Average customer rating:
- Much praised and enjoyed by many...
- Grog
- Nice Introduction to Sailing Warships, but confusing.
- illustrations are inferior
- This Book STINKS! And Here's Why!
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The Illustrated Companion to Nelson's Navy
Nicholas Blake , and
Richard Lawrence
Manufacturer: Stackpole Books
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
 Naval
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ASIN: 0811732754 |
Book Description
50 color photos 450 b/w illustrations 7 x 10
* Perfect complement to the fiction of historical novelists such as Patrick O'Brian
* An essential addition to every Nelson enthusiast's library
The fictional exploits of sailors in the Royal Navy have thrilled readers around the world. But to many, the "real world" of Nelson's Navy has remained a mystery until now. Whether looking for a recipe for "spotted dog" or the method for reefing the main topgallant, Nelson enthusiasts will find it in this extraordinary compendium. Every aspect of the Royal Navy is covered-the workings of the admiralty, the designs and building of ships, life on board, food and drink, discipline, seamanship, merchant fleets, and opposing navies-all are explained in succinct texts and illustrated with specially commissioned sketches, maps, and diagrams.
Nicholas Blake is currently an editor at Macmillan (London) where his authors include David Donachie. Richard Lawrence, who illustrated the book, is an accomplished graphic artist and designer who recently co-authored The Period House.
Customer Reviews:
Much praised and enjoyed by many..........2005-07-18
I fail to understand why I should pay attention to a review that pans this book ,(Richard Lawrence) which has been praised and enjoyed by many, myself included, and pans it on the basis of what clearly must be a personal or professional grudge against the publisher or co-author. Bizarre to say the least. I think for the reader of Hornblower or the Jack Aubrey novels, this book opens up a world of fascinating and most useful knowledge that wonderfully complements the reading of these novels. It also stands alone and a comprehensive and richly detailed glimpse of this remarkable period of naval history. I'm sure a second edition would set to rights the occasional factural errors. Cheers, Peter Lower, Port Hope, Ontario Canada.
Grog.......2003-08-18
Simply a must-have. If you are a fan of the period, or actively read 18/19th century sailing novels, this book is very helpful.
Nice Introduction to Sailing Warships, but confusing........2003-08-16
I needed a primer on warships in the age of sail, and needed it on short notice. This was available, so I bought it. All in all it wasn't too bad. The book covered a wide range of subjects, and I walked away with the feeling that I had acquired a good base of information. In this the book excels.
Still, for me the heavy use of period naval jargon hindered my understanding of the subject matter, and the illustrations weren't the best. As other readers have noted, there were a number of technical inaccuracies, many of which could have been caught through better proof-reading.
Still, all in all I liked the book, and will keep it around for future reference.
--Jeff
illustrations are inferior.......2002-12-31
The illustrations in this illustrated book are without detail and almost useless. If you are using this book for reference purposes forget it. It looks like the author passed the origional images through an imaging software program to distort them enough not to have to pay royalities or something. I'm very disappointed.
This Book STINKS! And Here's Why!.......2002-05-27
Quite simply, this book gets it's facts wrong so often I've had to annotate every page in 10 to put it right. Real life ship facts and biographies are wrongly quoted but even more glaringly this book fails in its main mission. It sold itself to me on having authoritative pieces written in it that list many ships in fiction books. Ships like the Hotspur or Virago from two noted writers novels. Guess what? The list is in error and has the wrong entries in it. Not only that but ships rates are wrongly classified in this book and the number of guns they carried. Most of the technical stuff is valid but when the author tries to weave the fictional maritime world in he fails miserably.
I do love my copy though, it makes for interesting reading BUT I would only recommend it to a seasoned historian or fan of the era who KNOWS the truth about certain facts and books and can use that to glean the goodness from this (very stylishly presented) mishmash. A glorious mess but still a MESS!
...
Customer Reviews:
A dense summary of Battle of Britain.......2007-07-07
Nice little book, it could be considered a quick summary of the Battle of Britain. Diagrams, drawings and timelines are very usefull. Sometimes it repeats the same thing over and over, but once (or if) you get used to it, it's very enjoyable.
Its All Here-The Biggest Air Battle Yet.......2006-06-26
The expression: "Turning Point of WWII", is a cliche no doubt, but it may apply to the Battle Of Britain airwar in 1940. Jacobs and Lightsey have done an excellent job of detailing Britain's struggle against the German Luftwaffe.There is just enough technical detail to show this is a well researched book, but not too many statistics and numbers to overwhelm the reader. Paul Jacobs' original and innovative drawings add another dimension to the text.
This book is a super package; the paper, printing, and high quality will provide a long life for a book that will be referred to often. Aviation buffs as well as history lovers will enjoy this book.
Everything You Wanted to Know About the Battle of Britain.......2003-01-06
This is a very comprehensive review of the Battle of Britain, the campaign which saved Europe from an indefinite period of darkness, oppression, and inhumanity. Without the courage and resilience of the British people and the courage, competence, and sacrifice of the young pilots and crews of the RAF from whom so much was demanded Hitler's legions would have stood triumphant over a defeated Europe. The level of detail about the technological and tactical development of aerial combat and strategic bombing from WWI to WWII, including radar, propellers, engines, gasoline, machine guns, gunsights, will attract aviation 'wonks' and the address of the broader political imperatives which led to war will attract the historian and political scientist. Mr. Jacobs' unbelievable sketches throughout add very helpful imagery of the aircraft which fought the campaign. I was intrigued, too, by the description of the influence of American aviation developments in the building of the German and British airfleets. I wish, though, the authors had addressed in more detail the effect of the early British breaking of German communication codes. A good read!
Book Description
The final demise of the Jacobite cause amid the slaughter of the Highland clans on a cold and damp Culloden Moor in April 1746 is undoubtedly one of the most famous battles in British military history. It has also been, until recently, one of the least well understood from both the military and political perspective. In this modern and highly detailed account the author combines a thorough knowledge of 18th century tactics, an intimate knowledge of the battlefield itself and a scandalously underused archive of contemporary material from both sides to provide a balanced and accurate account of this controversial encounter. Amongst other misconceptions the popular perception is that the British Army adopted an entirely passive role during the battle simply shooting down the Jacobites in droves with volleys of musketry. This account demonstrates that the British, and the Duke of Cumberland in particular, had a much more pro-active role in the battle - not merely staving off defeat, but actively seizing the initiative and winning the battle with a series of well-timed and well-coordinated counterattacks.
Customer Reviews:
The Highland clans at their most gallant and tragic.......2007-05-26
The work reviews the final battle in the campaign of Bonnie Prnce Charlie (Stuart) to regain the British threone from the Hanoverian line. The Authors describe the opposing sides and political situation well. The battle is done with great care and leaves the reader with a sense of being there. I can best describe it as similar to the experience of watching the movie Culoden nearly forty years ago on PBS.The period has always fascinated me and I have continually searched for works on the topic. For many years John Prebble was the only source. It is nice to find good works at a fair price available.
Butcher Cumberland's Finest Hour.......2002-09-04
In 1991, Osprey Campaign volume #12 by Peter Harrington covered the Culloden campaign of 1745-1746. Now eleven years later, Osprey recovers the same ground with campaign volume #106 Culloden Moor by Stuart Reid. Aside from the questionable logic of re-doing the same topics when so many other topics in military history remain neglected, Osprey has at least picked the right person to revisit this infamous campaign. Stuart Reid, is an expert on the subject of Culloden and author of the ground-breaking accounts, Like Hungry Wolves and 1745: A Military History of the Jacobite Rising. Reid's narrative is efficient and professional, and the graphic presentation methods of the campaign series have certainly improved over the past decade. As to whether Reid's volume is better than Harrington's, I would say that both are good campaign summaries but they approach the subject from different angles. Harrington's earlier volume dealt with the '45 as a whole, spending considerable effort discussing the battles of Prestonpans and Falkirk and only 41% on the Battle of Culloden itself. Reid's account is more squarely focused on Culloden with 60% devoted to the battle, and much less to events preceding the battle. Unlike Harrington, Reid does not even bother to discuss the flight of the Pretender or the brutal mop-up operations. Therefore, Reid's account contains more battle narrative than Harrington's, but Harrington provides more background material on the campaign as a whole.
Culloden Moor 1746 follows the standard Osprey campaign series format and begins with a short introduction and campaign chronology, followed by short but well-written sections on opposing commanders, opposing armies and opposing plans. Reid includes orders of battle for the Dutch and Hessian auxiliary troops that served under British command, as well as the main Jacobite and British forces that fought at Culloden. The campaign narrative itself, which covers the period January-April 1746, is 55 pages long. Reid concludes with a brief aftermath section, notes on further reading and comments on the battlefield today. There are five 2-D maps (Major troop movements in Britain, operations around Inverness, the Jacobite night march, initial dispositions at Culloden, and Culloden moor today) and three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (Culloden opening moves, the Highland charge and the destruction of the Jacobite army). There are also three full color battle scenes: the Highland charge at Prestonpans, The Royal Scots at Culloden and the Royal Ecossois at Culloden.
Reid makes a number of very good points about the weaknesses of British cavalry in the reconnaissance role, the Jacobite oatmeal stockpile in Inverness that was critical for their survival as an army, the operational choices facing the Jacobites in April 1746 (run and disperse, defend or attack) and the cautious but professional tactics of the British. The author also makes insightful comment that the British infantry volleys at Culloden almost certainly caused far greater casualties to the Jacobites than the artillery barrage, which he reckons was shorter and less destructive than generally claimed. Indeed, the reader is left with little doubt that Reid has mastered the historical details of this subject.
The only complaint with Reid's narrative applies equally to his other works on Culloden: a tendency to downplay British atrocities. Nowhere in these pages do we find mention of "Butcher Cumberland," the notorious accolade for the British commander who presided over one of the grimmer chapters in British military history. Reid's bias is the standard device for those who wish to avoid dealing with black pages in their country's history: deny, minimize, ignore. According to Reid, John Prebble, author of the classic Culloden in 1961, was too inclined to accept atrocity allegations at face value. Reid denies the most vicious atrocity stories about Culloden - such as the alleged burning of Jacobite wounded in a farmhouse and bayoneting of wounded - but concedes that "isolated incidents" by the "vestry men" (British short-term conscripts) probably occurred. Minimize: it wasn't the British army that did these atrocities, but if any occurred it must have been the draftees not the regulars. Furthermore, the "everybody was doing approach" is employed by suggesting that other countries dealt just as harshly with rebels (this is really the "lowest common denominator" approach in suggesting that one's army merely need not act worse than any other army - say, the Turks - rather than setting any kind of higher standard). Then, Reid has the audacity to state that, "the bitter legacy of those punitive expeditions [that followed the Battle of Culloden], justified as they were..." Murder and rape are justified? Readers should consult Prebble's account to get a better understanding of the year-long killing, raping and looting spree that the British army undertook along the Great Glenn in reprisal for the Jacobite Uprising. In particular, Prebble - unlike Reid - notes that the British were so indiscriminate in their reprisals that they often brutalized loyalist Scots who had supported the crown against the rebels. Even if Prebble's account is too biased against the British as Reid claims, there is no doubt that the British punitive measures were very harsh indeed. Furthermore, American readers should consider the brutal repressive measures that this same British army would use to combat American rebels thirty years later; British regulars bayoneted many unarmed American soldiers in the Gowanus Swamps outside New York in 1776 and Banastre Tarleton's atrocities in the south were infamous. Reid's efforts to whitewash this sorry chapter in British military history are just as offensive as German historians attempting to minimize the activities of the SS or Japanese historians the Bataan Death March.
The fact is that Culloden was a seminal event in Scottish history. Reid's account is essentially an operational account that - while very good in the military realm - leaves out the true social, political and psychological context of this battle. The British used Culloden and the suppression of the Jacobites to crush any trace of Scottish independence for over a century and in that unstated sense, it was a national tragedy.
Butcher Cumberland's Finest Hour.......2002-09-03
In 1991, Osprey Campaign volume #12 by Peter Harrington covered the Culloden campaign of 1745-1746. Now eleven years later, Osprey recovers the same ground with campaign volume #106 Culloden Moor by Stuart Reid. Aside from the questionable logic of re-doing the same topics when so many other topics in military history remain neglected, Osprey has at least picked the right person to revisit this infamous campaign. Stuart Reid, is an expert on the subject of Culloden and author of the ground-breaking accounts, Like Hungry Wolves and 1745: A Military History of the Jacobite Rising. Reid's narrative is efficient and professional, and the graphic presentation methods of the campaign series have certainly improved over the past decade. As to whether Reid's volume is better than Harrington's, I would say that both are good campaign summaries but they approach the subject from different angles. Harrington's earlier volume dealt with the '45 as a whole, spending considerable effort discussing the battles of Prestonpans and Falkirk and only 41% on the Battle of Culloden itself. Reid's account is more squarely focused on Culloden with 60% devoted to the battle, and much less to events preceding the battle. Unlike Harrington, Reid does not even bother to discuss the flight of the Pretender or the brutal mop-up operations. Therefore, Reid's account contains more battle narrative than Harrington's, but Harrington provides more background material on the campaign as a whole.
Culloden Moor 1746 follows the standard Osprey campaign series format and begins with a short introduction and campaign chronology, followed by short but well-written sections on opposing commanders, opposing armies and opposing plans. Reid includes orders of battle for the Dutch and Hessian auxiliary troops that served under British command, as well as the main Jacobite and British forces that fought at Culloden. The campaign narrative itself, which covers the period January-April 1746, is 55 pages long. Reid concludes with a brief aftermath section, notes on further reading and comments on the battlefield today. There are five 2-D maps (Major troop movements in Britain, operations around Inverness, the Jacobite night march, initial dispositions at Culloden, and Culloden moor today) and three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps (Culloden opening moves, the Highland charge and the destruction of the Jacobite army). There are also three full color battle scenes: the Highland charge at Prestonpans, The Royal Scots at Culloden and the Royal Ecossois at Culloden.
Reid makes a number of very good points about the weaknesses of British cavalry in the reconnaissance role, the Jacobite oatmeal stockpile in Inverness that was critical for their survival as an army, the operational choices facing the Jacobites in April 1746 (run and disperse, defend or attack) and the cautious but professional tactics of the British. The author also makes insightful comment that the British infantry volleys at Culloden almost certainly caused far greater casualties to the Jacobites than the artillery barrage, which he reckons was shorter and less destructive than generally claimed. Indeed, the reader is left with little doubt that Reid has mastered the historical details of this subject.
The only complaint with Reid's narrative applies equally to his other works on Culloden: a tendency to downplay British atrocities. Nowhere in these pages do we find mention of "Butcher Cumberland," the notorious accolade for the British commander who presided over one of the grimmer chapters in British military history. Reid's bias is the standard device for those who wish to avoid dealing with black pages in their country's history: deny, minimize, ignore. According to Reid, John Prebble, author of the classic Culloden in 1961, was too inclined to accept atrocity allegations at face value. Reid denies the most vicious atrocity stories about Culloden - such as the alleged burning of Jacobite wounded in a farmhouse and bayoneting of wounded - but concedes that "isolated incidents" by the "vestry men" (British short-term conscripts) probably occurred. Minimize: it wasn't the British army that did these atrocities, but if any occurred it must have been the draftees not the regulars. Furthermore, the "everybody was doing approach" is employed by suggesting that other countries dealt just as harshly with rebels (this is really the "lowest common denominator" approach in suggesting that one's army merely need not act worse than any other army - say, the Turks - rather than setting any kind of higher standard). Then, Reid has the audacity to state that, "the bitter legacy of those punitive expeditions [that followed the Battle of Culloden], justified as they were..." Murder and rape are justified? Readers should consult Prebble's account to get a better understanding of the year-long killing, raping and looting spree that the British army undertook along the Great Glenn in reprisal for the Jacobite Uprising. In particular, Prebble - unlike Reid - notes that the British were so indiscriminate in their reprisals that they often brutalized loyalist Scots who had supported the crown against the rebels. Even if Prebble's account is too biased against the British as Reid claims, there is no doubt that the British punitive measures were very harsh indeed. Furthermore, American readers should consider the brutal repressive measures that this same British army would use to combat American rebels thirty years later; British regulars bayoneted many unarmed American soldiers in the Gowanus Swamps outside New York in 1776 and Banastre Tarleton's atrocities in the south were infamous. Reid's efforts to whitewash this sorry chapter in British military history are just as offensive as German historians attempting to minimize the activities of the SS or Japanese historians the Bataan Death March.
The fact is that Culloden was a seminal event in Scottish history. Reid's account is essentially an operational account that - while very good in the military realm - leaves out the true social, political and psychological context of this battle. The British used Culloden and the suppression of the Jacobites to crush any trace of Scottish independence for over a century and in that unstated sense, it was a national tragedy.
Book Description
Agincourt is one of the most evocative names in English military history. Remembered as a fifteenth-century Dunkirk, the battle is part of the great English tradition of victory in the face of vastly superior forces. The French army, according to chroniclers, was between three to six times as large as that of the English and composed the flower of France's chivalry. Henry V's forces were numerically weakened by their earlier siege-action at Harfleur, and had become increasingly tired, hungry, and ill as they journeyed through enemy territory on their way to the safe port of Calais. The appearance of large French forces blocking their way seemed to signal the end of Henry V's brief attempt at the crown of France. However, the English had several advantages over their enemies. Not only was their command structure far more coherent than that of the French, but also their forces had far greater tactical flexibility. English success in arms was based on the extremely effective combination of heavily armoured men-at-arms with troops armed with the long-range, quick-firing longbow. The havoc that this weapon wreaked on the French forces before they were close enough to engage with the English knights was crucial for the English victory, as was the disorganisation of the French forces and the unforeseen problems in their pre-prepared battle plan. Matthew Bennett examines the Agincourt campaign from the siege of Harfleur to the aftermath of the battle at Agincourt itself. Ably using original fifteenth century evidence, including the surviving French battle plan and the accounts of men present in both armies, Bennett discusses the lead-up to the battle, the tactical dispositions of the two forces and the reasons for the ultimate English success. What results is a full and extremely interesting account of one of the most important campaigns of the Hundred Years' War.
Customer Reviews:
Short and concise and informative.......2007-08-21
If you want a quick overview of the battle of Agincourt, this is the book for you. Mr. Bennett does a good job of: providing an overview of the opposing commanders, discussing the troops (strengths and weaknesses), giving the political background, describing the battle field and (finally) describing the battle. He also explains the differing interpretations of the battle field and the position of the troops. He also talks about a recently discovered document of the French battle plans (and provides the text) that was recently found in the British Library. I would be remiss to not mention that the book actually starts with the battle of Harfluer and describes Henry's retreat through the French countryside before the final battle at Agincourt. As with all the books in this series, the illustration are terrific and the maps and battle plans are worth the price of admission. As with most books in this series, it is quickly read and is a great reference tool for the curious minded.
Good Overview.......2003-01-05
Agincourt 1415 (Campaign ; No. 9)by M. Bennett is a quality overview of an improbable military victory. In 1415, during the Hundred Years War, the English Army commanded by Henry V defeated a French Army many times its size. Bennett goes to great lengths to explain how this happened and concluded that it resulted more from the failures of the French to take advantage of their numerical advantage, then the brilliance of Henry V.
The book follows the typical Ospery format. The most significant difference is that Bennett goes to great lengths to discuss the controversies regarding the battle as well as the inadequacies of the commanding officers. Bennett does not go overboard with his praise for Henry V and discusses his success and failures.
All in all, this is a good read for one that wants an overview of the most famous battle of the Hundred Years War.
Book Description
In the late summer of 1588, Philip II's Spanish fleet of 130 ships fought their way up the English Channel, heading for a rendezvous with the Spanish Army waiting for them at Calais. Although the English fleet failed to stop or even seriously damage the Spanish fleet as they sailed along the English coast, they were able to prevent them from linking up with their army. During a bitterly fought series of battles off Calais and Gravelines the Spanish were forced to abandon their amphibious invasion of England, and had no option but to return home to Spain. Forced out into the North Sea by the British, the Spanish were forced, by strong winds, to sail around Britain and Ireland in order to return home. The voyage was a nightmare, severe weather and faulty navigation caused the wrecking of many of the Spanish ships along the British and Irish coasts. This combined with the lack of supplies caused King Philip to lose around a third of his fleet and half his men, thus forcing him to abandon all hopes of crushing the reformation. This detailed account of the battles fought gives an insight into why the Armada failed. The many questions surrounding the campaign are addressed. Just how dangerous was the Spanish threat? Were the English really superior in ships and gunnery? And what would have happened if the Spanish had succeeded?
Customer Reviews:
In the fine tradition of the Osprey Series.......2002-06-07
The Armada Campaign 1588 : The Great Enterprise Against England (Campaign, 86) by Angus Konstam, and Howard Gerrard (Illustrator) is written in the fine tradition of the Osprey Campaign Series. It is written in the traditional format and describes the immediate causes and effects of the battles as well as the battle itself.
The book is well written and easy to follow. The maps are very helpful and do a good job of putting the narrative into context. When one finishes, one has a basic understanding of the wheres, whys and hows of the attempted invasion of Britain. The fact that the British protagonists are names which bring forth images of dashing and gallant pirates, such as Francis Drake, doesn't hurt.
Decent but Too-Limited a Focus.......2001-04-28
The Armada Campaign 1588 is a decent summary of the Spanish attempt to invade England in the late 16th Century. As per the standard Osprey Campaign format, Angus Konstam provides succinct but accurate sections on the origins of the campaign, the opposing leaders, opposing plans and opposing warships. A detailed campaign chronology, blow-by-blow battle account and epilogue complete this survey of the Spanish expedition. Konstam concludes that the Spanish fleet maintained fairly tight defensive formations throughout the week-long fighting and while the English had the upper hand in gunnery and maneuvering, the English were unable to defeat the armada outright. Rather, the fortuitous fireship attack off Calais forced the Spanish to abandon the amphibious part of their mission and severe Atlantic storms demolished the once-mighty fleet on its return to Spain. The maps and illustrations that support the text are excellent.
However the problem with this volume is an over-focus on the English-Spanish naval battles in the channel. This campaign was merely an episode in a very long Anglo-Spanish struggle for hegemony, not an isolated event. For example, Drake's pre-emptive raid on Cadiz in 1587 inflicted far more damage on the preparations for the Armada than this account suggests. Although Konstam provides a good order of battle table on the English and Spanish fleets, there is no information on the Duke of Parma's Spanish in the Netherlands or the Dutch rebels. In fact, the Dutch fleet was far from insignificant in the campaign because it served to impede Parma's ability to mount an amphibious operation from the Netherlands. Certainly the large Spanish galleons in the Armada were no solution to dealing with shallow-draft Dutch warships that could interdict the Spanish invasion barges. Nor does Konstam mention the 18,973 soldiers that sailed with the Armada in his order of battle (there were five brigade-size tercios with the fleet). Another area that is totally ignored is that of finances and logistics. Nobody had ever supplied a fleet for extended operations with gunpowder weapons before and ammunition shortages were a major limiting factor, particularly for the British. While Konstam mentions the "Royal ships" (ie. warships owned by the crown), he does not mention how expensive it was to maintain a standing navy. Queen Elizabeth had to de-mobilize parts of the fleet in late 1587 when the Armada was delayed and then time re-mobilization in 1588 with the expected arrival of the Spaniards. Disease was another factor that caused attrition of trained crews sitting around in ports. All of these are examples of a broader view of the campaign, rather than just warships slugging it out in the channel.
Nor does the author spend much effort in discussing follow-up operations or the impact of the failure of the Armada. The English expedition to Portugal in 1589 is ignored, as is the Spanish intervention in the French civil wars in 1588-9. The Spanish expeditions of 1596-7 are mentioned, but not detailed. The loss of fifty or more warships and 15,000 or more crewmen was a catastrophe for Spain that is not spelled out in this account. King Philip II sent the hurled the best force he could afford at England and failed utterly. Reconstituting a similar force was beyond his means. Finally, the Armada Campaign was a landmark in naval history due to the fact that it set the pattern for the next two centuries of fleet battles.
Book Description
In August 1644, at the height of the First English Civil War, John Graham, the Marquis of Montrose, raised the standard of Royalist rebellion in Scotland. In a single year he won a string of remarkable victories with his army of Irish mercenaries and Highland clansmen. His victory at Auldearn, the centrepiece of his campaign, was won only after a day-long struggle and heavy casualties on both sides. This book details the remarkable sequence of victories at Tippermuir, Aberdeen, Inverlochy, Auldearn and Kilsyth that left Montrose briefly in the ascent in Scotland. However, his decisive defeat and surrender at Philiphaugh finally crushed the Royalist cause in Scotland. Stuart Reid details the remarkable Scottish campaign waged by the Marquis of Montrose.
Customer Reviews:
Good overview of the campaign.......2003-11-20
Having read many books about the Marquis of Montrose, I have become a fan of his, so my review may reflect that bias. Perhaps that is why I can give this present work only a marginal approval rating. Stuart Reid seems to write this from a distinctly English/Covenanter standpoint.
Before I deal with the negatives, let me say that overall the book is good. The paintings of the battles add greatly to the presentation, and give the reader a good idea of the face of an English Civil War battle. Sketchings of clothing and uniforms as well as weapons and flags are placed throughout the book.
While the entire campaign of 1644-45 is covered, much of the book deals with the central battle of Auldearn. Mr Reid details this battle well, with both maps and photographs. Understanding what happened at Auldearn can enable a person to get a good grasp of the entire period.
The maps are good, although in typical Osprey fashion the middle of each two-page map is obscured by the bookbinding. This is unfortunate, since much of the action in a map occurs in its center, but this is the very part that cannot be clearly seen.
Now the negatives. Mr Reid seems to have a desire to detract from Montrose's fame and achievements. Perhaps this is because he believes that Montrose has benefited from "hero worship" and been raised to nearly mythological status. In this he may be correct, but his efforts to "set the record straight" seem to lead to an over-reaction against Montrose. For instance, Mr Reid seems to consistently underestimate the size of the Covenanter armies. I say this because his figures often disagree with virtually every other account of the battles that I have read. Perhaps Mr Reid is right on some accounts, but I wonder if he may have just wanted to diminish Montrose's accomplishments.
Another, perhaps picky, observation is that Mr Reid refers to Montrose's troops as rebels and Alasdair MacColla's Irishmen as mercenaries. Montrose in fact supported the legitimate government of King Charles and so was not a rebel at all. The Irish were decidedly not mercenaries; they were involved in a blood feud with Clan Campbell, and fought for glory, honor, and plunder. Montrose had no money to pay them, even if he had wanted to. Again, I must wonder at Mr Reid's motive in designating the troops this way. It seems to demean them somewhat.
By the way, in spite of what the back cover says, Montrose did not surrender at Philiphaugh.
Despite my criticisms, I do indeed recommend this book, but only as a companion to other, more thorough accounts of this very interesting campaign.
Worst Volume in Campaign Series.......2003-08-18
It is difficult to see how Stuart Reid's volume on the Auldearn Campaign in Scotland in 1645 made it into Osprey's Campaign series. For a series that claims to provide "accounts of history's greatest conflicts," this obscure sideshow to the English Civil War clearly does not rank as a "great conflict." Indeed, since Osprey has yet to produce volumes on significant battles like Friedland, Stalingrad, El Alamein, Tannenberg, , Blenheim or Actium, it is amazing that they would stoop to devoting an entire volume to a campaign that hold so little historical or military value (surely a section in the upcoming Essential Histories volume on the English Civil War could have sufficed). Nor is Reid, who wrote admirably about the Georgian-era British Army and the Culloden campaigns, up to snuff in this volume. He does not so much narrate this campaign as inflict it upon the reader, making it about as pleasurable as a root canal. With Auldearn 1645 Reid has accomplished the unthinkable - he has displaced Bosworth 1485 as the worst volume in the Osprey Campaign series.
The introductory sections on background, opposing commanders, plans and armies occupy a mere 11 pages - well below the series average. Noticeably, there is a portrait of only a single commander, the Marquis of Montrose. Reid provides only the faintest detail on other commanders, such as noting that MacColla was a professional soldier, but doesn't even mention the age of 3 of 4 leaders. The section on opposing armies is skeletal. The actual campaign narrative is an interminable 73 pages long (seemed like 900). Normally, I detail the maps and graphics that support the author's text, but there seems little point in this case, since Auldearn 1645 is so meandering. Readers should also note the very large number of current photographs of the various "battlefields" in this volume - Reid had a lot of void to fill. The rest of the artwork varies from fair to mediocre to irrelevant (lots of crude sketches of Highlanders).
First and foremost, the Auldearn Campaign simply didn't matter because the English Civil War was decided by Englishmen in England, not small bands of Irish mercenaries and Scottish tribal levies in the boondocks of Scotland. Montrose's plan to attract Parliamentary forces away from the main fighting in England was an early and conspicuous failure, since his forces - while elusive - were just too small to matter. Furthermore, Royalist forces lacked the popular support necessary to control large population areas, which was necessary for decisive results in a civil war. Another important factor, noted by Reid, is that many of the Scottish levies used by both sides had local agendas that had nothing to do with Royal authority (e.g. Clan Donald). Thus, win or lose, Montrose's wanderings in Scotland had negligible effect upon the outcome of the English Civil War. Even the authoritative Encyclopedia of Military History by Dupuy & Dupuy devotes only three short sentences to this entire campaign. Yet Reid, who seems hell-bent upon detailing every miniscule tactical movement, ignores this essential lack of strategic relevancy.
Another reason why this volume is a complete waste of time is the lack of sufficient reliable data to support Reid's narrative. Reid's paragraphs are so riddled with expressions like, "assuming," "it is likely," "this could mean," "this can be read to mean," "not quite so clear," "is uncertain," "is unknown," "was not explained" that the reader will quickly tire of all this vague guessing and wonder just what the author actually knows for a fact. It is particularly unsettling when Reid has to cite "local ballads," "local traditions," and "a pretty widespread rumor." Auldearn 1645 has the feel of poorly written historical fiction, not military history.
Finally, the Auldearn Campaign is simply not worthy of serious military study, since the forces involved were such primitive tactical throwbacks. At a time when real tactical development was occurring in England and on the continent, Reid bores the reader with detailing a battle where neither side had artillery, where perhaps 50% of the troops fought with pikes or swords, and where cavalry was used in only tiny amounts. Indeed, the recurrent lack of pre-battle reconnaissance by most of the combatants, and the preference for simple, frontal assaults mark the Auldearn Campaign as an affair of merely armed mobs. It is also significant that despite Reid's numerous photographs of modern cow fields in Scotland, there is only a single photograph of one small plaque marking one of the actions in the campaign; that should demonstrate to the reader just how well-remembered the Auldearn Campaign is in Scotland today. When I visited the Inverness-Nairn area years ago, I found plenty of mention of the Battle of Culloden, but not a word of Auldearn.
Book Description
The port of Balaclava was crucial in maintaining the supply lines for the Allied siege of Sevastapol. The Russian attack on it on 25th October 1854 therefore posed a major threat to the survival of the Allied cause. The battle took place in four stages, first of which was the successful Russian attack on the redoubts of Balaclava. This was followed by the action of "the thin red line" in which an assortment of about 700 British troops, some invalids, were abandoned by their Turkish allies and forced to successfully resist the attack of four squadrons of Russian cavalry. The subsequent charge of the Heavy Brigade which neutralised the threat to nearby Kadikoi was followed by the most famous part of the battle: the charge of the Light Brigade. Immortalised by Tennyson's poem, this action was not so much glorious as a major example of military ineptitude. Divisions at the top of the British command structure, and confusion in the transmission of orders prompted Lord Cardigan and the men of the Light Brigade to attack the Don Battery which was protected by infantry and more artillery on its flanks. John Sweetman looks at these events and analyses their collective significance in the outcome of the Battle of Balaclava.
Book Description
Bannockburn was the climax of the career of King Robert the Bruce. In 1307 King Edward I of England, 'The Hammer of the Scots' and nemesis of William Wallace, died and was replaced by his son, Edward II, who was not from the same mould. Idle and apathetic, he allowed the Scots the chance to recover from the grievous punishment inflicted upon them. By 1314 Bruce had captured every major English-held castle bar Stirling, so finally Edward II took an army north to subdue the Scots. Pete Armstrong's account of this pivotal campaign culminates at the decisive battle of Bannockburn that finally won Scotland her independence.
Customer Reviews:
An Excellent Campaign Summary.......2002-05-13
Pete Armstrong, a British artist and model-builder, has written an excellent campaign summary of Scotland's greatest military victory, the Battle of Bannockburn in 1314. Although some of the exact details of this famous battle remain open to debate, Armstrong does a fair job in presenting a balanced campaign narrative that incorporates different viewpoints. Bannockburn is also enhanced by excellent artwork and maps, which help to bring the battle into sharp focus. All in all, this is one of the better Osprey Campaign series titles.
In accordance with standard Osprey Campaign series format, Bannockburn 1314 begins with short sections on the origins of the campaign (8 pages), a campaign chronology, opposing commanders, opposing armies and opposing plans. The section on armies details the infantry and cavalry formations of both sides and the author stresses that while the English had superior cavalry, their failure to employ combined arms tactics utilizing both infantry and cavalry was a fundamental flaw in their numerically superior army. Certainly combined arms tactics are sound advice in any period, but while the author points out the English failure in this regard, he fails to point out how the Scottish were any different. If the English were overly reliant on their cavalry, the Scots were certainly overly reliant on spear-armed infantry. The Scots had no answer to the English superior quality and quantity in archers, and this had led to the defeat at Falkirk 16 years before. The section on plans notes that the English King Edward II was well provided with intelligence about the enemy as well as supplies, but had no real plan of campaign other than to relieve the siege of Stirling Castle. Edward's lack of combat experience and his assumption that the Scots would disperse in the face of a major English invasion are cited as primary causes of his negligent planning. Again, while the author's assessment of deficient English planning appears correct, it is hard to see that the Scottish King Robert the Bruce had any serious plan of campaign either. Until the second day of battle, the Scots kept their options open to fight or flee and their victory was the result of opportunity, rather than planning.
The campaign narrative itself is 38 pages long and is enhanced by five 2-D maps (Scotland in 1314, Edward II's invasion, the flight of the English army, Scottish raids in northern England, Bannockburn then and now) and three 3-D "Birds Eye View" maps (the fighting on 23 June 1314, the Scottish attack and the collapse of the English army). There are also three excellent battle scenes: the encounter between Robert the Bruce and Henry de Bohun, the attack of the Earl of Gloucester's cavalry on a Scottish schiltron and Edward II's flight). A somewhat longer than usual 20-page section on the battle's aftermath covers casualties, reasons for the English defeat, results of the battle, the continuation of the English-Scot war and changes in military tactics because of the battle. Indeed, the author should be applauded for finding space for some analysis of the battle. Essentially, the author blames most of the defeat upon Edward II's atrocious lack of leadership and faulty decisions, which was certainly a key ingredient in the disaster. Coupled to Edward's poor leadership, Robert the Bruce's ability to boldly seize opportunity presented by English indecision and confusion resulted in a successful Scottish counterattack on the second day. Rather than merely blaming one individual, I think it might be fairer to say that English arrogance was to blame for the defeat, since this same kind of arrogance figured in other battles where professional English armies opposed irregulars (e.g. the American Revolution, the Zulus, the Boers). Inexperienced as he was, Edward II probably would have entered battle more cautiously if opposing a professional continental foe like the French or Spanish. The author does conclude that the English eventually learned at great cost to deal with Scottish tactics and that they put this to good use against the French in the Hundred Years War.
Books:
- History: Fiction or Science? Chronology 2 (Chronology)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
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