Product Description
The Naval Institute Press is pleased to make available for the first time this cloth edition of a now-classic war memoir that was a best seller in both Japan and the United States during the 1960s. Originally published as a paperback in 1961, it has long been treasured by World War II buffs and professional historians for its insights into the Japanese side of the surface war in the Pacific. The book has been credited with correcting errors in U.S. accounts of various battles and with revealing details of high-level Imperial Japanese Navy strategy meetings. The author, Captain Tameichi Hara, was a survivor of more than one hundred sorties against the Allies and was known throughout Japan as the Unsinkable Captain. Called the workhorses of the navy, Japanese destroyers shouldered the heaviest burden of the surface war and took part in scores of intense sea battles, many of which Captain Hara describes here. In the early days of the war victories were common, but by 1943, the lack of proper maintenance of the destroyers and sufficient supplies, along with Allied development of scientific equipment and superior aircraft, took its toll. On April 7, 1945, during the Japanese navy s last sortie, Captain Hara managed to survive the sinking of his own ship only to witness the demise of the famed Japanese battleship Yamato off Okinawa. A hero to his countrymen, Captain Hara exemplified the best in Japanese surface commanders: highly skilled (he wrote the manual on torpedo warfare), hard driving, and aggressive. Moreover, he maintained a code of honor worthy of his samurai grandfather, and, as readers of this book have come to appreciate, he was as free with praise for American courage and resourcefulness as he was critical of himself and his senior commanders. The book s popularity over the past forty-six years testifies to the author s success at writing an objective account of what happened that provides not only a fascinating eyewitness record of the war, but also an honest and dispassionate assessment of Japan s high command. Captain Hara s sage advice on leadership is as applicable today as it was when written. For readers new to this book and for those who have read and re-read their paperback editions until they have fallen apart, this new hardcover edition assures them a permanent source of reference and enjoyment.
Customer Reviews:
A good view of naval history.......2007-09-10
Excellent view of the naval WWII war in the Pacific from the viewpoint of a knowledgeable Japanese officer who was in many of the battles. Very readable and informative.
Five stars and two thumbs up!.......2007-08-07
I read this book in paperback the summer before I started college in 1972. I still have the old Ballantine paperback in my personal library here in my office - along with many other classic WWII memoirs and histories which were released between the early '60's and '70's - and they remain to this day the backbone of any historians efforts to understand the conflict from a human perspective.
Hara was there. Regardless of the rhetoric,and the apologetics of his stance, it's impossible to argue with the eyewitness accounts he provides, and the detail of his style.
He creates at once a sympathetic and enthralled audience for his side of the story - one which needed telling, and which wasn't available until he committed it to print.
An enduring classic; this one belongs on the shelf of any person who wants to thoroughly understand the Pacific War.
Japanese Destroyer Captain...WWII.......2007-06-11
I recently had the oppertunity to read "Japanese Destroyer Captain: Pearl Harbor, Guadalcanal, Midway-The Great Naval Battles as seen Through Japanese Eyes.
Tameichi Hara paints an interesting palet of not just the Naval engagments, but the social and economic upheavels in Japan during the war. The hardships he mentions on the civilian population were horrendous, and the reader soon realizes that the "bitter taste" of war is universal for every nation that finds itself at war.
The Naval battles and discription of those engagements was enough to give the "arm-chair" Admirals and Captains cold chills, however, sometimes I felt that Tameichi Hara was too redundent, and...much more of a tactician than I wanted to read about.
Overall, a very good book, and one worth reading for anyone who has the slightist interest in history, and Naval wafare.
Outlines the life of a Japanese Destroyer Captain in the Pacific conflict 1941-45.......2007-06-11
I first read this book in the early 1970's, on the life of Tameichi Hara and his activities while a destroyer captain during the Pacific conflict in World War Two. I found it a very interesting read, on his life and what led up to his involvement in most of the major actions against the U.S. Pacific fleet, especially in the Solomon Islands. The book is well written and kept me just as entranced the second time as it did the first. It is refreshing to have a Japanese version of the events instead of an American one. Well recommended.
Through Japanese Eyes..........2007-06-10
Growing up, I read as much as I could of the Pacific Theater during World War II. I was disappointed that so much was available from the U.S. side, with very little published on the Japanese side. Of course one reason for that was so many Japanese died during the war. So it was a great pleasure to find this book. Hara fought in almost every major surface engagement during the war, and still lived to tell about it. As another reviewer wrote, Hara gets into some of the technical aspects, notably his work before the war on the "Long Lance" torpedo. This weapon was one of the few systems that was superior to the allies- and was a surprise to them in 1941. It had extremely long range and a large warhead and was used with devestating effect during the night battles around Guadalcanal, many of which Hara was an eyewitness of.
In short, if you are interested in WW2 Naval History, this book is a "must have" for your library.
Product Description
I'M STAYING WITH MY BOYS... is a first-hand look inside the life of one of the greatest heroes of the greatest generation. Sgt. John Basilone was lauded by General Douglas MacArthur as ...A ONE MAN ARMY and awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic defense of a vital airfield early in World War 2. It was the turning point of the war and Basilones foxhole was the site of the turning point in that battle. Distinctive among military biographies, the story is narrated by Sgt. Basilone himself allowing readers to experience the development of Johnny Basilone, the aimless youth, into Gunnery Sergeant MANILA JOHN Basilone, the clear-eyed warrior, undefeated light-heavyweight boxer and nationally revered war hero. This publication is the only family-authorized biography. The story is woven with surprising personal details such as Sgt. Basilones uncanny premonitions. Three times he confided to his family unlikely visions of his future. All three times the visions came to pass - including the final one that foretold his death. In spite of his final revelation, and true to his unwavering dedication to his men, he returned to battle and was killed on the beach at Iwo Jima - an emotional true story
Customer Reviews:
A MUST READ ! ! !.......2005-09-15
My friend loaned me this book to read and I must say that it gave me a new found appreciation of what those men and women did for us in WWII. This book was very easy to read, and should be included in the curriculum of every Recent American History course taught in High School or College. I HIGHLY recommend picking up a copy of this book. I have already purchased a copy for myself after reading my friends copy.
It sounds so prophetic.......2005-01-26
He knew he was going to die, and he just kept on fighting. He never abandoned his marines and thats just what he should have done. Its how the writer makes this so real that is so inspiring, not that his deeds werent great, but there have probably been thousands who have done just what he did, they just werent famous. But overall this is a good book. I like how it takes us to a time when being "patriotic" didnt get us arrested or sued.
A must read.......2005-01-06
Wonderfully moving and well written insight into a true American hero. It is a must read for all patriotic Americans and almost a responsiblity for us all to be aware of one of the US Marine's best.
Excellent.......2004-10-25
If you are interested in a personal story of WWII, then this is an excellent book. Rather than getting into the details of the conflicts this book focuses on the personal story of John Basilone - one of the handful of true American Heroes from WWII.
Written in the first person with an ample dose of personal details from his family, this book truly brings Manilla John back to life for many. I've been studying WWII for only 10 years and have read my share of the technical assessments of the important battles in WWII. This book stands out in my mind because it puts the reader in touch with the qualities of America's best young men and women of the 1940's; selflessness, courage, a supreme sense of duty, and in Basilon's case, a supreme sense of destiny.
Highly recommended for anyone with a passing interest in WWII, or for anyone who wants to learn about what made America's young people "tick" 60 years ago.
An Extraordinary Biography and Full Frontal View of War.......2004-08-28
Author and Film Producer Jim Prosser has created a richly detailed, raptly written, devastatingly powerful book about the life of American War hero John Basilone. This book is especially pungent at this time in history because it revives a lost tradition of the country's view of maritime heroism. Since the atrocities of the Vietnam mistake to the present harrowing details of a similar (or worse) war in Iraq the concept of war is now very much in a negative light. Even the words 'war hero' seem an oxymoron, so strident are the feelings about America's latest aggressions. But to appreciate this fine book requires a return to the mindset of the US during World War II when not only was Europe under the vile threat of Hitler and Mussolini, but the Japanese warriors were annihilating China, Korea, and ultimately the Philippines in the mission to own the Pacific Ocean. And even in those early years the threat seemed frightening but distant until the Japanese successfully decimate the US Pacific Fleet on December 7, 1941. That incident unified the country, creating a fighting force and support system at home that eventually resulted in the defeat of the massive evil outside the borders of the USA.
Given that atmosphere of over a half century ago, author Proser has created one of the most convincing portraits of a military hero in literature. And the intensively researched and detailed approach results in a biography that fully restores the ambience of WW II. John Basilone was a nice Italian boy form Raritan, New Jersey, a lad who quit school to follow his recurring visions. He caddied for Japanese businessmen at a country club, seeing in his prophetic mind that at some day he would be at war with Japan. After trying multiple jobs he finally enlists in the Army, makes the best of boot camp by gambling and boxing, and is shipped to the Philippines where he spent time waiting, boxing (becoming a champion nicknamed Manila John), running a little bar with his Island sweetheart, and finally returning home. Frustrated once again with the boredom of work and the embarrassment of not having finished his education, Basilone finally returns to the military by signing on with the USMC, trains hard at Quantico, Cuba, and other US training camp swamps, and finally is shipped to Guadalcanal where his brilliance and dedication to his commanding officer ("Chesty" Puller) through one of the most devastating battles in the Pacific arena earned him not only the respect of his men, but also the Medal of Honor - the highest commendation offered by his country. Returning home form this mission he ride the waves of adulation form the American people, hobnobs with movies stars, sells War Bonds, and falls in love, only to be shipped out once again to the Pacific where he is killed in action in the battle for Iwo Jima.
The amazing (that is, ONE of the amazing) aspect of this book is that Proser has elected to write it in the first person of John Basilone. Everything is told as Basilone perceives it, lives, feels, and survives it. Rarely has a story been written with such clarity and perception: we truly feel that Basilone has written his memoirs. The language of the period is exactly right, the descriptions of the various battles and conditions of being a soldier under tremendously adverse conditions are vivid, and the soldiers' mentality of being in the thick of war are written with such bulls-eye focus that no matter what the reader's opinion of War might be, this book makes it all understandable form the point of view of the soldiers who fought. Some of the battle passages are tough to read: "On October 23, a light tank and infantry attack across the mouth of the Matanikau ran right into the teeth of Vandegrift's defenses. It was chewed up in short order with over 600 Japs killed, many of them trapped in a jungle clearing where US tanks just drove over them instead of wasting ammunition. They ground the poor bastards up like sausage under the tank treads until the entire clearing was covered in gore and left to rot in the sun." And a soldier's impressions: "We all heard a lot about the bravery of the Japanese soldier before we got on the island. They were supposed to be the most fearless warriors ever to fight. But I kept thinking what kind of bravery it was that sent them, one after the other, right into the same guns that mowed down dozens before them. I don't know if that was bravery. I don't know what it was. Either they were crazy or they just didn't care. So I didn't care either. They weren't even men anymore. They were dumb animals who wanted me dead and had killed all my friends."
Proser very cleverly weaves snippets of Iwo Jima from the opening of the book to its finish, which in an act of brilliance makes the whole story more pungent in retrospect. There is little doubt the Sgt. John Basilone was an extraordinary soldier and military hero along with the thousands of others who lost their lives in the incomprehensibly vast WW II. I think this is a very important book that everyone should read, and I say that as a pacifist, as a Vietnam Veteran convinced that war on any level is simply not an option. This book is vastly important, well written, and contains a story and moment of history we all should face and incorporate. And perhaps then we can all better empathize with soldiers form throughout history to the very present. Recommended without reservation!
Customer Reviews:
Almost perfect - almost.......2007-08-02
I concur with all the highest praises for this book but for two irksome faults. One, there is no decent overall map of Guadalcanal island. The whole island is only pictured on a 4" wide map covering Japan to California where it's a dot with a name, and on another map of the Solomons where Guadalcanal is only 3/8" across (obviously without any sites or beaches indicated). All the other maps are tight zoom-in's and often without any scale. On the plus side the author tracks troop movements meticulously, but you'd best have along side a war atlas or expert memory and visualization skills.
The second disappointment is more minor, and not all will think it a drawback - the author's painstaking detail on...everything. I, too, love detail, but with one or more excellent maps the author could've saved a fifty pages of "ninety-five yards north, then angled seventy yards northwest, then backtracked to the southwest one hundred fifty-seven yards until...". A GOOD map is worth a thousand directions.
Last word: still get this book, it is a remarkable work.
History at its Best.......2007-05-20
All but one of the other reviewers has given this book a four or five star rating. There is a reason. This is an exceptionally well-written book that covers a broad range of topics. Most military historians pick one type of warfare--ground, naval, or air combat--and focus on that area, even if they look at a number of different wars. Guadalcanal does not lend itself to such a focus. It was an air, land, and sea battle with each part influencing another. It was also an extremely important campaign. The one sided outcome of the World War II in the Pacific has blinded us to the fact that it was possible that the Japanese could have won this war had things gone a little differently. Guadalcanal was a tough series of battles in which the Japanese scored a number of victories.
Frank provides a subtle and nuanced account of this conflict, giving equal attention to the American and Japanese sides. He also avoids painting his pictures in black and white. Some wrong decisions did not necessarily seem like bad ideas when they were made and a number of leaders that faltered in the battle had legitimate reasons for their decision making process. The result, is a rich story that fully develops the human side of these engagements. Frank also explains what life was like for those down at the operational and tactical levels, discussing things that might easily escape the notice of other writers like the amount and type of food that people were getting and how this affected their morale and performance.
At the same time, it is a rousing read. The coverage of the naval battles is particularly engaging. The maps are quite clear and easy to follow. In short, this book is very, very, very good.
Essential Guadalcanal History.......2007-03-20
I have been a serious student of WWII military history for a few decades now. Even though I spent years in the US Navy, I have, until lately, concentrated on the war in Europe, the North Atlantic, Russia and North Africa. I have read Jones and Mailer and their South Pacific war novels and am passing familiar with Pearl Harbor. After reading "Shattered Sword" (Five+ stars from me)which brings modern history and recent fact to the still-misunderstood Battle of Midway, I was led deeper into the war in the South Pacific. After both of Lundstrom's "First Team" books recounting the Naval and Marine air war from Pearl through Guadalcanal, I turned to Frank's book for an overall history of this campaign.
This is a thoroughly well-researched book, well written and comprehensive. If you are at all interested in this most crucial of the battles in the Pacific, and, in fact, the one that turned the war against Japan.
Buy it. Read it.
Especially good on the Navel engagements ............2006-11-08
WOW! An extremely well researched account of the battle of Guadalcanal that allowed me to grasp the events on land, and in particular the tragically catastrophic and sometimes confusing Naval engagements in this campaign.
I thoroughly recommend this account, which is written to allow for a chronological understanding of each significant battle. In particular the Naval engagements around Savo Island are dealt with in a mastery fashion with Cape Esperance, Santa Cruz and Guadalcanal battles brought to life in a fascinating descriptive. Rear Admiral Tanaka and other Japanese Naval commanders are given their dues and from a US perspective although victory ensued, it is illuminating to view the tactics and skill, or relative lack thereof, of the US Navy early in WW2. The author brings to life the tragic consequences of being ill prepared.
What's particularly impressive about this writer is that the Japanese perspective and is highlighted bring a rounded view of the campaign. This is more factual and perhaps could be considered 'dry' next to Sledge, Tregaskis & Bergerud yet I consider this to be the definitive Naval account of the decisive campaign. Those interested in the timeline of events around the historical battles around Guadalcanal in WW2 will not be disappointed.
This is the definitive account (to date).......2006-10-10
In June, 1992, I flew into Guadalcanal to begin research on my great uncle's experience as a Marine during the WWII campaign. My plan was to retrace his steps during the months-long battle fifty years to the day after he took those steps.
Like no other book I read, this book helped me do that.
My six-month-long stay on Guadalcanal was preceded by more than a year of reading every single thing I could get my hands on about the battle. I read every book I could find in the English language -- accounts from Brits, Kiwis, Aussies -- as well as a few translated from Japanese. I spent two weeks at the Marine Corps Historical Museum in D.C. going through my great uncle's unit's combat reports.
This book was without question the book I counted on the most to understand the chronology of the battle -- who on both sides was where, doing what and when during the battle, how the battle unfolded, etc.
The Guadalcanal story has been told many times since our grandfathers came home from that war. But, to my knowledge, it has never been told in this detail. Nobody has documented the Battle for Guadalcanal better than Richard Frank.
He tells the story elegantly, with detail about troop movements, unit actions, ship names, etc. that only someone obsessed with such details (like me) would find interesting. Yet, the detail he documents doesn't get in the way of the telling of the story. The details flow with the drama. And drama there was, of course.
It's a scholarly book for scholars and a reader's book for readers. Anyone truly interested in how and why this battle was historic will find this book immensely rewarding.
If you're seriously interested in learning about this momentous battle, this book is a must-read along with William Manchester's "Goodbye Darkness."
Book Description
An abundance of new evidence demanded this reevaluation of Frank Jack Fletcher, the "black shoe" admiral who won his battles at sea but lost the war of public opinion. A surface warrior -- in contrast to a "brown shoe" naval aviator -- Fletcher led the carrier forces that won against all odds at Coral Sea, Midway, and the Eastern Solomons. These and other early carrier victories decided the Pacific War not only because they inflicted crippling losses but also because they denied Japan key strategic positions in the region.
Despite these successes, by 1950 Fletcher had become one of the most controversial figures in U.S. naval history and was portrayed as a timid bungler who failed to relieve Wake Island in December 1941 and who deliberately abandoned the Marines at Guadalcanal.
In this book, author John Lundstrom recalls that Fletcher once remarked, "after an action is over, people talk a lot about how the decisions were deliberately reached, but actually there's always a hell of a lot of groping around," and notes that the goal of his study is to probe and explain the "groping around." Drawing on new material, Lundstrom offers a fresh look at Fletcher's decisions and actions. The first major reassessment in more than fifty years of the once-maligned naval officer, it provides a careful analysis of the effect of radio intelligence on decision-making in the carrier battles during the first nine months of the war in the Pacific. This new assessment is based on thousands of documents and massive dispatch files and personal papers that no historian has previously used.
Customer Reviews:
Indispensable history.......2007-10-14
I've belatedly gotten around to reading the FJF bio, and it's absolutely indispensable to understanding the first year of the Pacific War. With due respect for The Big E, Fletcher and Yorktown (CV-5) lugged most of the flattop mail in the six months after Pearl Harbor, and with his Guadalcanal experience, he became the leading practitioner of carrier warfare in the US Navy--and in the world.
If you don't read anything else, go to the Conclusion for an education in how history gets written, especially by Recognized Historians with agendas. As an example of expositive historiography it will stand alone for a long-long time.
long time Pacific War buff.......2006-10-25
This is a long overdue look at Adm Fletcher and his role in the critical first year of the war. I always found it odd that the victor of the three most important battles fought by our fleet in WWII was quickly shunted aside and treated with disdain by postwar historians. John Lundstrom does a fine job of exposing the biasis and backbiting within the navy at the time that resulted in Fletcher's downfall.
Mr Lundstrom is an eminent historian of this subject and has produced a first rate, readable and important work. It deserves a place with the best accounts of the wartime Pacific Fleet to appear in many years. It clearly shows Frank Jack Fletcher for the fine leader and fighter that he was.
Scholarly Work.......2006-10-24
Black Shoe Carrier Admiral is one of two excellent works to be published this year on WWII Pacific carriers, battles and the men who commanded them. John Lundstrom has obviously put a great deal of effort into setting the record straight on Admiral Fletcher and his contributions to our early victories in the Pacific. His work is well documented and thoroughly researched, and adds new sources that had not previously surfaced in World War II histories of that period.
The book demonstrates how Fletcher became the target of severe criticism for his actions, primarily by others who hoped to improve their own reputations or deflect criiticism as a result. Lundstrom pulls no punches, however, by describing both Fletcher's strengths and failings in the events of December 1941 to September 1942. He repeatedly demonstrates that misinterpretations of Fletcher's actions, particularly by Admiral King in Washington, resulted in Fletcher's eventual downfall. At the same time, he explains how some noted historians played down or ignored Fletcher's important contributions, that sealed the US victories at Coral Sea and, particularly Midway.
John Lundstrom's book is an excellent read for anyone wanting to know more of the early war in the Pacific. It is also an important source for any serious student of the period who wants to gain insight both to the actions of the war and the politics inside the Navy at that time.
A 5-star book by a 5-star author.......2006-10-21
"Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" is a 680-page, meticulously detailed accounting of Admiral Fletcher's leadership of U.S. carrier forces during the first year of World War II in the Pacific. Author John Lundstrom's fundamental thesis is that Fletcher has been unfairly maligned by many of his peers, by historians, and by a large segment of the U.S. Marine Corps for perceived errors of judgment or even failings of character during crucial battles in the Coral Sea, at Midway, and in the Solomons.
The author's painstaking research into primary sources largely ignored by other writers (i.e., memos, letters, and logs kept by those who were present with Fletcher during those battles, plus actual radio messages and dispatches sent by and to him aboard his various flagships) reveal a reasonable rationale for many of Fletcher's controversial decisions that mostly seem to have escaped his critics. It's not possible to adequately summarize them in a short review like this, but suffice to say that admirals sitting behind desks in Hawaii or Washington are poorly situated for grasping all of the important realities of a convoluted combat scenario occurring half a world away. Thus when Fletcher is condemned for failing to charge full speed ahead to engage the enemy when doing so would have totally exhausted the fuel in his escorting destroyers, making victory impossible and needless destroyer losses inevitable, he is chastised for failing to engage the enemy rather than praised for sensibly preserving America's meager fleet assets in the face of superior forces.
While there is much more to be said about this fine volume, it seems necessary in this forum to spend as much energy reviewing some of the other reviews as the book itself. It is patently unfair to the author for a reviewer to post a derogatory assessment of this or any book when he (a) apparently has not read it, or (b) does not seem to be in possession of factual information about it or the author, or (c) both. Such is clearly the case with some of the reviews found here, with the result that Black Shoe Carrier Admiral gets less than the five-star ranking that it clearly deserves. For example:
~One reviewer denigrates the book because it says relatively little about Fletcher after the 1942 carrier battles. He apparently didn't bother to read the book's subtitle: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal.
~Another writer says Lundstrom has no documentation and there is no evidence to support the suggestion that USS Hornet captain Marc Mitscher sent his air group in the wrong direction at the Battle of Midway. That writer is apparently ignorant of an abundance of testimony from Hornet veterans, both aircrew and ship's company, that support exactly that (see Naval History magazine, Feb 2006, p. 48 for just one resource).
~Another devotes all of three lines in ALL CAPS to trumpet the claim that Fletcher was hated by the Marines. Such a brief review obviously provides no space for the writer to tell us his opinion of Marine Colonel Melvin J. Maas, who unlike legions of other fine Marines, actually knew and worked directly with Fletcher during the Solomons campaign. Col. Maas cited Fletcher for his exceptional ability as a naval tactician and superior quality as a task force admiral.
~Other one-star reviewers complain that Lundstrom is trying to write an academic history without being an academic himself (Lundstrom has a master's degree in military history), that his book makes claims unsupported by facts or documentation (the book has 82 pages of fine print citing documented sources, largely original, for every significant statement in the manuscript), and that Fletcher was responsible for the loss of three fleet carriers in 1942 (apparently the Imperial Japanese Navy, with superior aircraft, battle-experienced aircrews, and an awesomely deadly torpedo had nothing to do with it).
Such agenda-driven opinions do not serve Amazon's review process in the intended manner, and in this case present a grossly inaccurate portrayal of the book's content and its author's qualifications for writing it. "Black Shoe Carrier Admiral" is a magnificent achievement, representing years of dogged research and composition by an award-winning expert who is eminently qualified and experienced in this subject matter. To revile it as anything less without supporting facts and documentation (so important to Lundstrom's detractors) is simply irresponsible.
Overdue detailed study of a key commander in the first year of the Pacific War.......2006-10-01
This is an important book for any student of the Pacific War, because it corrects the largely unrefuted negative accounts of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's service as commander of the U.S. carrier task forces in the first three of the four carrier battles of 1942 (Coral Sea, Midway, and Eastern Solomons). In fact, there were only two carrier battles in history where he did not command the winning side - Santa Cruz in October 1942, and Philippine Sea in 1944.
Despite this record, Fletcher has been savaged by critics for allegedly failing to stand by the Marine garrison at Guadalcanal, and, since he headed the relief expedition to besieged Wake in January 1942, he gets blamed for that expedition's turning back as well (despite the fact that he was ordered to do so). That he won three carriers battles against superior forces never gets him the credit he deserves. This was due in part to a confluence of several negative factors. First, he was a "black shoe" admiral, and not an aviator - and aviators were furious that carrier task forces were being commanded by non-aviators in the early stages of the war. In their mind every mission he didn't send them on would have been a great success - and that's what they told his superiors. Second, he was a convenient scapegoat for other admirals - most notably Richmond Kelly Turner at Guadalcanal, and CinC Ernest King - when they either made mistakes (Kelly at Guadalcanal) or were dissatisfied with his failure to act more "offensively" in spite of the circumstances that prevented it, or counseled against it. Third, when the attacks started rolling in during the war and after, Fletcher did not respond to correct the record, in part because of two unfortunate circumstances. First, he lost his records for the first half of the war when the Yorktown went down at Midway. Second, when he left the Saratoga at Pearl after her torpedoing, he unexpectedly was not permitted to return for the change of command ceremony, and thus lost his records from June through September as well. And after the war, without these records to refute what was being said about him he repeatedly demurred when asked to review what was being written about the battles in which he took part. So the people who were writing that he'd been incompetent and reluctant to risk battle to the point of cowardice, and used hindsight to justify their opinions were largely refuted for half a century. Someone else (I cannot recall who, but Lundstrom does not mention it) has said that Fletcher in postwar interviews seemed confused and unsure what had happened when. Whether this was due to lack of records or old age, the writer said that Fletcher's appearance may have reinforced the common belief that he was not very bright, and was in over his head during the war. I thought I saw a reference to Fletcher's becoming senile as he aged (he did not die until 1973) and that probably did not help things - it is hard to see someone who is visibly impaired by old age as a sharp-eyed fleet commander.
Enter John Lundstrom. Lundstrom's painstaking knowledge of what the carrier commanders knew, and when they knew it, and when various participants were flat-out lying about what happened, or making incorrect assumptions (uniformly to Fletcher's detriment) makes clear than at numerous crucial points Fletcher consistently made the right decisions, at least based on what he knew at the time, and preserved the U.S. Navy's irreplaceable (at the time) carriers. Most readers are aware of Nimitz' order to Fletcher at Midway to only risk the carriers when he had the opportunity to inflict serious damage on the Japanese carriers, but it appears that Fletcher was under the same instructions at Guadalcanal. And with a far more dangerous mission in sub-infested waters within range of Japanese land-based bombers he made the decision to leave the forces at Guadalcanal temporarily uncovered at times to reduce the risk to the carriers. What this book makes clear is that at the time he was not aware - in part due to bad communications and in part due to Turner's errors, that he was leaving at a bad time. Of course both Turner and the Marines didn't see it that way, and there was nothing his presence could have done to avert the Savo disaster, but then they didn't know what he knew.
At bottom, the unpleasant truth was that Fletcher's carriers were incomparably more important than the Marines at Guadalcanal, and if he had to choose between abandoning the Marines (which he did not believe he was doing at the time he retreated to refuel - which he had to do at some point so as to be ready when the Japanese carriers showed up) or putting the carriers in substantial risk with no prospect to inflict equal damage on Japanese forces, the carriers won. Losing Guadalcanal would have been a temporary setback. Losing the bulk of the carriers in the fall of 1942 would have been far worse. The Marines would disagree - and understandably still do - but had that been the decision (and Lundstrom makes clear that it was never that clear) that would have been the right decision. In the long run, the Marines depended on the carriers being there to stop the Japanese Navy when it showed up far more than they needed them to cover the unloading of supplies, and that was what Fletcher did. If he had lost the carriers covering Turner's delayed unloading of supplies, the Marines would have been dislodged when the Japanese Navy showed up, no matter how much supplies they had on hand.
Not everything Fletcher did was right, of course, but given that he was practicing a new form of naval warfare in which he had no experience (neither did anyone else, of course) and he won every battle he was engaged in, and preserved the Navy's carriers long enough to bridge the gap till the new carriers under construction reached the fleet, he deserves far greater credit for what he did.
The book also explain better his post-carrier command work. Once he was out of the South Pacific after the Saratoga was torpedoed, his days as a carrier commander were over - both King and to a lesser extent Nimitz were unhappy with what they perceived as a lack of offensive-mindedness, and he was relegated to a land-based commend on the mainland.
But Lundstrom also makes clear that that may have been where he was headed anyway. Having an admiral with no aviation experience command carrier task forces in early 1942 may have been unavoidable because there were no air admirals with sufficient seniority, but by the end of 1942 all the fliers who had started the war as captains (Mitscher as an example) were now rear admirals, and sufficiently senior to command carrier task forces. Fletcher, on the other hand, was now a vice admiral, too senior for a task force command, and with the wrong background to command the overall carrier fleet (despite his phenomenal failure at Midway, Mitscher did end up being the right man at the right time). Add to that that Fletcher did have a record of not seizing the initiative (although I don't think he can be faulted for doing so in the circumstances in which he operated) I really don't see that he would have remained with the carriers in any event. His record was precisely the opposite of the tactics that Mitscher would later employ to great success in early 1944. Again, it has to be said that Mitscher could afford to take risks with the forces available to him, and Fletcher could not. Had he played with fire the way the armchair admirals wanted him to, the benefits would have been minor, and the risks were incalculable.
In the end, if anyone deserves the credit for the way the U.S. carrier task forces successfully fought the first year of the Pacfic War, it has to be Fletcher, and I'm glad we finally have a book that explains this. Lundstrom is not neutral on the subject of Fletcher, but then neither has anyone else been, and this book helps to balance the account.
The only reason I give the book four stars instead of five is that Lundstrom's detail is sometimes overwhelming, and he not infrequently has sentences that are unintentionally cryptic, where it's hard to tell what exactly he is trying to say. It is also clear that he is an advocate for Fletcher, and while I applaud that because it helps balance the record, this is an analysis of what Fletcher did and why and why his detractors are or are not wrong. A five star rating would be appropriate if it were a balanced account of what happened. But that book is not yet possible, because no one had done the homework to see whether the attacks on Fletcher were justified. That has now been done, and we can now see what the next generation of naval scholarship makes of this stage of the war. For example, I am particularly interested in reassessments of what King and Nimitz thought about Fletcher - Lundstrom seems to be not entirely sure, and while that it perhaps not needed in this book, to get the whole picture, that needs to be analyzed further. There were a lot of politics going on in Washington, and perhaps Pearl as well, and those need to be taken into account.
Customer Reviews:
Good Overview, Short on Archeology.......2004-11-19
I will say that like most of Ballard's books this is nicely laid out; good sized and with excellent photographs & drawings.
Most of the book is taken up by short histories of the various battles that make up the 'Guadalcanal Campaign.' This didn't leave much room for the exploration of the wrecks themselves which gives you a rather rushed feeling despite the good background history.
Perhaps this would have been even better as an expanded two volume set.
An incredible journey through a graveyard of lost ships........2004-09-23
The work of Dr Robert D. Ballard knows no bounds and is truly inspirational to those of us who read of his exploits and seek to emulate his standards with much lesser shipwrecks.
Once again, just as soon as I took delivery of "The Lost Ships of Guadalcanal" I knew I had a 5 Star Book in my hands and, once again, I found nothing within it's 220 pages to make me take away any of those stars.
This book will stand the test of time as a literary work and outstanding account of one of the major naval battle zones of the Pacific in WW2. There are modern photographs including a number taken from the air, historic photographs (American, Australian, Japanese and local) of the places, the personalities, the ships, aircraft and soldiers, some incredible paintings of the night actions that took place, pictures of Ballard's crew as they go about their work and his advanced equipment being deployed and used. There is also a picture of a very young John F. Kennedy in his PT-109.
The first underwater pictures are enough to make the heart stop for just a moment as you realise this man Ballard has done it again - not once, but in this case several times. Commencing with the 9,850 ton Heavy Cruiser HMAS Canberra (the "A" stands for Australian) we no sooner see the first underwater photographs of this once magnificent ship - which went down fight in the opening minutes of the Battle of Savo Island, then we turn the page to find a 3-page open-out spread of Ken Marschall's painting of the entire wreck.
On the opposite side of that 3 page spread is another equally outstanding painting of USS Quincy followed by her own set of underwater photographs. As the story of Guadalcanal continues, so we find more details of US and Japanese successes and losses and the trials and tribulations endured by the forces of both sides as the author carefully draws us towards that part in the overall series of battles that will bring us to his next discovery and Ken Marschall's next incredible painting - the USS Monssen.
With more underwater photographs of yet more of the "Lost Ships of Guadalcanal," and yet more paintings by Ken Marschall, the author skilfully brings the reader both to the end of the series of battles and to the end of his own journey of discovery. Whilst not one of the greatest works of art within the book, one of my favourite paintings is found on p.200. This is an aerial picture of the entire area called "Iron Bottom Sound" - painted as though the water had been removed and showing the location of no fewer than 13 warships, one aircraft and two beached freighters. As part of the caption states ".... that makes this one of the greatest submarine battlefields." Yes it is, and in this book it was all brought back to life by Dr Robert D. Ballard.
An excellent book by any standards.
NM
Price of Freedom Lies Between These Pages.......2002-11-12
The title above is what my great-uncle inscribed on the inside cover of this book. He is the Tommy Morris whose story is told in the pages of this book. Like many more famous sailors and soldiers, Uncle Tommy (who died only two weeks ago after a long decline, for those readers who might be interested)used to tell me and my grandfather (Tommy's brother) that it was impossible for him to think of people as "civilized" having seen how we turn our new discoveries and technology so easily to the unhappy task of killing each other. He also said to me once that his role in the Quincy sinking was that of a "damsel in distress".. which description was follwed by that sort of masculing deep-seated chuckle which only come forth from heroic men who have seen hell on earth.
I am biased, but I wer I not, I would still think this an excellent book!
Gary Morris
Great book on the warships lost in Iron Bottom Sound.......2001-09-15
Between August 1942 and February 1943, a land-sea and air battle was waged for an island in the south pacific called Guadalcanal. The six-month long battle for the island would be one of the definitive battles of the war. It was also one of the costliest. Thousands of Allied and Japanese soldiers died. And a channel north of the island had so many ships go down there that it was renamed Iron Bottom Sound.
It is possible that more men died in the waters off Guadalcanal then on the island itself. But for many years, most of the ships were out of reach to divers and eventually were all but forgotten. Then, in 1992, Oceanographer Robert Ballard, who had found the Titanic and the Bismarck, decided to explore the area using the latest in technology. It is quite an experience to see a past battlefield on land like Normandy, Pearl Harbor, Gettysburg or Guadalcanal itself. But the battlefields were obviously cleaned up afterward and don't look the way they did when the battle concluded. But time knows no boundaries in Iron Bottom Sound. The paintings by Ken Marshall and the photographs show many of the ships still upright on the ocean floor; Their guns and torpedo tubes still trained outward as if firing at a long gone enemy. But some of the ships are not so beautifully preserved. The Battleship Krishima, for example, lies upside down in two pieces on the ocean floor. And the Destroyer Barton is broken in half and lying on its side from two torpedoes. Nevertheless, most of the ships appear ready to rise up and continue fighting.
Lavishly illustrated and with a detailed text, The Lost Ships of Guadalcanal will make a welcome addition to the collection of any War, Naval or Shipwreck enthusiast (If you can find a copy that is).
A keystone in every maritime library.......2001-08-28
Dr. Bob Ballard discovered the Titanic in the mid 1980's using cutting-edge underwater technology. For this book, he turned that skill and knowledge to lead an expedition to examine the wrecks of one of the bloodiest naval battles of World War II, one so full of death and destruction that veterans of the battle gave the waters of Gualdalcanal the nickname of "Iron Bottom Sound" because of the number of ships and aircraft that lay underwater. Guadalcanal was the linchpin of American and Japanese military strategy for control of the south Pacific islands. The Americans controlled the airfield, but the Japanese controlled the island and the waters around it. The Japanese couldn't resupply its army because of attacks to its freighters by Allied aircraft and the Americans couldn't resupply its airfield because of attacks to its fleet of ships. In one single battle in the pitch-black darkness of night, the mighty Japanese fleet engaged a weaker American destroyer group where American guns were aimed by radar and Japanese guns were aimed by looking for the flashes from the American weapons. The American fleet was destroyed but it was a Pyhric victory because the Japanese supply ships failed to reach the starving Japanese troops on the island. Dr. Ballard does a remarkable job of capturing both the essence of the battle and the essence of underwater archeology to create a wonderful book filled with full-color pictures of the wrecks and period black-and-white pictures of the war. He also includes the fantastic paintings and maps in the style that has adorned his other books to show how the wrecks would look if there was absolute clarity underwater and with a "God's Eye". This book is one of the better ones I've found that deal with the ships of Guadalcanal and underwater archeology. I've noticed copies adorning the workbenches of many model-ship builders (including mine). Its a great gift idea and sure to please anyone interested in great battles, maritime history, WW2, underwater exploration, or tales of bravery (by those who fought and those who study the ocean).
Product Description
In May 1942 the Japanese landed on a number of southern islands in the British Solomons and began constructing an airfield on Guadalcanal. Their actions threatened Australia and her vital American supply lines and could not be tolerated by the Allies. The 1st Marine Division, with its attached 1st Marine Parachute Battalion, was directed to spearhead the assault on Gavutu Island and take the Guadalcanal airfield, even though it was not prepared for such an offensive action. The result was a bloodbath, and when it was over, less that one in five of the Marine paratroopers walked off Bloody Ridge.
Although crucial to the action, the 1st Parachute Battalion is rarely credited for its part in what Gen. Alexander A. Vandergrift, USMC, called the key battle of the Guadalcanal campaign. Here, James F. Christ draws not only on government documents but also on hundreds of hours of interviews with the men who were there to tell their remarkable story. It is a story of how in the face of overwhelming odds and seemingly irrational decisions from above, the battalion fought heroically, accepting orders without question and adapting to circumstances beyond its control despite sickness and a critical shortage of resources. In bringing public attention to the contributions made by these men during the first amphibious assault by U.S. forces in World War II, this book adds significantly to the history of the war in the Pacific.
Customer Reviews:
My favorite World War II book.......2007-05-07
I highly recommend reading this book! It is a gripping account of the 1st Marine Paratroopers at Gavutu, and Bloody Ridge on Guadalcanal. The author's style combines meticulous historical detail with the feel and emotion of a great novel. The author knows his subject, and in turn I got to know and care about these incredible, courageous marines. The battles are intense and you feel like you are right there. I also appreciated his ability to inject humor amid the heavy drama of the battle field. I also recommend his first book, Mission: Raise Hell, which follows the 2nd Marine Paratroopers diversionary raid on the island of Choiseul. Both are a great read!
A great read about a legend........2007-04-20
When I first noticed this book, I rushed to buy it, because my motivating thought was, "At last, someone wrote the story of the 1st Marine Parachute Battalion at Guadalcanal." Much has been written about the Guadalcanal campaign but little is available about the 1st Marine Parachute Battalion that participated in the bloodiest fighting of the campaign. This book walks the reader through two of the para-marine heroic battles. Battles where outnumbered Marines fought their way to victory at a cost that decimated the battalion.
The author has managed to find and interview the small number of remaining battalion survivors. His discussions with these survivors provides the author the ability to bring the reader down to the individual and small unit level and explain how their actions contributed to the fight.
At the beginning of the Second World War, the US Marines organization is rapidly expanding from two light regiments into division and corps size units. The reader discovers that most of the members of the parachute battalion have already served an enlistment before the war and before the battalion is formed. These men were professionals and experienced. Today's Marines will want to call them "Old Corps" but the Corps did not exist when most of these men enlisted. It is that experience and dedication the author captures in this book that provides the essence of victory.
This story is how Marines, out numbered, starved, sick and short supplied, managed to prevail over a numerically superior enemy in historically critical battles. As they say; "It is the stuff that makes legends." I think the author has provided a book for the record that truly captures the bravery of the Marines of the 1st Parachute Battalion and establishes their legend. The author not only captured what makes a great military unit, but also the essence of why men fight and win desperate battles.
"You are there" feelong........2007-04-18
This is an excellent book written in a style to make you feel like you are actually there. Knowing a Marine who was actually on Gavutu was the main reason I bought this book but I will be sure to purchase more from this author.
Book Description
The 1st Marine Division's defensive positions were set up as a horseshoe containing Henderson Field and its Cactus Air Force.
Customer Reviews:
A Vital Battle That Saved Guadalcanal.......2004-11-19
Fresh off of their victory at Midway in June, 1942, the Americans prepared for their first amphibious assult of the war. Intelligence showed that the Japanese were building an airfield on the island of Guadalcanal, located in the Solomon Islands. If the Japanese were allowed to complete construction of this airfield, they would be in position to threaten Australia and vital American supply lines. The joint chiefs, in July, 1942, made Guadalcanal their target. In the next six months, some of the most ferocious fighting of the Pacific war would occur, but one battle turned the tide and assured that Guadalcanal would not be re-captured by the Japanese. That battle became known as the battle for Bloody Ridge.
Bloody Ridge is an area of high ground about one mile from Henderson Field, the re-named airstrip which the Americans captured when they initially landed on Guadalcanal. Whoever held the high area would control the airstrip. For three bloody days in September, 1942, the Japanese and Americans fought ferociously and fanatically for control of the ridge.
The Japanese outnumbered the American marines approximately three to one, but the marines, led by such men as General Alexander Vandegrift and Colonel Merritt "Red Mike" Edson, held out and defended the ridge against these overwhelming odds. In the final analysis provided by author Michael S. Smith, it was imperative for the Americans to hold the ridge, for in Smith's opinion, a Japanese victory would have meant certain re-capture of the airstrip by the Japanese. Loss of the airstrip would have been disasterous for the Americans. The certain destruction of the American aircraft by the Japanese would have left the Americans defenseless in the air, but, fortunately for the Americans, they proved that they could defeat the famous Japanese jungle fighting soldier.
This is an excellent book. Author Michael S. Smith not only provides analysis of the American side, but he also goes in-depth in his analysis of the Japanese as well. He paints a vivid picture of the ordeals faced by both sides, such as lack of sufficient food and ammunition, as well as providing expert analysis of both Japanese and American plans for battle. The maps, tables, and photographs presented throughout the book were of great assistance for me in following the flow of the battle. I highly recommend this book. Read it and discover how a group of under-fed, low on ammunition American marines managed to hold off a superior Japanese force and ultimately turn the tide of battle in their favor.
Bloody Ridge:The Battle that Saved Guadalcanal.......2002-10-30
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
SHORTLY AFTER NIGHTFALL OF SEPTEMBER 13TH SOME ELEMENTS OF THE KAWGUCHI'S 35TH BRIGADE CAME RUSHING OUT OF THE UNDERBRUSH AND STRUCK THE CREST. THIS MOVEMENT WAS BY A VAN UNIT.IT WAS NOT UNTIL 2010 THAT MIXED FORCES BEGAN TO HIT THE MARINE LINES AND THE MAJOR BATTLE WAS ON. THE MARINE MUSCLE WAS ITS MACHINE GUNS, GRENADES,BARs AND PURE GUTS AND COURAGE THAT TOOK THE TOLL ON THE ADVANCING JAPANESE; THOSE WHO MADE IT HAD THEIR BAYONETS FIXED AS THEY MINGLED WITH THE DEFENDERS IN HAND TO HAND COMBAT. THE ORDERS WERE "DROP IT FIVE ZERO AND WALK IT BACK AND FORTH[LEFT TO RIGHT] ACROSS THE RIDGE." EDSON KNEW HOW HIGH THE STAKES WERE IN THIS DEADLY GAME. BEHIND HIM, ONLY A MILE FROM WHERE HE STOOD, WAS HENDERSON AIRFIELD. THE HILLS HAD TO BE HELD AT ALL COSTS, EDSON PICKED UP THE PHONE AND TOLD COLONEL THOMAS [1ST MARINE DIVISION CHEIF OF STAFF] "MY LOSSES HAVE BEEN HEAVY, I NEED MORE MEN."AT A DESPERATE POINT DURING THE NIGHT, HE [EDSON] WAS HEARD RALLYING, " RAIDERS, PARACHUTERS, ENGINEERS, ARTILLERYMEN, I DON'T GIVE A DAMN WHO YOU ARE. YOU ARE ALL MARINES, COME UP THIS HILL AND FIGHT." COL. MERRITT A. EDSON USMC RECEIVED THE MEDAL OF HONOR FOR HIS COMMAND PART AND A GREAT, NUMBER OF MARINES WHO WERE THERE RECEIVED THE NAVY CROSS, THE MARINE CORPS SECOND HIGHEST HONOR.
SMITH HAS DETAILED THIS BATTLE BY BLENDING THE INVOLVEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL JAPANESE UNITS AND THEIR PARTICIANTS; SOMETHING FEW AUTHORS HAD ACCOMPLISHED. HE COVERS BEFORE THE ACTION AND THE AFTERMATH WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE BATTERED JAPANESE CRAWLING BACK TO THE REFUGE OF THE MATANIKAU RIVER BASIN.
Stanley C. Jersey, author,Hell's Islands: A Fresh Prospective on the Guadalcanal Campaign.
Why the battle has to be won.......2001-04-20
For any historian, there is a constant struggle between what to include in any writing and what to leave out. Michael Smith has attempted to solve this problem by keeping his focus relatively discrete; he doesn't try to bite off too much.
The Battle of Bloody Ridge, Sept. 13-15, 1942 was indeed crucial to winning Guadalcanal and Smith does an excellent job of showing the reader why. What is more compelling is his description of what a close-run victory it was. There were many opportunities for the Japanese forces to defeat the US. How those chances were lost makes the overall story more enthralling.
For the most part, Smith is a good writer but he falls into the manner for writing for the professional military man. This style hurts his narrative as might be read by the general public. Those of you who have read the historical journals published by the three services will understand. He is hampered by a tendency to name all the officers leading particular units prior to telling what happened. Frequently, it's the only time the names appear and, hence, begs the question of why mention them at all.
Quibbles aside, this is an excellent book and tells an important story which more people should read.
Why the battle has to be won.......2001-04-20
For any historian, there is a constant struggle between what to include in any writing and what to leave out. Michael Smith has attempted to solve this problem by keeping his focus relatively discrete; he doesn't try to bite off too much.
The Battle of Bloody Ridge, Sept. 13-15, 1942 was indeed crucial to winning Guadalcanal and Smith does an excellent job of showing the reader why. What is more compelling is his description of what a close-run victory it was. There were many opportunities for the Japanese forces to defeat the US. How those chances were lost makes the overall story more enthralling.
For the most part, Smith is a good writer but he falls into the manner for writing for the professional military man. This style hurts his narrative as might be read by the general public. Those of you who have read the historical journals published by the three services will understand. He is hampered by a tendency to name all the officers leading particular units prior to telling what happened. Frequently, it's the only time the names appear and, hence, begs the question of why mention them at all.
Quibbles aside, this is an excellent book and tells an important story which more people should read.
Great book!.......2001-01-24
After reading Frank's work "Guadalcanal", this book should be next on your list in describing the most important battle in the Solomon's campaign. Done with great detail, and vivid first hand accounts (including the Japanese, bravo Mr. Smith), this book is to the history about Guadalcanal that "The Thin Red Line" is to the fiction of it. Mr. Smith has a keen eye for the naval movements that shaped the battle (as a Naval officer their is no doubt he is an expert), as well as the role of (or lack of) airpower played in the battle. Very quick and enjoyable.
Book Description
John Hersey (1914–93) was a correspondent for Time and Life magazines when in 1942 he was sent to cover Guadalcanal, the largest of the Solomon Islands in the Western Pacific. While there, Hersey observed a small battle upon which Into the Valley is based. While the battle itself was not of great significance, Hersey gives insightful details concerning the jungle environment, recounts conversations among the men before, during, and after battle, and describes how the wounded were evacuated as well as other works of daily heroism.
Customer Reviews:
War is Hell.......2007-09-25
That's the bottom-line message of this short, artfully written book by a distinguished writer who served as a war correspondent in the Pacific early in his career.
America had no choice but to fight World War II, and the Marines profiled in this book had to be where they were. But Hersey shows you the war from close up, not from the lofty vantage point of the generals, with their maps, strategic theories and neatly prepared statistical tables.
These are real people being blown to bits. Human lives and humanity itself are expendable in the quest for a few yards of territory.
You will come away from this book hating war, however necessary it may be under certain circumstances.
The same author capped off his message some years later with his classic account of the Hiroshima bombing and its aftermath. If you haven't read that one, your education isn't complete.
Great for what it is.......2007-04-06
I was pretty surprised by how short this book was -- not counting illustrations, there are maybe 45-50 pages of content here. That said, it gives a really good perspective on being in battle and how the every-day must have been. It feels a little "cleaned up" and therefore slightly propagandistic (e.g., no one swears, no one is lazy, everyone is helpful to the writer, etc.), but for me at least, that's also helpful in understanding the time and place. The other issue is that you never for a moment forget that this is being written by a journalist (and not by an infantryman) -- the book never pretends to be anything else, though, and the reporter's POV is still useful and in some ways perhaps better for its "objective" third-partyness.
All-in-all, worthwhile for anyone interested in the subject matter.
bkd
Told As It Was.......2003-09-01
Please do not be put off by fours stars: this is a superb book about early WWII written by someone who 'was there'. The lack of a fifth star merely reflects my desire to have seen a longer, even more in-depth, book. I was born in 1950, so my knowledge of those days is gained mostly by people like John Hersey. Also, my uncle (and namesake) was a member of Edson's Raiders--and he was there, too. I have had the great good fortune to have met many of the Raiders and others on Guadalcanal and I find "Into the Valley" to be most accurate of the descriptions told to me by these veterans. All human, the Marines had to draw on their training and leadership to get themselves through the bitter fighting and to prevail against unsettling odds on Guadalcanal. Hersey allows us to see the Marines as human--young boys and men, for the most part. He paints success and he paints failure with an honest brush. This is a "must read" for anyone interested in WWII and the South Pacific.
Book Description
Beginning with detailed descriptions of the history of the aircraft carrier, the development of carrier-air tactics, the training of carrier pilots, and numerous operational considerations that defined the way carrier battles had to be fought, Carrier Clash takes the reader into the air with brave U. S. Navy fighter pilots as they protect their ships and the Guadalcanal invasion fleet against determined Japanese air attacks on August 7 and 8, 1942. Next, Hammel sets the stage for the August 24 Battle of the Eastern Solomons, by putting the reader right into the cockpits of the U. S. Navy Dauntless dive-bombers as they drive on the Imperial Navy light carrier Ryujo - and hit the ship with 500-pound bombs! Carrier Clash is the definitive combat history of the Battle of the Eastern Solomons' third battle (of only five) between American and Japanese aircraft carriers. Had the Navy failed in this battle against the Japanese fleet, the 1st Marine Division's invasion of Guadalcanal would have been defeated almost before it began.About the AuthorEric Hammel is the author of almost thirty works of military history. He is also a frequent contributor to various military journals including Marine Corps Gazette and is currently working on an illustrated history of the Marine Corps in World War II to be published by Zenith Press. Hammel lives in northern California near San Francisco.
Customer Reviews:
Meticulous Military History.......2005-12-25
Despite the book's title this is really a history of the Solomons campaing up to the battle of the Eastern Solomons, the first carrier to carrier clash of the campaign. It certainly has its center of gravity placed on the operations of the American carriers, but includes much of the actions of both navies in and around the slot, the fighting on the ground, and the aerial duels between the Japanese coming out of Rabaul and the Cactus air force.
Foremost this book is an account of what happened in a very comperehensive manner. After explaining the aircraft and ships the Japanese and Americans possesed, and delving into an interesting comparison of their air wing make ups and tactics, the author takes you chronologically through the Solomons campaign.
The reason this book only merited four stars instead of five is that sometimes this can be a bit dry. There's a lot of " . . . and then at 1350 the Wasp launched two more Hellcats on CAP. At 1415 a Mavis was shot down by a Hellcat from the Enterprise. Japanese records indicate that this was from their base in the Shortland Islands. At 1430 four planes from the Hornet CAP returned to refuel. At 1435 planes from the Wasp sighted another Mavis but were unable to pursue it. At 1440 . . . " Stretch this amount of minute by minute detail out over several weeks worth of operations and you get a sense of what the book is about, and it's a marvel it's not longer.
This might be slow at some points but it does allow some interesting insights that many other more easily read, and more exciting books can obscure. First is the sometimes monotomy and boredom of war. Second is the ridiculous degree to which kills of enemy aircraft and ships were overstated during the battles that occured. By comparing accounts of both sides the author makes it clear that most engagements resulted in fewer losses than the participants thought took place. (Clearly the engagements must have been emotionally draining and fierce.) If the after action reports are to have been believed it would seem as though the Japanese thought they wiped out the entire American force several times over and vice versa.
Certainly interesting for people with a passion for WWII history, especially the pacific campaign, but too much like pure history to really recommend for the casual reader.
The Story of What the Carriers Did at Guadalcanal.......2005-04-23
The Invasion of Guadalcanal and the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, August 1942.
The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was history's third carrier clash. A collision of U.S. Navy and Imperial Navy carriers in the wake of the invasion of Guadalcanal--whose airfield the United States desperately needed and the Japanese desperately wanted back--the battle was waged at sea and over Guadalcanal's besieged Marine-held Lunga Perimeter on August 24, 1942.
These battles were the result of the US deciding to draw the line in the pacific at the Solomons. If the Japanese had been able to complete the airfield on Guadalcanal, their planes would have been able to prevent the sailing of ships to Australia via the Pacific. So it was here that the Americans drew the line. Before the Guadalcanal battle the Americans fought the Battle of the Coral Sea stopping the Japanese southern advance.
Remember that this was a time before the Americans brought out their newer aircraft. This battle was fought with Wildcats against Zeros. And the dive bombers were the old SBD Dauntless.
This is not a history of Guadalcanal or of the overall place of this battle in the war, it is as the title says, a description of the carrier vs. carrier battles. This is only part of the story, but it is well told here.
Not a companion book, but anyone interested in the stopping of the Japanese advances should also read the new Australian book "A Bastard of a Place." This covers the stopping of the Japanese advance across Papua New Guina a fierce and deciscive battle little known in the US.
Richly detailed.......2001-07-02
CARRIER CLASH is the first of a two book set detailing the campaign in the Solomons from Aug-Oct 1942. The reader is familiarized with aircraft carrier doctrine, operations, and the aircraft types used by both combatants. The book takes the reader through the opening operation (the initial landings on Guadalcanal)right through to the Battle of the Eastern Solomons in late August. As in the second volume CARRIER STRIKE, this book follows an almost minute-by-minute account of the tension and confusion of aerial combat.The reader is thrust into the midst of the action. I was hardly able to put the book down.
Long on detail, short on analysis.......2000-05-29
The man has definitely done his research - this is the most detailed account I've ever read of any Pacific theatre battle.
However, although the book describes Guadalcanal and the battle of the Eastern Solomons, Savo Island is all but ignored. There is no discussion of the significance of the battle, nor even of who won it! Essentially, the book stops when the fighting did, which is a bit odd.
If you like blood-and-thunder dogfight anecdotes you'll like this book, but some more of the big picture would have been nice.
Historically accurate! Entertaining! Engrossing!.......1998-08-14
This book details a small section of history from World War 2. It describes the equipment, the men and the battles, but it does it in such a way that you are unable to put the book down. By the time you've finished you have a feeling of some of what it must have been like to be involved in the struggle for that 'terrible' island. You also begin to believe that you know the men who fought there. This book is unmissable.
Customer Reviews:
A Riveting Story of Brave Men.......2007-07-13
In early 1942 the Japanese were lords of the Pacific, the Zero the best fighter plane between Tokyo and London and Emperial navy seemingly unstoppable. Lundstrom's story of the first year of the Pacific War and the Navy pilots who first flew from US carriers to blunt the spread of the Empire and take the first steps on the road to victory is by far the best that I have read. As other reviewers have said, Lundstrom's research of the details of the air battles, from both the US and Japanese sides, is unrivaled. His ability to weave these details into a gripping story in which the characters come to life is just as unique. This book and his first volume about Coral Sea and Midway are the kind that you don't want to finish because they are so good.
The bravery of these American flyers comes across well, but so does the the tension (and occasional humor) of this first full year of combat in the Pacific. The F4F-4 Wildcat was a well built, strong plane but could not compete with the Zeke in manuverability or speed. Yet the "First Team" flew their Wildcats from carriers and Guadalcanal's Henderson Field, held their own or better and started the distruction of the Japanese's veteran pilot cadre.
The fact that 10 of 34 pilots from VF-5 (the carrier squadron that flew along side the Marines from Henderson in late summer/early fall '42) were killed or seriously wounded shows that the attrition rate among these pilots was high and points to their bravery and endurance.
Mechanical problems with the F4F-4, bad weather, inhospitable islands, and the endless Pacific Ocean were added to the skilled and agressive opponents to make flying a Navy fighter plane a tough occupation. These flyers were truely a special breed.
You won't find a better told tale of the first year of the Pacific War anywhere. Lundstrom focuses only on the Naval pilots and their battles for more than 500 pages mand it's a tactical story in the truest sense. If you're tired of reading military history that never gets you out of the Admiral's cabin or Washington DC and London, this is for you. "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign" is a terrific read. Highly recommended.
One of the best books on a campaign in the Pacific War.......2007-01-10
Although this book concentrates on U.S. Navy fighter combat during the first four months of the Guadalcanal campaign, it gives so many details of associated events that it should be read by anyone interested in the entire Guadalcanal campaign itself. This book also does a great job of giving details of the Japanese side, even to the point of naming most of the individual Japanese pilots involved in combat with the U.S. Navy and Marines around Guadalcanal. The only criticism (and this is slight criticism) I have of this book is Lundstrom's strong defence, for whatever reason, of Fletcher's actions during the initial part of the campaign which have been heavily criticized by just about every other historian. But, I guess it stands to reason that at least one credible historian would find a reason to defend Fletcher.
Anyway, if I were to name the top three books about the Guadalcanal campaign, this would be one of them along with Richard Frank's "Guadalcanal, the Definitive Account" and Michael Smith's "Bloody Ridge."
First Team Scores Again!.......2007-01-03
The First Team - Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway
and
The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign
John B. Lundstrom
Naval Institute Press
I have been studying naval aviation combat since the early 1960s, and I have never come across a book half so comprehensive, from a historical basis - nor half so useful, from a modeling perspective - as this two-volume set recently reprinted by the Naval Institute Press. The title - "The First Team" - refers to US Naval Aviator fighter pilots who were in service at the start of World War II; a convenient way of focusing on naval fighter combat from December 7, 1941 to the end of the Guadalcanal campaign in early February, 1943. This was a time when the F4F Wildcat bore the brunt of the aerial warfare - a few F2A Buffalo fighters served in the Navy during this time-frame, but the only Buffalos that saw combat were serving with the Marines (who are outside the scope of this two-volume study).
This book covers literally every incident of aerial combat that included US Navy fighter aircraft from December 7 through the end of Guadalcanal. I mean EVERY incident, every American shoot-down (and every American shot down) and every American carrier attack on a Japanese island target fought during the first 14 months of the war in the Pacific: the Wake relief force, the Gilbert, Marshall and Marcus Island raids, the assault on Rabaul, and the attacks on Tulagi, Lae and Salamaua - and of course, Guadalcanal. The books also cover every carrier vs. carrier battle that was fought in the Pacific before 1944: Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. In short, The First Team two-volume book is incredibly comprehensive. Maps and charts illustrate each battle, each significant combat incident, each movement of carriers and air groups - the detail is remarkable. Author John Lundstrom makes these battles come alive in ways that no other history I've read have been able to accomplish. But for all their value as pure history, these books go way beyond that.
For instance, The First Team covers combat tactics - the prime reason why the vastly-inferior F4F-4 Wildcat was able to best the incredible Japanese Zero in almost every encounter (including decisive victories at Midway and Guadalcanal). Pre-war, the US Naval air service - alone among the world's air forces - trained its pilots to successfully use deflection shooting, permitting pilots to attack from beam positions, instead of just from directly astern. To perform a deflection-shooting attack successfully, the pilot couldn't aim at the target; instead, he had to aim for where the plane would be when the bullets arrived.
Deflection shooting is a kind of lead-the-target targeting performed by duck hunters and skeet shooters; a process vastly complicated in aerial combat because both the attacker and the target are moving at several hundred miles per hour, generally in different planes. However, when successfully executed, deflection attacks are almost unbeatable. This kind of deflection shooting permitted American Naval fighter pilots to attack the enemy with limited risk of counter-battery fighter from defending aircraft. Deflection attacks were decisive in attacks on bomber aircraft, but this approach also gave U.S. Naval aviators a significant advantage over the more maneuverable and - at most altitudes - faster Japanese fighters.
Other tactical elements explored in great detail were the comparative tactical formations - American transition from four-aircraft divisions to two-aircraft divisions while the Japanese held onto the far more awkward and inflexible three-plane formations - as well as the evolution of the "Thatch Weave," a mutually-supportive defensive formation the Japanese were never able to effectively counter.
The First Team also looks - in depth - at the training of Japanese and US Naval aviators. In 1941, Japanese naval aviators were, man-for-may, the best-trained pilots in the world, yet thanks to different tactical approaches, they were consistently outfought, first by well-trained US Naval Aviators and later even by grass-green Ensigns not long out of advanced training programs. Training and organization were critical - Japanese were taught to move in units of three aircraft, and to take advantage of their aircraft's incredible maneuverability.
American Naval Aviators were trained in deflection gunnery, in pilot-wingman cooperation and in emphasizing mutually-supporting defensive tactics culminating in the unbeatable Thatch Weave - which remarkably was under development before the outbreak of the war, though "conventional wisdom" has held that Commander John "Jimmy" Thatch developed the mutual-support tactics in response to initial combat with the Japanese.
Another factor that The First Team explored which worked against the Japanese was the very different organizational structure of the two countries' carrier air groups. In the US Navy, carrier air groups were fungible organizations - new squadrons and new pilots could be shuffled through the air groups, and these groups could be shuffled from carrier to carrier as needed. By contrast, Japanese carrier air groups trained as a unit, and were permanently assigned to a specific aircraft carrier.
When a Japanese group suffered significant combat casualties, not only were the individual squadrons no longer combat-capable, but the carrier itself was out of the battle. As a result, after the bloody draw at Coral Sea, surviving Naval aviators from the sunken Lexington were able to go back into combat onboard the Yorktown at Midway - less than a month later - effectively replacing losses the Yorktowners suffered at Coral Sea with combat-tested pilots. Even though the Yorktown had been badly damaged, it was patched together and able to field a combat-ready air group that proved decisive at Midway less than a month later.
However, as explained in The First Team's assessment of Japan's carrier air group organization, the Zuikaku - which, unlike the surviving Yorktown, was undamaged but which also suffered heavy pilot losses - was unable to serve at Midway because the Zuikaku's carrier air group had been decimated, and a carrier without an air group is little more than a target. Although sufficient combat-experienced pilots from the heavily-damaged Shokaku had survived and were at least technically available, because of a long-standing organizational policy, the Japanese were unable to restore the Zuikaku's group.
Instead, both air groups had to be restored to full combat capability only after receiving infusions of trainees, which required a long work-up period. The Yorktown's presence at Midway was decisive; the absence of Zuikaku was at least potentially just as decisive. Had two Japanese carriers - Zuikaku and Hiryu - survived the first devastating US Naval attack, their return strike may have done more than just knock out the Yorktown.
The books even get into fascinating controversies, such as the odd decision to put six .50 caliber machine guns into the Navy's new folding-wing F4Fs, even though they'd add a further weight penalty that would - along with the weight of the wing-fold mechanism -cripple the Wildcat's climb, range and overall combat capabilities. The early-war fixed-wing F4F-3 carried four .50 caliber machine guns - which US Navy fighter leaders felt was sufficient to knock down unarmored Japanese bombers and fighters. However, the fixed wing took up deck and hanger space and sharply limited the number of fighters a carrier could handle. With fighter squadrons growing from 18 to 27 to 36 aircraft, the need for folding wings was essential, even though the weight penalty imposed by the folding mechanism would inevitably degrade performance.
The initial decision to go with six .50 caliber guns in a folding-wing Wildcat was made by the British Fleet Air Arm, which did not routinely face fighter-to-fighter combat - minimizing the need for high-end performance - yet rightly felt it needed the heavier firepower inherent in six .50 calibers to swiftly knock down armored and well-armed German and Italian bombers. Oddly, instead of listening to their own fighter leaders, the US Navy's "Brass Hats" listened to the Brits, and decided - in the name of production efficiency - to standardize on the British design.
The result was the F4F-4 - a sluggish, slow-climbing short-range fighter which had six .50 caliber machine guns but fewer total rounds of ammo (and, therefore, a much shorter firing time) than the older F4F-3. This plane had a harder time climbing to a decisive altitude. It had difficulty conducting CAPs of more than a couple of hours or escorting bombers farther than 175 miles; and when it did find targets, this new Wildcat all-too-quickly ran out of ammunition. When front-line Naval Aviators complained about being asked to fight what was arguably the best carrier planes in the world with an increasingly second-string fighter plane, the Navy Brass in Washington told these front-line troops to fly their Wildcats with a 2/3rds fuel load and two unloaded guns - absurd advice to pilots who knew they needed every bullet and every gallon of gas every time they went head-to-head in combat with the best-trained naval aviators in the world, the Japanese.
These limiting factors for the new F4F clearly had an impact in the loss of the Yorktown at Midway, as well as the loss of so many torpedo planes at that same battle - and these F4F deficiencies may have also contributed to the loss of the Hornet at the Battle of Santa Cruz four months later. Nobody from the greenest Naval Aviation Ensign all the way up to Admiral Chester Nimitz had a good thing to say about the F4F-4 - but it was only after the end of the Guadalcanal campaign that the General Motors-built FM-1 reverted to a four-gun armament - too late to face down the Japanese.
Yet remarkably, the US Navy seldom fought the Japanese head-to-head without coming out on the winning end. Ultimately, the Wildcat scored a three-to-one winning margin over the Japanese - not because the Wildcat was a better fighter aircraft, though it did have some advantages, but because American Naval Aviators had better tactics, from the two-plane division to the Thatch Weave.
As noted, while it had dramatically shorter range, at least a marginally lower speed at most altitudes - and it was far less maneuverable than the Zero - the Wildcat that fought the Japanese from December 7, 1941 to February, 1943 did have some significant advantages over its adversary. The Grumman was solidly built - earning for its manufacturer the affectionate nickname "Grumman Iron Works." The Grumman fighter was also well-armored (at least where it counted), and - early in the war - it began to receive functional self-sealing fuel tanks that would absorb a 7.7 millimeter (.30 caliber) Japanese machine-gun bullet.
While it was slow to climb, the Wildcat could dive like a bat out of hell - given enough altitude, American Naval Aviators could always break off combat with Japanese Zeros - and given an initial altitude advantage (hard to come by, but not impossible to achieve), the Wildcat could initiate combat - attack Zeros and other Japanese aircraft - with no recourse by the Japanese. They couldn't escape a diving Wildcat; they could turn and fight, but couldn't run away.
Further, in a head-to-head attack, the Wildcat's rugged structure and .50 caliber armament (either four-gun or six-gun) easily outmatched their Japanese adversaries. The Japanese Zero's 20 mm cannons were low-velocity weapons useful only at short range; the longer-ranged Japanese 7.7 mm (.30 caliber) machine guns had too little hitting power to ensure a quick victory over the Wildcat. On the other hand, the standard American .50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns were fast-firing, long-ranged and hard-hitting enough to knock down any Japanese fighter - or bomber - they could hit.
All of these factors were covered in fascinating detail in The First Team, making them a feast of information, insight and factual data for the historian - and the history buff.
Beyond that, the two "First Team" volumes also offer a great deal to modelers. Each book is heavily illustrated with contemporary photos which show evolving markings on US Navy fighters. Not a few of these photos will also offer modelers display and deck-handling diorama ideas.
In addition, Appendix 3 of The First Team and Appendix 4 of The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign each features side-view profiles of F4F fighters in use during the time periods covered by the books. Together, these let modelers authoritatively paint-and-mark virtually any F4F that fought off one of the USN fleet carriers during the first year of the war - including carrier-based planes that temporarily served on Guadalcanal. With the recent spate of new F4F Wildcat releases in 1/32nd scale (including the soon-to-be-here Trumpeter Wildcat), this kind of reference will prove invaluable to modelers.
Bottom line: These two books are remarkable. For those interested in carrier-based fighter combat during the dark early days of World War II in the Pacific, these are "must-reads." The books have been released in Trade Paperback format by the US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland - it's also available from Amazon.com.
Another excellent job by Lundstrom!.......2006-02-28
An excellent follow-up to the "First team". Written in the same style as his previous work, this is the only book you need if you are interested in Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons and day-to-day operations on Guadalcanal.
It is well known the Japanese were hard pressed to provide enough quantities of aircraft and qualified pilots even before the Midway operation. But Lundstrom shows just how critical this same situation was for the US during the Solomons campaign.
What is surprising is what a poor job Japanese fighter pilots did in protecting the bombers they were assigned to escort. Had they done a better job this campaign could have been much more costly for the US.
WWII Aviation Wonks - Lundstrom is your man.......2005-06-18
If you are a casual reader of World War II books, this is NOT the book for you, but if you are a wonk, then you'll love this book and John Lundstrom's companion book which covers the time period of Pearl Harbor to Midway. What sets Lundstrom apart is that he has taken the time to get to know virtually all of the pilots (on both sides) who fought in the Pacific battles in 1942. A theme that runs through both books is that each side had a small fraternity of pilots, and everybody knew each other. These pilots ("The First Team") held the line through the Guadalcanal campaign. Those that replaced them generally did not have the same level of skill.
Lundstrom is good at separating myths from the facts. He must either read Japanese or have a great collaboration with someone who does because his research through Japanese sources is the best that I've seen.
One interesting fact brought to light by Lundstrom: in terms of fighter-to-fighter combat through the Guadalcanal campaign, the A6M Zero and the F4F Wildcat effectively fought to a draw. If you see a reference on the F4F claiming a 5/1 kill ratio or something like that, it is likely based on inflated claims and claims against bombers and seaplanes. The biggest difference between the two types statistically is that a F4F pilot was much more likely to survive the downing of his plane. More of the United State's first team survived to fight again and to train other pilots to fight.
Japan made a mistake in trying to achieve air superiority over Guadalcanal from Rabaul, which is over 500 miles away. Just because the Model 21 Zero could fly that far and fight doesn't mean that it was a good idea to make it a regular practice. The distance was a big factor in the pilot attrition that eventually crippled the Japanese Naval Air Force.
I have no idea how many hours John Lundstrom put in to writing each of these books. I do know that the hours you spend reading them (and in my case re-reading them) will be well-spent.
Books:
- Jewish and Russian Revolutionaries Exiled to Siberia, 1901-1917 (Jewish Studies)
- Julius Caesar (New Folger Library Shakespeare)
- Kaplan ASVAB, 2007 Edition: The Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (Kaplan Asvab)
- Learning Perl, Fourth Edition
- Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson and His Times, 1908-1960 Volume 1 (Lone Star Rising)
- Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg--And Why It Failed
- Manchild in the Promised Land
- Manhunt: The 12-Day Chase for Lincoln's Killer (P.S.)
- Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany
- Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany
Books Index
Books Home
Recommended Books
- Get Your Ship Together: Be The Captain of Your Subconscious Mind!
- The Poe Shadow: A Novel
- High Access Home: Design and Decoration for Barrier-Free Living
- Nutrition: From Science To Life
- Primates and Philosophers: How Morality Evolved
- The Official Guide for GMAT Review, 11th Edition
- The Hand of Justice
- Kitchens and Baths
- Old and New: Combining Past and Present in Contemporary Homes
- Adaptations and Responses of Woody Plants to Environmental Stresses
Japanese
| Ethnic & National
| Biographies & Memoirs
| Subjects
| Books
Tales From a Tin Can: The USS Dale from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay
The U.S. Navy Against the Axis: Surface Combat, 1941-1945
Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway
Battle Line: The United States Navy, 1919-1939
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor: The Imperial Japanese Navy and the United States
