Customer Reviews:
Sound logic but too much of details.......2003-03-14
1. Colin Gary's book titled 'Leverage of Sea Power' is first book of the author on maritime affairs. This book is a classical work propounding the effect the Sea Power has had on the events in history, ancient and modern. The painstaking research and logical flow of this work stands out.
2. The author has been successful in establishing the fact that there has been no land power, what so ever, which could achieve lasting success in strategic statecraft without having its own Sea Power or Sea Power of its allies. Thus bringing out very clearly, the leverage, presence and availability of Sea Power can provide in warfare, right from the age of galley warfare to World Wars.
3. The book examines the issue in more than adequate depth and succeeds in making the point very clear. However, this being research based book, the chapters do get little drawn out and tend to make the reader loose interest. A little more stress on the explanation of concepts with reduction in repeated examples (though I must admit, if one has to prove that the concepts of leverage of sea power applied in all times and types of conflicts, such examples are necessary) would have helped capture a non-academic but interested reader's interest through out the book.
4. A book backed with painstaking research. Worth reading, but a reader has to put in efforts to retain focus on the thoughts presented in the book.
Product Description
One of the key concerns of naval strategists and planners today is the nature of the Chinese geostrategic challenge. Conceding that no one can know for certain China s intentions in terms of future conflict, the editors of this hot-topic book argue that the trajectory of Chinese nuclear propulsion for submarines may be one of the best single indicators of China s ambitions of global military power. Nuclear submarines, with their unparalleled survivability, remain ideal platforms for persistent operations in far-flung sea areas and offer an efficient means for China to project power.
This collection of essays presents the latest thinking of leading experts on the emergence of a modern nuclear submarine fleet in China. Each contribution is packed with authoritative data and cogent analysis. The book has been compiled by four professors and analysts at the U.S. Naval War College who are co-founders of the college s recently established China Maritime Studies Institute.
Given the opaque nature of China s undersea warfare development, readers will benefit from this penetrating investigation that considers the potential impact of even the most revolutionary changes in Chinese nuclear submarine capabilities. The editors believe that to ignore such possibilities would be the height of strategic folly and represent inexcusable negligence in terms of U.S. national defense.
Anyone who is interested in the future of the U.S. Navy and the defense of the United States will find this book to be essential reading.
Book Description
This book provides a detailed survey of the Danish navy during the highly influential reign of Christian IV. He created a large and powerful navy with impressive ships and one of Europe's finest dockyards. It was relatively advanced in the design and construction of its warships and the administration of its seamen and dockyard workforce. However, its political and military leadership were highly flawed, reflecting the power struggle between the king and his council at both an international and domestic level, which ultimately led to its crushing defeat at the hands of Sweden. This work offers for the first time a valuable insight into the workings of one of the most significant, but frequently ignored navies in early modern Europe.
Book Description
Influential classic of naval history and tactics still used as text in war colleges. Read by Kaiser Wilhelm, both Roosevelts, other leaders. First paperback edition. 4 maps. 24 battle plans.
Customer Reviews:
Ponderous and ponderable.......2007-09-08
Mahan wrote to his contemporary heads of state as Machiavelli wrote to the Medici's. Passages bemoaning the state of the American navy in the late 19th century are sprinkled throughout this text. U.S. policy in the following years and his remembrance in Annapolis, aside from famed anecdotal readers and devotees, attest to his being heard.
While the thesis is self-evident in the title, this book is a worthwhile read to those interested in history and the history of empires. Mahan offers his perspective, contrary to economic or geographic or religious theories, on the forces that affected - one might claim *determined* - the modern geopolitical reality.
Classic Study of Naval Power.......2007-08-27
Introductory chapter provides classic overview of importance of naval power and is alone worth the price of the book. Historical chapters are perhaps less relevant today in an era of air and space power, as they were written during the transition from sail to steam navies. Introductory chapter provides inspiration for "out of the box" thinking about strategy, political power, and business, made significant by its view that the oceans provide a means of connecting nations and peoples rather than imposing a barrier to contact and communication. Reverses your thinking about the importance of land versus sea transportation.
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783.......2007-07-18
The Influence of Sea Power upon History: 1660-1783 is practically a historical document. The book's first copyright was in 1890 by Alfred Thayer Mahan. The copyright was transferred to Ellen Lyle Mahan in 1918 which eventually fell to the publisher who has published twelve editions of this book.
The style of the writing and the format of the text adhere to that of the original text and the traditional style. These aspects not only allow the reader insight and virtually unheard of detail about the various battles discussed but also a view of how those campaigns were viewed in the original author's time.
Unfortunately, these same aspects make this book somewhat cumbersome. The book is meant to be read from start to finish (all 557 pages). Thus, the reader's knowledge gradually grows as the book progresses making it difficult to look up details on a particular change of technology or a specific campaign.
The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783.......2005-08-09
This book ,written by an obscure U.S. Navy officer, is credited with opening the eyes of many emerging countries to the need for seapower. It lit off the first arms races that almost bankrupted countries building "dreadnoughts" (early Battleships) and lead to the rise of both Japan ,Germany and the U.S. as serious Naval powers actively seeking colonies.
This book ignited the fuse that lead to the battle of Jutland and to Pearl Harbor.
History buffs,Naval officers and students getting ready for their first year at Annapolis should check it out.
The influence of History on Sea Power.......2005-02-14
In reading Mahan, I felt his exposition overreached the applicability of his theory. His selection of evidence seems motivated by a hidden agenda. The meaning he asserts seems to go beyond what that evidence can support. But I have to be forgiving. History isn't science.
We rely on the experience, knowledge and intuition of a grand expert of naval strategy. We haven't the opportunity to replay Trafalgar a hundred times to harvest its truths. We can't really know whether the French had the intrinsically superior strategy and the English dominated merely by favorable throws of fortune's dice. Did Mahan really see the British navy would have an American successor?
I note the Prime Ministers, Presidents and Princes of the First and Second World Wars relied on this expert. Thus Mahan's book itself is a subject of history, an event that shaped the great saga of nations. For this reason, one can't understand naval history without reading Mahan.
Book Description
Back by popular demand, this dramatic appraisal of the Spanish Navy and its defeat by the British at Trafalgar in 1805 disproves many long-held beliefs about the competence of the Spanish fleet. The author examines the factors that shaped the development of the Spanish Navy in the eighteenth century and maintains that the well-built ships and skilled forces were nowhere near as ineffective as they are usually represented. The book includes specifics of Spanish warship design and construction and is illustrated with beautiful contemporary plans, engravings, and photographs of ship models, some in full color. 208 pages. 120 illustrations. Hardcover. 8 x 10 1/2 inches.
Customer Reviews:
A good break from Anglocentric Naval Historians .......2005-06-09
Author John Harbron's book is a nice relief from the all long line of Anglocentric Naval historians that like to downplay the accomplishments of the Spanish and, to a lesser extent, French navies in the 1700s. The Spanish Royal Navy did a fine job in the 18th century given the fact that they were outgunned and outmanned and could rarely coordinate effectively with their French naval counterparts in their battles against the British Royal Navy. The results speak for themselves. During the 18th century Spain was able to successfully maintain her vast American empire vitually intact despite contant British Royal Navy attacks. It was only when revolutionary movements in her American empire that Spain lost most of her territories and not because of British actions.
John Hebron's book articulate accomplishments of great Spanish commanders like Blas De Lezo and Bernardo Galvez who had a consistant record of defeating British foes. Facts that are rarely mentioned or glossed over in English language history texts.
Excellent topic, but not followed through.......2001-07-27
While the author has made the point that there were many fine officers in the Spanish Navy, and that there were many excellent ships, the facts indicate that this combination was never capitalised upon, and the result was invariably disasterous. The best of leaders can only do so much with what they are given, and in the case of Spain, this meant far too few seamen, far too much influence by the Army, far too little training for crews, and some of the worst treatment imaginable. There is no point in building enormous warships if they cannot be effectively manned! Further, it is well-documented that ships of the line of the Spanish navy, although enormous in size, were laughably undergunned compared to their contemporaries. This is not made clear in this book. That said, it would also be of enormous benefit to view some of the plans and profiles of these ships, so as to compare them with their British and French contemporaries. Dozens of books have been written about HMS Victory and other Royal Navy ship types, but almost nothing about the ships of the other navies of the time, and even less in English! It is a great pity the author chose to use so many primitive contemporary Spanish paintings for illustration rather than something either commissioned for the book (expensive, no doubt!), or obtained with a bit more research into what is available.
Book Description
This is a gripping blow by blow account of a war between the United States and Japan. It was a forerunner of actual events, written 16 years before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. Bywater, the world's leading naval authority in the period between the two world wars, prophesied the following: A Japanese surprise attack attacks U. S. naval forces in the Pacific. Japanese troops simultaneously invade the Phillippines and Guam. Recognizing their limits, Japanese commanders hold off from any attempt to capture Hawaii.
Customer Reviews:
A day of infamy?.......2007-08-05
Who will forget Roosevelt's speech condemning the Japanes for their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor? But was it a day of infamy or a very predictable event that US intelligence failed to get right? After all In his book the naval authority Hector Bywater outlined in novel format a scenario for a Pacific war between Japan and the US in 1931. Japan made a surprise attack on the US Pacific Fleet based in the Philippines ( Pearl was not then the naval base). After initial setbacks the US employed a strategy of island hopping to cut back the Japanese. Finally they made a move on the Japanese so provocative that the Japanese fleet had no option but to come out and fight to save their honor. They were annihilated.
He was called a war mongerer. Roosevelt attacked him and disagreed that such a war would happen. Meanwhile a fellow called Yamamoto bought and read the novel as did most of the Japanese naval academy.
December 7th 1941 Hector Bywater's novel became reality.
Whilst the novel is old worldly quaint and focuses on pure ship power (aircraft at the time did not have the capability to inflict any significant damage) it is prophetic if only Roosevelt had listened.
A must read for all those interested in naval power and the war in the Pacific.
The Great Pacific War.......2007-01-17
A well written, quickly moving narative with main chapter subjects at beginning of each chapter. This author is a terrific news man and a far cry from the self-serving propagandist we have to day.
not bad .......2005-07-20
Obviously written before the author (and his training) really understood the signifigance aircraft carriers would have in the war between these two countries (1941 -1945), so a lot of his suppositions are not born out by fact.
However, the three biggest objections I had to the volume was 1) the fact of his use of very very long paragraphs to get his point across (some paragraphs would go for two or three PAGES at a minimum); 2) the fact that the volume was/is touted as having predicted the attack on Pearl Harbor (at least a decade before it actually happened) but does not mention an attack there at all in the narrative, and 3) how Japan is protrayed as treating prisoners of war in the novel versus how they actuslly treated them in fact.
Is it worth reading- - - yes. Just don't do it to see how history was revealed, but only as it might have been.
An Interesting Read.......2004-06-13
Bywater explains the "inevitable" war in the Pacific between the United States and Japan if the Naval Treaty between the US, UK, and Japan hadn't been signed in the 1920's. What is interesting is the amount of detail that Bywater brings to the "war that never happened" and forecasts some of the steps that the US would enventually take in WW2. It's not for everyone but if you like the "What-If" genre of history you'll find it quite enjoyable. This book was out of print for years so if you want to read it buy the reprint now! I tried to find it for years from specialty shops and could never find it.
Prophetic Book That Foretold the Coming War.......2002-06-26
A surprise attack on a US installation in the Pacific by the Japanese? The US conducting a campaign of "island-hopping" to fight the enemy? The Japanese using suicide aircraft to defend themselves? This sounds like a history of WWII but it isn't from WWII but rather a novel written years before. What the author has done is basically use military logic to write a book that details a clash between the US and Japan. Some parts of the book are right on the mark with what would later happen for real in World War II. However, other parts miss wide such as the author having the US use gas as a weapon.
As novels go, this book really isn't that exciting. It's main interest is to the historian, both professional and amateur, who is interested in what was foreseen by some people in the 1920's.
Customer Reviews:
Analysis Over Technical Details.......2007-07-15
I really liked this book. I have to admit, I'm no expert on naval power and haven't read many of the books on the topic. Indeed, I find that my lack of knowledge of some of the technical aspects of naval warfare hurt my understanding.
But the book has some tremendous insights. At first, I had trouble deciding exactly what the book was about. Rose discusses doctrine, training, how officers act and are chosen, how the ship mates thought and acted; however, he also talked about grand admirals, naval colleges, plans, and technology.
After reading it, it is clear that the book is about EXACTLY what it is called -- naval power. And to Rose, everything matters, all of the aspects mentioned above.
In essence, Rose appears to be a great believer that naval power is profound, but it must be used correctly. The navy must be built for the purpose it is used, and leaders and sailors must be trained and work to that end.
The book begins with, perhaps, the overestimation of sea power. Mahan's theories were universally believed, and the history of fleet building before WW1 is so linked to international power politics that it first reads like a book on Political Science.
Over and over, the folly of breaking these axioms is displayed. The Germans build a powerful navy, and then don't use it. Rose agrees that Germany's building the large fleet inevitably lead to conflict with Great Britain, a horrible mistake, since Germany's natural enemies were France and Russia. Conversely, unlike many authors who make the same claim, Rose is even more critical of building the fleet and not ever using it.
Rose discusses how a large and bold use of the fleet could have worked and been decisive. But the German fleet wasn't made to fit a doctrine and wasn't used to supplement the strategies of war.
We also learn about heroes that aren't household names. The brilliant American Admiral, William Snowden Slim, and the genius of Japan, Sato Tetsutaro.
I suspect there is a lot here to disagree about, but my son and I have been talking about his theories for weeks.
In The Navy.......2007-06-24
I am a little amazed when I realize how much I learned playing board games as a child and I doubt I'm alone. For example, I'd guess plenty of kids learned the fundamentals of world geography from Risk. While reading Volume One of Lisle Rose's Power at Sea, I kept going back to my days with Battleship: this book is a history of the ships from that game: destroyers, submarines, cruisers, battleships (of course), and even in a limited sense (for this volume), aircraft carriers.
Volume One is subtitled The Age of Navalism and covers 1890 to 1918. The starting point is significant in that it's around the beginning of the era of steel clad ships driven by steam (although there were predecessors even in the Civil War with ships like the Monitor). The Age of Sail in warfare was over. The concluding point is more easily defined: the conclusion of World War I.
Prior to the Great War, the navies were beginning to develop more and more powerful ships, particularly battleships and their smaller, faster cousins, the cruisers. Governments became obsessed with the strategic value of these fleets, but the transition was far from painless: besides beings expensive, they were generally untested.
Although other countries are discussed, the three nations most discussed are Britain, Germany and the United States. Britain had the biggest navy, the better to support its far-flung empire. Germany, with ambitions of its own, decided that a strong navy was important to remain competitive with Britain. The U.S. developed greater strength primarily to protect its interests in the Americas and the Pacific.
When World War I broke out, the naval conflict was untested ground (or ocean) for all involved, and it became obvious that there were significant problems with battle strategies; too much naval brass still though in terms of sailing ships. In addition, both the German and British navies were very aristocratic, with officers treated very well and most regular sailors mistreated. The U.S. Navy, while not perfect, was more respectful to its crews (due in part to the more democratic principles of the country in general). In fact, Rose depicts the U.S. as looking the best of the big navies in World War I.
This is not a perfect book. For one thing, I found Rose's writing slow going at times, though it did eventually pick up. Another issue is that he is focuses so much on the big picture we don't get much of a picture about how life was on these ships; yes, we are told that things were rough, but for the most part, we only see the ships from the outside, not how they looked from within. Finally, Rose assumes a basic knowledge of ships on the reader's part: if you don't know what distinguishes a cruiser from a destroyer, he doesn't provide much beyond the most basic details. With these caveats, this book is still good and informative and should be appreciated by those interested in learning about naval history.
An Interesting Study of History and Sea Power.......2007-05-05
This book is a history of global sea power during the critical period from the last decade of the 19th century through World War I. Lisle Rose keeps his book manageable in length while broad in scope.
The rise of Japan to dominance in the Asian Pacific through sea power and its resulting threat to the United States share equal billing with the nation-states of Europe and the navies of the Atlantic. We are led through a review of the importance of sea power as a tool and manifestation of waning colonialism and rising industrialism. This allows for insights into the huge technological and cultural shift from the Age of Sail to the mighty dreadnaught and the new era of undersea warfare and air power.
The stubborn resistance of social stratification from an aristocratic past to the adaptations required by rapid advances in technology and industry is explored, which is to say that the common seaman is not ignored. We are continually reminded that his training and treatment were often archaic and unjust, although he was, in the final analysis, the true source of naval power. Rose leaves plenty of time for the theorists and titular leaders, egos and all, but their roles are placed in a large perspective.
There is a liberal sprinkling of anecdotes and quotations, which add interest and bring history alive. We are, for example, deftly told that the American navy had an underside along with its justifiably proud past when we learn that a young George Dewey, later to become famous at Manila Bay, once "found over a hundred men in chains between the guns and rioters in possession of part of the lower decks."
Along with the sweep of history there is technical review of naval design, production and budgeting in readable form. Rose does not exaggerate, but his engaging style serves to highlight his dramatic descriptions of the tensions, uncertainties and horrors of sea warfare. This is a thoughtful, well-written book, which will be fascinating and informative for navy buffs and historians, as well as those who just enjoy a good read.
An Outstanding Read.......2007-04-16
As a former naval officer and, for the last six years, a docent at the USS Lexington (CV-16) museum, I have had a strong interest in the history of the US Navy for some time. I found Dr. Rose's first volume of Power at Sea an outstanding read. What I particularly liked was that, rather than a dull retracing of each and every historical event, it was an easily read, fascinating, and insightful foray into how the major nations used, or misused, sea power during the age of the battleship. The book unifies the different threads of naval development into a consistent whole and, in the process, brings to light areas of influence the average reader may not have considered. I recommend this book as an enjoyable addition to the library of any person interested in the naval history of the battleship era regardless of their academic background.
Deep Flaws Ruin a Potential Great Read.......2007-03-25
As someone who does research in the time period discussed in the book, I pick up anything that's new to see if there's any new research. Unfortunately, there's nothing new in this book, and in all honesty, I can not figure out how this book was published by a university press, considering the poor notation and poor logic behind some of Rose's arguements.
The book sets out to be a popular narrative of the naval affairs from 1890-1918, but is spotty in its coverage. For example, the Spanish-American War gets only a skimming over, as does other significant events in World War I, such as Dogger Bank, Coronel and the Falklands, Gallipoli, and the exploits of SMS Koenigsberg and SMS Emden in the Indian Ocean. Mahan gets a brief mention, but Sir Julian Corbett gets no such love. On the other hand, expect the requisite narrative regarding Jutland, as well as chapters on the Imperial Japanese Navy and the US Navy.
However, this is not the greatest flaw in this work. It ostensibly states how it will cover social aspects of navalism, but the deepest it gets is statements about how harshly officers treated enlisted sailors and the public's reaction to the Anglo-German naval race. Rose has trouble keeping his story straight. He pumps up the role of naval fleets running up to the war, and then laments their uselessness after the war breaks out because they spent the most of their time in port. Perhaps if he had read Corbett, he would have seen their uselessness in port with regards to blockading, but I digress. He also seems to have an affinity for what-if scenarios, as he goes on for at least five pages talking about various ways in which the Germans could have sunk the British reinforcements in August of 1914, and even seriously discusses Jacky Fisher's idea regarding landing troops in Pomerania and marching on Berlin, of course without looking at trivial things like the Swedish-Danish mining of the Kattegat or what the German fleet would do this whole time.
In addition, Rose lambastes the design principles of Dreadnoughts, and in the process states how German guns were better than British guns because they were lighter than their direct British counterparts, then in the next paragraph says how German guns were inferior to British guns because they couldn't make bigger guns than the British. He never gets around to sorting that out, much like he never gets around to explaining how many British Dreadnoughts were sunk by torpedoes after stating how vulnerable they were to them. He also talks about how British ships were so vulnerable to plunging fire because of a lack of deck armour, then fails to point out that British deck armour was equal to their counterparts in other navies.
Speaking of proof, if I hear another "Well, as another scholar has noted..." without a footnote, I may just scream. Rose has a nasty habit of backing up his statements with the credentials of another scholar, without actually citing them. Speaking of citing, the notes in this book is frankly high school level. Rose goes for long sections without footnotes making statements like the ones given above, then goes through a slew of notes over the next several paragraphs covering innocuous statements. As for the bibliography, it is a useful guide to secondary sources, but it is extremely unsettling to see a statement saying how it is highly selective and how they were the works that influenced his line of thinking in writing the book. An actual bibliography covering the works he used in the writing of the book as sources would have been much better.
Rose has two more books covering the rest of the century, but at present I am rather gun-shy about actually reading them if this book is any indication of the quality of the other two. In the end, if you want a good read about the time period, especially in terms of an Anglo-German view, I would definitely go for Robert Massie's classics Dreadnought and Castles of Steel. They read just as easy, have much better notation and research, and provide the in depth coverage of the important events that they deserve.
Average customer rating:
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Naval Blockades and Seapower: Strategies and Counter-Strategies, 1805-2005 (Cass Series: Naval Policy and History)
Manufacturer: RoutledgeFalmer
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ASIN: 0415354668 |
Book Description
This new collection of up-to-date essays by well-known scholars covers the most significant naval blockades of the 19th and 20th centuries, including Napoleon's Continental Blockade of England and the American Civil War, as well as blockades in more recent conflicts such as World War II, the Korean War, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Persian Gulf interdiction program, and the Chinese "missile" blockade of Taiwan in 1996. br br Each chapter addresses the causes of the blockade in question, its long and short-term repercussions, and the course of the blockade itself and takes advantage of new research and methodologies to provide the most complete information to both the specialist and non-specialist reader. This volume presents fresh insights into issues such as what a naval blockade is, why countries might chose them, which navies can and cannot make use of them, what responses lead to satisfactory or unsatisfactory conclusions, and how far-reaching their consequences tend to be. br br This book will be of great interest to all students and scholars of strategic studies, military history and maritime studies.
Customer Reviews:
Well Worth Your While.......2007-04-20
If you don't know the Battle of the Atlantic from the Battle of Leyte Gulf, you'll want to do a quick review of U.S. naval history during World War II before starting Dr. Rose's second volume in his Power at Sea trilogy. That said, I think that even the casual historian will find this book well worth their while. A revealing look into the rise of the aircraft carrier as the dominate weapon of sea power is only one of the several intriguing topics covered. I was particularly fascinated by the section that described how close the axis nations actually came to winning the war they had so recklessly begun. This book provides an excellent look into the era in which the United States surpassed Great Britain as the greatest sea power in the world.
Books:
- Like a Cliff in the Ocean: A History of the 3rd SS-Panzer-Division Totenkopf
- Mayflower: A Story of Courage, Community, and War
- Mis Memorias. Mis Bodas De Oro Con El Tango 1A. Ed
- Omaha Beach: D-Day, June 6, 1944
- Once Upon a Country: A Palestinian Life
- Radio Controlled Helicopters: The Guide to Building and Flying C Helicopters
- Reading the Man: A Portrait of Robert E. Lee Through His Private Letters
- Seasons of War: The Ordeal of the Confederate Community, 1861-1865
- Secret Six: The True Tale of the Men Who Conspired with John Brown
- Service Parts Planning with mySAP SCM: Processes, Structures, and Functions
Books Index
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