Book Description
Renowned author Paul Carell's photo album to accompany his definitive studies on the war in Russia. Over 570 b/w and color photos from both German and Russian archives explore the entire campaign., 7" x 10"
Customer Reviews:
basically false.......2005-11-26
The pictures in this book, dealing with the most terrible war in history of mankind, have cleary been chosen with an expert eye.
Seen from a narrow, technical point of view Paul Carell's collection is downright magnificent. Every single photo connects, makes you part of the scene. A function strongly emphasized by Carell's accompanying expert comments.
However, Paul Carell's way of selecting should not be overlooked here. Even stronger, it is subject of severe criticism:
1 His book was primairily issued for German buyers, and provides a strong accent on the comradeship between the German soldiers fighting in Russia from 1941-'45.
2 My copy from 'Unternehmen Barbarossa im Bild' dates from 1967, a period when ancient 'Ostfrontkämpfer' (= Eastern front fighters) came to reflect on their memorable war-past.
3 Consequently this collection mainly shows the German war effort in a pretty enjoyable way, greatly underrating the criminal conduct by the same German soldiers towards the Russian civil population. As well as the severe persecution of Jews in the German-occupied part of the Soviet Union.
4 Don't believe the story that atrocities, genocide and war crimes towards these defenseless Russians were an exclusive affair for Hitler-fanatics. History has proven abundantly that lots of common Wehrmacht (= regular army) soldiers were involved, too. They are the grandfathers of every common German you can meet nowadays.
5 Carell strongly emphasizes on front life for the common soldier, Russian or German. Senior commanders are pictured through their eyes. In a true German style these high-ranking officers come out like icons, enjoying sincere admiration for their military skills. Right up to Hitler himself. Criticism on their conduct of the war is ommitted - though the gravest and most irresponsable military mistakes were made on their level.
6 In fairness to Carell, one finally should consider that German photo-sources on this 1941-'45 war are much richer than the Russian ones.
My final conclusion: the excellent quality of Carell's photos tends to color this war favorably. In particular to the Germans, who behaved worst.
Thus 'Unternehmen Barbarossa im Bild' basicly provides a strongy false historical view. For this I grant one star, for this war was too terrible, criminal, murderous and devastating to justify Paul Carell's way of showing.
Ausgezeichnet!.......2002-10-10
Okay, I was looking at reviews and after looking at those done by others, I just HAD to write something! Operation Barbarossa in Photographs is absolutely great!! Paul Carell is a famous German author and is a vet of the Wehrmacht too. Yes, the book has a German bent--it was written by a German who was THERE--of course he will have a different perspective than someone sitting at home in America in the 21st century. This is a MUST-HAVE book and is chock full of SO many good pictures you can't read in one or even two sittings, it just has to be broken up to absorb it all. I HIGHLY suggest this book for any student of the Eastern Front and/or the German Military of the Second World War.
Great collection of photos, but.............2001-11-23
Wow,the photos in the book were great but I have a bone to pick. The author says these were photographed by the soldiers. Then what about all the inhumane crimes committed by the Wehrmacht and all the photographs taken by its sadistic soldiers. Look no further than the book "German Army and Genocide" for them. Also, the author obviously has a pro-German bias. He describes the Russian soldiers as "Reds"- this is not the Russian civil war! One of the pictures describes the 'fanatic' resistance at Brest-Litvosk while always describing the 'heroics' of the Germans. Also he uses the German spelling for Soviet cities: Lemberg, Moskau, etc. There are also several errors by labeling General Vassili Chuikov (the hero of Stalingrad) as General Zhukov. Still the book is a great collection of photos.
Great photo collection from Paul Carell.......2000-10-25
This is by far the largest collection of eastern front photos I've ever seen. Most of the photos are never before seen snapshots taken by ordinary soldiers and this is also one of two weakest points of this book: they (photos) are not of best quality. Other weak point is captions. They are very short and mostly un-informative (caption might read for example "German soldier in trench" and nothing about where the photo was taken etc.).
This is definately not a book for eastern front enthusiast who is looking for facts about war fought in Russia, but for one who is tired of seeing same old photos we have seen during last 30 years. Quantity of photos alone makes this book worth buying.
not a history work...but a great war photo records!.......2000-06-05
This is a massive collection of photographic records of battlefield,soldiers and civilians at nazi-russia war times. It seems that most of the photos may never have been introduced or published before.They're very vivid,captions are accurate and to the point. But I think all photo captions are too brief to understand the whole process of war.Scarcely any other explanatory texts are. It makes this book not a history work but only a kind of war photo album. It may leave serious readers something to be desired,I sure. But if you have had carell's other works,this book can be a useful pictorial guide to them. Even if main text is very poor,all photos match well with military history are worth seeing.
Book Description
Of the German Army Groups that attacked Soviet Russia, Von Leeb's Army Group North, tasked with seizing the Baltic States and Leningrad, was the smallest and weakest. General Kuznetzov's Northwestern Front, however, was in an even weaker state. Despite brave counterattacks and defense by the Soviet forces, the Germans smashed through the Dvina Line, then the Stalin Line, flooded into Latvia and pressed on to encircle Leningrad. This book examines the German offensive and also the courageous Soviet attempts to halt the German spearhead, defending every possible line against overwhelming odds.
Customer Reviews:
Not Up Even to Osprey Standards.......2007-09-12
Osprey clearly presents its Campaign series books as general overviews of usually complex subjects. The Campaign series all contain a standard format: an introduction, a chronolgoy, presentation of the opposing plans, a quick look at the opposing commanders and the opposing forces, and then the bulk of the text addresses the specific campaign. All well and good -- a structured overview is promised and that is usually what Osprey delivers. The quality of the product varies, but at least a cursory understanding of the campaign is realized.
Not for Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2) Army Group North.
The principle content of the book begins with a report of the frontier battles. One map, and only one map, is available to decipher the intitial German attack and a Russian counter attack. The author's approach to the events is to rapidly and tersely present a myriad of unit names, place names, geographical locations with general comments that the Germans were advancing either with difficulty or easily. Attempting to follow these movements on the single map is, at best, difficult or, often, impossible.
The next topic is the German drive north from the Dvina to somewhere. I'm not quite sure where the Germans went because no map was included to let me envision the movement. But again, quick sentences resembling -- "And then the 99th Division pushed through rough terrain to Strombolsky on the Luchina river where it seized a bridge somewhere in the area." -- were the norm. I have no idea where the drive north went.
The author does handle fighting in Finland and the Arctic much more clearly. Three maps provide considerable assistance, although, once more, the text and the map are not always coordinated.
Given the limited space available in an Osprey Campaign book, the author's choice to spend over two pages of text and a two page map on a sideshow conquest of several Baltic islands is puzzling. The space could have been much better used.
Next the fighting approaching and around Leningrad is recounted. More maps appear, but the fragmented approach to describing operations coupled with a lack of clarity on the basic movements and consequences to those movements continue to plague the text.
Finally, right before the conclusion, two maps providing a strategic overview appear -- about 88 and 89 pages too late.
I will credit the author with an impressive abilty to mix both the Germand and Russian high commands' perceptions and decisions, the logistics difficulties, the organizational challengers, and the consequences of the leader's personalities -- and to show the impact of that mix upon the fighting. That was quite well done.
However, I found that the text lacks a basic clarity, does not always distinguish between important issues and trivial ones, and can be haphazardly organized.
Even by Osprey Campaign standards, this is sub-standard. I'd look to another source to understand Barbarossa in the North.
Hardly a comprehensive review.......2006-01-05
Considering the extremely limited scope of this book (Army Group North during the first six months of the war against the Soviet Union), this book offers only a cursory overview of its subject, and lacks significant detail. I can't help but think that Osprey squandered a great opportunity here by failing to offer any new information that can't already be found in other sources. Compounding the problem is that the maps are disappointing and too few in number. The book gives an adequate overview of Army Group North's campaign through the end of 1941, but that feat was achieved by others long before this book was published. Fortunately it's a relatively inexpensive book though, so it may be worth adding to your library if you don't already have a book on this subject. Just don't expect much more than a broad overview of the campaign.
Excellent Series.......2005-06-15
Colonel Kirchubel has done an outstanding job of synthesizing the extremely complex German invasion of the USSR. His latest book for Osprey, Army Group North, builds upon the success of the earlier Army Group South. Thousands of pages have been written on Barbarossa, so covering the massive assault in three books of 100 pages each is ambitious. One can only assume that with the anticipated completion of the trilogy we will have a good overview of the entire campaign.
Kirchubel gives valuable introductory information on the geo-political background, each side's plans, commanders and armies. However, where other authors have wasted space on generals like Wilhelm Keitel (a staff politico who didn't command anybody), Kirchubel describes in human terms the various leaders actually involved. In the heart of the volume, the actual campaign, he adroitly works within Osprey's size constraints to present a good mix of operational and tactical combat and maneuver. I found the anecdotes of small-unit actions, for example the Germans' initial difficulty defeating new Soviet armor or fighting in the land of the midnight sun, very representative. Of course Osprey is known for its graphics and Army Group North does not disappoint. Kirchubel provides a good selection of German and Soviet point-of-view photographs, artwork and maps. My favorite is the battlescene depicting Stuka ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel sinking the battleship Murat: artist Howard Gerrard brings to life a scene I'd only read about in Rudel's memoirs.
One of Army Group North's strengths is its treatment of the fighting in Finland. This is a theater often neglected in other Barbarossa histories which act like the Russian front terminated at Leningrad. Also interesting was the description of the German's joint operation against the Baltic islands-a little-known action. It is clear, however, that Kirchubel's main interest is the command and control aspect of Barbarossa. Military history amateurs (and some professionals) are guilty of idolizing German military leadership. However, among other things, Army Group North makes it clear Hitler failed to keep a tight rein on his generals, Halder was a behind-the-scenes schemer and Leeb was totally unsuited for high leadership during Barbarossa. A caveat: Readers uncomfortable with an author squarely giving credit or criticism of a general's conduct of operations my find Kirchubel a bit too willing to call a spade a spade.
On a related matter, I have no idea who comrade academician Forczyk is, but for someone who seemingly makes an avocation of trashing Osprey books he knows little about the product. Forget for a moment the unprofessional, speculative and personal-attack nature of Forczyk's reviews (describing Kirchubel as "unaware," "ignorant" and "apparently confused"). He believes eight pages on opposing armies is "insufficient:" the exact word count allowed for each section is strictly controlled by Osprey. He also wants all reinforcements mentioned in the order of battle (also subject to Osprey limits) in a campaign where OBs changed daily-a subject that could justify an entire book. However, Forczyk's shot against Osprey's "slip-shod editing" is well aimed.
With so many Osprey Campaign Series books dealing only with battles and engagements it's good to read about a real campaign. I for one look forward to Kirchubel tying together the story of Barbarossa with the final volume on Army Group Center. Army Group North¬, meant to supplement, not supplant, the "hallowed texts" of Glantz, Ziemke, et al, is a necessary addition to the library of historian and hobbyist alike.
Robert Francis
A Solid Summary .......2005-05-01
Although there are numerous books already in existence on the Eastern Front in the Second World War, Robert Kirchubel's two volumes on Operation Barbarossa - the German invasion of the USSR in 1941 - are valuable summaries of current material on the subject. In this volume, Kirchubel covers the operations of the German Army Group North (AGN) in its efforts to capture Leningrad and link up with Finnish forces, in the period June-December 1941. Kirchubel's work is primarily a synthesis product rather than relying on much original research, but he is able to incorporate some of the better sources available.
Operational Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North follows the standard Osprey campaign series format, with initial sections on the origins of the campaign, opposing leaders, opposing plans and opposing forces, as well as a campaign chronology. These sections are well written and informative, although the order of battle is rather basic (no mention of reinforcements) and lists Soviet air units, but not German Luftwaffe units. As usual, the quality of maps and color graphics is one of the main selling points for the Osprey campaign series and Operational Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North is quite successful in this area. The author provides seven 2-D maps, four of which deal with operations in Finland: frontier battles; Operation Platinfuchs (drive on Murmansk); Operation Polarfuchs; Finnish attacks in Karelia; Tikhvin/Volkhov; strategic overview Finland; strategic overview, Army Group North. There are three 3-D Maps: Soviet attacks around Staraya Russa, August 1941; German assaults on Baltic Islands, September 1941; Battles on the Luga River Line and approaches to Leningrad, August-September 1941. There were probably too many maps on Finnish operations in this volume and not enough on the actual operations of Army Group North itself. I found it difficult to follow German operations in July, since the only map that covers this is a tiny strategic overview at the end of volume. No map depicted in detail the final German lines around Leningrad, which would have been interesting (you just can't see the Duderof Heights on the 3-D map, which must be about 1:1,000,000 scale). Just as an aside, the Germans normally depicted their operations on 1:300,000 scale maps and it would be nice if Osprey could keep that in mind.
The color battle scenes are also very good: the Soviet 8th Army attempting to breakthrough the LVI Panzer Corps at the Dunaburg bridgehead, 28 June; German 269th Infantry Division using captured anti-tank guns to destroy Soviet T-34 tanks, July 1941; Hans Ulrich Rudel sinks the battleship Marat at Kronshtadt, 21 September 1941. However, Kirchubel claims that Germans were using captured ZIS-3 76.2mm anti-tank guns in July 1941, which is very doubtful, since that weapon only went into very limited production in July 1941. Kirchubel appears to be confusing the ZIS-3 with the 76.2mm F-22 USV divisional gun or the 57mm ZIS-2.
Kirchubel's campaign narrative is fair, but it tends to wander. He starts out well on the frontier battles in June 1941, then gets sidetracked into about ten pages on the Finns, then falls into a lengthy discussion about the arguments between Hitler and the OKH army staff about objectives in the Soviet Union. By the time he gets back to what Army Group North was doing, particularly in July-August, it seems like a bit of an afterthought. We know a lot today about the arguments in the Fuhrer's headquarters thanks to the diaries of Generals Halder and Warlimont, but that doesn't mean that they are always that relevant; officers like Halder tended to exaggerate their impact because they were competing for control of the Wehrmacht with Hitler. Fact is, they lost that control before the war and their role steadily diminished, no matter what their diaries say. Kirchubel's coverage of the Finns and the OKH policy debates make for a more complete picture, but given the size restraints of an Osprey volume they probable take away more than they add.
Kirchubel does add many good details into his volume about armor operations, air operations, supply issues and terrain - it is clear that he has studied the existing secondary sources carefully (particularly David M. Glantz). I do wish that Kirchubel had made some mention of Army Group North's casualties and the Soviet Northwest Front's casualties in this period - the data is available. The author concludes that the Germans failed to take Leningrad because Field Marshal von Leeb, Army Group North's commander, "conducted a flawed campaign" in that he "refused to accept the risks essential to Blitzkrieg success" and that he "did not focus on a single decisive point." These conclusions appear correct, in that AGN spread its forces too thinly and lost the initiative in July. However, it is hard to agree with Kirchubel's opinion that the Germans had "gained some valuable tactical lessons from the 1940 Western campaign, but learned all the wrong operational and strategic ones." The Wehrmacht demonstrated time and again in 1941 that they were experts at operational maneuver (it was intelligence and logistics where they were awful), particularly against the cannon-fodder Soviet armies of 1941. As for strategy, Kirchubel never asks or answers, "how would Germany have benefited from capturing Leningrad in 1941 as opposed to merely blockading it, as they did?" Hitler ordered the city blockaded, not seized, and that is precisely what AGN accomplished. Since AGN was able to impose a 900-day siege on Leningrad, I'm not sure that their campaign was a failure in 1941 - they did everything they were ordered to do but link up with the Finns, and it does not appear that a link-up would have been strategically useful had it occurred. The "so what" test is a critical determinant for historical relevancy and it does not appear that von Leeb's "flawed campaign" of 1941 contributed in any large measure to the Wehrmacht's ultimate defeat in the USSR.
Book Description
The final volume in the Barbarossa trilogy, this title completes the account of the strategic intricacies of the German campaign against Russia. Detailing the final Nazi push for Moscow, Robert Kirchubel examines the causes behind the German failure, including the inability to re-supply troops or provide reserves, and the lack of decent German winter uniforms and transport.
Full-color artwork, maps and bird's-eye views illustrate the campaign in detail, revealing how the Red Army capitalized on every German weakness in spite of its own flaws.
Customer Reviews:
Stumbles Across the Finish Line.......2007-09-14
This third volume in Robert Kirchubel's account of Operation Barbarossa, number 186 in Osprey's campaign series, is a mixed bag, with some good, some indifferent and some bad. Having written Moscow 1941, Campaign No. 167, last year, I was eager to see how this volume would complete the trilogy on the largest ground invasion in history. Unfortunately, this volume seems to be the weakest of the three the author has written and appears to falter badly toward the end.
The opening sections on origins of the campaign, opposing forces, plans and commanders is relatively short, but understandable given that this volume is third in a 3-part series. However, the author devotes 10 pages to opposing forces, without actually saying a great deal. It is clear that the author has not used the superb research by David Glantz in Stumbling Colossus, which spells out the extent of disarray in the Soviet army on the eve of Barbarossa. The author does seem to want to avoid some of the standard canards about the campaign concerning bad weather in favor of a more logistics-heavy focus (which echoes the approach I used in my own Moscow 1941), but without providing the facts to back it up. For example, he states that the 4th Panzer Division only had enough fuel to go 60 miles (96 kms) at the start of Typhoon, without any supporting data, yet it actually had enough to go 200 kms in the first few days of the offensive.
The volume has five 2-D Maps (strategic overview; Boldin counteroffensive; Timoshenko counteroffensive; Vyazma and Bryansk; German advances toward Moscow) and two 3-D BEV maps (Minsk encirclement; Operation Typhoon). The maps are problematic in this volume, for example, the map entitled "Vyazma and Bryansk" does not actually show the town of Vyazma, nor do any of the maps show railroads. How can you discuss German logistics in Operation Barbarossa if you don't show the rail lines, to which they were tied? The 3-D maps are zoomed out such that the grid lines are 50 kilometers apart, meaning they depict battle areas of 400 x 300 kilometers - meaning that terrain features are virtually indistinguishable. Trying to cover a two-month offensive involving six German armies on a single BEV was just ridiculous! On the other hand, the three battle scenes by Peter Dennis (Soviet 6th Rifle Division defends Brest-Litovsk; 7th Panzer and 29th Motorized Infantry Division link-up closing Smolensk kessel; German 137th Infantry Division assault through Moscow defenses near Voronino) are excellent - probably one of the best aspects of this volume. The author provides a fairly decent bibliography, but the omission of David Gantz's landmark Stumbling Colossus is incredible.
This narrative consists of three main set pieces: the opening border battles and Minsk-Bialystok pocket in June-July 1941; the Battle of Smolensk in July-August 1941 and Operation Typhoon in October-December 1941. The author's sources are German-heavy, although he has made efforts to include Soviet material from David Glantz. The section on the Minsk encirclement is fairly good, although a bit short and provides only the barest details on critical actions, such as the assault on Brest-Litovsk. By the time that the author gets to Smolensk, his narrative gets hard to follow. The author also begins inserting information that is incorrect or misleading. For example, on page 46 that "OKH created Fourth Panzer Army" on 2-3 July (it was not until 5 October) and on page 49, talks about Von Kluge "in his new role as a Panzer Army commander". On page 64, the author writes that, "on July 27, when von Kluge was removed from command of Fourth Panzer Army," yet Generaloberst Erich Höpner was the commander of 4th Panzergruppe from February to December 1941 and von Kluge was commander of 4th Army. About this point, I began to get a funny feeling about this volume.
By the time that the narrative moves to Operation Typhoon, I could sense that the "facts" being used herein were rather squishy. The number of Luftwaffe aircraft supporting Typhoon listed here was more than double what they actually had and claims that the Germans had broken through the entire Mozhaisk Line by 16 October are false (Mozhaisk did not fall until 18 October and Volokolomsk not till 27 October). The author says that "Hitler could not bring himself to assault Moscow frontally," but in fact, 4th Army was stopped cold at Naro-Fominsk on 20-23 October. On page 78, the author says that "one division from the Soviet Far East was arriving near Moscow by rail every two days" in late October, but actually only a few Siberian divisions went to Moscow and most went either to the Leningrad or Ukrainian fronts. The author's take on von Kluge's failure to act also seems to accept a lot of baloney (von Kluge was lying to his peers and superiors, which von Bock's diary bears out), which makes his telling incomprehensible. This final volume in the trilogy stumbles across the finish line and collapses in a disorderly heap.
Been waiting for this one .......2007-09-10
Ever since getting Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2) I've been waiting for this one to come out. And it is about time it did. It is as good as the priveious two covering operations in the North and in the South of the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the clash between the 20th Century's Two most evil empires. Why the author kept this one for last I do not know but I am glad Osprey has finally published it.
Covers operations in the move for Moscow quite well. Very well describes its actions and why it failed for the Germans even though they came so well close to Victory. Politicians should never be allowed to meddle with military decisions.
A must read for students of military history and anyone interested in WWII.
Book Description
Germany's surprise assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941, Operation Barbarossa, aimed at nothing less than the destruction of the Soviet Union. Adolf Hitler saw this as the last vital step in the establishing of "Lebensraum" for the German people in the East. South of the Pripyat Marshes Field Marshal von Rundstedt's powerful Army Group South was responsible for the capture of the Ukraine and the Crimea including the important cities of Kiev and Odessa. Von Rundstedt's force faced the Soviet Southwestern and Southern Fronts containing many of the best, equipped, trained and commanded units in the Soviet order of battle. The initial fighting in the south was characterized by fierce and effective Soviet resistance, and the German timetable was badly disrupted. Nevertheless, German superiority began to tell, and the entire Soviet 6th and 12th Armies were encircled and destroyed at Uman. In addition, Adolf Hitler directly ordered General Heinz Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group to turn south from Army Group Center to assist. This resulted in a still greater encirclement at Kiev that eliminated four entire Soviet field armies consisting of more than 600,000 men. By the beginning of October 1941, it appeared that the Red Army was in the final stages of collapse and nothing could stop the German juggernaut.
Book Description
The second of two volumes, this is a chronological account of the campaigns on the Eastern Front, following the Soviet counter-offensive around Stalingrad to the final destruction of the Ostheer.? ?Having carefully mustered their forces for a counter-offensive around Stalingrad, the commanders of the Red Army began the long process of besting the German Army and pushing it out of the Soviet Union. The last large-scale German offensive in the east, Kursk, broke the back of the revitalized Panzerwaffe and placed the Ostheer on the defensive for the remainder of the conflict. Unrelenting pressure pushed the Ostheer back to the Dniepr and beyond and paved the way for the overwhelming Soviet victories of 1944 and 1945. In the last 18 months of the war the Red Army demonstrated a complete mastery of the application of force and the crushing victories in Belorussia, the Balkans and Poland destroyed the cohesion of the Ostheer and proved beyond any doubt that Germany was destined for total defeat.
This day-by-day account allows the reader to obtain an understanding of the scale of the conflict and assess the impact of distance and time upon operations or alternatively, to concentrate upon a specific battle as it unfolded. By detailing each combat sector, be it the hard fighting around Leningrad, the destruction of Army Group Centre in Belorussia or the battles of attrition at Kursk, the reader is able to study a chosen area of operations in isolation while also assessing its impact upon the wider campaign
Customer Reviews:
A good general source for the War on the Eastern Front.......2004-09-12
Many books have been written and are yet to be written on the Eastern Front battles between Germany and the Soviet Union. This book and its companian are a good starting point for a novice study of these battles.
The books are a quick read but with only a half page or less per day it leaves a lot left out and only covers the major actions of the combatants.
A recommended addition to a Eastern Front libary as a good starting point for future research.
Book Description
Operation Barbarossa, Germany’s surprise assault on the Soviet Union in June 1941, aimed at nothing less than the complete destruction of Communist Russia. This book focuses on Field Marshal von Rundstedt and Army Group South, tasked with the capture of the Ukraine and Crimea. Von Rundstedt’s 46 divisions and single Panzer Group faced fierce resistance from the best equipped, trained and commanded units in the Red Army, but ultimately succeeded in destroying the Soviet 6th and 12th Armies at Uman before inflicting a further 600,000 casualties at Kiev. Here, von Rundstedt’s five-month advance to Rostov is examined in detail.
Customer Reviews:
Some Rough Edges, but a Decent Summary.......2003-11-24
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Kirchubel, of the California Army National Guard, has embarked upon the ambitious task of summarizing the greatest land offensive in history - Operation Barbarossa - in three volumes. Kirchubel's first volume covers the German Army Group South's (AGS) invasion of the Ukraine in 1941. The bar is high for this task, given the vast literature available on this subject, and this volume does suffer from some rough edges. However, LTC Kirchubel's volume is a handy summary of an important campaign and as such, is useful for military professionals and amateur historians alike.
Operation Barbarossa 1941: Army Group South begins with a 5-page introduction and a detailed campaign chronology. The 5-page section on opposing plans is good, and emphasizes that while Hitler sought the destruction of the Red Army, many of his commanders were attracted by prestige objectives like Moscow. The 3-page section on opposing commanders is decent in covering army-level leaders, but then Kirchubel starts to ramble and includes a diverse assortment of minor subordinates. Considering the vast amount of material available on the opposing armies in 1941, the author's 8-page section is insufficient. Kirchubel states that "von Rundstedt's command numbered 46 ½ German and allied divisions" but his own order of battle lists 48 German, 2 Slovak and 14 Romanian divisions for a total of 64. Oddly, the author does not mention that AGS had 674 tanks at the start, despite tons of data available on the panzer divisions. As for the Red Army, somehow the author managed to miss the fact that the Soviets were in the midst of a huge reorganization of mechanized forces in the summer of 1941, which had a major impact on their combat readiness. Indeed, it is clear that the author did not use David Glantz's excellent Stumbling Colossus, which details the Soviet disorganization. Kirchubel makes two other significant errors in regard to Soviet forces: (1) he is unaware that the anti-tank brigades had been stripped of their trucks rendering them immobile and (2) his exaggeration of the combat prowess of the KV-1 heavy tank is tempered by his ignorance of the vehicles' faulty transmission that rendered it too, immobile (a recent article in ARMOR magazine described how Soviet propaganda had concealed the KV-1s weakness for decades because it was one of Stalin's pet projects).
The 2-D maps in this volume are quite good and include: initial dispositions (division-level); the frontier battles; the Kiev pocket; the capture of the Crimea; the Donbas and Rostov; and strategic overview. The three 3-D maps (the Uman Pocket, the Battle of the Sea of Azov, and the Battle for Rostov) are a bit less even; the Uman map is the victim of poor editing that mixed up Axis and Soviet units and the Rostov map is just too busy (it could have showed the German offensive or the Soviet counteroffensive, but not both). The Rumanian front does not get its own map, so both the Axis allies and the German 11th Army are under-represented. The three battle scenes are all very good but lacking in balance, since all are from the German viewpoint (I thought Osprey always tried to represent both sides?) and indeed, the entire volume is clearly pro-German. The Soviet tank counterattack at Dubno - one of the largest tank battles before Kursk - would have made a good battle scene.
Kirchubel's campaign narrative, which is 55 pages in length, is relatively clear and strait-forward. It is clear from his bibliography that he has combed many excellent lengthier works for source material and that he is able to synthesize this data into a coherent summary. Unfortunately, very few of these sources represent the Soviet point of view. Overall, this volume represents a decent campaign summary, albeit one that is heavily from the German point of view. The author also misuses the 5-page conclusion to essentially summarize the highlights of his narrative with very little analysis and some faulty statistics (is he really trying to say that AGS suffered only about 20,000 casualties during Barbarossa?). The editing throughout this volume is often slip-shod, which reduces the author's ability to drive his points home.
Customer Reviews:
Speculative History.......2006-07-11
Much of this outdated book is based on pure speculation. Written in the mid-seventies when accurate Soviet source material was scarce, Fugate presumes the 1941 Red Army was not the stumbling colossus of post-war German Myth, but actually a cunning and devious foe who had a secret plan to destroy the Germans all along.
As we now know, Fugate was pretty much 100% wrong here. Recent research has shown that no matter how devious Stalin, Zhukov and Timoshenko might've been, the Red Army was a disorganized, ill-trained, ill-equipped mess. He overestimates Soviet capabilities at Smolensk-Yelnia (a theme he develops again in the 90's re-write of this book "Thunder On The Dnepr") and he claims the Germans had absolutely no idea of what they were doing invading the USSR.
However, the book does have some interesting (but again, speculative) insights into the conflicts among the various German High Command personalities who all squabbled among themselves over the best way to conquer Russia. Fugate portrays Guderian as an arrogant primma donna, and seems to think Hitler's concept in Aug '41 had the best oppurtunity to win the war...(ahem, cough).
Oddly, this is almost the only book in English which covers the Army Group Center vs. Western Direction Smolensk operation(s) (approx July 5 to Sept 25 1941) in any detail. This pivotal campaign has, for some weird reason or another, eluded close scrutiny from historians. There exsists no comprehensive, detailed book on Smolensk in any language as far as I know, except perhaps Eremenko's memoirs. At least Fugate has attempted to write one. We are badly in need of new and detailed research.
Fugate unfortunately writes in a ponderous, rambling style (like many Russian writers, actually); I have attempted to read this book cover to cover since 1980, and have only forced myself in 2002.
'A' for effort and research, 'D' for conclusions = 3 stars
Pick up a cheap used copy, but check out Glantz's Stumbling Colossus for a far more accurate picture.
Insightful book........2004-06-22
This insightful book covered the initial year of the German invasion of Soviet Russia. I thought the book was pretty well written and the author was able to go beyond the basic assessment as he tries with certain success, what went wrong and what went right during the initial seven months of this campaign. The author made it clear that it took a lot more then bad weather, Hitler's interferences and over extension of German forces to cost Germany any chance for victory during this period. He seem to be in the mind that German overall military leadership remains badly divided and also gives credits to the Russian willingness to trade space for time as they took the initial devastating losses and converted that time into a defensive position where they could launch a set of massive counter offensives. It seem that Germans were fixated into short term goals and objectives while the Russians were gearing for the long haul.
The author give a fair and pretty perceptive views of the strategic and tactical situation during this initial seven month period of the Operation Barbarossa. Its appears to be well researched and I enjoyed the book coverage of the leading military commanders of the campaign. I thought this book proves to be quite thoughtful and interesting to read.
Average customer rating:
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Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies (Perspectives in Intelligence History Series)
John Erickson
Manufacturer: Edinburgh Univ Pr
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Customer Reviews:
Uneven but interesting.......2001-02-19
"Barbarossa" is a collection of different essays born as the by-product of a conference held in 1991 at the Institute For International Studies of the University of Leeds. The subject of that meeting was Operation Barbarossa (the Nazi attack to the Soviet Union in 1941) and its consequence. While not a conference report, it is somewhat a collation of writing growing out of that meeting, the main "evolving factor" has been - of course - the collapse of the old Soviet Union, and all the opportunities and difficulties that the end of Cold War has presented to the Eastern Front historian.
This said, "Barbarossa" is a wildly uneven effort. On paper, the list of contributors is nothing short of superb: John Erickson, Gabriel Gorodetsky, John Chapman, Klaus-Jurgen Muller are among the writers. The topics covered are - too - a real treat for anyone into the subject: the book is divided in three sections: "Germany Turns East" (covering the prelude and the immeditate aftermath of Barbarossa), "Strained Alliances, Flawed Strategies" (on the complicate tangle of open or covered alliance coagulating after the Nazi attack began), and "Conflict, Compromise, Cost" (on the such controversial issues as Soviet losses, collaboration with the invaders and German war crimes). Unfortunately the quality of the material is not always brilliant and, alas, the Russian contribution is disappointing, being more concerned on then-current political issues (and rather generic "put the blame on Stalin") rather than historical research. The short essay by Dimitri Volkogonov (then a political adviser of Boris Yeltsin) is particularly lame. Some of the rest could have been better, and there's a distinct lack of uniformity in the editing of the text - some is laced with errors.
Anyway, I still give "Barbarossa" four stars, because it contains at least three gems. The first is Gabriel Gorodetsky's "Allied Strategy On The Wake Of Barbarossa", an analisys of the contradictory views held by western powers over the possibility of Soviet survival to the Nazi onslaught. Much of that material went into Gorodetsky recent masterpiece "The Grand Delusion", so I refer the readers to the latter volume.
The second piece of interest is John Chapman's "The Imperial Japanese Navy and the North-South Dilemma", a terrific insight on how the Japanese Navy: a) correctly forecasted a Nazi defeat as early as the second week of July 1941 and b) greatly influenced the Japanese diplomacy into a strategy bent on making their way out of the Russo-German conflict, and convicing Hitler of the reverse. This chapter is expecially well researched, and make a convicing case of Japanese total unwillingness to attack Stalin from the east.
The last great item is John Erickson's "Soviet War Losses - Calculation and Controversies", an overview of what we reasonably know about the scale of Soviet human cost on WWII. The numbers are presented in a concise and clear way, divided by period and single operation. It is interesting to know that, according to the most reliable sources, the final "KIA loss ratio" (Erickson calls it "dynamics of combatant losses") between Russian and Germans is not far for being 1 to 1, and the German efficency of inflicting total casualties on Soviets was around 1,5 to 1 - quoting Erickson "a far cry from the more hysterical assessment of Soviet ineptitude"). If you want to make your own opinion, the hard numbers are here.
The book (now out of print) is quite expensive, so make sure you're serious about the topic before you buy. However, a truly interesting document.
Customer Reviews:
This spectacular edition demands a reprint! .......2007-08-17
This series of books being an amazing source on the eastern front aviation war it is disappointing to see the first volume run out of print and used copies selling for enormous prices.
Average customer rating:
- Yet another opinion
- Could have been a great book...
- Very Good...But Needs to Examine Larger Scale
- A Semi-contrarian View
- Sheds Much New Light on the War in the East
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Black Cross/Red Star : Vol. 1, Operation Barbarossa 1941
Christer Bergstrom , and
Andrey Mikhailov
Manufacturer: Pacifica Press (CA)
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Customer Reviews:
Yet another opinion.......2005-09-27
I acquired volumes one and two in order to learn something of the aerial conflict on the eastern front in WWII, particularly from the Soviet point of view, and was not disappointed. The only other book I have studied on this subject was the 'official' Soviet history of the Red Air Force during the Great Patriotic War which had it's uses as a general reference. These books gave me a much more operational view of the conflict.
As an amateur wargame designer, these books provided me with insight as to how I might model the air portion of this vast conflict and were, therefore, of significant value to me. As has been stated elsewhere, there isn't much else out there on this subject, at least showing the Russian side, which may indicate why so many of us gave these books 5 stars.
I certainly take exception to the one person who tried to make a case against these books by citing the large numbers of vehicles and craft in the Soviet tank and air parks. They obviously have no clue as to the difference between effective machines vs total machines. I would recommend David Glanz's books to anyone who would like to get a better handle on this dynamic, particularly Stumbling Colossus; The Red Army on the eve of World War.
For my purposes, these were great books and I am looking forward to the remaining volumes.
Could have been a great book... .......2005-03-18
At first I thought this book is great... It's filled with exciting material, stories and photos. The authors tried to shed the objective light on the events and give a balanced perspective from the both sides. Vivid first-hand accounts and great photos make this especially interesting reading.
But the more I read the more disappointed I became... There is, of course, a story behind all of this... what happened, where, when, and why... and here's where the book falls so short of logical explanation, it becomes terrible... The more I read the book the more it reminded of the old Communist propaganda saying that Stalin decapitated the Red Army, did not believe in progress, and did everything possible to make USSR weak and defenseless in the face of oncoming agression... The Russians were not prepared, not prepared, not prepared... All of this we had heard and read before, but it is not the real reason the WWII happened the way it did...
If Russians were not prepared for the war, how come Germans found over 20,000 airplanes opposing them? Why there were millions of Soviet troops so close to the border? Why there were tens of thousands of Red Army's tanks, exceeding Vermacht's panzer forces by 7 times? Why were there so many small, nimble planes in the Red Army, and why was the Russian airmen's training so short and inferior to Luftwaffe's? The authors give one answer... Stalin... the dictator-idiot who believed in poorly trained air force and obsolete hardware... for any questions of "why" go ask him...
The German side of the story is narrated in the book clearly and logically, but the USSR looks like a bunch of lunatics obeying the madman on top... and if he has been such an imbecile, what should we imply about everyone else in the country who obeyed such a dictator?... this is sickening, not because it touches anyone's pride, but simply because it does not make any sense!!!
There is an outstanding book about the beginning of WWII... it is Victor Suvorov's "Icebreaker" and it explains very clearly and very logically the real story behind the Russia's "gross unpreparedness" for the war. I have not read a better book on WWII. Every fact supports his theory, including all the facts found in this book.
But here, in this book, all we find is a lot of interesting facts, with descriptions of what happened, when and how, but you won't find a logical explanation of the root of it all. If you're willing to swallow the "lunatic asylim" explanation of Russia's stance, this book is palatable...
If not, instead of getting the answer to the most basic question of why, you'll find a bunch of facts shoehorned to fit an old wives' tale. This is the major disappointment of this book.
Very Good...But Needs to Examine Larger Scale.......2002-08-05
First of all, this is probably the best book on a greatly neglected topic. The air battles along the eastern front were every bit as critical to the war as those in the west. As this book demonstrates, Luftwaffe losses during the summer/autumn of 1941 were as great as the much publicized Battle of Britain. Soviet losses in men and machines were astronomical, another factor ignored by most western historians who emphasize mainly U.S. and British contributions. This book discusses these issues in great detail.
One aspect of the book which is both a plus and minus is the authors emphasize the microscale aspects of the Eastern Front air war. They provide great detail about the air operations of small scale units or individual pilots and what life was like to be a German of Russian flyer over Russia. But the effects of these operations on the larger scale are somewhat neglected. One wishes more discussions were directed as to how large scale bomber operations affected the ground battles. More could have been written concerning the German attempt to develop a strategic bombing campaign, especially against Moscow. In fact, I would have liked to see more discussions concerning the effects of German bomber and dive bomber operations in general since this is what proves most decisive in any offensive. The authors definitely have a pro-fighter bias, which is the main reason I did not give it 5 stars.
A Semi-contrarian View.......2002-04-19
Black Cross Red Star Vol. 1 seems to have become a relatively expensive out-of-print. I only recently finished my new-bought copy after it sat on the to-read list for a long time. If one is considering pursuing it in the second hand market:
The material and perspective are unique. It is a serious attempt at a two sided account of the Soviet-German air war on the Eastern front in WWII, in contrast to previous detailed and even scholarly but still mainly one sided acccounts from the Axis perspective and excepting Soviet propaganda, a few post-Soviet Russian oral histories (eg. Loza's "Attack of the Airacobras"). The Soviet photo's, poor reproductions though they are, could alone make this an important book.
But I was somewhat disappointed given all the 5-stars. This book isn't comparable to the best air combat histories I've read, John Lundstrom's books on US-Japan carrier fighter combat in 1942, and falls short of other excellent WWII air combat accounts as well (Ford's "Flying Tigers", Bartsch's "Doomed at the Start", or the many works of Cull, Shores and Franks).
Even though the authors promise, I believe, 6 volumes to tell the story of the Eastern Front air war, even June-Dec '41 is too much to cover in detail in the relatively short length.
The other authors I mentioned didn't have to deal with the massive scale of the Russo-German air war, and perhaps a 1000 page Volume 1 was not realistic, but still I could at least imagine a better way to address the large scope of the subject.
Perhaps only some detailed accounts would be given for flavor (and perhaps this is the intention) but if so this would better have been done in the framework of more complete consistent and clearly presented aggregate statistics (changing orders of battle, strengths, claims and losses). Complete omission of the Finnish effort is another casualty of too much ground to cover.
The narrative seems to have a split personality sometimes, perhaps between the authors? Certain passages and accounts have a decidedly pro-Soviet tone somewhat at odds with expectation in a neutral account. It often seems important to establish at length that there were many brave and some highly skilled Soviet fighter pilots though that might be assumed, and the limited statistics given don't really challenge the conventional negative characterization of 1941 Russian fighter effectiveness. Where detailed accounts are given, it's not always clear that the claims especially of decorated Soviet pilots and elite Russian units are scrutinized as much as possible compared with available German loss records.
The footnoting and source listing is limited if one would consider further independent research.
One can better understand the book with previous knowledge or an accompanying source on the ground campaign.
This is probably the best book to have appeared on its particular subject, I just hope it's not the last word. Based on V.1 I'll probably buy V.2, but not an immediate must-buy.
Sheds Much New Light on the War in the East.......2001-09-18
Although there are many books that cover the German invasion of Russia in 1941, few deal with the massive air operations in any detail. This book provides an excellent campaign narrative of the six-month struggle for air supremacy in Russia during June-December 1941. The authors are to be applauded for their attention to detail and their scrupulous objectivity.
The book is organized in 31 short chapters, which generally cover a specific area and period in the campaign, like air operations over the Baltic States in July-August 1941. There are three introductory chapters that cover the doctrine, training, tactics and equipment of both the German Luftwaffe and the Soviet VVS. Numerous relevant photographs, many of which have not been published before, enrich each chapter. Additionally, there are six maps and six excellent appendices (Luftwaffe and VVS organization, orders of battle, rank structure and awards). Chapters usually begin with an operational overview of ground operations and objectives in a given area, followed by accounts of air actions in that area on a virtual day-by-day basis. First hand accounts are used to describe fighter engagements and bomber attacks.
The first day of Operation Barbarossa is covered in great detail, much more than I have seen anywhere else. Although there are digressions on minor theaters of action, such as the Siege of Odessa and the Arctic Front, most of the focus is on the three main theaters of action, in north, central and south Russia. The authors skillfully weave together German and Soviet records to produce as objective an account of the air battles as possible. Some striking aspects of the book include the shockingly deficient level of Soviet pre-war flight training; many Soviet pilots went to front-line squadrons with only 10 flight hours accrued, versus an average of 250 hours for new Luftwaffe pilots. Soviet pilots were further disadvantaged by obsolete aircraft, faulty doctrine and lack of combat experience, whereas the German pilots had plenty of experience and flew excellent aircraft like the Me-109E. Anyone who wonders how the Luftwaffe could have so many pilots with 50 or more "kills" should read this books account of the slaughter of hundreds of Soviet bombers during the first weeks of war. The VVS seemed to have an endless supply of SB and DB-3 light bombers that it continued to send in broad daylight and without escort to attack German ground units. The Luftwaffe experten shot them down by the bushel. The VVS was also slow to disperse its aircraft and develop low-level defenses and consequently, Luftwaffe bombers continued to catch large numbers of Soviet aircraft on the ground even three weeks into the campaign. Other interesting aspects include details on the Soviet strategic raids on Berlin, the German strategic raids on Moscow and some industrial targets, and the Soviet predilection for "taran" (air-to-air ramming tactics). Soviet propaganda tended to exaggeration "taran" tactics, but the fact is that it was not unusual; on the first day of Barbarossa alone the Luftwaffe lost 14 aircraft to ramming.
Between June and December 1941, the Luftwaffe destroyed about 17,000 Soviet aircraft at a cost to themselves of 2,000 aircraft, but the Soviets were able to rebuild their air power in a short period despite these horrendous losses. The authors conclude, "the predominant tactical doctrine of the Luftwaffe and the lack of equipment to undertake a strategic bomber offensive proved to be the fatal flaws of Operation Barbarossa." Additionally, the authors cite the role of airpower as particularly decisive in the Moscow campaign, where the declining strength of the Luftwaffe and its ability to contribute effective air cover or ground support contributed to the German ground offensive running out of steam. Massive Soviet air reinforcements to the Moscow sector then tipped the balance and allowed the Soviet army to roll up the over-extended Germans. Finally, the Luftwaffe shifted air reinforcements to this sector from other areas and helped to prevent the collapse of ArmeeGruppe Center.
Black Cross/Red Star is an invaluable book for military historians and future volumes should add to its value. However this book is ill-suited for general readers who lack knowledge of the Eastern Front, since the book is loaded with German and Russian military jargon, and there is little discussion of wider aspects of the campaign (the participation of German allies such as Romania, Finland and Italy is mentioned only in cursory fashion). Readers familiar with the Eastern Front will find this book a feast of information which offers new perspectives on the Russo-German War.
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