Military Innovation In The Interwar Period

Book Description

This study of major military innovations in the 1920s and 1930s explores differences in innovating exploitation by the seven major military powers. This volume of comparative essays investigates how and why innovation occurred or did not occur, and explains much of the strategic and operative performance of the Axis and Allies in World War II.

Customer Reviews:

Some good information, but lacking in many areas.......2006-08-14

The book does provide detailed footnotes as it is a series of essays where the writer of each "chapter" presents their viewpoint and analysis. However, this book provides no tables or charts to support any of the analysis or discussions presented. It would have been very helpful if there were a table or chart comparing each nation's "innovation" in each category described in this book, examples: armored warfare, strategic bombing, carrier development, etc.

What is most lacking in this book it that it focuses primarily on the US, Britain, and Germany, limited on Japan (amphibious assault and aircraft carrier development but nothing on their armor and combined arms tactics) and nothing significant on France, Italy, and Russia, who are mentioned merely in passing. This is the most glaring weakness of this book. Russia developed the T-34 tank, had a sizeable navy, large industrial base, naval infantry, paratroopers, cavalry, and actually trained with the Germans in the 1930's. The Italians were on the winning side of World War One, developed a large navy, their own tanks, and an ambitious goal to dominate the Mediterranean Sea, but they too are not mentioned.

It is important to learn how each of these major combatant nations developed as each had their own policies that led to successes and failures. An example is in amphibious landings, where the writer presents a view that the US was the most developed in the world during the interwar period. If that is the case, then why didn't the US attempt an amphibious assault prior to 1943 and why were the casualties so high in the first assault experienced at Tarawa? If the US was amphibious warfare strategy and doctrine was the most developed, then why did the British conduct the disastrous raid on Dieppe in 1943 as a rehearsal, wouldn't the US have enough experience in northern Africa, Sicily, and Anzio in 1943? The writer's claim is not supported through citing successful battles or numbers of equipment produced.

Another question is why weren't the British, Germans, Italians, and Russians mentioned or compared to in amphibious warfare? If Italy wanted to control the Med, wouldn't they have developed some type of doctrine or equipment? The Germans thought about invading England, what kind of equipment did they have and how would they have executed the invasion? The Russian Naval Infantry, what was their doctrine? The Japanese amphibious landing is well researched and presented, but again, no tables or charts are presented to summarize the writer's viewpoint.

Russia's development during the interwar period is very critical as the equipment developed during the period was superior or at least equal to the German equipment. The T-34 tank's only weakness in 1941 was the lack of radio equipment along with the doctrine of dispersing the tanks instead of massing them into large formations. If one reads other WW2 history books, one learns that the Germans were only able to defeat the T-34 tank in 1941 with better unit maneuver and with greater numbers. German anti-tank weapons had no effect with the German tanks undergunned and under ranged. The largest caliber on a German tank in 1941 being the short barreled 75mm mounted on the Panzer MK IV and the StugIII (which was an assault gun found in anti-tank battalions).

Another glaring omission in this book is there are no discussions on anti-weapons or counter munitions designed to defeat the innovations being developed in the interwar period, the lone exception being the torpedo and US artillery proximity fuses. There are no discussions on the bazooka, anti-tank rifles, anti-tank guns, shaped charges, depth charges, or anti-aircraft guns. Obviously the Germans had planned for anti-aircraft defense, otherwise they would not have developed the 88mm gun nor would have the deployed it so close to the front line troops. Rommel was able to repulse the British armor counterattacks at Arras, France in 1940 only with the 88mm anti-aircraft gun. This experience influenced him to utilize this weapon in a dual purpose anti-tank role in the desert. The British had attacked him in Arras with heavily armored Matilda tanks, armed with a 2-pound anti-tank gun, but no high explosive rounds against infantry. These cases are extremely relevant and important discussions into the interwar period.

Why did the British choose not to equip their tanks with HE rounds? Why didn't the Germans equip their Panzer MKIV and StugIII tanks with long barrel 75mm guns from the start? Why didn't the Russians equip their early T-34 tanks without universal radios (only the platoon leader had a radio)?

How was the Sherman tank developed and doctrinally planned to be utilized, a vehicle with an underpowered 75mm gun, prone to catching on fire, and a narrow track base not suited for cross country mobility (as described in the book Death Traps, Belton Cooper)? At the end of WW2, the US might have gotten directly into war against the Russians? How would the Sherman tank fared in the vast Russian muddy steppes and marshes and no highways? The Germans learned the hard way fighting against the T-34 an incorporated many of the features (wide track base and sloped armor) into the Tiger and Panther tanks. Was the Sherman tank designed to be an infantry support vehicle with anti-tank battalions designed to defeat enemy armor? What calibers of weapons were they equipped with and how were they to be employed? None of these questions are answered in this book.

Overall the book does provide some information that is interesting, such as the German night bombing tactics, use of the Stuka dive bomber to provide precision bombing, and the lack of reliable and powerful aircraft engines that prevented German strategic bomber development. However, the lack of direct comparisons (such as comparing the T-34 vs the Panzer Mark IV vs the Sherman Tank in armor thickness and armament range, penetrating power), lack of tables (such as showing the range and capacity of the Japanese aircraft carrier vs the US and British), charts (comparing the number of tanks and tank regiments fielded by Russia, Germany, England, France, Italy, US, and Japan in 1939), and complete omissions of the Italians and Russians is glaring and detracts to what could have been a well rounded and educational book.

Given the Editors' strong professional and education backgrounds, expected a lot more information from this book. Recommend borrowing this book from the library rather than purchasing it.

Military Innovation in the Interwar Period.......2005-08-26

This book is a necessary for those who want to understand the relationship between development of technology and military innovation. It is not an easy book to read, but contains tremendous amount of information along with accurate historical records. Must for military tacticians and historians alike.

Essential Addition to the Study of the Inter-war Period.......2005-01-15

The acclaimed scholarly team of Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett have edited an anthology of essays encompassing the technological innovations in weaponry during the 1920's and 1930's. These innovations span the research and developments of all the major belligerents that play a major role in the coming global conflict. Each scholar was instructed to compare and contrast his or her topic country with two other countries making this work not only a significant contribution in and of itself, but also a vital comparative study as well. In addition, the researchers were asked to structure their essays around three concepts: the strategic framework of the period, the organizational factors of the institutions under study, and the doctrinal framework of the services. Many of the contributing factors to victory and defeat in World War II are covered within the pages of this important work. Williamson Murray takes a look at "Armored Warfare: The British, French and German Experiences," and "Strategic Bombing: The British, American and German Experiences." Richard R. Muller examines "Close Air Support: The German British and American Experiences, 1918-1941." Geoffrey Till discusses "Adopting the Aircraft Carrier: The British, American, and Japanese Case Studies." But perhaps the most important chapter is Allan R. Millett's "Assault From the Sea: The Development of Amphibious Warfare Between the Wars-the American, British, and Japanese Experiences." Millett compared the development of amphibious doctrine in Japan, Britain, and the United States. The author concludes the U. S. led the way in amphibious warfare doctrine, initiating combined arms operations between air, sea and land that would prove to be a critical advantage in the pacific campaign. According to Millett, Japan started out impressively as was evident by its ever-expanding Pacific empire in the 1930's. Since every landing force became an isolated island garrison, however, Japan's whole amphibious program literally faded away. Great Britain, on the other hand, never had the economic resources necessary to implement a successful amphibious program. Millett concludes that factors such as budget and innovative foresight are vital contributing factors in technological innovation. The author is also quick to point out that in many cases, new weapons become obsolete as soon as hostilities begin. Generally, books of essays are usually disjointed and inconsistent. The guidelines and structure the editors have chosen have tied all the chapters in this book together nicely. This is arguably the best work on the inter-war period to emerge in years. Highly recommended.

Great historic analysis on military innovations.......2001-09-18

It is a very good review on how things developed between world wars. It provides a good insight of the thinking of the different countries and how they coped with their doctrines and how much they took an advantage of the WWI experiences.
I am rating 4 stars because actually I would like much more information rather than 30 pages on each subject.

Readable and Good.......2001-07-15

This is an anthology of various articles. Generally anthologies are the pits as they tend to lack a central them and the quality will vary. These articles are generally by the authors and as such they are of an even standard.

There are a number of chapters that discuss a range of issues from the use of Tanks to the development of the Aircraft Carrier.

The book is interesting although the area covered is naturally enormous and the amount of space that can be devoted to complex subjects is naturally limited. Despite this most of the essays are interesting and not only for what they say. In the first essay about the development of armored warfare by way of an aside the writer attacks Gueridian as a sycophant and also as a person whose reputation was largely the result of self publicity. Later the English theorists Fuller and Liddell Hart are critiqued as presenting overly schematic histories of the First World War which warped the truth to fit in with their own theories. Interestingly the essay then goes on to suggest that the first world war infantry battles were so complex that even now we struggle to understand them and for that reason it was no surprise that Douglas Haig had the problems that he did.

Book Description

Recorded history is a finely-woven magic fabric of intricate lies about events predating the sixteenth century. There is not a single piece of evidence that can be reliably and independently traced back earlier than the eleventh century. This book details events that are substantiated by hard facts and logic, and validated by new astronomical research and statistical analysis of ancient sources.

Customer Reviews:

Calculations are only as good as your numbers.......2007-08-03

Yes, we can all agree that mainstream history is nearly 100% BS due to politics, economics, ego, problems with dating techniques, and various conspiracies. Agreed. But, I've been researching the distinct possibility that human history (in terms of civilizations) are much more ancient than we've been told, so coming across this book was very interesting to me. I wondered how Fomenko could be wrong (if at all) because he is very persuasive in his presentations. Then it dawned on me. If at previous times in prehistory, due to the various catastrophies that are well documented (comets, asteroids, planetary disruptions, plasma discharge, pole reversals, etc) the Earth was in a different position in relation to the sun, different tilt on its axis, different orbit, different rotation (in terms of velocity and DIRECTION), and the continents were in different positions, then would this not cause the ancients to see the sky (constellations) differently? In other words, is Fomenko making erronious assumptions about the physics of the Earth in pre-history, which then corrupt his data with regards to dating the relevant astrology? The last event to seriously disrupt our planet occured roughly 3500 years ago, according to other good researchers, so is it possible Fomenko has been confused by this? The vastly different physics of our planet in the not so distant past may explain this confusion, which is not to say the "mainstream" version of history is correct; on the contrary. I am not an expert in these fields, but wanted to see if this idea could spark discussion.

Pants on fire?.......2007-07-19

Will people ever read before spamming? Yes, Jesuits could not rewrite world history alone, they had help. Anyway, Dr Prof Acad A.Fomenko does not point to jesuits as the driving force of world wide history manipulation in published volumes 1,2,3;, actually he barely mentions the poor devils. Check it with 'Search inside' feature, please. China is rarely mentioned either, in fact, Dr Fomenko is completely eurocentric. Right, his theory contradicts all mainstream schools of history, because in their actual state they are all built on blatantly erroneus chronology. You don't need a mysterious cabal (conspiracy) to falsify history, the falsification is its modus operandi. It is inherent to history(ians) to falsify (distort) events, as it is inherent to humans to boast as it is inherent to power (authority) to legimize itself by referrring to glorious past made to its own order. Dr Prof Fomenko and team have identified scores of instances of such manipulation in Russian, European, etc.. history, and delivered valid statistical proof thereof. His own 'reconstruction' is completely another story. Forget c14 as a valid method of dating. W.Libby has initially discovered a brilliant method of INDEPENDENT dating. Too bad, c14 method has become a joke after a forced marrige with dendrochronology with consensual chronological scale inbuilt. Radiocarbon method can't stand blind tests, but is so very productive as a rubberstamp.

Accepted History & Chronology Must Be Changed. .......2007-04-09

There is no doubt that history as most know it is a sham, & institution's version of History both University & Church is fradulent & inaccurate. Everything was established with an agenda, The real "Dark Ages" are now when we have access to incredible amounts of information past authorities & more important 'common folk' didn't have but our institutions & educators are slow to evolve because of what has ignorantly & arrogantly been taught for too long. This is on many subjects not just Chronology.

For anyone to question "Why would a Mathematician have anything credible to say of History?" The answer is from Dr. Fomenko's preface in the book: "It would be worthwhile to remind the reader that in the XVI-XVII century Chronology was considered to be a subdivision of Mathematics." These volumes could possibly be some of the most important works to date & should be read by everyone with an interest in History, especially professors & educators who have a duty to the public. I have read both books & must say that 'Chronology 1' has some very eye opening & revolutionary information. Even if these volumes are part true the implications are profound & opens the doors to further investigations & questions which must be done. I speak several different lanquages & must say the logic Dr. Fomenko uses with "inflection" of words & words being read from left to right in one region & right to left in another then written backwards, the removal of vowels & get down to basics of words, or different cities & locations having the same name etc. is correct. Vowel usage has always been optional & varied, actually complicating linquistics & study. The first thing one has to understand is that words never had a fixed spelling in history like we do now, the spelling of words was mutable & regional, as well as names & titles of people were vast, varied & changed, NOTHING WAS FIXED or understood linear. Matters of Life & Death as well as financial profiteering yesterday & today were & are made with ignorant, illogical & conspiratorial views of history & reality, it's time people get closer to the Truth & society collectively grow up.

Very Interesting.......2007-03-07

It is a good proposal and I believe it will mature into something even better in the future. I think it deserves to be read.

History as Science Fiction.......2007-01-10

Anatoly Fomenko has written a very intriguing book, full of pictures, charts, and computer 'proof' of his thesis: backwards of AD900 we don't really know what happened or when. Between AD900 and AD1600 there is more certainty, but there is still a lot of fuzzy ground, and things don't get reliable until we get past the 1600's where the printing press made it very difficult for the perpetrators of this timeline manipulation to change anything that had been committed to print. The Dark Ages did not happen. Books were burned for a reason. One organization has doubled the actual length of its existence by expanding the real chronology. Read why.

I had always wondered why Christ died about AD33 and yet men waited until the 11th century to form the Knights Templar, the Cathars, etc and go after the Holy Land by force. Why the 1000 year gap? Turns out there wasn't more than a 10-12 year gap and he proves it using astronomy. This also implies that the planet is not as old as we have been told, and current Christian and other creationist scientists are already championing that idea without being aware of Fomenko's book. The two groups, creationist scientists and the Russian mathematical analysts corroborate each other. Fascinating.

Of course, all this flies in the face of what we have been told traditionally is the 'proper' chronology of western civilization, and most readers will experience 'cognitive dissonance' in reading this book. It means that our history going backwards from AD1600 becomes progressively more incorrect and unreliable until it cannot be trusted at all... in the space of 700-800 years.

Naturally, the curious, open-minded reader will want to know WHO did this, WHY, and did any of the events we think of as really ancient ever happen?
Dr. Fomenko is a respected scientist/mathematician at Moscow State University who has already answered these questions to the satisfaction of his initially skeptical colleagues. Most of them are now believers, a few still refuse to believe (the usual diehards), and of course the western press has ignored Fomenko's work -- for obvious reasons when you read the book. The ones who perpetrated this chronology ruse have a lot to answer for. They are still with us. That's why this book is a well-kept secret.

I gave the book a 4-star rating because I was unable to check out some of his claims; those I checked were as he said. But if even 1/3 of his claims are true, this punches a big hole in what we think is our history, the meaning of western civilization, our educational process (for repeating the ruse as gospel), and the trustworthiness of the organization that perpetrated this ruse, well-intentioned or not.

This book relates to current research into a Young Earth paradigm, to John Keel's discoveries about our planet, and Fr Malachi Martin's insights (in his now out-of-print books). We are indeed sheep who are manipulated and kept ignorant -- for a reason. While knowing what these men have to say may be the "booby prize" (as in: 'what can you do with this knowledge?'), it will provide interesting reading. Didn't someone say: "...and the Truth will set you free."?? For you to judge if this book contains the truth.

Average customer rating:

The Rapoport introduction ruined it for me
An unwieldy translation
A few translation suggestions
Would-Be-Commanders Should Buy Other Books
Its the ECONOMICS, stupid !!

On War
Carl von Clausewitz
Manufacturer: Princeton University Press
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0691018545

Book Description

On War is the most significant attempt in Western history to understand war, both in its internal dynamics and as an instrument of policy. Since the work's first appearance in 1832, it has been read throughout the world, and has stimulated generations of soldiers, statesmen, and intellectuals.

Download Description

Two motives lead men to War: instinctive hostility and hostile intention. In our definition of War, we have chosen as its characteristic the latter of these elements, because it is the most general. It is impossible to conceive the passion of hatred of the wildest description, bordering on mere instinct, without combining with it the idea of a hostile intention. On the other hand, hostile intentions may often exist without being accompanied by any, or at all events by any extreme, hostility of feeling. Amongst savages views emanating from the feelings, amongst civilised nations those emanating from the understanding, have the predominance; but this difference arises from attendant circumstances, existing institutions, &c., and, therefore, is not to be found necessarily in all cases, although it prevails in the majority. In short, even the most civilised nations may burn with passionate hatred of each other. Please Note: This book is easy to read in true text, not scanned images that can sometimes be difficult to decipher. The Microsoft eBook has a contents page linked to the chapter headings for easy navigation. The Adobe eBook has bookmarks at chapter headings and is printable up to two full copies per year. Both versions are text searchable.

Customer Reviews:

The Rapoport introduction ruined it for me.......2007-02-23

There is a reason that this is a classic. If I'm a teacher at a war college like
West Point , I can assign chapters
and test the students on the understanding of the material.
It is more in the western form of learning than Sun Tzu's classic.
Where does it fail?
Even at this time the "staff" type running of war
that defeated Napoleon was being used by joint European powers.
The running of a war has come to be viewed as like that of an effective business.
You even need a legal staff to deal with civilian complaints.
The modern mathematical approaches of games theory ( Rapoport ) for tactics and
systems theory ( Asimov ) for long range strategy are what spoil this book for me.
War as an object of nationalistic policy has been destroyed by science in our time.
The terrorists have tried to breath new life into the ancient war of faith
by killing their own people at a greater rate than they do the enemy.
Logistically that approach is destined to failure:
you just run out of soldiers fool enough to die for their god.
Carl von Clausewitz was sold on "genius" as the answer to war problems.
I think accounting ability may be as important.

An unwieldy translation.......2006-11-20

In a nutshell: Don't waste your money on this version.

The original version of this translation dates to just after the turn of the century, but the introduction and further editing by Anatol Rapaport (a biologist and a musician, not a political scientist or historian), make this a clumsy read at best and downright misleading at worst.

Rapaport, for being an editor of Clausewitz, was not a believer in the trinitarian system (primordial violence, non-rational actions, and rationality)- probably not a good choice for a work which owes as much as it does to the first and second Trinities (army, people, and government).

If this is the only one you can get, then live with it. The first chance you get, get the much clearer, much more straightforward Paret/Howard translation, which is the one that's actually taught at most service schools as well as in universities in their courses that use it.

A few translation suggestions.......2006-09-27

A few years ago, I translated the crucial first chapter of On War's first book from German into Portuguese. The results were then discussed vis-à-vis the Paret/Howard English version in our post-graduate program. Back then, I wrote a few additional comments in English about nuances of the Paret/Howard text [otherwise, very good], which - so I believed - seemed to dilute the depth of Clausewitz' exposition at key spots. These brief comments follow below, as I still believe they can be of some interest, particularly to those who meditate the relation between war and politics, and as they touch the very heart of Clausewitz unsurpassed insight into the nature of bellic conflict.

The first sentence is the Paret/Howard quotation; the second is the original German; and the third is how I would suggest it in English.

Title 26
* All Wars Can Be Considered Acts of Policy

** Sie koennen alle als politische Handlungen betrachtet werden

*** They [the wars of the previous paragraph] can all be approached as political actions.

§ 2
* If the state is thought of as a person, and policy as the product of its brain, then among the contingencies for which the state must be prepared is a war in which every element calls for policy to be eclipsed by violence. Only if politics is regarded not as resulting from a just appreciation of affairs, but - as it conventionally is - as cautious, devious, even dishonest, shying away from force, could the second type of war appear to be more `political' than the first.

** denn betrachtet man die Politik wie die Intelligenz des personifizierten Staates, so muss unter allen Konstellationen, die ihr Kalkuel aufzufassen hat, doch auch diejenige begriffen sein koennen, wo die Natur aller Verhaeltnisse einen Krieg der ersten Art bedingt. Nur insofern man unter Politik nicht eine allgemeine Einsicht, sondern der `konventionellen' Begriff einer der Gewalt abgewendeten, behutsamen, verschlagenen, auch unredlichen Klugheit versteht, koennte die letzte Art des Krieges ihr mehr angehoeren als die erstere.

*** for if one approaches politics as the intelligence of the personified state, so it ought to be possible, among all constellations that its [the personified state's] calculus must consider, to understand those [constellations] in which the nature of all relationships also determines a war of the first kind. Only if one understands politics in the conventional [depreciative italics] view - as a violence-averse, cautious, devious, and even dishonest cunning - and not as a generic discernment; only then could the last kind of war belong more to politics than the first.

§ 3
*First, therefore, it is clear that war should never be thought of as something autonomous but always as an instrument of policy; otherwise the entire history of war would contradict us. Only this approach will enable us to penetrate the problem intelligently.

** Wir sehen erstens: dass wir uns den Krieg unter allen Umstaende als kein selbstaendiges Ding, sondern als ein politisches Instrument zu denken haben; und nur mit dieser Vorstellungsart ist es moeglich, nicht mit den saemtlichen Kriegsgeschichte in Widerspruch zu geraten. Sie allein schliesst das grosse Buch zu verstaendiger Einsicht auf.

*** First, therefore, we see that we ought always to think of war as a political instrument, and by no means as an autonomous thing. And only with this kind of conception we will not contradict the entire history of war. It [this kind of conception] alone [my italics] opens the great book of proper understanding.

101 § 1
* ... a paradoxical trinity...

** ... eine wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit...

*** ... an amazing trinity...

§2
* The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government.

** Die erste dieser drei Seiten ist mehr dem Volke, die zweite mehr dem Feldherrn und seinem Heer, die dritte mehr der Regierung zugewendet.

*** The first of these three dimensions is directed more to the people; the second, more to the commander and his army; the third, more to the government.

§3
* These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another.

** Diese drei Tendenzen, die als ebenso viele verschiedene Gesetzgebungen erscheinen, sind tief in der Natur des Gegenstandes gegruendet und zugleich von veraendlicher Groesse.

*** These three tendencies, which appear just like many different codes of law, have their foundation laid deep in the nature of the object and, at the same time, may acquire variable magnitudes.

My final suggestion is that the name of Clausewitz' book in English should be "Of War", instead of "On War". This is not only a picky nuance: there is a wide and deep gulf between "Of" (`Von', `De') and "On" (`Über', `Super'), a gulf which has been overlooked even by the best philosophers - but not by Clausewitz in his title. Everyday language makes us used to mistakes such as "speak on something", "reflect on something", and truly, these things do not happen. We speak something, meditate/mediate a thought. Clausewitz speaks of war, and certainly not ON war; Jomini speaks on war: he is actually sitting ontop of it, and, really, knows too little to speak OF it.

Would-Be-Commanders Should Buy Other Books.......2006-09-18

If you are going into politics this book is for you. It is very abstract and rambles on for thousands of words in order to get to a single point.

If you are like me I read it, hoping to find great ideas about strategy, and how to best understand ways for armies to maneuver and defeat an enemy. Clauswitz, however, really did not fulfill my needs.

After reading other books titled "The Art of War" there are two that are better than Clauswitz, regarding operational strategy. Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini's "The Art of War," and Sun Tzu's "The Art of War." These go straight to the point. Jomini's was written in the same era of Clauswitz. Like Clauswitz it discusses the principles and lessons of the wars of Frederick the Great and Napoleon. Unlike Clauswitz, Jomini discusses how commanders can best use specific strategies in battles, like flank attacks, the oblique order, convex order, etc.--Fun Stuff!

Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" is like reading Psalms (only with military themes)--it is most concise; with fewer words each passage inspires one's mind with creativity in understanding important principles of strategy (there was not much space anyway on bamboo for ancient Chinese philosophers to write long treatises, like that of Clauswitz!)

Much of the philosophies of Clauswitz are viable, but there is a foolish one that I must give criticism to. It is well known in military studies that the generals of World War I studied this book extensively. In "On War," Chapter XI, the author states, "Let us not hear of Generals who conquer without bloodshed. If a bloody slaughter is a horrible sight, then it is a ground for paying more respect for war...." World War I commanders must have really taken this to heart, because the Western Front must have been the most wasteful and unproductive meat grinder in the history of warfare. For example, Falkenhayn wanted to bleed the French white in the Battle of Verdun. He got his wish--a total of a million people died. What positive result did it get anyone? NOTHING! (I guess you can say there WAS more respect for the horrors of war, but what good did that do for millions of families which lost loved ones!) This Clauswitzian theme for bloodshed proved moot when in World War II armies followed a different theme: fight with as little casualties as possible.

Its the ECONOMICS, stupid !!.......2006-09-09

-Everyone expressing a erudite opinion about Clausewitz or "ON WAR" has completely missed the point here.
-The question is NOT whether Clausewitz or "On War" is an essential read for everyone interested in military hsitory or military affairs. THAT is a moot piont to the Nth Degree.

-The REAL question IS - WHY would you pay $595.oo for a book that has the same identical information as another book for $30.oo ?!?!?!?
-That is the ONLY question regarding THIS particular version of "ON WAR".
-Its the ECONOMICS, stupid !!

Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (Strategy and History Series)

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New Insights into a Modern Classic

Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd (Strategy and History Series)
Frans Osinga
Manufacturer: Routledge
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0415371031

Book Description

This is an in-depth analysis of the strategic theories of John Boyd, the leading US strategist.

The book corrects the common misinterpretations of his work, showing how his thinking impacted on US military doctrine and defense policy over the past 25 years. Boyd is important for his introduction of scientific and philosophical developments into a methodology for strategic thinking. This book presents these complex ideas in an enlightening context.

Customer Reviews:

New Insights into a Modern Classic.......2007-01-20

John Boyd's answer to the problem of winning in any form of conflict, the "Discourse on Winning and Losing," is a set of roughly 300 charts, and Dutch AF Col Frans Osinga has set himself the task of guiding his readers through them. It is a formidable assignment. Boyd, you see, did not intend the briefings of the Discourse to be read on their own. For years, he would not give out copies until after the presentation, and it had to be the "whole brief or no brief." It may seem obvious, but it was in briefing format not so much in tribute to Sun Tzu - although The Art of War is, like the Discourse, a set of bullet points - but simply because he didn't feel that there were enough readers inside the Beltway to make it worthwhile.

Osinga accomplishes his mission magnificently. If you are interested in Boyd's problem of how to win regardless, stop right now and order the book. If you have not heard the briefings, my recommendation is to begin with chapter one, then skip back to chapter seven for a summary of Boyd's influence on strategy. Then, download the charts, go back to chapter two, and work your way through the rest of the book. [The briefings are all available on Defense and the National Interest.]

Is it a tough read? Do you know of anything really worthwhile that is easy? Just as there is no royal road to mathematics, there is no royal road to Boyd. I was present at the creation of many of these charts, and I found a lot in this book that was new and helpful in broadening my understanding (for one thing, I have not, as Osinga did, read Boyd's original notes in the source books).

This book is a distilled version of Col Osinga's Ph.D. dissertation, which he completed while serving as a research fellow at the Clingendael Institute of International Relations in The Hague. He has done an excellent job of making academic rigor accessible to the general reader - the only equations, for example, are the ones Boyd used in "Destruction and Creation" - while exploiting the depth of research that a dissertation requires. There are 32 pages of single-spaced notes and 12 of bibliography.

I enthusiastically recommend Science, Strategy and War to all students of strategy, particularly those more concerned with where strategy is going than where it has been.

National Security and The Nuclear Dilemma, 1945-1991

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National Security and The Nuclear Dilemma, 1945-1991
Richard Smoke
Manufacturer: McGraw-Hill Humanities/Social Sciences/Languages
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0070593523

Book Description

This definitive survey examines the impact of nuclear weaponry on national security issues. Written by an experienced author and founder of the Peace and Common Security Institute in Berkeley, California, this text describes how current nuclear dilemmas have developed out of past choices and events. The final chapter of this chronologically organized text covers events that took place from 1985-1991, making the material relevant to the post-Cold War era.

The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics

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American Defense Policy
Understanding Strategy

The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics
Robert J. Art
Manufacturer: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0742525570

Book Description

The sixth edition of this classic text retains the best from earlier editions and adds thirteen new selections that highlight twenty-first century challenges, including terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. Strategies for using force, together with case studies that illustrate the general principles, are hallmarks of the text. New case studies include Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Asia. An entirely new section devoted to coping with terrorism looks at the issue from a variety of geographical and philosophical viewpoints.

Customer Reviews:

American Defense Policy.......2006-05-02

This book is a collection of scholarly articles that demonstrate, both historically and politically, what the United State's defense policy has been during major and minor conflicts, cold war era, and through the present day war on terrorism. It is an excellent insight into the past with a good idea into where this countries policy are heading with an analysis of where it should be through varying perspectives. I found the book a good read and even though I disagreed with some of the conclusions it certainly demonstrated the arguments from all sides.

Understanding Strategy.......2000-07-02

This book, a collection of essays by some of the world's leading historians and political scientists gives a reader a glimpse into both the theroetical structure and real life examples of military structure. This is not a textbook on military strategy however, and the examples may not always directly illustrate every given aspect of the theory. But if you want a taste for strategy - it is highly recommended.

Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat

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Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias
Operational Level Analysis of Traditional Cultures
Tribes and Clans vs Superpowers
How do you win if you have different definitions for "victory"?
Academia Only Goes So Far

Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat
Richard H. Shultz , and Andrea J. Dew
Manufacturer: Columbia University Press
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Binding: Hardcover

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ASIN: 0231129823

Book Description

Since the end of the Cold War, conventional militaries and their political leaders have confronted a new, brutal type of warfare in which non-state armed groups use asymmetrical tactics to successfully fight larger, technologically superior forces. In order to prevent future bloodshed and political chaos, it is crucial to understand how these unconventional armed groups think and to adapt to their methods of combat.

In Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias, Richard H. Shultz Jr. and Andrea J. Dew investigate the history and politics of modern asymmetrical warfare. By focusing on four specific hotbeds of instability-Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq-Shultz and Dew conduct a careful analysis of tribal culture and the value of clan associations. They examine why these "traditional" or "tribal" warriors fight, how they recruit, where they find sanctuary, and what is behind their strategy. Traveling across two centuries and several continents, Shultz and Dew examine the doctrinal, tactical, and strategic advantages and consider the historical, cultural, and anthropological factors behind the motivation and success of the warriors of contemporary combat.

In their provocative argument, Shultz and Dew propose that war in the post-Cold War era cannot be waged through traditional Western methods of combat, especially when friendly states and outside organizations like al-Qaeda serve as powerful allies to the enemy. Thoroughly researched and highly readable, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias examines how non-state armies fight, identifies the patterns and trends of their combat, and recommends how conventional militaries can defeat these irregular yet highly effective organizations.

Customer Reviews:

Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias.......2007-07-29

I was excited when I saw the title, thinking that it was a timely work on an important subject. I was sorely disappointed. I am surprised at some of the people who are listed on the back cover who recommend the book; faced with the alternative explanation, I will accept that they actually did not read the book through.

The book is tremendously redundant throughout, wasting many pages to reiterate what was said a few pages previously. There was very poor quality control throughout the book as well; many misspellings and sentences which appeared to be pasted together from disparate attempts and not word-smithed.

The authors do not achieve their own stated goal, to provide a set of principles which could be applied to conflicts transcending time and space to enable understanding of potential enemies and operational environments. They fail miserably at this. Their analyses at the end of each chapter serve only to regurgitate what was said in the rest of the chapter, sometimes less concisely. The authors also enjoy throwing around the current most popular misused term in U.S. military circles: Asymmetric Warfare. They use this frequently and in many different contexts, often contradicting their own usage of the term. They never lay out exactly what this means to them or how it is defined by any other institution. It is used by the authors as a catch all phrase to explain strategy, tactics or anything which does not include exact force parity on the battlefield.

The authors have completely ignored the massive amount of work done through the previous century on Guerrilla Warfare. This is perhaps their most egregious mistake. They seem to believe that because their subjects of discussion are from tribal societies that their "asymmetrical warfare" is somehow unique in history. They continuously demonstrate their lack of understanding of even the most basic of tactics and strategies, or even the principles of warfare.

The chapters outlining the four areas which they profess to analyze and illuminate their "principles" do provide some basic understanding of these four areas (Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Iraq). However, even this seeming contribution is fraught with errors and popular misconceptions pulled from the press, many which are just wrong and could have been corrected in this book if a little research had been done from original sources. Their section on Iraq degenerates into a regurgitation of press reports, perpetuating myths and illuminating nothing; they do not seem to be aware of what is going on there. And in Afghanistan they claim that the Pashto were not incorporated into the campaign to eliminate the Taliban or in the government. Do they not realize that President Karzai is Pashto? It was the defection of the Pashto which made the Taliban crumble so rapidly.

Overall, this book contributes nothing to understanding, and actually confuses, the issue of how to fight non-nation state actors. The authors provide no original research and no unique understanding. The book was a miserable failure. And it could have been so good. I gave it one star because the is no zero star rating.

For a really useful tool to understand this subject read "Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse" by Bard E. Oneill. For a very thorough and concise book on Jihadist ideology read "Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror" by Mary Habeck.

Operational Level Analysis of Traditional Cultures.......2007-03-30

Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias by Richard Shultz and Andrea Dew is a solid introductory text that aims to guide current Intelligence Analysts with a framework to assess current and potential adversaries to US Forces worldwide. The operational framework they propose is specifically designed to analyze unconventional and guerrilla forces rather than the traditional military assessments that were designed and created for use in a conventional war (with the Soviet Union). Six questions are used to create their framework:

1) What is their concept of warfare?
2) Organization and Command and Control?
3) What are the Areas of Operations?
4) What are the Types and Targets of Operations?
5) Constraints and Limitations to the use of force?
6) The influence of outside actors?

The authors then explore four historical and contemporary case studies on how this framework would have assisted policy makers. The case studies are Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq. Over all the best case study is Iraq, due to the level of detail that the authors give- they describe the different `types' of insurgency and their historical basis, which impressed me. The worst is Afghanistan, where too much history is given too little type, and in the end we are left without much substance on the current operating environment there. I found the Chechnyan and Somali studies interesting and relevant, and the bibliography provides a guide to further and more detailed reading.

Overall, a great deal of emphasis is placed on the tribe, clan and religious structure and history of the societies. This is a relevant and worthy addition that many intelligence professionals can benefit from. Because these features are defining aspects of traditional cultures, they should hold an equivalent status in our analysis of them.

My only disappointment stems from the fact that because of their operational focus, many intelligence professionals in fields `closer to the ground' will find that their ideas, while interesting and worth keeping in mind, are not extremely helpful to the tactical level of intelligence analysis. For instance, although they explain why a Former Regime Element in Iraq has different motives for fighting than an Islamist in Iraq, this is not much use to a smaller, more specific area than say, Baghdad. To the intelligence professional concerned with the Bay'a, Al-Amel or Saydiyah Muhallahs within Baghdad, the most useful questions revolve around types and emplacement techniques of IEDs, and how these may be related to the structure and orientation of a specific insurgent group or cell; how, when, and where, do sectarian groups operate . . . These questions are of the most immediate concern, and will likely have the most substantive effect once the answers are found.

That being said, this book was a very interesting read, and a valuable one.

Tribes and Clans vs Superpowers.......2007-03-24

Using four case studies of conflict, Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq, the authors highlight the differences between conventional warfare with clearly established front lines and unconventional warfare there the is no front and engagements are hit-and-run surprise attacks with battlefields in the streets of a cities.

Until the times of these conflicts, American and Russian troops were trained to fight along the lines established by Alexander the Great and Napoleon, where divisions fought divisions, and one battle could have a decisive result. But in these conflicts the authors point out that the attackers often numbered less than 50 and before the defenders could organize their divisions to repulse the attack, the attackers, wearing the cloths of the locals, would melt into the population. No one was there for the division to fight.

The Red Army's experiences in Chechnya are cited as an example of tribal tactics. The Chechens would allow a column of Russian tanks to penetrate deep into the narrow, winding streets of their ancient cities. They would attack and disable the lead tank with a barrage of hand held rockets and then do the same to the last tank in the column. With the column of tanks unable to move forward or backward, the Chechens would pick off the remaining tanks before the Russian air force arrived.

All together, the book provides an excellent summary of the events encountered by the superpowers when they fought in Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan and Iraq. But the main point of the book is, with a little study of the culture and practices of Tribes and Clans in these areas, the U.S. (and the Russians) would have anticipated how the insurgents and militants would respond to invasion - and how and where they would fight.

The authors argue that what transpired in all four cases could have be predicted and countered.

How do you win if you have different definitions for "victory"?.......2007-02-21

Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat is a very useful contribution to the growing body of literature of modern conflict. While the subtitle of the book suggests a tempo-centric view of the Now, the book's purpose is really to demonstrate the value of anthropological analysis of the irregular warriors we are facing today. Unlike "modern" states who might employ irregular tactics, the authors look at the societal and cultural interactions specific in warrior societies, or "martial races" (a term indifferent to ethnicity), and their resulting organizing principles. This is done to satisfy Sun Tzu's admonition to "Know the enemy" which we do not. The absence of this knowledge, in simple terms, means we not only don't know or understand why or how the enemy fights but we don't even know how defeat or subordination, perhaps a better word, is defined by the enemy or conforms to their belief system. Afterall, both victory and defeat must be acknowledged by all sides.

In 2004, Major General Robert Scales went before the House Armed Services committee and recounted a conversation he had with a commander from the Third Infantry Division (then) recently returned from Iraq. Scales had asked about the improved situational awareness worked during the march to Baghdad. The response foretold the future, as well as described the past: "I knew where every enemy tank was dug in on the outskirts of Tallil. Only problem was my soldiers had to fight fanatics charging on foot or in pickups and firing AK 47s and RPGs. I had perfect situational awareness. What I lacked was cultural awareness. Great technical intelligence....wrong enemy." This book not only helps lay the ground work to identify the enemy, but also makes us look at their motivation from a different angle.

The authors, Richard H. Shultz and Andrea J. Dew, lay out the framework and goals of the book at the very beginning. This book is not out tactics or even strategy, but "operational art", the middle ground between Strategy (big "S") and Tactics (big "T"). Using case studies of Somali, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq, the authors demonstrate their theories through both recent and historical encounters. Some of their analysis is interesting as elements of previous success were clearly not understood and led to later failures.

The authors submit the following framework, all explicitly or implicitly found in Sun Tzu's 33 paragraphs on Offensive Strategy (which includes the advice to Know the Enemy and Know Yourself), as a means of better understanding the questions how and why that are critical to success.

1. What is the concept of warfare?
2. What is the Organization and Command and Control?
3. What are the Areas of Operations?
4. What are the Types and Targets of Operations?
5. Are there any Constraints and Limitations to the use of force?
6. Do they receive support and assistance from Outside Actors? If so, who are these Actors and in what form does the help come?

These are seemingly basic questions that go unasked, let alone answered.

In addressing American operational art, the combination of time and tempo (popular example: "Shock and Awe"), the authors don't make specific prescriptives but suggest incorporating new (to us) understandings of how the enemy organizes and operates. Shultz and Dew show that OODA loops don't matter when the invaded don't see war as "organized violence" requiring "paper, forms, and documents", don't mirror our hierarchy, and have different priorities. The behavior of the enemy is far different from modern Western principles and thus has different levers and pressures points for manipulation. Our focus on whether or not the engine of insurgency is religious or socio-political may ignore the underlying realities of the why and how in specific instances. Like in the West, religion may be a Gramscian distraction and our focus on it blinds us to the levers and pressure points necessary for successful operations.

The case studies note strong martial traditions and historical features that checked internecine violence. In Somali, for example, the authors show how these mechanisms were purposely broken to intentionally foster internal conflict, leading the path to disintegration of the state. They also show how our tactics empowered our target instead of breaking his support system. The enemy in Afghanistan and elsewhere know how their people organize and exploit it while we doom ourselves by imposing our own organizing and motivating principles on them. With parallels to the motivators of modern suicide terrorism, the authors look at warrior traditions and legacies, as opposed to cultural and social structures to reframe the perception of our Other.

Modern, West-centric theories such as "Fourth Generation Warfare" look at conflict with the "Gap" countries as a new way of warfare when the reality is quite the opposite. Likewise, simplifying insurgencies as monolithic or based in religion potentially blind us from opportunities to co-op and disaggregate and even to know how to define victory.

The authors are critical of both the US intelligence services and its endemic mirroring and of the shortcomings or military analysis. A case in point on the latter is the example of the USMC case study of Chechnya that looks at Russian failures in the 1994-1996 war and the study's absence of any analysis of the Chechens themselves.

Insurgents, Terrorists, And Militias does a good job demonstrating the value of knowing the enemy and showing how we don't. More importantly, it shows that our lack of understanding is counterproductive and fuels the engine of opposition. This should be on any counterinsurgency and irregular warfare reading list, as well as readings on the Gap. Be prepared to scribble in the margins as you read.

Academia Only Goes So Far.......2007-01-21

As a former Marine who has had experience in dealing with unconventional operations and counter-insurgency warfare, I agree with fellow Marine, D.A. Leonard "devintvi", below. The book does make some valid points, specifically that US leaders do need to understand the enemy before jumping into the odd quagmire that may seem feasible at the time. In recent history, both the US and Britain have been involved in unconventional warfare at least since the 1950s - for the US, we can go back to 1920s Haiti, Guatamala, Nicaragua, the Philippines, etc. However, even after all that experience with unconventional warfare, our leaders, planners and policy-makers still don't seem to have learned any lessons on the simple fact that I was taught in Boot Camp: "KNOW YOUR ENEMY."

That said, however, simply reading or "researching" what other writers and academics have said about unconventional warfare, or playing "game theory" about clans, cults, cells, or whatever, can only give an academic so much information. There is considerable difference between theory and practice, so for a valid analysis on current aspects of asymetric warfare, the analyst/academic needs to get out of their ivory tower and view the game up close and personal. At least do the research a basic combat journalist does when he or she is imbedded with a unit conducting such operations.

Simply arguing the same old liberal (read academic) saw that the government is inept in the current war, something with which I agree, just doesn't wash in and of itself. There needs to be more indepth analysis to make the argument, which has been going on for generations, more valid. For example, how many actual terrorists, insurgents, guerrillas, clan members, etc., have the authors interviewed? Evern been to Gitmo?

When discussing terrorists, insurgents, etc. in the current context, unlike previous, possibly more logical foe, it might also be feasible to identify the current Islamic combatants, not as mere clan members, but as the religious fanatics they are, who are actually willing to die for their rabid beliefs and, in doing so, hope to help anihilate the West.

Overall, an interesting, but ACADEMIC, view of the issue of the modern warfare we face. Certainly some useful information, but also "game theory" that doesn't really help the Grunt in the field who is dealing with a hopped up fanatic with explosives and an automatic weapon. I guess the book's attraction will depend from what side of the fence the reader is actually looking.

Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought

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Comparative study
Comprehensive
An Accessible Analysis of the Art of War
Essential reference.
Ideal for the academic,

Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought
Michael Handel
Manufacturer: Frank Cass
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

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ASIN: 0714681326

Book Description

This study is based on a detailed textual analysis of the classical works on war by Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mao Tse-tung and, to a lesser extent, by Jomini and Machiavelli. The central conclusion is that the logic of waging war and of strategic thinking is as universal and timeless as human nature itself.
This third revised and expanded edition contains five new chapters. One of these concerns Clausewitz' insights into the problem of war termination. Another is dedicated to the importance of correctly identifying the nature of war. The author has also added a chapter on Corbett's naval strategy, the relation of his work to the spirit of that of Sun Tzu, and in particular the issue of limited war and war by limited contingency.

Customer Reviews:

Comparative study.......2007-07-19

I liked the way Handel compares the classical thoughts of Clausewitz and Sun Tzu. This a good way of understanding the fundamental similarities and differences in approach to war the West and East have.

Comprehensive.......2007-04-30

This book is a comprehensive analysis of classical military thought. Although some would argue that this book is for military scholars, I beg to differ, and, heartily suggest this book to any First Year Student of Military Studies. It will greatly assist you in your comparison and analysis of theory and theorists and will also give you a comprehensive understanding of the universal logic of the principles and tenets of war.
This is a great book.

Dr. Terry Tucker
Combined Security and Transition Command-Afghanistan

An Accessible Analysis of the Art of War.......2006-08-14

Michael Handel's third and final version of his "Masters Of War" may be the most accessible analysis of classical military thought available to the military professional or academic. Handel's patient, methodical, side-by-side textual analysis of the works of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz overcomes the deceptive simplicity of Sun Tzu's precepts and the equally deceptive dense verbiage of Clausewitz's "On War." The result is an enlightening exploration of what may be mankind's most complex and most dangerous collective activity. For all its wastage and terror, war continues to be a final arbiter of the destiny of nations and ideologies.

Handel's work is an intellectually challenging read designed for the military professional or academic. He examines important concepts such as the centers of gravity, the correlation of ends and means, and the relationship of military and political objectives through a compare and contrast analysis of the writings of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz. The writings of some other authorities such as Mao and Jomini are cited where especially relevant. Handel's prose is straightforward. He uses examples from a broad range of military history to illustrate his points.

The author, who died in 2001, completed his revisions for this edition before the start of the Global War on Terrorism. Nevertheless, both classical military thought and Handel's analysis continue to be relevant.

This book is very highly recommended for the mid-grade military professional, especially for those studying at the intermediate service college level, and for the military academic seeking a broader understanding of the operational and strategic levels of war.

Essential reference........2001-12-05

The best side-by-side comparison of Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, and Jomini strategic thought one can find. Included is Mao's strategic approach to completely round out classical perspective on war and strategy. The single best reference for understanding the similarities and differences between the masters of strategy.

Ideal for the academic,.......2001-06-02

is how I would describe Handel's 'Masters of War'. This however should not deter the keen reader from purchasing the book as it is indeed a wonderful, clear and interesting read.

In the course of his analysis, Handel sets out to compare and contrast the different schools of thought that 'the greats' developed, with particular attention being paid to Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz. Perhaps this is where the text comes into its own for the academic. If one was to consider writing a study on the conduct and role of the military in this day and age, this book brings not only Sun Tzu and Von Clausewitz, but also Jomini and Machiavelli into focus. The student will hardly require a more comprehensive guide to different schools of thought for the construction of their essays.

Product Description

`History: Fiction or Science? Chronology 2` is the second volume of the most explosive and astounding tractate on history ever written - however, every theory it contains, no matter how unorthodox, is backed by rock solid scientific data. The book is easy and pleasant to read; it is well-illustrated, contains hundreds of charts, graphs and illustrations, copies of ancient manuscripts, and countless facts attesting to the falsity of the chronology used nowadays. You will be amazed to discover: - That the chronology universally accepted today and taken for granted is simply wrong; - That ALL methods of dating of ancient sources and artefacts known today are erroneous or non-exact; - That there is not a single document that could be reliably dated earlier than the XIth century; The Author refers to the Middle Ages as the Antiquity and proves mutual superimposition of the Second and the Third Roman Empire, both of which become identified as the respective kingdoms of Israel and Judah. Furthermore, he asserts that the famous reform of the Occidental Church in the XI century by Pope Gregory Hildebrand was the reflection of the XII century reforms of Byzantine emperor Andronicus who in his turn identifies with Jesus Christ. The Trojan war counted by Homer happened only as late as of the XIII century A.D. and the great poet actually lived in XIV century A.D. No stone in history of Antiquity is left unturned. Literally. This book is the beginning of a major correction to the chronology we live with.

Customer Reviews:

Check and see.......2007-06-21

I don't care what other people say of this book. Those affirmig it's fake, they hadn't ever read it. Or have some special reasons to do so. "Living is easy with eyes closed, misunderstanding all you see..." This book won't make you feel comfortable. It'll make you feel free. It'll make you feel you're "not the only one" to feel you'd been lied to for centuries.

Suprise! Suprise!.......2007-03-22

Here is a serie of books which turns "the whole world" upside down. I learned a lot of it and I hope that a new book from A.T. Fomenko will follow very quick. A absolute must for everybody who is interested in history or even a little bit from it.

Prescient St Augustine?.......2006-02-05

We can so far divide the New Chronology into the following three parts:

a) The verifiable theory that proves consensual chronology wrong with the aid of astronomy, statistics and mathematics;

b) The new chronology hypothesis based on a new understanding of known historical facts and the most likely logical explanation of the most obvious inconsistencies inherent in the official version of history;

c) The history conjectures, that is experimental historical reconstructions based on assumptions that the authors believe to make sense in the light of their research and linguistic parallels - void of ironclad factual support to date.

Fomenko's theory complies with the most rigid scientific standards as a whole:

It gives a coherent explanation of what we already know.

- It is consistent: independent lines of inquiry all lead to the same conclusion.

- The predictions it makes are confirmed empirically.

Fomenko goes by the following axioms:

- Chronology is the basis of history;

- Human evolution has always been linear, gradual and irreversible;

- The "cyclic" nature of human civilization is a myth, likewise all the gaps, duplicates, "dark ages" and "renaissances" that we know from consensual history;

- The accumulation of geographical knowledge as reflected in cartography is a gradual and irreversible process;

- The chronological distance between a given manuscript and the events described therein is proportional to the amount of distortions it contains;

- There is no "useless" information in authentic ancient sources.

Why the mainstream historians do not shower mathematician Academician Dr.Prof Fomenko with thanks and laurels?

The Russians:

Because Fomenko asserts that there was no such thing as the Tartar and Mongol invasion followed by three centuries of slavery, providing a formidable body of documental evidence to prove his assertion. The so-called "Tartars and Mongols" were the actual ancestors of the modern Russians, living in a bilingual state with Arabic spoken as freely as Russian. The ancient Russian state was governed by a double structure of civil and military authorities. The hordes were actually professional armies with a tradition of lifelong conscription (the recruitment being the so-called "blood tax"). Their "invasions" were punitive operations against the regions that attempted tax evasion. Fomenko proves that Russian history as we know it today is a blatant forgery concocted by a host of German scientists brought to Russia by the usurper dynasty of the Romanovs, whose ascension to the throne was the result of coup d'état, charged with the mission of making their reign look legitimate. Fomenko proves Ivan the Terrible to be a collation of four rulers, no less. They represented the two rival dynasties - the legitimate rulers and the ambitious upstarts. The winner took it all! Over some 30 years of controversy, Russian historians have made a most remarkable transition - they were initially accusing the young mathematician Fomenko of anticommunist dissident activity and attempts to deface the historical legacy of Soviet Russia; nowadays the middle-aged mathematician is accused of adhering to "pro-communist Russian nationalism" and defacing the proud historical legacy of Great Russia.

The Westerners:

Because Fomenko blows consensual Russian history to smithereens, successfully removing a crucial cornerstone from underneath the otherwise impeccable edifice of World History. Fomenko adds insult to injury, wiping out one by one the Ancient Rome (the foundation of Rome in Italy is dated to the XIV century A. D.), the Ancient Greece and its numerous poleis, which he identifies as the mediaeval crusader settlements on the territory of Greece, and the Ancient Egypt (the pyramids of Giza become dated to the XI-XV century A. D. and identified as the royal cemetery of the Global "Mongolian" Empire, no less). The civilization of the Ancient Egypt is irrefutably dated to the XII-XV century A. D. with the aid of the ancient Egyptian horoscopes cut in stone. He was the first one to decipher and date all such horoscopes, coming up with mediaeval dates in every case. English historians rage at the suggestion that the history of Ancient England was de facto a Byzantine import transplanted to the English soil by the fugitive Byzantine nobility. To reward the English historians who consider themselves the true scribes of World History, the cover of the present book portrays Tintoretto's Jesus Christ crucified on the Big Ben.

The Chinese:

Because Fomenko wipes out the Ancient History of China outright. No such thing. Full point. The compilation of the so-called Ancient Chinese History is reliably datable to the XVII-XVIII century only. It is perfectly recognizable as the Ancient European history, reworked and transcribed in hieroglyphs as yet another historical transplantation, this time performed on the Chinese soil by the loving Jesuit hands. The Chinese are the next in line to go berserk. Chinese history is inevitably bound to get both more ancient and more eventful, proportionally to the growing involvement of China in the world affairs. Chinese historians will keep on finding valid proof of prehistoric Chinese spaceflights until the Politburo orders them to shut up.

The Arabs:

Too bad. Islam with all its key figures is datable to XV-XVI century A. D. Arabic historians may find consolation in the crucial historical role of the Ottoman Empire in the XVI-XVII century. The trouble is that this empire was initially a Christian state, with Hagia Sophia identifiable as Temple of Solomon, according to Fomenko! We can only guess if the acquisition of Alexander the Great (a Macedonian and a Christian) as the founder of the Muslim World Empire will make Fomenko's theories more acceptable to the Arabic mainstream. He certainly does not spare any holy cows at all, claiming The Stone of Qa'Aba in Mecca to contain the lost Arch of the Covenant.

The Divinity:

Despite of reiterated statement that his theory is all about chronology and not Religion, Fomenko stirs up a whole condominium of wasp nests. His collection of anathemas, fatwa, and other condemnations from all parties concerned is already considerable. Little wonder, considering that the history of religions à la Fomenko looks as follows: the pre-Christian period (before the XI century and JC), Bacchic Christianity (XI-XII century, before and after JC), JC Christianity (XII-XVI century) and its subsequent mutations into Orthodox Christianity, the Catholicism, Islam, Buddhism, and so on.

According to Fomenko we know strictly NOTHING about the events that predate the X century A. D.

St Augustin was prescient when he spoke unto us: "be wary of mathematicians, particularly when they speak the truth."

Something of a disappointment.......2005-09-09

After having read the first volume of this expected series of 7 volumes I was triggered by the thesis of these authors that ancient Greek and Roman history did in fact take place in the Middle Ages. So I started studying medieval history of the Middle East - also known as Islamic history - to find out if the opponents of the ancient Greeks and Romans - the Acheamenid Persians, Sassanids, Scythians, Egyptians, etc. - also have their duplicates in medieval history. My search was disappointing: none of the many medieval Islamic dynasties seemed to correspond to the ancient middle eastern rulers.

However, I did find a close correspondence between Herodotus' Persian kings and medieval events:

- the defeat and capture of an Anatolian king - the Lydian Croesus - by the Persian conqueror Cyrus is identical to the defeat and capture of another Anatolian king - sultan Bayezid - by the Asian/Mongol conqueror Tamerlane;
- the Persian conquest of Egypt by the cruel tyrant Cambyses reds almost exactly as the Ottoman conquest of Egypt by Selim the Grim (note the nickname!);
- Darius the Lawgiver of the Persian Empire looks very much alike to Sulayman the Magnificent, the Lawgiver in Islamic history;
- Xerxes, whose main claim to fame is to be defeated by the Greeks at the naval battle of Salamis, looks like Selim II (the Sot) whose main claim to fame is to be defeated by a Spanish-Italian alliance at the naval battle of Lepanto.

I should have expected Fomenko et al. to arrive at similar conclusions, however, they claim that the Persian kings are the alter egos of the Angevin kings of Sicily whose biographies do not contain the exploits of the Persian kings.

The similiarities I indicate lead to the conclusion that Herodotus must have written his Histories at the close of the 16th century. But this is extremely late, given that Herodotus is "the Father of History", so therefore all other "ancient" histories must have been fabricated even later. Yet, the founders of modern chronology - Scaliger and Petavius - laid their foundations also at the close of the 16th century and had the full corpus of ancient histories already at their disposal.

It seems to me that Fomenko has to address these inconsistencies, maybe in the forthcoming 5 volumes?

Another critique of their book is that the correspondencies between different rulers are often based on a superficial comparison of the biographies; upon a more thorough comparison many details appear that do not correspond at all.

Finally, the authors rely heavily on the works of Gregorovius (1821-1891!!) - his medieval histories of Rome and Athens - as the source of medieval history; these works are - at least in the West - hoplessly outdated and have been superceded by more up-to-date works (for instance, Julius Norwich's trilogy on Byzantine history is not even cited).

Romulus courts Helen, Paris founds Rome, Moses goes to Troy.........2005-07-30

If you agree with Fomenko that Roman chronology is basically the foundation of the entire edifice of global chronology; you would also certainly agree that despite its numerous gaps and inconsistencies, Roman history is the best-documented field of ancient history, and thus a reference scale. But how well is the actual date of the Eternal City's foundation known?

Firstly, Rome is supposed to have been founded by the Trojans who had to flee after the fall of Troy. Some claim Rome to have been founded by Aeneas and Ulysses shortly after Troy had fallen; others are of the opinion that there was an entire dynasty that ruled for 500 years between the fall of Troy and the foundation of Rome.

Well, that's just an innocent 500 years long misunderstanding compared with what heretic Fomenko says, asserts, proves in his second volume: Second Roman Empire, Third Roman Empire, Biblical Kingdom of Israel, Biblical Kingdom of Judah, Holy Roman Empire are stories about basically same events, written from different points of view at different times. The underlying events have actually taken place during xii-xv cy. These histories have been written and perfected by multitude of highly talented humanist and clerical writers of xiii-xvi cy disguised as "ancients" with glorious names like Homer, Pluto, Thucydides etc..Chronology 2.0 beta..

Historians are kindly invited to report the bugs.

An Introduction to Planetary Defense: A Study of Modern Warfare Applied to Extra-Terrestrial Invasion

Average customer rating:

Remember the Stars
Problem is well stated but no easy answers
A good read, despite a few flaws
An effort to be respected, if not a perfect product
Chutzpah defined

An Introduction to Planetary Defense: A Study of Modern Warfare Applied to Extra-Terrestrial Invasion
Travis S. Taylor , Bob Boan , R.C. Anding , and T. Conley Powell
Manufacturer: Brown Walker Press
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ASIN: 1581124473

Book Description

This book describes a serious look at defending the planet in the event of an extra-terrestrial invasion. Travis Taylor, et al, have written the definitive book on the defense of earth against a potential alien incursion. Whatever your beliefs on the subject, and despite many of my own popular novels I am agnostic at best, the book also serves as an important primer on the potential future of warfare on every level. It is tightly grounded in current day realities of war and extrapolates thoughtfully but closely about future potentials. It should be on the reading list of anyone who is serious about national security and the future of war.

Customer Reviews:

Remember the Stars.......2007-10-07

An Introduction to Planetary Defense

I remember the stars. No, I remember the promise of the stars--the promise of a future antiseptic and soft around the edges. A promise shattered by the hard reality of the arrival of the Overlords. Now, my days are filled with pain and torment. I labor from dawn to dusk, scrabbling across the harsh desert, imploring the dry earth to give rise to the stark monument demanded by the Overlords to symbolize their power and prestige. I'm but a slave, and according to our masters, a slave requires nothing but work, food, and religion, but I require something more. I require hope. No, I require retribution. I grab a rock. Its rough texture fills my hands. It fills my heart. "Bless this rock, oh Lord. May it crush my enemies' exoskeleton..."

I grew up reading and loving science fiction, and I love reading about aliens. Any story from aliens-are-hungry and coming-to-eat-us, to earth-needs-to-be-demolished-to-make-way-for-an-interstellar-superhighway, but I always found these books in the science fiction section. An Introduction to Planetary Defense: A Study of Modern Warfare Applied to Extra-Terrestrial Invasion is, just like its title says, a book discussing possible events in case an extraterrestrial invasion force one day appeared and started attacking Earth. But it's not a work of fiction.

Nope, the authors are dead serious. The authors, all highly-educated experts in their fields, decided to apply serious science to the matter of defending earth from an alien invasion. They start from the perspective of probabilities. These guys have done their homework and have done a nice breakdown of the "Drake equation", which Cornell astronomer Frank Drake developed for estimating the number of probable civilizations in the Milky Way. They've done the math and according to the "experts" there's a very good probability of at least one ET visit in the course of the average earthling's life span.

Hmm, since mathematics isn't my strongest subject, I'm not going to check their work. But I am familiar with Fermi's paradox, which is the apparent contradiction between the high probability of extraterrestrial civilizations and the lack of evidence or contact with such civilizations. You know, just where is everybody? For a great book on the subject, check out If the Universe is Teeming with Aliens...Where is Everybody? Fifty Solutions to Fermi's Paradox and the Problem of Extraterrestrial Life by Stephen Webb. It gives 50 hypotheses on why we haven't found empirical evidence of probes, starships, or email from little green men.

Ok, so it's a pretty big universe, and there's at least a possibility that we aren't alone. So what are we gonna do about it? Well, just because the authors are paranoid, doesn't mean ET isn't out to get `em. SETI(the search for extraterrestrial intelligence) is basically beaming radio signals advertising "Hey, we're over here". They might as well put up a neon sign that says "Eat at Joe's". Face it, the chance for ET being hostile is at least equal to him being benign and showering us with great technology--such as can openers that actually work.

The authors examine modern warfare and how we might possibly implement our ability to wage war against a significantly advanced alien force. They used various fancy force multipliers and simulations, to come to the conclusion that ET would kick our [...], and that in order to have any chance of survival, a reserve force (the general population) and asymmetrical war (guerrilla tactics) would need to be harnessed to have a fighting chance. These guys motto is "prepare now, survive later." So, it may come at no surprise that they support a big military budget on such things as space lasers and powered armor. I get the impression that these PhDs just want to blow stuff up in a really big, expensive way.

There are also some attempts to examine invading motives of aliens. The human race knows only two motivators. These are 1. Desire for gain and 2. Fear of loss. Aliens may want slaves, food, or just to pick up earth chicks, but the thing to remember about aliens is well, that they're aliens. I did find how mankind might react to an invasion an interesting section. Will we believe it? How will our beliefs and response aid or hinder the overall defense of Earth? Will religious, moral, and ethical beliefs influence the decision-making process, and what are we going to do if the aliens end up looking like demons, or cute, fluffy bunnies? For a more complete look at this fascinating subject, I recommend Contact with Alien Civilizations: Our Hopes and Fears about Encountering Extraterrestrials by Michael Michaud. His analysis suggests that contact is a serious - and not necessarily pleasant - possibility....

Whatever you wish to believe, I have to give the four authors credit for some serious chutzpah (courage bordering on arrogance, roughly equivalent to "nerve") for writing this book. The book did leave me with some thought-provoking questions, and I recall the axiom of my history teacher, "those of you who fail to learn history, will be doomed to repeat it." It brings to mind the Native American tribes of the New World. Surely, if they had known what the white invaders had planned, they would have never granted him a green card? Hmmm...maybe the surest sign of intelligent life in the universe is that they haven't tried to contact us...

Kevin Coolidge, editor "Of A Predatory Heart"

Comments, questions, let ET phone home or hold an alien autopsy? The cat wrote a book, Hobo Finds a Home: A children's book about a barn cat who wanted more out of life. Illustrated by Susan M. Gage written by Hobo.

Problem is well stated but no easy answers.......2007-08-05

The crux of the problem is that ANY species capable of interstellar travel must have the technology to generate and control energies many orders of magnitude more powerful than mankind's total current production technology. Our largest thermonuclear device ("Tsar Bomba" - the 50 megaton Russian experiment) is of little standing compared to the energy needed for interstellar space flight.

The general serious work on extraterrestial civilizations goes back to Carl Sagan and beyond; even Enrico Fermi touched on the issue. Unfortunately, theories procede from data and there is little of that. Still, the math is persuasive - they are out there.

A weakness is any understanding in the book of a motivation - why would we NEED to mount a defense? What would they be after? A civilization in command of the power needed for interstellar travel could create ANYTHING they wanted. A military strategist needs to understand the opponent's war aims to check them. Our immediate goal in face of initial contact must be gaining time and information so we can influence events.

The suggested institutional arrangements for a secret R&D organization sound plausible although one can have one's doubts about the competence and sense of responsibility of our politicians in supporting it. Geeks can be sooo trusting!

The book is weakest in its indulgence in fantases about robots and weapontry and "mecha." Goofy at best and lowers the tone of the book.

A strength is the discussion of why current national governments have an interest in denial of any contact. Nor do they have any advantage in a common response, al la UN.

As a book on strategy, the authors are no Admiral Mahan, Herman Kahn, Lao Tzu, or von Clausewitz but then, they can't build on millenia of history either.

The issue is one that merits deeper and more thorough thinking. This book is a small step towards making this a topic of respectable conversation.

A good read, despite a few flaws.......2007-07-11

An Introduction to Planetary Defense: A Study of Modern Warfare Applied to Extra-Terrestrial Invasion is, just like its title says, a book discussing possible events in case an extraterrestrial invasion force one day appeared and started attacking Earth. And it's not a work of fiction.

Right... Hmm... Wait, hold that thought for a second... A what? Extraterrestrial invasion force? From outer space you mean?

You bet. And the authors are dead serious. And no, I really don't think it's a book one should ridicule or trivialize. Sure, at first sight it might sound extraordinarily dumb writing a book detailing different ways an extraterrestrial attacker might choose to engage in battle or how we earthlings will be able to best protect both themselves and our society. After all, as far as we know, no solid proof has been found showing that extraterrestrial life forms even exist, much less are able to build interstellar spacecrafts.

Still, the book is most definitely as silly as you might think. First and foremost it's both entertaining and well-written (besides the poor proof-reading), but it also actually does make you think. Because, regardless of how much you laugh at the thought of evil aliens coming to eat us all; there's still a valid idea - unlikely perhaps, but still valid - that it might happen. The universe is larger than any of us can even begin to understand, and go ahead, please prove to me that a malicious alien race on some remote planet somewhere in the vastness of the universe at this very moment is not planning to attack at dear old Mother Earth. Not that the governments of the world immediately will donate money or anything in order to follow the recommendations that are presented in An Introduction to Planetary Defense, but at the same time, it's hardly that a book such as this has been written, in this UFO- and alien-crazy era we live in. Prepare now, survive later, is the motto of the authors, and there might just be more to that perky motto than most people realize.

However, it's not the best book I've ever read, far from it (lightyears, even). At the end the text started to feel seriously repetitive, as if the authors were more interested in producing as many pages as possible instead of focusing on the content. And when they start insinuating how the U.S. - who else? - should take charge and be responsible for the survival of mankind, the whole thing actually comes close to feeling like one big joke. Not only that, seemingly endless number of pages are absolutely packed with various graphs, charts, and equations utterly inconceivable to anyone except mathematical geniuses (which I'm not). And, as mentioned before, the proofreading is way too sloppy.

An effort to be respected, if not a perfect product.......2007-06-27

While I emphatically agree that a more modern, serious treatment of the subject matter for mainstream consumption is long overdue, I was somewhat disappointed in this effort. The book, as others have observed, is fraught with grammar and spelling errors and amateurish drawings (I blame the editor more than the authors) and overall the work feels...well, rushed.

I did get a sense of the authors' passion of the subject matter. Certainly, boring details aside, they plainly state their opposition to others who cite less than obvious, apples-to-oranges mathematical/ probability models to disprove any likelihood of intelligent alien life. As much, the authors are clearly particularly opposed to those who adhere to the belief in advanced ETs who adhere to a benign utopian ideal. One author tellingly relates a past personal confrontation with the late Carl Sagan, in which Dr. Sagan reportedly patently refused to discuss even the possibility of hostile aliens. In this light, such non-substantive errors may be construed as urgency for an opinion to be heard, and to be taken seriously.

Multiple mainstream scifi/space opera references are made, in a seeming attempt to find common ground with the reader of average knowledge/interest; however, several chapters are devoted to mathematical modeling that likely makes many of those same readers either accept these hypotheses as granted (counter to the whole point of the exercises), or skip over such chapters completely. Also, while some such references have clear credibility (for example, the clandestine research facilities in Robert Heinlein's "Sixth Column"), others are somewhat lacking (notably, references to the film "Independence Day"). And some references obvious to my generation of readers (say, Larry Niven's "The Ethics of Madness") are conspicuously absent (possibly due to copyright issues?). Thus, the book teeters somewhere between reference text and pulp entertainment.

Having said all that, I found they do get their point across; the probability of ET existing, being more advanced AND dangerously hostile demonstrably outweighs the possibility of humans being adrift alone in the universe, or accompanied by the beatific angels supposedly "evolved" past all conflict; indeed, the latter viewpoint appears naive (bordering on childish). And if they are out there, we really should be doing something to prepare, other than sending out "WE ARE HERE" messages to anyone who might be listening. To paraphrase Heller, it isn't paranoia if they ARE indeed out to get you, just simple common sense.

I really wanted to like this book. Particularly, other works by Dr. Taylor that I'd read displayed impressive technical knowledge and ideas, and I was looking forward to reading something honest and serious. So while I can easily recommend it to those with similar opinions (that is, if they can stomach technical references to "Independence Day"), I honestly don't know if it would convince someone sitting on the fence, much less on the other side.

Lastly, there's one aspect of Dr. Sagan (as well as Robert Heinlein, Stephen King and even the Church of Scientology) the authors (and publisher) could adopt: release the book in standard mass-market paperback form, at STANDARD PRICES. Almost everything I've ever owned or read by Sagan, Heinlein or Arthur C. Clarke (or for that matter, Niven, Steinbeck, Conan Doyle and the Boy Scout Manual) was in good, old, relatively affordable, easy-to-carry paperback, not some expensive soft-cover pseudo-textbook. If the authors feel their message is that important, they should give the public an alternative to "Cosmos", which even in hardback doesn't cost $34.95. I hold some hope for a revised edition.

Chutzpah defined.......2007-05-13

I HAVE read this book. There are many logical flaws in it, and it is quite disorganized, as others have mentioned. I want to mention one flaw specifically: the treatment of Fermi's paradox.

It takes chutzpah to use the word "blunder" and the name of Nobel Laureate Enrico Fermi in the same sentence. Unfortunately for these authors, chutzpah seems to be all they had to work with. In addressing the paradox, they basically erect a straw man, and then flail away at him rather ineptly.

Somehow the authors have gotten the idea that Fermi assumed an unbounded expontential population growth curve in making his statement that the galaxy should long ago have been completely colonized (and thus exclaiming "so where the heck is everyone"). This is the great "blunder" the authors go on (and on) about. Except as far as I have ever read, Fermi did not make any such assumption, only some fairly conservative assumptions about the velocity with which a wave-front of intelligent life might propagate among solar systems. Fermi's paradox works just fine even with relatively constrained rates of population growth, mainly because the galaxy is so incredibly old, the growth rates assumed almost don't matter as long as they are positive.

The authors belabor all sorts of issues that are irrelevant to the argument, such as predator-prey ratios. And all of their mathematical models are of population growth rates on a two-dimensional surface - the Earth's surface. But the Galaxy is decidedly three-dimensional, having a substantial thickness of over 2000 light-years in our neighborhood, and many times that toward the center.

Even worse, the growth of populations of individuals on a savannah or a planet is not directly analogous to the expansion of civilizations across space by colonizing multiple star systems in succession. Trying to understand the potential expansion of intelligent civilizations across space by looking at populations of people or animals on Earth is somewhat like trying to predict the best strategey for winning a world war by examining how two gang members conducted a knife-fight in a phone booth!

There were provocative ideas raised in this book, but after seeing the hash the authors made of arguing with Fermi's paradox, and the smugness with they chortled over his "amateur blunder", I had difficulty accepting their credibility on anything else in the book.

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