Book Description
A fascinating narrative-and a bold new thesis in the study of the Civil War-that suggests Robert E. Lee had a heretofore undiscovered strategy at Gettysburg that, if successful, could have crushed the Union forces and changed the outcome of the war.
The Battle of Gettysburg is the pivotal moment when the Union forces repelled perhaps America's greatest commander-the brilliant Robert E. Lee, who had already thrashed a long line of Federal opponents-just as he was poised at the back door of Washington, D.C. It is the moment in which the fortunes of Lee, Lincoln, the Confederacy, and the Union hung precariously in the balance.
Conventional wisdom has held to date, almost without exception, that on the third day of the battle, Lee made one profoundly wrong decision. But how do we reconcile Lee the high-risk warrior with Lee the general who launched "Pickett's Charge," employing only a fifth of his total forces, across an open field, up a hill, against the heart of the Union defenses? Most history books have reported that Lee just had one very bad day. But there is much more to the story, which Tom Carhart addresses for the first time.
With meticulous detail and startling clarity, Carhart revisits the historic battles Lee taught at West Point and believed were the essential lessons in the art of war-the victories of Napoleon at Austerlitz, Frederick the Great at Leuthen, and Hannibal at Cannae-and reveals what they can tell us about Lee's real strategy. What Carhart finds will thrill all students of history: Lee's plan for an electrifying rear assault by Jeb Stuart that, combined with the frontal assault, could have broken the Union forces in half. Only in the final hours of the battle was the attack reversed through the daring of an unproven young general-George Armstrong Custer.
Lost Triumph will be one of the most captivating and controversial history books of the season.
Customer Reviews:
What's wrong with a little speculation?.......2007-07-19
First of all, I definitely recommend this book. I think a lot of the people giving it a bad review are being far too harsh.
I say that even though I also take issue with certain parts.
To begin with, I find it very hard to accept that Lee would not tell Longstreet that he intended to have Stuart attack the center of the Union line from the rear. I should think it would be rather vital that the commanders leading the charge be aware that once they got over the wall, they might see Stuart's cavalry approaching from the OPPOSITE direction. Otherwise, it would be a natural response in the dense smoke and confusion of battle for attacking Confederates to assume they were Union cavalry and fire upon them.
I should certainly think that Lee would be particularly sensitive to this, considering the fact that he recently lost his best subordinate, Jackson, in a similar "friendly fire" circumstance.
Since we know from his criticisms after the war that Longstreet did not know of any such plan of Lee's, the author argues that Lee did not inform Longstreet, due possibly to a combination of his irritation with Longstreet, his strong inclination for secrecy, and Lee's supposed principle that Longstreet did not need to know. Yet I simply can't believe this wouldn't fall into the category of "need to know."
I also have a problem with what I feel is the author's tendency to oversimplify when he speculates about people's motivations and thought processes.
There are other quibbles, of minor importance. Still, this book is a very worthy read. While people can (and will) argue the particulars endlessly, in the long view this theory makes a whole lot of sense. While the theory is far from proven, it is eminently worthy of serious consideration and further research by scholars and buffs.
And even if it isn't true, what's wrong with a little educated speculation? It's not as though he's suggesting that space aliens murdered JFK.
Very Speculative... and A Major Historical Error.......2007-04-30
Much material has already been presented concerning the speculative nature of much of the "evidence" presented here. Some of that speculated evidence seems simply beyond belief for Lee's normal reputation of dealing with his immediate subordinates in a normally open and his infamous non micromanager style of leadership (i.e., things like that Lee didn't tell Longstreet what the real plan was because Longstreet "didn't have a need to know" - that sounds more like Thomas Jackson's style by far - OR that Lee was miffed at Longstreet because Longstreet "had been surly" the last few days... give me a break!).
Even assuming that this was in fact "the" legitimate plan, performing it in this fashion still contained simply way too many fatal flaws.
The Northern forces were dug in and not threatening any offensive moves. And their central position - which had not been attacked at all on Day Two - was easily their strongest position. In addition it not only contained significant artillery resources but was very readily capable of being reinforced by yet even more artillery much more quickly than either flank could.
It would have made much more sense for Lee to have held his center with a relatively minor force (like he did at Chancellorsville) and overloaded his right flank and then on Day Three envelope the Northern left flank with an assault from their rear - which would have also threatened not only the Union's left rear (as would also be concurrently happening on the Union right rear flank), but would have threatened to cut off the Taneytown Pike LOC at the same time that Ewell's forces (on the other side) were slamming closed the LOC of the Baltimore Pike on the Union's right flank.
Each maneuver element would then have been able to deploy forces simultaneously into the Union rear while also "rolling up
both Union flanks towards the center. Stuarts cavalry force could then have had the option of "slamming closed the rear door" well to the east of the Federal cavalry (i.e., continuing to ride around the Federal army to the east and then to the south intercepting the Baltimore Pike ahead of the retreating / routed Union forces) OR could have been used in a "pursuit role" (once the Federal cavalry force was moved to the south in an attempt to stand-in-place and cover the withdrawing Federal army).
The plan - as given - presumes a breakthrough of the "penetration" type against the strongest point of the Union line - BEFORE the Confederate cavalry penetration into the rear of the Union forces at the breakthrough point. Much is made of the Confederate forces on the left flank rolling up the Union right towards that breakthrough point whilst the remnants of the breakthrough - not all as some have to stay in place to maintain the breakthrough opening, then turn south and start rolling up the Union line from the center towards the Union left flank anchor (Big Round Top). That plan of action presumes too many "ifs" and "maybes" and assumes no survival response by the Union forces. Even had this plan worked as orchestrated, the Union forces SOUTH of the breakthrough would have simply retreated southward along the still open Taneytown Pike Road. The Northern forces would have lost pretty much all of Howard's Corps and a major portion of Hancock's Corps... but a good part of Hancock's Corps as well as most of Sickle's Corps, Sykes' Corps, and Sedgwick's Corps would have been able to successfully extricate themselves with a withdrawal south and / or then southeast.
A double-flanking movement (as was used at the Battle of Cannae - not this type of plan)would have been more in line with the Battle of Cannae that seems to be what the the author is proposing was Lee's "real" (but "secret") plan. And I specifically refer - in my option - not to a movement that simply attacks head on the opponent's flank positions, but enveloping them with attacks simultaneously to their sides and rear areas as Jackson did at Chancellorsville.
But it was in the discussion - early in the book, Chapter four - where the author made a major error of serious significance concerning military history as regards that battle. An error that basically "blew it" for me. In fact, I was quite surprised that the reviewer who was a "historian by training" didn't immediately catch it - and catch it in horror!
First of all (but not the major point) was that the author has the figures completely wrong. I have checked a number of sources and find no major historical figures (i.e., Polybius, Livy, etc.) who reveal those particular numbers that the author uses.
The general consensus is that the Romans (who maintained very excellent and accurate records) had a total of 80,000 + troops. Approximately 10,000 troops were left behind to guard the main camp when the main Roman army deployed on the plain to face Hannibal. The deployed Roman force consisted of 55,000 Heavy Infantry (Roman Hoplites), about 9,000 Light Infantry (auxiliary units of primarily sling-throwers but also some allied archers) and 6,000 cavalry. The Carthaginian forces (deployed) consisted of 32,000 Heavy Infantry, 8,000 Light Infantry (slingers and archers), and 10,000 cavalry. At least the author DOES show the correct placement of the opposing forces - and their subsequent movements during the battle (with the exception of not reflecting the Numidian cavalry's continued pursuit of the Roman cavalry thereby allowing Hasdrubal's Carthaginian cavalry to return to the main battlefield and seal off the rear of the Roman army thereby effectively completing the full envelopment of the main Roman force.
But the MAIN error in describing the battle and inferring it being a major reason in the defeat of th Romans was the author's commentary that the Roman army was "arrayed in a rigid phalanx" ... "their front covered by rows of shields from which loomed menacing lances... "!!!!! The author immediately revealed a complete lack of understanding of the Roman army and the tactics of Roam warfare. The author was clearly confusing the Roman army and tactics with that of the Greek and Macedonian armies from CENTURIES before the Roman army developed completely DIFFERENT battle tactics...
"A phalanx is a rectangular mass military formation, usually composed entirely of heavy infantry armed with spears (note: NOT lances... lances are cavalry spears), pikes (simply longer spears - but still not "lances"), or similar weapons. The troops were disciplined to hold a line which created a nearly impenetrable forest of points to the front. The phalanx is a hallmark of ancient Greek warfare. Most authorities date the formation of the hoplite phalanx of ancient Greece to the around the 7th century BC in Sparta (about 600-700 years BEFORE the Battle of Cannae). The (Greek / Macedonian hoplite) phalanx was a formation in which the hoplites would line up in ranks, usually no less than four deep, in very close order. In this formation, the hoplites would lock their shields together, and the first few ranks of soldiers would project their spears out over the first rank of shields, to try to gain the upper hand in the battle early on and as a result, allowing for the first three or so ranks of spearmen to engage their spears against the enemy. Therefore, one might say that the phalanx was essentially a formation in which the hoplites created a mass spear and shield wall... The Greek 'doru' was a type of spear in general use in the Hellenistic world. Although accounts of its length vary, it is usually now believed to have been seven to nine feet long. It was held one-handed, the other hand holding the hoplite's aspis (shield). The front spearhead was usually a curved leaf shape, while the rear had a spike which was used to stand the spear in the ground (hence the name), as a secondary weapon if the main shaft snapped, or for the rear ranks to finish off fallen opponents as the phalanx advanced over them... "
The Macedonians then perfected the tactical idea of the phalanx roughly around 300 BC (now "only" about 500 years before the Battle of Cannae). Their improvements consisted primarily of deepening the phalanx from 4 ranks to 8 ranks - and increasing the length of the spears (not more accurately "pikes" from 7 - 9 feet to 18 feet. Additionally the Heavy Infantry phalanx was designed by the Macedonians (Phillip II and Alexander the Great) to be used primarily as a holding force while allied Light Cavalry and Light Infantry protected the flanks and the Macedonian elite Heavy Cavalry effected either an envelopment or a penetration into the opponents rear.
The Romans meanwhile (jumping forward a couple hundred years) developed "manipular or cohort" tactics to use with their specifically designed Roman legion units...
"The nature of a manipular or cohort legion is that it's inherent flexibility, initiatives at the cohort/manipular level often resulted in infantry conduct the flanking movements, something a phalanx wasn't able to do with much finesse or if a phalanx line was broken anywhere to exploit it by utilizing their sword drills to slaughter hoplites at close-order fighting... "
The Roman legions were never armed with spears (much less pikes or especially "lances"), but each hoplite carried two javelins. A military historian would - of course - immediately understand the difference in that spears or pikes are meant to be HELD and to be FOUGHT WITH during the course of the battle (unless a spear shaft breaks or a spearhead becomes embedded in which case the Greek / Macedonian hoplite would either drop back to be replaced by the next hoplite in file or in dire cases draw and use his sword. The javelin on the other hand is meant to be THROWN. And that was the Roman legion primary tactic. Approach the enemy line at a rapid but controlled pace and throw - on command - first one javelin and then - on command - the second one... and then draw the sword and wade in to the enemies now disrupted and demoralized front lines, stabbing away with their special short sword specifically designed as a stabbing / thrusting weapon rather than a slashing sword.
AT the point of reading that (according to the author) the Roman army was "arrayed in a rigid phalanx" ... and that "their front (was) covered by rows of shields from which loomed menacing lances... ", well, I lost a great deal of credibility for the author from that point on. And wondered aloud that this is a West Point graduate who I assumed (like the trained historian reviewer) has supposedly studied Roman military history along with simply the Battle of Cannae??? From that point on, most things were taken with "a grain of salt"... a BIG grain of salt!
Intellectual History at its Best.......2006-11-01
I've read several reviews prior to writing mine and it appears that many reviewers (specifically the negative ones) are missing the thrust of this book. This is a work that blends standard history - which relies on factual primary and secondary sources to attempt to establish facts on the ground - and intellectual history - which is a discipline that attempts to divine the thoughts of actors through an examination of their cultural and educational milieu combined with their actual statements.
Both disciplines are legitimate and there are historical situations where they can not be reconciled, but in many cases the two disciplines can illuminate one another to provide a foundation for a theory which answers the salient questions about key historical events. This is one such case.
To begin, many reviewers claim an entire lack of evidence for Tom Carhart's theory among the facts of the battle (to be clear, the theory is that Lee planned a three-pronged attack on Meade's positions of which Picket's Charge was only one piece and the key to its success was an attack by Stuart's cavalry, and attached units, on the rear of Meade's position both at Culp's Hill and the clump of trees on Cemetary Ridge). I'm not certain which reviewers actually read the book versus which didn't, but it is simply not true to claim there is "no" actual historical evidence of such a theory. Mr. Carhart notes it in his work several times, for example: 1. he cites Stuart's after-action review which stated that he hoped to strike the Union rear; 2. he cites Lee's reported comments to Imboden the evening of July 3 (in my mind the best evidence) in which Lee states that Picket's Charge was not supported as it ought to have been and he didn't know why when the only battlefield commander left to debrief was Stuart - therefore, Stuart would be the only source to provide the answer to why Picket's Charge wasn't "supported;" and 3. he cites McClellan's comments about Stuart's multiple firing of one gun and McClellan's statement that no one knew what Stuart was doing, though McClellan though it may have been a signal to Lee (one reviewer said this was nonsense as it had to have taken place during the artillery barrage on Cemetary Ridge and therefore Lee couldn't have heard it - interesting that such an obvious problem wouldn't occurr to McClellan, who was actually there - in other words, if McClellan thought it a signal of some kind to Lee, then the artillery barrage on Cemetary Ridge could not have been happening yet since McClellan would, actually being there, have known it couldn't be heard - therefore, logically, it had to have occurred prior to the barrage) - another negative reviwer pointed out that he tracked down McClellan as the source of this idea - also interesting since Mr. Carhart cites McClellan as his source so he shouldn't have had to track down anything - it makes me wonder if he even read the book. These three items are cited from primary sources (and there are others in the book) which are generally considered the best form of historical evidence for facts on the ground. It is true that there is a huge mass of primary material dealing with Gettysburg and that these are very small pieces of that mass - and such a fact could lead one to accuse Mr. Carhart of "cherry-picking" his facts (though I think that claim would be innaccurate based on the intellectual history portion of the work), but it is simply untrue to claim there are "no" facts cited to support his theory.
The intellectual history portion is critical to this work. It examines the theoretical aspect of General Lee and his commanders to try and divine what they planned. It is true that Lee refused, almost entirely, to discuss battles post-action - it is also true that he was notoriously close-mouthed about his plans. To expect enlightenment from Lee directly for posterity's sake is to misunderstand the man, Lee. What Mr. Carhart does is examine the professional education of Lee and compare it with his actual actions in other battles he commanded to show how that education led him to maneuver his forces in a certain way to achieve the critical military principles of war known as mass, surprise, secrecy, objective and economy of force. After that examination (which I would have liked to have been fuller since I find it the most fascinating and convincing portion of the book), he then posits the question that has been asked for 150 years (and that I have asked myself repeatedly when studying Gettysburg): "What the hell was Lee thinking?" Picket's Charge simply could not succeed AS IT WAS CARRIED OUT AND EVERYONE WOULD KNOW THAT - MOST ESPECIALLY LEE. To claim hubris as the source of the decision (as one negative reviwer does) is simply to assert your own intellectual theory in place of Mr. Carhart's - with somewhat less justification I might add. In other words, to claim that you know what Lee was thinking without the benefit of a developed theory of Lee's psyche based on his education, culture and other actions. Mr. Carhart does posit a theory of Lee's intentions based on just such an examination - and it rings true. IF Lee's plan was such as Mr. Carhart posits (and while I am unable to be dogmatic about it, I am convinced that he is correct), then the question about what was Lee thinking when he ordered Picket's Charge is answered, and answered in a way that fits with what we know of Lee's psyche based on his education, culture, training and other actions during the war. In other words, Mr. Carhart has developed an intellectual history justification that makes sense and when that is added to the primary historical sources he cites, then the theory breathes. It is neither counterfactual, evidence-poor nor badly-argued. Like all theories, it does not demand assent, but it appears to me, from the evidence, that it is strongly supported. So, in contravention of one of the other reviwers, Mr. McPherson should have no shame in providing a forward - rather he simply acknowledged the quality work of a fellow historian done well.
In conclusion, Mr. Carhart has written a fine piece of intellectual and traditional history that sheds new and convincing light on one of the most inexplicable decisions made by any commander in history. I strongly urge readers to read it themselves and think it through.
Final note: I'm an historian by training and a lawyer by profession so examining historical evidence is not out of my area of expertise.
Kelly Whiting
A controversial account of why Robert E. Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg.......2006-09-23
Was it Lee's fault? Tom Carhart a West Point graduate ponders this question as he looks at Gettysburg. Along the way we read brief accounts of famous battles Lee studied at West Point. Especially important are Cannae in 216 BC won by Hannibal against Rome; Leuthen in 1756 which was Frederick the Great's best battle and several Napoleonic battles. Napoleon was the beau ideal of the great soldier in nineteenth century military study.
The book has a short introduction by noted scholar James McPherson which gives it respectable cache with this reader. Carhart's thesis is
that Lee wanted Longstreet and Ewell to attack both wings of the Union Army on Cemetery Ridge on July 3rd. The key to victory was to be JEB
Stuart's cavalry assault from the rear on Culp's Hill. However, these
plans were stopped cold by the Union victory on the East Cavalry Field
battleground where the intrepid George Armstrong Custer led his Wolverines to victory. Picket's Charge was also a disaster.
Along the way we are given a brief sketch of RE Lee's career and several Civl War battles.
Carhart has a vivid writing style but I would want to read more before accepting his theory. It does sound plausible.
The Da Vinci Code of Gettysburg?.......2006-08-12
The Da Vinci Code was a work of fiction based on theories that had been kicked around long before, and it displayed little depth or knowledge of theology or history -- especially of the history of the Holy Grail, which made its first bow in literature in the late twelfth century (despite copious vain attempts to link it, however tenuously, with more ancient myths). Yet the Da Vinci Code was apparently a good read and a runaway success that has changed the way people think, even if what they think is provably inaccurate.
LOST TRIUMPH doesn't sink to those depths, but it does present an interesting alternative to the battle of Gettysburg via speculation. Like the Da Vinci Code, the author's idea has been batted around before (I read another book with the same theory before I read LT). Unlike the Da Vinci Code, it has some basis in history.
The great question was always, "What was Lee thinking?" While I have read defenders of Pickett's charge (if only Longstreet had gone when he was told!) But when Longstreet didn't go, and didn't go, and didn't go, why didn't Lee scrub the mission -- or sack a subordinate who refused to follow orders? And did Longstreet finally charge those men to their deaths out of spite, just to rub Lee's face in it? LOST TRIUMPH is an attempt, albeit speculative, to address these more than 150-year-old questions and provide answers.
The book's largest failure is structural. It might have been better if the author had taken the pedantic fact-cum-fiction approach of THE EDUCATION OF JULIUS CAESAR. "The Education of Robert E. Lee: and How it Lost Gettysburg." He does a good job of describing Lee's education at West Point, and his cultural milieu, for beginners. He even points to some of Lee's favorite reads. He takes us through Mexico with Lee, and shows the young Lee's courage and resource (which would come into play when he was given command of an army that was always smaller than his opponent's, and with less materiel).
The author takes his time getting to Gettysburg. His ideas are speculative, but so is much of accepted history. What he lacks in primary documentation, he makes up for in imagination. Other reviewers have compared "facts" presented here with "facts" presented by the likes of Shelby Foote -- but Foote cannot be relied upon, either. Foote apparently made up the story that the Confederates went to Gettysburg to look for shoes, which is often presented as known fact, although that story could be the poster child for undocumented speculation.
The premise of the book (and the author gets around to it about like I have in this review, after a lot of other stuff) is that Lee sent Stuart -- who had circled the Union army twice -- around the Union army for rear action simultaneous with Longstreet's frontal advance. Stuart's rear action and the frontal assault were meant to divide the Yanks. Wow. This is a sweeping idea (and, as I said before, hardly new). Is it true? I don't know. Is it plausible? Lee was an audacious commander, and though his generalship has been under fire by revisionists, that tide will subside. It's certainly a plausible idea, and if Lee didn't have it, he should have. Unfortunately, Gens. Stuart and Lee are both deceased, so we can't ask them. Any attempt to read their intentions will contain some degree of projection.
So, why did the dual assault fail? The frontal assault failed because of Longstreet's intransigence, and Union movement during day three of the battle. The rear assault failed because Stuart was stopped dead by -- George Armstrong Custer, who was later felled in another famous battle, that of the Little Bighorn. Custer has been much maligned (not always unfairly) but the premise that Custer saved the union at Gettysburg is tough meat for some readers to chew, because of the baggage of their own cultural milieu.
That explains why Lee didn't scrub the mission when Longstreet failed him: Stuart's ball was already in play and without the frontal assault, the rear action was rendered pointless.
But readers don't have to worry about Custer saving the Union. That point, which was actually implied by the previous book I read on the subject, is not debatable. Gettysburg made a lot of noise, but Vicksburg, where the Yanks actually did divide the Confederacy, was where the Confederacy was lost. The Confederacy would have survived Gettysburg (especially with Meade in command). Vicksburg started the gray sand of the Confederacy leaking out of the hourglass. It was only a matter of time, unless public war-weariness up north could be exploited the way it is by America's enemies today.
LT should be read with some background to the battle. It's not a starter's kit. A solid, general (for Da Vinci Code readers, I mean "not specific") history of the battle should be read beforehand, and the accepted facts absorbed. It probably should not be read by experts, either, since, judging by the reviews, this sort of book gets their nose out of joint.
Book Description
Little Round Top, the Railroad Cut, Pickett’s Charge—these are the turning points within the most important battle of the Civil War. Even careful students of Gettysburg, however, can find themselves disoriented when visiting the site itself. Here, finally, is a convenient guide for serious student and casual visitor alike that makes plain the sweep of events and the geography of the battlefield.
This invaluable guidebook was created by scholars who have walked the battlegrounds, consulted with local experts and park guides, and studied the testimony left behind by the participants. Gettysburg will help you find all the important locales and understand what the participants saw in 1863, even if you have no prior knowledge of the battle. Designed to enhance the experience of both first-time and returning visitors, this guide can be used alone or as a supplement to a tour. Clearly written and illustrated with maps and photographs, this is the book to have when you explore Gettysburg.
Customer Reviews:
Take what you want, this is the only book you'll need.......2004-11-24
A masterful guide to the Gettysburg battlefield. I took several books on my trip to Gettysburg earlier this year but this was the only one I carried on the battlefield. It is organized around the tour stops, but also contains several side trips to lesser known areas, and simply tells you all you need to know about the events in that area at the time of the battle. It contains several maps and the directions it provides to areas on the battlefield are concise and easy to follow. If you wish to seriously tour Gettysburg National Park, this book is essential.
Made it crystal clear.......2002-10-23
I grew up near Gettysburg & have been there numerous times. I just spent 2 days there with this book on the battlefield--this book made the battle crystal clear! I ran out of time exploring the battlefield (it takes more than the 6 hours described in the book--my only criticism). This book brings the battle to life and explains the terrain like never before. I learned a lot about the battle that I never knew and many components of the battle came into focus in new and exciting ways. In particular, this book does a good job on overviews of each day and with it's clear directions, leads the reader through each stop--I really felt as if I had an expert by my side explaining all the facets of each aspect of the battle. Along the way, everything was just as the book described. The maps were excellent & it's nicely complimented with various portraits of leaders, common soldiers, etc. The guide brings the 3 days together as a cohesive whole. This is the book to get if you're going to visit Gettysburg; forget all the others.
I now live near Chickamauga and I plan on getting their book on that battle!
A Must for the Civil War buff.......2001-10-23
I recently took a trip to Gettysburg (my 3rd) and carried this tour guide for the 1st time. It is far and away the best experience I've had seeing the battlefield. It follows the battle chronologically and offers several sites and insights not offered on the audio tours available at the local shops. Many of the stops are multifaceted. At several points the stops feature 7 to 10 asides which often involve only a minor shift in position to point out various phases of the battle. It includes a side trip to the cavalry field which I've never run into on the audio tours. The driving directions are easy to follow but do veer from the order of the Military Park brochure and the audio tours to give greater detail to the battle. The book says to allow for 6 hours-it's more like 10 hours to give time for exploring beyond some of the "stand here and turn left" instructions. 11 hours total if you include a break for lunch. We started at nine on one morning, toured until about 4 with a break for lunch and finished the following day. Sites included on the audio and Park tours tend to start getting crowded from 11 to 3, so this will add to the tour time depending on time of year and crowd. To sum it all up and paraphrase a popular commercial-when going on a tour of Gettysburg-"Don't leave home without it!"
A great guidebook for first-time visitors!.......2001-06-10
An excellent, well-written guidebook and the best I've seen on the subject. I carried this book on my first visit to Gettysburg in Spring 2001, and it greatly enhanced the experience. The directions are clear and up to date, and the text is precise and detailed enough to be compelling without trying to be an exhaustive treatment of every minute detail. If used as a companion to an actual visit, I would strongly recommend reading the book in advance of your visit, then bringing it with you for reference. There are only a few very minor faults I might find with this guidebook. On the maps, it would be helpful to have present-day landmarks indicated in some way to help with orientation. Also, the book suggests the full tour can be completed in six hours, but in my experience to make all the stops and fully enjoy it you'd need at least a full day, or preferably two. You'll want to leave some time for reflection at such places as McPherson's Ridge, Little Round Top, the High Water Mark, and others to think about the enormity of what occurred on that ground.
Read this book and you'll come away with a good working knowledge of the three-day battle. Highly recommended!
The best Gettysburg guidebook around.......2000-02-14
I have tramped over the Gettysburg Battlefield a half dozen times with various books in hand. My hat is off to Mark Grimsley & Brooks D. Simpson. I found this book to be the most thorough and well written of any text I have used. In November, 1999 I went to the battlefield with the main purpose of studying the fighting around the Peach Orchard and Wheatfield. This book was very helpful in helping me understand the chain of events that occured in these places July 2, 1863. I also found the descriptions of the fighting July 1st around the McPherson Farm to be excellent.
A very good and practical guide.
Book Description
The Maryland campaign of September 1862 ranks among the most important military operations of the American Civil War. Crucial political, diplomatic, and military issues were at stake as Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan maneuvered and fought in the western part of the state. The climactic clash came on September 17 at the battle of Antietam, where more than 23,000 men fell in the single bloodiest day of the war.
Approaching topics related to Lee's and McClellan's operations from a variety of perspectives, contributors to this volume explore questions regarding military leadership, strategy, and tactics, the impact of the fighting on officers and soldiers in both armies, and the ways in which participants and people behind the lines interpreted and remembered the campaign. They also discuss the performance of untried military units and offer a look at how the United States Army used the Antietam battlefield as an outdoor classroom for its officers in the early twentieth century.
The contributors are William A. Blair, Keith S. Bohannon, Peter S. Carmichael, Gary W. Gallagher, Lesley J. Gordon, D. Scott Hartwig, Robert E. L. Krick, Robert K. Krick, Carol Reardon, and Brooks D. Simpson.
Customer Reviews:
Informative Essays about America's Bloodiest Day of Battle.......2003-05-31
Just like previous reviewers, I agree that this book is a fine addition to the on-going series about the Military Campaigns of the Civil War. This installment about the Battle of Antietam is particularly strong because of the quality of scholarship included and the distinguished group of historians that Gallagher gathered for this edition.
Each author includes an interesting essay that details a specific aspect of the battle. Some examples of topics that are covered include: the supply challenge the Confederacy faced, how new Union recruits reacted to the carnage of Antietam, the role Confederate artillery played, and why McClellan failed to pursue Lee after the battle. I found that every essay presented a compelling argument and really offer the reader a detailed analysis that you will not find in other books about the battle.
As always, this type of book is not aimed at telling the history of what happened at Antietam. If you are looking for a general narrative of the battle - this is not the right book. On the other hand, it is designed for those who are somewhat familiar with the battle and are looking for the most current research from a find group of historians. I highly recommend the book for people who fall into this category. It will greatly enhance your understanding of key aspects that affected the battle which has been the bloodiest day in US military history.
Outstanding information and viewpoints of Antietam!.......2002-09-25
Similar to past works of Gallagher's, this book contains invididual chapters written by popular Civil War historians keying in on battle concerns, myths, strategies and political concepts during the campaign. I really enjoyed reading William Blair's chapter on how Marylanders caught in the middle of political unrest viewed the campaign and Lee's invasion. Brooks Simpson's chapter on how the Army of the Potomac was McClellan's bodyguard according to Lincoln really made me understand the political frustrations the Lincoln party had in regards to McClellan's slow moving and cautious approach to battle. Keith Bohannon's view on Confederate logistical problems was very informative and really brought forth information as to Lee's reasons for invading the north and also his retreat.
These chapters are just some of the great amount of information brought together in a very fine book. I would recommend this book to someone who has already read a book on the battle itself before reading this one. This book contains some fighting information but isn't one for coverage on the entire battle. It is one for understanding political unrest, commander motivations, strategies and little unknown and sometimes unclear myths that surround the entire campaign in September 1862. 5 STARS!!!
Gallagher has done it again! A great addition to the series!.......2000-08-01
Once again, Gary W. Gallagher has compiled a wonderful collection of essays in this latest volume of the Military Campaigns of the Civil War Series. Each chapter or essay focuses on a different aspect of the campaign and is written by a different author. This allows for a new perspective on the campaign with each chapter. Among the topics covered by the various essayists are Confederate perception of Antietam as a victory or defeat, Confederate logistics, Confederate artillery, the use of the Antietam battlefield as a classroom for military leaders in the 20th century, the impact of new recruits on the Army of Potomac's effectiveness, and the experiences of individual units.
All of the essays are well-written and contain wonderful insights into their selected aspects of the campaign. Due to the focus of the series on military events, other important issues related to Antietam are only briefly mentioned. Most notably, issues related to emancipation and foreign intervention are mentioned in passing. This, however, is a result of the decision by the editor and the press (University of North Carolina Press) to focus on military aspects. Despite this weakness, I would highly recommend this and all other books in the Military Campaigns of the Civil War series to anyone with an interest in the Civil War.
Gallagher has done it again! A great addition to the series!.......2000-07-10
As usual, Gary W. Gallagher has compiled a wonderful collection of essays on a wide variety of topics related to the selected campaign, in this case Antietam. Among the topics are Confederate public perception of Antietam as a success or failure, Confederate logistics, the impact of untrained newly recruited troops on the Army of the Potomac, Confederate artillery, experiences of individual units, and how the campaign served as a lesson for future military leaders.
As with the other books in the series, this book is hard to put down. The essay format covering a variety of topics, along with the quality of writing allows a different perspective on the same events with each new chapter. I would recommend this and other books in the series to anyone with an interest in the Civil War.
Book Description
The Richmond campaign of April-July 1862 ranks as one of the most important military operations of the first years of the American Civil War. Key political, diplomatic, social, and military issues were at stake as Robert E. Lee and George B. McClellan faced off on the peninsula between the York and James Rivers. The climactic clash came on June 26-July 1 in what became known as the Seven Days battles, when Lee, newly appointed as commander of the Confederate forces, aggressively attacked the Union army. Casualties for the entire campaign exceeded 50,000, more than 35,000 of whom fell during the Seven Days.
This book offers nine essays in which well-known Civil War historians explore questions regarding high command, strategy and tactics, the effects of the fighting upon politics and society both North and South, and the ways in which emancipation figured in the campaign. The authors have consulted previously untapped manuscript sources and reinterpreted more familiar evidence, sometimes focusing closely on the fighting around Richmond and sometimes looking more broadly at the background and consequences of the campaign.
Contributors:
William A. Blair
Keith S. Bohannon
Peter S. Carmichael
Gary W. Gallagher
John T. Hubbell
R. E. L. Krick
Robert K. Krick
James Marten
William J. Miller
Customer Reviews:
Insightful essays about Richmond Campaign.......2001-09-19
I agree with an earlier reviewer who writes that this book is a great companion (or follow-up) book to Stephen Sears "To the Gates of Richmond". Mr. Sears books gives a vivid account of the overall campaign, while this book offers some insightful essays about certain aspects of the campaign. The authors are all experts in the field, and offer well written essays for the reader to contemplate.
I really enjoyed this book because the authors cover a wide range of topics to include General McClellan's flawed performance, "Stonewall" Jackson's less than stellar leadership during the campaign, the artillery battle at Malvern Hill, "Prince" John Magruder's struggles, and the affect of the campaign on both Northern and Southern society. These detailed essays offer readers the latest and greatest scholarship about the Richmond campaign. They really helped me gain a much deeper understanding about what the campaign was like, why it was so important to the overall war effort (for both sides), and most importantly, how did if affect those involved.
I highly recommend this book for those "students" of the Civil War (like me) who are looking to gain a richer grasp of the events that happened during the Richmond campaign. If you have not read anything about the Richmond campaign (usually referred to as the Pennisula and Seven Days campaign) then I suggest that you read "To the Gates of Richmond" by Stephen Sear first, then this book.
Fascinating Detail on Key Battles , Leaders and Politics.......2001-06-01
Great book to read after Stephen Sear's Penninsula Campaign (even noted by the editor). This great collection of CW historians take the leading characters and events of the 7 days campaign and provide insights to this fascinating series of battles that set the Union back three years. Fascinating writing of John Bankhead Magruder, the hero of the lower Peninsula, whose prewar reputation for drink and ladies combined with lack of sleep, stress, illness and improper medical treatment created a magnifyer for his failures particularly at Malvern Hill. Lee's desire to rid himself of Magruder who was a hero just weeks before is in stark contrast to his retaining of Stonewall who as R. K. Krick writes was virtually ineffective for a multitude of reasons, primarily due to sleep deprivation. Also, great essays on McClellan whose grandiose ego was not able to stand upright on the battlefield and his engineers who could build anything he needed but were used as scapegoats just like anyone else to excuse his own conduct. Additional essays are on the great importance of the seven days battles to lift southern morale and the enhancement of the radicals position contributed to by McClellan's failures during the campaign. Superb article on the artillery duel on Malvern Hill and confederate attack that collapsed under murderous and accurate union artillery fire. The Union's artillery was no match for its southern counterparts. R.E.L. Krick highlights Whiting's Division (with Hood) breaking the Union line decisively at Gaines Mill. No one knows the battlefield better than Krick. Longstreet may have wished he never picked up a pen after Krick writes of Longstreet's post war confusion of facts over his command of Whiting, "It appears an unusually early example of the gasconade for which Longstreet is now famous". That commentary would have made "Old Jube" proud.
Nine essays exploring questions regarding high command.......2001-03-11
The April-July 1862 Richmond campaign was a critical point in the American civil war that resulted in more than 50,000 casualties, 35,000 of whom fell in seven days (June 26 - July 1). The Richmond Campaign Of 1862: The Peninsula & The Seven Days offers nine essays exploring questions regarding high command, strategy and tactics, the effects of the fighting upon the politics and society of both the Union and the Confederacy, and the ways in which emancipation figured in the campaign. Included is an invaluable analysis of the Richmond campaign's place in the broader sweep of the war in 1862, assessments of George B. McClellan's generalship and Stonewall Jackson's flawed performance, an examination of the campaign's impact on white and black civilians in the region, the role of the engineers in the Union effort, the role of artillery in the battle of Malvern Hill, and more. Highly recommended for personal and academic Civil War studies reading lists and reference collections, The Richmond Campaign Of 1862 is an impressive work of painstaking, informative, insightful scholarship.
Book Description
The Spotsylvania Campaign marked a crucial period in the confrontation between Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee in Virginia. Waged over a two-week period in mid-May 1864, it included some of the most savage fighting of the Civil War and left indelible marks on all involved.
Approaching topics related to Spotsylvania from a variety of perspectives, the contributors to this volume explore questions regarding high command, tactics and strategy, the impact of fighting on officers and soldiers in both armies, and the ways in which some participants chose to remember and interpret the campaign. They offer insight into the decisions and behavior of Lee and of Federal army leaders, the fullest descriptions to date of the horrific fighting at the "Bloody Angle" on May 12, and a revealing look at how Grant used his memoirs to offset Lost Cause interpretations of his actions at Spotsylvania and elsewhere in the Overland Campaign.
The contributors:
—William A. Blair, Grant's Second Civil War: The Battle for Historical Memory
—Peter S. Carmichael, We Respect a Good Soldier, No Matter What Flag He Fought Under: The 15th New Jersey Remembers Spotsylvania
—Gary W. Gallagher, I Have to Make the Best of What I Have: Robert E. Lee at Spotsylvania
—Robert E. L. Krick, Stuart's Last Ride: A Confederate View of Sheridan's Raid
—Robert K. Krick, An Insurmountable Barrier between the Army and Ruin: The Confederate Experience at Spotsylvania's Bloody Angle
—William D. Matter, The Federal High Command at Spotsylvania
—Carol Reardon, A Hard Road to Travel: The Impact of Continuous Operations on the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia in May 1864
—Gordon C. Rhea, The Testing of a Corp Commander: Gouverneur Kemble Warren at the Wilderness and Spotsylvania
Customer Reviews:
The Best CW Historians Essays on this Brutal Battle.......2001-01-14
Gallagher hits homeruns with this wonderful series of books on the critical campaigns of the CW. Not a continuous retelling but Gallagher and company get into specifics of the campaign through separate essays that allow greater detail on controversies, personnel, mistakes, and many subjects that prior to this were limited in detail. An example is Krick the Younger's detailed essay on the little known battle of Yellow Tavern that cost Jeb Steuart his life. The other essays all offer new detail and great insight. I was particularly fascinated by Gallagher's own essay on Lee's grappling with command erosion through the loss of Longstreet, Ewell's collapse and Hill's physical erosion. Show's Lee as a great commander much like a coach that loses star players but still manages a great game. All the essays are excellent by Matter, Reardon, Blair, Rhea and Carmichael but Krick senior's feature on the Mule Shoe exhibits great detail on one of the most horrid portions of any battle of the CW involving endless hours of close up fighting in the salient. The fighting involves trench warfare, attacking and shooting from just a few feet apart, hand to hand combat, continuous rain and a continuing of a struggle with death that seemed to have no end. After you read Krick's Mule Shoe, you recognize how the war changed dramatically from Bull Run to an incredible desperate struggle of all out war. Read closely Krick senior's dig at Longstreet who was not present after being shot down in the wilderness. Krick, a legendary critic of Longstreet, cannot leave him alone even in his absence.
Another tour de force from Gallagher et al........1999-02-18
A great addition to the Campaigns of the Civil War series, and proof that there is always something fresh to say about any historical subject. I especially liked the essay concerning Lee's personnel moves in the wake of The Wilderness; it's becoming increasingly politically incorrect to praise Marse Robert. Also, the essay on the fighting at the Bloody Angle is a wonderful piece of microhistory. The maps are excellent. As with the rest of the series, a must- read for the hardened Civil War student.
Book Description
The hard-fought and dramatic battles of Chickamauga (September 19–20, 1863) and Chattanooga (November 23–25, 1863) changed the course of the Civil War. These battles sounded the death knell of the Confederacy and put Ulysses S. Grant on the road to final victory. For the first time in one convenient guide, Steven E. Woodworth provides an overview of the battles and an on-site tour to help both serious students and casual visitors get the most out of a visit to Chickamauga and Chattanooga.
The guide emphasizes how the opposing armies used terrain and how that terrain shaped the course of each battle. Easy-to-follow directions to specific locations enable you to view the field from the historic perspectives of the combatants. Whether used alone or as a supplement to a tour, this guide will enhance your visit. Clearly written and illustrated with maps and photographs, it is an invaluable tool for both knowledgeable Civil War enthusiasts and first-time visitors to Chickamauga and Chattanooga.
Customer Reviews:
Not Good.......2004-01-10
Don't get this book. The earlier reviewer was correct. I found a free guide on the internet that had better maps and was more in depth. This book is interesting but I kept having to turn from the tour to the back to follow the optional stops which was annoying. I had also read several books about the battle before I went on my tour and noticed that the author had taken his interesting stories right out of these books which I didn't like. I also recommend the War College Guide and the new book by the same author that has a guide to the Battle of Chattanooga (Storming the Heights).
Good not Great........2003-09-12
As is typical of Dr. Woodworth's books, he has once again rehashed old material into something new. The maps are excellent but the paths this book leads the reader down are too well worn to truly be interesting. Also, the way the book is laid out with regard to touring the Chickamauga Battlefield is cumbersome. The reader has to move from the front of the book to the back in an awkward way to visit the optional excursions. These should have been left in order and the reader simply allowed to skip them at their discretion. I agree with the other reviewer that the War College Guide is better if the reader has any Civil War touring experience. In comparison to the other guide books available, this one definitely rates as mediocre. A quick search of the internet before a visit to the park will net the reader a much better guide and probably one for free!
Fall in love with Chickamauga.......2003-05-17
I have spent three days on the Chickamauga battlefield with this book. Since I live in the area, the days were not consecutive and I did some of the stops twice, but it only added to my pleasure. This book will give you all the details you want to know.
I grew up near Gettysburg and thought I could not love a place as much as I do Gettysburg; but with this book as my guide, Chickamauga is getting close.
This series (Hallowed Ground--two books so far, the other is on Gettysburg, which I've also used and reviewed) takes you "off the beaten path" and gives you insight into the battle that you do not get from the official park tour. If you include the option excursions you will really enrich your trip.
The maps are clear and the directions from stop to stop are percise. The book is also illustrated and enhanced with various drawings from Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.
I definitely recommend it to you. This book, like the one on Gettysburg, says it will take you six hours to hit all the stops--perhaps if you rushed and didn't take time to think about what you're seeing and reading; I recommend eight hours as a minimum, because the optional excursions are worth it.
Good for quickie not for the veteran.......2000-08-03
Steven Woodworth's tour book is excellent for the novice who wants more than the average tour of the battlefield. This is apparently his goal for the book. Other than some out of chronological order stops, I found the tour easy to follow and the maps easy to use. The information most useful from this book is the section on the battles of Chattanooga. I have not found a better quick tour of Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain anywhere. What I didn't like about the book was the fact that it extensively sampled from material already available elsewhere and provided no new information on places to visit at Chickamauga. If you want the best tour, get the US Army War College Guide to Chickamauga and correlate the stops from it while using Woodworths maps. In summary, if you are a novice to the Civil War Battlefield or have never been to ChickChatt National Park this book is for you. If you are a veteran of the Civil War Battlefield it's not.
great overview of the battle, a must for park visitors.......2000-05-31
This is a great battlefield guide, full of clear, easy to understand instructions and maps. By far the best battlefield guide of any I've read. If you really want to understand where you are in the park, and what happened where, buy this book. Read it first, then carry it with you for the tour.
Book Description
Was the Civil War really the birthplace of modern battlefield tactics? Paddy Griffith argues that despite the use of new weapons and of trench warfare techniques, the Civil War was in reality the last Napoleonic-style war. Rich in description and analysis, this is a book of interest both to military historians and to Civil War buffs.
Customer Reviews:
Missing the Point.......2006-02-20
Griffith makes one big mistake here in not making his point more plain. He assumes that the reader understands the broader context of his critique. American readers are rarely aware that in 1859 (France v. Austira), 1866 (Austira, Hanover, and Bavaria v. Prussia), and 1870 (Prussia v. France) rifle-armed armies won quick, decisive victories by taking the offensive. In fact, the armies of 1870 were much better armed than American Civil War forces. So how can one use the "rifle revolution" to expain the bloody and indecisive nature of the Civil War? Griffith maintains with admirable evidence that organization, training, staff work, and doctrine were the key ingredients in the Civil War bloodbath, not technology. The learning curve was too steep for vast, improvised forces to adjust easily. Ironcially for his detractors, Griffith argues that in the Appomattox Campaign, Sheridan and the Federals developed a combined arms offensive doctrine that lept over European practice, but it came too late to take root. But I think his great crime is not anti-Americanism (of which he shows none), but a lack of fawning sentimentality of the Ken Burns type.
More Lies and Nonsense From Paddy Griffith.......2004-04-06
Paddy Griffith likes to write books in which he claims his research shows that what everyone thought about a given war was wrong. Only he has found the truth, that the Civil War was really the 'last Napoleonic War.' Unfortunately, the evidence shows precisely the opposite.
Griffith gets the simplest things wrong. Example: on page 147, G. has a table of "Ranges of musketry fire." Do the math yourself, and you find that he can't divide or even add correctly. The tables of p 76 and 77 are even worse.
Griffith distorts his sources. On page 146, he claims "British experts" figured that 200 yards was "the battle range of the Brown Bess smoothbore musket." Turn to the footnotes, and you find a reference to p. 32 of Hew Strachan's FROM WATERLOO TO BALACLAVA. I have the page before me as I type. Nowhere on p. 32 is anyone mentioned as being an expert, nor is it even implied that anyone in the British Army was an expert in the performance of the Brown Bess. Quite the contrary.
What Strachan actually says is that the ability to hit a target with the Brown Bess "dwindled" as the range increased from 100 to 200 yards; that "most manuals" (written by unknown people of unknown knowledge) set the "maximum effective range" of the smoothbore as 200 yards; that "It was only just as the Brown Bess was nearing the end of its long life in the British army that any definite idea of the weapon's performance was secured"; that knowledge of "the range and power of the musket" was "very limited" as late as 1846; that at ranges over 116-126 yards, a considerable number of musket balls hit the dirt before reaching the target; and finally that the British concluded "as a General Rule musketry should not be opened at a distance exceeding 150, and certainly not exceeding 200 yards, as at and beyond that distance it would be a mere wast of ammunition to do so."
Griffith ignores evidence he doesn't like. Strachan's book goes on to say on p. 47 that the rifled musket resulted in "whole regiments 'melting' before British fire" at Inkerman; that penetration was much greater than with the musket (very significant when people fought in closely packed groups); that "At 150 yards the Minie was twice as accurate as the smoothbore musket," and "Furthermore this superiority of practice was not confined to a few marksmen."
Another: in ATTACK AND DIE: CIVIL WAR TACTICS AND THE SOUTHERN HERITAGE, Grady McWhiney & Perry D. Jamieson points out that in the War With Mexico of 1846-47, the U.S. Army fought with Napoleonic war tactics and weapons, and almost every Civil War general on both sides participated. The tactics used worked, even though they were carried out by amateurs. When they were attempted in the Civil War, they didn't work. Griffith blames the failure of Napoleonic tactics in the Civil War on the troops being amateurs and the generals not knowing how to fight.
Griffith misunderstands what's in front of him. G. mentions Jack Coggins's books ARMS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE CIVIL WAR, and calls your attention to an illustration on page 38-39 of Coggins, showing that in order to hit a target at 300 yards range, the bullet traveled 43 inches above line of sight at 150 yards. Griffith fails to realize that if the shooter is standing or kneeling, the bullet will be so high in the air it won't hit people at most ranges, but if the shooter fires from ground level (prone, or from a trench), it will NEVER get too high. Therefore, the effectiveness of rifle fire increased as entrenchments became more common.
Griffith just makes up bullsh*t. E.g., by mid 1863, soldiers were reluctant to attack entrenchments frontally. G. believes they were 'dispirited,' a bunch of 'old lags' who'd lost their nerve. This nonsense is an insult to the brave men on both sides in the last two years of the war. During this period, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia both took about 45% casualties in only 40 days, while in Tennessee and Georgia Hood's Army was destroyed in combat when repeatedly attacking Sherman's troops.
Enough. The bottom line is that this book is so unreliable in every detail, you can't trust a single sentence written by Griffith. The only things of value are the direct quotations and the bibliography. Don't buy it.
More Lies and Nonsense From Paddy Griffith.......2004-04-06
Paddy Griffith likes to write books in which he claims his research shows that what everyone thought about a given war was wrong. Only he has found the truth, that the Civil War was really the 'last Napoleonic War.' Unfortunately, the evidence shows precisely the opposite.
Griffith gets the simplest things wrong. Example: on page 147, G. has a table of "Ranges of musketry fire." Do the math yourself, and you find that he can't divide or even add correctly. The tables of p 76 and 77 are even worse.
Griffith distorts his sources. On page 146, he claims "British experts" figured that 200 yards was "the battle range of the Brown Bess smoothbore musket." Turn to the footnotes, and you find a reference to p. 32 of Hew Strachan's FROM WATERLOO TO BALACLAVA. I have the page before me as I type. Nowhere on p. 32 is anyone mentioned as being an expert, nor is it even implied that anyone in the British Army was an expert in the performance of the Brown Bess. Quite the contrary.
What Strachan actually says is that the ability to hit a target with the Brown Bess "dwindled" as the range increased from 100 to 200 yards; that "most manuals" (written by unknown people of unknown knowledge) set the "maximum effective range" of the smoothbore as 200 yards; that "It was only just as the Brown Bess was nearing the end of its long life in the British army that any definite idea of the weapon's performance was secured"; that knowledge of "the range and power of the musket" was "very limited" as late as 1846; that at ranges over 116-126 yards, a considerable number of musket balls hit the dirt before reaching the target; and finally that the British concluded "as a General Rule musketry should not be opened at a distance exceeding 150, and certainly not exceeding 200 yards, as at and beyond that distance it would be a mere wast of ammunition to do so."
Griffith ignores evidence he doesn't like. Strachan's book goes on to say on p. 47 that the rifled musket resulted in "whole regiments 'melting' before British fire" at Inkerman; that penetration was much greater than with the musket (very significant when people fought in closely packed groups); that "At 150 yards the Minie was twice as accurate as the smoothbore musket," and "Furthermore this superiority of practice was not confined to a few marksmen."
Another: in ATTACK AND DIE: CIVIL WAR TACTICS AND THE SOUTHERN HERITAGE, Grady McWhiney & Perry D. Jamieson points out that in the War With Mexico of 1846-47, the U.S. Army fought with Napoleonic war tactics and weapons, and almost every Civil War general on both sides participated. The tactics used worked, even though they were carried out by amateurs. When they were attempted in the Civil War, they didn't work. Griffith blames the failure of Napoleonic tactics in the Civil War on the troops being amateurs and the generals not knowing how to fight.
Griffith misunderstands what's in front of him. G. mentions Jack Coggins's books ARMS AND EQUIPMENT OF THE CIVIL WAR, and calls your attention to an illustration on page 38-39 of Coggins, showing that in order to hit a target at 300 yards range, the bullet traveled 43 inches above line of sight at 150 yards. Griffith fails to realize that if the shooter is standing or kneeling, the bullet will be so high in the air it won't hit people at most ranges, but if the shooter fires from ground level (prone, or from a trench), it will NEVER get too high. Therefore, the effectiveness of rifle fire increased as entrenchments became more common.
5) Just makes up bullsh*t. E.g., by mid 1863, soldiers were reluctant to attack entrenchments frontally. G. believes they were 'dispirited,' a bunch of 'old lags' who'd lost their nerve. This nonsense is an insult to the brave men on both sides in the last two years of the war. During this period, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia both took about 45% casualties in only 40 days, while in Tennessee and Georgia Hood's Army was destroyed in combat when repeatedly attacking Sherman's troops.
Enough. The bottom line is that this book is so unreliable in every detail, you can't trust a single sentence written by Griffith. The only things of value are the direct quotations and the bibliography. Don't buy it.
Take The Good With The Bad.......2004-03-24
Griffith's book certainly makes some good points, but there's plenty of bad mixed in. Since so many have discussed what they believe is good about this book, I'll list my reservations. In addition to others who did a review of this book, I also suggest reading Archer Jones's "Civil War Command And Strategy" as a complementary book, since the latter breaks down the campaigns tactically while this book breaks down the battles.
Field Fortifications - Griffith essentially concludes that field fortifications were a psychological deterrent more than a physical one. Often Griffith states that fieldworks didn't create a big advantage, and in doing this he cites figures on how many people were hit per minute or per shot fired. In other parts of this chapter, he claims that armies were too quick to dig in, even if they were on the offensive. With Jones pointing out how invaluable counter attacks were, and with Shiloh proving that point, I disagree with Griffith there as well. Finally, Griffith seems to ignore that multiple lines of fieldwork were generally put up at places like Gettysburg and Chancellorsville. To sustain big losses to take one set of works doesn't automatically grant a side the strategic or even tactical victory, as the Confederates proved on Culp's Hill on 2 July 1863.
Cavalry - Griffith seems to take others to task for their "romantic lore" over how they view the CW. I wholeheartedly disagree with his conclusion that Civil War cavalry should have been used on the battlefield in condensed charges more often. In making his point, he often hearkens back to Napoleonic times, yet he conveniently omits any mention of how devestated the Grande Armee was at Waterloo by using that tactic. Griffith disregards the obstacle that fieldworks would have made on a cavalry charge by saying horses could jump them. I'd suggest to Griffith that he reads Keegan's chapters on cavalry in "The Face Of Battle."
Finally there were just minor inconsistencies peppered throughout the book, whether negating the importance of Union raiding that mostly commenced in 1864, or suggesting Lee was "hardly surprised" by Hooker's Grand Plan when both Lee and Stuart corresponded in the beginning stages of the Chancellorsville campaign that they didn't know what Hooker was up to.
I'm not going to pretend that these faults were made simply because the guy was British, or that he's either subjectively or objectively biased. I think he simply jumps to conclusions before he can ably prove them.
A Brit's Critical Analysis of the Civil War.......2004-01-06
What Paddy Griffth did here in 1989 was something no American historian on the Civil War ever had the courage to do. Griffith, not being an American, was able to take a dis-passionate, and objective look at our Civil War in order to discover many of its fallacies. This was something we have not been able to do because as Americans we have been so enthralled by our Civil War that it has become sacred to us. This was a pioneering book which dared to look at Civil War combat and compare it to other conflicts.
Paddy Griifth poises the question was the Civil War truly a precursor to so called modern warfare, i.e. World War One? Or was it really just bad Napoleanics! This slender volume takes on that large and interesting question, and covers a lot of ground in just 200 odd pages. If we really look at how tactical combat was condcuted in the Civil war there is a lot that just does not make sense. Why were the battles so indicisive? Were the new rifled weapons really changing the battlefield? Griffith shows us that above all else staff work was really poor. Generals could barely manage their troops, and it is no wonder that battles became crude, head-on affairs. Even the so-called genuses of the war, the Lee's, Jackson's and Grant's start to look more like average generals trying to wrestle with crude armies when subjected to the kind of analysis that is applied here.
The Civil War has been made into such hyberbole by past and present American historians that is has been difficult to stand back and really take an objective look at it. No doubt these very same people, as evidenced by some of the reviewers here, will take great offense at what Griffith is trying to get at here. The Civil War was a poorly fought conflict. The armies were hasily created out of nothing, and as a result could do little more than blaze away at each other. The infantry tended to be held back by an inate tendnecy to fire and dig in, the cavalry was religated to doing next to nothing for the first half of the war, and the artillery was never properly employed. When we look at the conflict subjectively, its diffiuclt not to agree with Von Moltkes' assessment that the Civil War was nothing more than armed mobs roving about the woodlands of North America!
Infantry fire power has been greatly over-rated in this war. The new rifled muskets had potentially greater range, but the troops were rarely encouraged to employ it. Studies of firefights show ranges roughly similar to Napoleanic period with smoothbores! Yet the basic tendency of Americans was to stand and shot, rather than to maneauver and develope the battlefield, even though the French tactical doctrine that they based their training on emphisized battlefield movement. When advantages were gained, there was nothing to exploit success because there was no battlefield cavalry to do so. Even the famed JEB Staurt never used his 10,000 Confederate cavalry to acheive any kind of massed charge on the battlefield which might have provided decisive victory. Instead he was content to ride around the rear of the Union army making petty raids!
In all fairness to the ametuer nature of the armies on both sides Griffith does show that there was potential, and as the war dragged on innovative commanders did achieve noteworthy successes on occasion. Because the armies had to be created from the ground up everything had to be learned on the job. Each regiment was trained at a different level and achieved experience at different rates. Brigade commanders had to hope that their regiments could cope with each tactical situation on a ad hoc basis. The Civil War shows what has become until recently the American way of war. Create an army from scratch, throw it together, learn on the job, mkae horrondus mistakes, but learn and somehow get better. The Civil War armies did just that, and if the conflict appears less innovative under scutiny, this still does not detract from what they were able to accomplish.
In his conclusion Paddy Griffith shows us that if we want to look to the first truly modern war we must examine the Franco-Prussian 1870 conflict in greater detail. The Civil War has wrongly taken that place because of the endless promoting of American historians. While written a few years ago, Paddy Griffth's work is still quite relivant, and the field of Civil war tactical analysis is still largely devoid of any new works, despite over 200,000 published books on the Civil War! What Griffith began here has been taken up recently by Mr. Noseworthy in his book "The Bloody Crucible of Combat: Civil War fighting Methods". But the field is still wide open for investigation if any Civil War historian is brave enough to challenege the chreished notions of the confilct. Only by reading books like this can we began to place the Civil War into proper perspective and learn how it truly contributed to the development of Western Warfare.
Product Description
Military historian Paddy Griffith looks at the problems faced by the commanders in this fascinating conflict and examines in detail how they overcame them. Working closely with illustrator Peter Dennis, Dr. Griffith reveals in a new and exciting way the mechanisms of command, the instruments of victory and of defeat during those four terrible years.
Book Description
The epic history of a bloody campaign that determined the course of the Civil War--and forged two of America's greatest military leaders.
Deep in the winter of 1862, on the border between Kentucky and Tennessee, two extraordinary military leaders faced each other in an epic clash that would transform them both and change the course of American history forever.
Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant had no significant military successes to his credit. He was barely clinging to his position within the Union Army--he had been officially charged with chronic drunkenness only days earlier, and his own troops despised him. His opponent was as untested as he was: an obscure lieutenant colonel named Nathan Bedford Forrest. Forrest was a slaveholder, Grant a closet abolitionist--but the two men held one thing in common: an unrelenting desire for victory at any cost.
After ten days of horrific battle, Grant emerged victorious. He had earned himself the nickname "Unconditional Surrender" for his fierce prosecution of the campaign, and immediately became a hero of the Union Army. Forrest retreated, but he soon re-emerged as a fearsome war machine and guerrilla fighter. His reputation as a brilliant and innovative general survives to this day. But Grant had already changed the course of the Civil War. By opening the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers to the Union Army, he had split Dixie in two. The confederacy would never recover.
A riveting account of the making of two great military leaders, and two battles that transformed America forever, Men of Fire is destined to become a classic work of military history.
Customer Reviews:
The value of "Men of Fire" to those interested in the Civil War !.......2007-09-02
"Men of Fire" was everything that it was obviously supposed to be : a detailed account of the actions of two great leaders of the Civil War , one for the North & one for the South , during their first major Battle ,early in the Civil War and each being "basically untried & unknown" ! Of course I'm talking about the two principles of the book , U. S. Grant and Nathan Bedford Forrest !
This book accomplishes this main task , very , very well ! It gives "background material" on both great men , that I had never read before ! It really brought these two "legends & heros" into very clear view ! It shows , in this very early battle , thier motivations , their courage , their basic tactics , their vision , their learership , their greatness , their energy , their strengths , their disgusts with the folly & fools around them !
What it did in addition , that I thought most outstanding , was the clear way that it showed the "disorganization , the in-fighting , the jelousey , the politics , the poor planning , the lack of vision" of both sides in this vast conflict , shown so clearly , esp. at the very top of the leadership ladders !
Because of this clear evidence of the "truly medocore and untalented and stupid" majority of politically modivated leaders on both sides and especially at this very significant , early battle ; U.S. Grant and Nathan Bedford Forrest emerge as giants ,as noble warriors ,as dedicated leaders ,who are focused on only one thing : Victory for their cause ! They know what is at stake for their sides and they go at the truly terrible endeavor of a war ,that has been committed to take place , with one unyielding purpose : To achieve absolute victory , at all costs !
This was a great book , about two great men , deeply involved in a most horrible conflict !
Readable but Questionable.......2007-08-22
I want to like this book much more than I do! Jack Hurst is an excellent writer. The portraits of the participants are skillful and incisive. The descriptions of battles capture the ebb and flow of the action and the reader is able to follow with few problems. He presents a number of ideas that are very interesting, logical and thought provoking. All of this makes for an enjoyable informative read covering the Civil War in the West from Belmont to the fall of Nashville. In addition, most of his views on the major players are the same as mine, allowing me to applaud as he skillfully skewers Halleck and Buell.
Why isn't this a five-star book review and why can't I be more complementary? I feel this book has a number of problems, none of which invalidate it but taken together diminish the value.
The idea of putting Grant and Forrest together in 1862 makes little sense. Forrest, in 1862, is not that important a person to link with Grant. Yes, they are both determined and both fighter but that does not qualify them for equal billing. The book seems to agree being almost all Grant with a few Forrest chapters. Only about two of the Forrest chapters are required for the story, I felt the rest were more marketing than history.
The idea of a desperate Grant, who may or may not be fighting demon rum, is the story line. Hurst has bought into the Longacre idea that Grant was fighting a serious drinking problem, in spite of the fact that history cannot fully support this idea. The author adds desperation, making Grant's actions as much fear of going back to being a clerk as a drive to win the war.
Maps are another problem. Most of them are two-page maps with the page split in the action being illustrated. No map has contour lines a major consideration at a number of points. The maps are not badly placed but the page split and selection is not helpful either.
I found footnotes to be a major problem. The author uses direct quotes without a footnote to support it. In once case, I think the quote was made in 1863 at Vicksburg not at the time implied. Additionally, one footnote may be for a paragraph that needs multiple footnotes. A couple of his better ideas are not footnoted at all.
Contradictions; the author reverses himself at least once on a major point. This was one of the ideas he presented, w/o footnotes, about 150 pages later, he states the opposite position.
Halleck was not the most honest of men. The author clearly dislikes him and goes out of his way to point out his failings. During this time, Halleck was trying to remove Grant while saying that he was protecting him. This is well documented but some of the book's statements need footnotes and better documentation. I have the same complaint for statements made about Buell.
I did not find any major errors in the book. I do feel that the author's emphasis some items is questionable and needs better documentation. Overall, this is a very readable history of the War in the West from Belmont to the fall of Nashville. I rate this 3 ½ stars that round up to four stars.
A Captivating Account of a Crucial Civil War Campaign.......2007-08-19
In Men of Fire, Jack Hurst, a Nashville-based author and former journalist who has written for the Chicago Tribune, the Philadelphia Inquirer, and The Tennessean, has penned a comprehensive, graphic narrative of a Civil War campaign that split the Confederacy in two.
Some 75 miles northwest of Nashville, on the Cumberland River near the hamlet of Dover, Tennessee, was Fort Donelson, and 12 miles farther west, on the Tennessee River, was Fort Henry.
In February,1862, Union forces commanded by Brigadier Gen. Ulysses S. Grant (army) and Flag-Officer Andrew Hull Foote (navy) led an expedition to capture these Confederate forts.
Marking the first major Union victories of the Civil War, their capture opened two strategic waterways that pointed like twin daggers at the heart of the Confederacy.
Hurst focuses on Ulysses S. Grant (1822-1885), born in Point Pleasant, Ohio, and Nathan Bedford Forrest (1821-1877), born in Chapel Hill, Tennessee. Although different in many ways, these men were alike in one important respect: both were fighters. These "men of fire" detested defensive warfare; they aggressively sought to hit the enemy and hit him hard.
First to be attacked was the more vulnerable Fort Henry, constructed injudiciously on shallow land often flooded by the Tennessee. Pummeled by revolutionary new ironclads led by Foote, the garrison soon evacuated the fort and fled to the more secure Fort Donelson.
Pursuing the Southern troops on a balmy, spring-like day, Union troops blithely discarded their overcoats and blankets, and left behind their tents. Th
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