, it also established itself as a classic, lauded by Stephen Ambrose as "a mesmerizing read." A dramatic first-person account by the father of modern tank warfare, it is also a searing group portrait of the Third Reich's leading personalities as they turned imminent victory into agonizing defeat.
Customer Reviews:
Courage, and brains, are not the property of one side..........2007-08-15
My son got me this for Christmas a couple of years ago...it may well be the finest memoir by a General Officer I have ever read [I have to admit that most of those by Confederate Generals are bure bilge]. Heinz Guderian was a commander of early, primitive, tanks in WWI, essentially invented modern tank warfare between the wars, then commanded Panzers in WWII, leading the invasions of Poland, France, and Russia.
General Guderian makes no moral judgments on the right or wrong of his job; he was told to go after lebensraum, and he did it. A devout Christian man, he must have been bothered at times, but....remember, Pope Benedict XVI fought for the same cause, though far below General Guderian's pay grade. He makes plenty of judgment on the stupidity of the Russian campaign, and on the defective plan in France, but that's all.
This was no modern day JEB Stuart [tanks are the military descendent of horse cavalry]; Guderian left the flash and style to the likes of Patton and Rommel, on whom it looked better. Maybe Guderian was Wade Hampton or Joe Wheeler. [The are no comparisons for Forrest; he was unique, though so few are].
This fine book is, of course, a translation. I can't vouch for the accuracy, as I can't read German, but it is quite readable. In most wars, the books are about, and by, the winners; the two exceptions are Germans from WWII, and Confederates. It has been said that that's because those are the two losing sides that still have adherents....maybe, but if you want to find out how a horse turned into a tank, and how a modern army is built, start right here.
Good inside story of the German military.......2007-05-05
Heinz Guderian's "Panzer Leader" provides an inside story of the development of the German armored forces before World War II and the operation of those forces during that war. Guderian was one of the major figures helping to develop the Panzer doctrine of quick striking and deep thrusting armored attacks. And the book portrays the resistance from more traditional army leaders in the German military.
The Introduction (by Kenneth Macksey) observes that (page vii): "'Panzer Leader' is about one man's endeavor, at a moment of institutional change, to defend his country by the modernization of its army." An obvious question is what do talented military leaders do when serving political leaders who are not worthy of their loyalty? In the "Foreword," B. H. Liddell Hart casually notes that (page 13): "'Their's not to reason why, theirs but to do and die. No nation that maintains fighting services can afford to revoke that rule of experience. Where soldiers begin to question the rightness of the cause for which they are fighting, armies soon collapse." And perhaps Hart unwittingly makes a point. When should a military recoil from the madness of a leader like Hitler? Hart may be far too forgiving of soldiers fighting for wicked causes. Still, a difficult issue.
The book itself traces, briefly, Guderian's early life. It then considers his role in the development of German armor and the consequent doctrines of warfare based on the use of armor. He discusses the German movements against Austria and the Sudetenland and then the invasion of Poland.
The role of armor was most dramatically seen with the German attack on the Western front. The Panzer divisions sliced deep into the allied defenses, creating havoc. Only Hitler's foolish calling off the army at Dunkirk allowed the English to rescue substantial elements of its ground forces.
Guderian's tale of the preparation for and carrying out of the attack on Russia is detailed (and dry). Much detail is provided (and see Manstein's book on the same subject, "Lost Victories"). Perhaps most telling is his tale of the slashing retreat as German forces found themselves vastly outnumbered by Russian forces and subject to the awful weather of Russia. Guderian explains the mad strategy of Hitler of refusing to let the German forces find better sites to defend their positions. For his criticisms of Hitler (pretty courageous of Guderian), he was relieved--only to come back later as, of all things, Chief of the German General Staff.
At the end, he ventures a few observations on leading personalities of the Third Reich and concludes with some very brief comments. It would have been interesting to get deeper reflections from his perspective on the nature of the war, the role of the army vis-à-vis a despotic government, his own sense of the role that he played. The final part of the book is a series of Appendices that are useful (memos of critical events, for example).
This is a book, like Manstein's, that is useful for providing graphic detail of the military struggles of the Second World War. And both reveal little perspective by the two fighting generals of their role in the misery created by the Third Reich.
Heavy duty tactical stuff.......2007-03-16
Guderian was a military theorist and innovative General of the German Army during the Second World War. Germany's panzer forces were raised and fought according to his works, best-known among them Achtung - Panzer!
As some have already pointed out, this is not a cowboy action book like a "D-Day" or "Bridge too far". Instead, it is a detailed account covering the formation of german tank forces, key battles and an exhaustive analysis of the russian campaign. This book is not for casual WW2 readers - you need to be passionate about WW2 to appreciate this book. The lack of coherent maps (while describing campaigns, strategies, offense etc) is the only reason why I am giving 3 stars instead of 4.
A Must Read but Turgid at Times.......2007-03-01
Any student of World War II in regard to the Germans in Russia should read this one. Of course, Poland [1939], France [1940], and the second Ardennes or Battle of the Bulge [1944] are dealt with, as well. Guderian, as he goes along, reveals the fantasy land of the Fuehrer and the "yes men" around Hitler, back at the Wolfschanze or other places.
Hitler's map fantasy and ideas are most helpful to the enemy, as things began to unravel. The main theme of this is Hitler's "fight for every inch," rather than fall back to good defensive positions and man them properly. Soon the German armies were used up. We see the terrible end in the bunker with Hitler maneuvering imaginary armies.
The battles in Russia have a certain monotony of places and actions we don't really know about, or all seem the same. In this, Guderian could have cut some of the material. We need to know what these individual battles mean in the big picture. However, the central issues are covered: the Russian winters; the T34 Russian tank; the two front war; the turning of the armies from Moscow to go south the first year; the terrible rains and mud on the very bad roads for armor and mechanized units; Hitler's interference and incomprehension of the situation at the local scene; the relieving and transfering of generals into command and from command; and finally, the Borman [Hitler's troll secretary] factor.
Turgid in places but a very good read.
By the way, Guderian is NOT a Christian and indicates he hasn't a clue about this. It is what he doesn't say that confirms this. It is interesting that many Nazi leaders give lip service to a God or a church but it means little. God is just an idea weakly fabricated and often mixed with all sorts of pagan philosophies. Die Aufklaerung resulted in something quite the reverse for Germany, as the Nazis applied it.
One of the best Books on the German Army in WW2.......2007-01-10
Having a strong interest in history and in particular the history of Germany and WW2 I have read a number of books on the subject, increasingly turning to personal accounts, valuing them as much for the unfiltered, raw insight as for the invariable personal bias they present.
This book, and Heinz Guderian, is all that and more; not only does he take you on a facinating journey, providing insight to the remarkable relationships and machinations that existed within the Army High Command at the time, but he clearly takes pains to present his facts and opinions in a way befitting a man of his stature and reputation. Equally interesting is the bias of opinion, evidenced as much by what is presented as by what is omitted, providing additional insight to the man and the times in which this was written.
If you are interested in the leadership of the German Army during WW2, then this is an excellent read.
Book Description
Biographers and historians have lionized Heinz Guderian as the legendary father of the German armored force and brilliant practitioner of blitzkrieg maneuver warfare. As Russell A. Hart argues, Guderian created this legend with his own highly influential yet self-serving and distorted memoir, which remains one of the most widely read accounts of the Second World War. Unfortunately, too many of Guderian’s biographers have accepted his view of his accomplishments at face value, without sufficient critical scrutiny, resulting in an undeserved hagiography.
While undoubtedly a great military figure of appreciable ego and ambition and with a volatile, impetuous, and difficult personality, Guderian was determined to achieve his vision of a war-winning armored force irrespective of the consequences. He proved to be a man who was politically naive enough to fall under the sway of Hitler and National Socialism and yet arrogant enough to believe he could save Germany from inevitable defeat late in the war, despite Hitler’s interference. At the same time, Guderian was unwilling either to participate in attempts to remove Hitler or to denounce as traitors the conspirators who did. In the end, he distorted the truth to establish his place in history. In the process, he denigrated the myriad important contributions of his fellow officers as he took personal credit for what were, in reality, collective accomplishments. Thus, he succeeded in creating a legend that has endured long after his death.
This brief biography puts the record straight by placing Guderian’s career and accomplishments into sharper and more accurate relief. It exposes the real Heinz Guderian, not the man of legend.
Customer Reviews:
A Long Overdue Balanced Biography of Hitler's Panzer Leader!.......2007-07-30
This very short but well balanced biography of Heinz Guderian is long overdue!
Historian Russel Hart has succeeded admirably in his goal of presenting a balanced picture of Hitler's leading Panzer general. Hart proves convincingly that Guderian, willingly assisted by British historian Liddell Hart, succeeded in mythologizing his own contributions to Nazi Germany's panzer force and World War II victories, while at the same time, hiding his own personal dedication to Hitler and his Nazi regime and his deficiencies as a combat commander. Guderian thus succeeded in creating a legend that has endured to this day.
It is true that there is little here that is really new for those who read widely on the German Army of World War II. For example, it has long been known that Guderian "shopped" around in Eastern Europe for an estate worthy of his contributions to the Third Reich and had no qualms about seizing such a prize from its Jewish owners. The same is, in fact true, of most of Nazi Germany's senior military leadership during the war.
But Hart has succeeded in bringing together a number of different sources and presenting in a succint manner a profile of the German panzer leader that will force historians to reassess all of Hitler's senior commanders in a new light and against a new standard. For that, he is to be commended!
It is time we stopped mythologizing the World War II German Army and its commanders.
Will the Real Heinz Guderian Please Stand Up?.......2007-07-04
This succinct summation of Heinz Guderian's career is a deliciously iconoclastic account of the man who was once viewed as the "inventor" of blitzkrieg. Over the past thirty years scholars have questioned this interpretation piecemeal. Hart summarizes and synthesizes this literature, bringing it together in one convenient place.
Guderian in Hart's formulation was one of a group of officers associated with the development of the German armored force in the 1920s and 1930s. He was very much a junior partner in this effort--his chief contribution being a flair for publicity and self promotion. (In the Cold War he used this latter skill to write more influential innovators out of his memoirs--and largely out of the conventional historical wisdom.) In the 1939 and 1940 campaigns argues Hart, Guderian exhibited a genuine skill in offensive tactics--when his opponents were technologically overmatched--but he had little sense of the operational or strategic context of his actions. Most of all, he profited from being in the right place at the right time. In the Russian campaign of 1941, he demonstrated that he "was simply not a very effective defensive commander." (Page 79.) Hitler was quite right to relieve him when he proved unwilling to conduct a positional defense. Given the state of the German Army in the winter of 1941-1942, any other course was an invitation to disaster.
Guderian was, if anything, a survivor. Hart's account of his maneuvering to hold a high position in any successor government to the Hitler regime while at the same time covering his tracks if the coup attempt failed is a masterpiece of historical reconstruction. The author is equally successful in stripping away Guderian's various evasions of his knowledge of and complicity in Nazi mass murder.
In Hart, Guderian has obtained the biographer he has long deserved. Guderian: Panzer Pioneer or Myth Maker is an outstanding entry in Potomac Books' Military Profile series edited by Denis Showalter.
Edgar F. Raines, Jr.
Macksey with a twist of Lemon.......2006-12-01
This is a much-anticipated, but ultimately disappointing new profile of Guderian. The author has done very little in the way of original research and has ignored some very important, easily accessible sources. He has basically taken Macksey's biography of Guderian, stripped out the positive elements, and tossed in some negative elements from the recent works of other historians. This isn't a biography, it's a hatchet job and from all the poor writing it contains - overloaded adjectives and repeated cliches - it's a very rushed hatchet job at that.
Guderian deserves better than this. If a biographer chooses to re-examine Guderian's life and perhaps deflate his legend along the way, he should do so using all available sources, such as Guderian's personal papers at the German military archives and the interrogation reports and unit records easily obtainable at a number of archives, including the US National Archives. Anything less than that is not worth the paper it is printed on.
Book Description
The second volume in the Spearhead series focuses on the Grossdeutschland Division, the German Army's premier mechanized unit in World War II.. Each Spearhead title includes an evaluation of the units combat effectiveness as seen by the unit, its opponents and subsequent researchers, and a research section including a bibliography and a listing of museums, websites, re-enactment groups and memorials.
Customer Reviews:
Not Quite What I had Expected.......2006-08-07
I had seen this book around quite a while before breaking down and purchasing it. As many of you already know, the Spearhead series of books aren't cheap. So having shelled out the money for this volume, I was really a bit disappointed in the photographs and the overall flavor of the narrative.
The pictures are fine in a generalist sort of way, but if you purchase this volume for pictures solely of Grossdeutschland you will be disappointed. The same is true of the maps and much of the narrative. It's a nice look at the overall picture, but I had hoped for a more narrow GD focus.
There are some nice extras such as a listing of all GD Knights Cross Holders and some useful weblinks, but it's a little pricey for those two items.
So be wary when looking for your next GD photo history. While this is a fine book, it might not be what the more discerning student of GD is looking for.
Customer Reviews:
Major Macksey's Major Disappointment.......2007-09-28
I echo the comments of 2003 by "Ken Estes" and feel like adding a few. For a book that purports to be groundbreaking and designed to set records straight, its scholarly apparatus is all but worthless -- because it is virtually nonexistent!
1. The index is of low quality. To give one small but telling example: the most curious entry is "International Mark Twain Society, vii, 212." On page 212 it is mentioned (in the same paragraph that describes Guderian's death in 1954) that a few weeks before his demise he became an Honorary Member of the International Mark Twain Society. (Surely it would have been interesting to know the background to this odd fact; since none is provided, it should have been left out.) But on page vii of the Introduction one finds no mention of the International Mark Twain Society; rather, there is a reference to the "International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg," a very different animal.
2. The bibliography is reminiscent of that of an above-average undergraduate term paper, that is, if it were one written 35 years ago: only 37 authors are mentioned (including Macksey himself), some of the books are highly outdated and many are of little relevance to the subject, and despite this edition being promoted as revised and updated, the ONLY listed work dating from after the mid-1970s is one of the author's own subsequent books.
3. THERE ARE NO FOOTNOTES OR ENDNOTES providing sources for his factual statements or backing up his opinions! Not one!!! For an author given to making so many controversial, not-general-knowledge, or simply snide references as this author, that is just about unpardonable. The reader notices some fact or statement, wonders "hmmm, what makes him think that?" and...has to try to infer which of the published books in the wretched little bibliography this quote or item might have come from--or NOT come from, which leads to the next big problem:
4. The bibliography or list of references is woefully, woefully incomplete. In his acknowledgments, dated 2003, Macksey thanks "the staff of various museums and libraries, who provided me with so many essential documents and books"--and while he names the libraries, he doesn't name ANY of the "essential documents and books," other than the list previously mentioned here, which consists mostly of standard works easily available in any research library or as cheap used editions.
I had the strong sense of a profiteering publisher collaborating with a very aged author (Macksey turned 80 in 2003) to plunder the public with a "new revised edition" that really added little, while ignoring the obscene scholarship problems that either the author was too old and tired, or the publisher was too cheap, to fix.
Major Macksey writes with the fluent and decisive literary style, mixing sweeping assertions with catty asides, that British historical writers--I will not go so far as to call him a historian--can be so adept at employing to paper over flaws in their arguments or gaps in their research; and for someone who isn't doing serious work in this area, and is looking for a positive, family-authorized hagiography of the deeply-flawed character who was Heinz Guderian, the book could be entertaining and even informative. As such it is comparable to the works of pop-history maestro Alastair Horne, who indeed makes an appearance in Macksey's rudimentary reference list.
In depth study of a military innovator.......2006-07-21
Before start reading I didn't expect to learn much from this book, as many WW II buffs probably would. Guderian's role in WW II is well known and heavily studied in myriads of books and there are also his own memoirs which give many details of his thoughts and actions. Macksey though surprised me, because he goes further away from what General told about himself and has unearthed many documents of his colleagues which often present another, more iconoclastic view of the general. The first 79 pages are devoted to Guderian's career before WW II and are really eye opening regarding his later attitudes. The big surprise though is what follows in the next chapters, where Macksey paints with vivid colors the endless machinations at the top of German military hierarchy and explains why Guderian was often hated by his superiors. The German generals were fighting in reality two wars: one against the enemies and one among themselves for survival and Hitler's flavour. Overall this is a very nice book but it loses the fifth star because of Macksey's persistence to call everything Soviet as "Russian" and not to avoid some common mistakes, like naming Guderian's Motorized Corps of 1940-41 as Panzer Corps. These formations actually were designated as Panzer Corps in the summer of 1942.
Guderian, The Master of Panzer divisions.......2005-07-06
I have readed this book many times. it was very clear and simple to understand. I wanted to know about Guderian for writing a book about him in IRAN for my people that have a same race with Germans. they are both Arias and I think its a good relation.
Unrevised from an unsatisfactory first edition.......2003-12-11
Sadly, Kenneth Macksey has declined to perform the major revision that the publisher trumpets on the dustcover. It is not "revised and fully updated" nor can one certify that it "draws upon fresh source material." Macksey retired from the Royal Tank Regiment in the 1950s and has since become a prolific writer on all matter of things military. He frequently provides interesting details in his books that cannot be found elsewhere but few source materials to guide the reader further. By now, he must be recognized as a `pop' writer of history, drawing upon his past works to flesh out new themes and narratives. As interesting as the story of Heinz Guderian is, the author has embellished and exaggerated his story, already well promoted by Guderian himself, and added a fawning, gushy style that convinces me that he has lapsed into a sheer hagiography of a man he admires without limit.
Macksey reveals much when he styles Guderian in the same class as British tank pioneers such as J.F.C. Fuller and Percy Hobart. Scholarship of the last 20 years has fairly demolished their reputations and their former icon status. But Macksey is at ease more with the interpretations and source material of the 1950s. Indeed, his "revision" introduces only two new sources, the story of the cracking of the German `Enigma' codes by the British, revealed by F.H. Hinsley and others in the 1970s, and the publication, in German, of a biography of Erich Fellgiebel, who Macksey considers a key signal officer of the Wehrmacht (and ample material for yet another of his books). The sole source in Macksey's 1 ½ page bibliography postdating his first edition is a volume of Hinsley (1979) and Macksey makes little use of the Enigma story in any case.
The book reveals a strange, iconoclastic and chatty writing style, utterly fawning over Guderian and his record, invoking badly skewed historical presentation and logic in almost every page, such that it remains a maddening read. Macksey relies far too much on Guderian's memoir, Panzer Leader (1953), offers a few letters between Guderian and his wife as the fruit of the "extensive Guderian family archives." The rest of his sources are near-obsolete ones, like John Wheeler-Bennett's 1953 Nemesis of Power. He has thus ignored later seminal writing on General Hans von Seekt, the development of the Blitzkrieg doctrine and forces, the command structure, fresh biographies, the conduct of the war and Wehrmacht implication in atrocities, among many relevant topics.
In order to advance the reputation of Guderian, fellow tanker Macksey portrays him as a lone visionary, scarcely understood in his pure and just quest for a dominant tank arm for the German Army. In doing so, Macksey ignores the evident accomplishments of many other thinkers and practitioners in the German forces, from the 1920-26 chief of staff Seekt onward, and ignores character traits of Guderian that show him to be stubborn, impatient and prone to seeing enemies at every obstacle. Not content with the conventional judgement that Guderian was one of Germany's leading armor advocates (nor was Guderian thus content), Macksey makes him the only theorist and visionary and the only able commander of armoured troops. We have no basis of comparison, for lack of knowledge, of the other major leaders of the Panzertruppen (such as Hoth, Kleist, Hoeppner), nor does Macksey explain how infantry officers like Rommel and Manstein could be at least as adept in handling armoured formations as Guderian. He does not indicate to the reader what the various inspectorates of motorized and fast troops did between his departure from them in 1935 and his return as Inspector of Panzer Troops in March, 1943; and they in fact directed most of the design, construction, organization and fielding of the German mechanized forces largely without Guderian's participation.
Guderian surely deserves recognition for his many feats and accomplishments, but with a critical eye of a modern biographer. Macksey cannot supply us with the information we want to know. Instead we have a flawed survey of the German Army, with Guderian pictured as the rebel at its center. I gather that he reads little German, based upon the assistance he acknowledges, and that plays some role in his neglect of sources. But he also invokes the term `academic' as a pejorative, as in "...the evidence is academic and too thin to be persuasive [p198n]." So Macksey has little use for the tools of modern research and gives us his gut instincts, based upon what he has read. This does not cut it, especially when as a tank officer he writes of a tank pioneer. Why do we know nothing about Guderian's command of one of the first three panzer divisions in 1935-38 (and who were the other two commanders)? Why do we learn little more about the man than he himself wrote in 1953? We learn that he loved his family and enjoyed pastoral scenery! What exactly were his theories in the early years and how are they distinguished from the others working in the field? Guderian was one of the few motor transport officers of the 1920s and combined with his signals experience of World War I, he surely imparted technical improvements to the evolution of the mechanized forces, but can we be so sure of the tactical elements? We simply do not know from this book, but are assured by the author that Guderian was the leader and the brains of the operation of the inspectorate of motorized troops, and (1931-35). To be present at the creation does not make one the architect.
Sadly, this review must lament what might have been instead of extolling the virtues of what has been written. Let this serve as a warning to all of us that the bookshelves offer a broad mix of quality and the reader must discern what truly merits his or her attention.
The originator of modern warfare as a man.......1999-10-29
This is one of the best military biographies I have read. It gives a very clear picture of Guderian as a surprising sympathetic character with much humanity; whilst at the same time deliniating Guderian's role in defining the nature of modern warfare. It only fails in not bringing Guderian to the public's eye to a position far above Irwin Rommel, a man who accomplishments pale into insignificance by comparison. Macksey makes clear the manner in which Guderian distillated the ideas of Fuller and his Tank Corps contemporaries: the true pioneers of Armoured warfare, and formed them into a practical and workable whole which secured for Germany her early victories and produced a formula for war still employed today as evinced by the Gulf War. In addition his not inconsiderable operational contribution to those victories are clearly explained as was his unique relationship to Hitler, who in marked contrast as to his attitude towards Guderians contemporaries maintained a respectful, if not admirable mein towards Guderian to the very end. A book that should be read by every student of armoured warfare and the Second World War.
Book Description
Certain to become the definitive work in English on the Battle of France, this volume is a long overdue and much needed correction to all previous English accounts. With extensive use of primary sources and strong secondary sources, it places us closer to the actual operational planning, preparation, and deployment of one of the most successful military operations in recent history. It covers major changes made by the German Army after the Polish Campaign; and the infighting surrounding these changes; the reorganization and preparation of the Army for the Battle of France. It also provides the only detailed day-by-day breakdown of German action during the battle's first five critical days. According to S. J. Lewis, it provides a totally new perspective to these battles and a unique view of the German Army. This volume covers extensive ground and uses numerous appendices and detailed biographical sketches to set the stage for its primary focus--a five day period during the Battle of France. Similar to the Allied Invasion of Normandy, the campaign plan for the Battle of France required six months to develop and elaborate. As a result, this reading provides an ideal opportunity to observe the World War II German Army performing its military work and an insightful look at the friction inherent in campaign planning and on the battlefield.
Customer Reviews:
Good story but with some annoying mistakes.......2006-04-18
This is a nice operational history of Guderian's armored thrust through the Ardennes to the Channel, but I would expect from the author to be more precise when choosing the military terminology: Guderian's force was NOT a Panzer Corps but a Motorized Corps in 1940 and later was named Panzer Group Guderian, Panzer Group 2 and 2nd Panzer Army. Germany did not have ANY Panzer Corps until the middle of 1942, when most of the existing Motorized Corps were renamed so.
Average customer rating:
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Guderian: Panzer General
Manufacturer: Greenhill Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
ASIN: 073943456X |
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- Caesar's Commentaries: On The Gallic War and On The Civil War
- Cathar Castles: Fortresses of the Albigensian Crusade 1209-1300 (Fortress)
- Celia Garth
- Chainbreaker: The Revolutionary War Memoirs of Governor Blacksnake (American Indian Lives)
- Darsan
- David Humphreys' "Life of General Washington": With George Washington's "Remarks"
Books Index
Books Home
Recommended Books
- The Complete Peanuts 1963-1964
- History: Fiction or Science
- American Castles: A Pictorial History
- Building Diplomacy
- Diagnosis and Treatment of Movement Impairment Syndromes
- Inventory Accuracy: People, Processes, & Technology
- Fall of a Philanderer
- American City: Detroit Architecture 1845-2005
- Artists' Interiors: Creative Spaces, Inspired Living
- Pitcher Plants: The Elegant Insect Traps
Panzer Leader
The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform
Hitler's Blitzkrieg Campaigns
Imagining War
