Book Description
This book discusses the concept of the Battlekreuzer. The German Großerkreuzers, as they were known, were built to strict financial limits, and therefore the German designs were always a compromise between the factors listed under design philosophy. Individual ship histories are detailed with particular emphasis upon their battle experience and deployment in conflict, and author Gary Staff includes a variety of official records and personal first-hand accounts will be used. The battlekreuzer had a remarkable ability to withstand battle damage, as demonstrated by the Goeben, which suffered five mine hits on one occasion. Full colour artwork plates and detailed line drawings and photographs support the and enrich the engaging text.
Customer Reviews:
Book of Nice paintings.......2007-04-04
German Battlecruisers outlines the physical characteristics of the four designs the Imperial Fleet put to sea in World War 1. Some discussion of their design philosophy is included along with a brief history of each ship. There are a few small pictures sprinkled in to give you a flavor of these great ships but the nicest part is the paintings of each class of ship. They show the color schemes for the time. One painting correctly depicts Lutzow at Jutland with a red after funnel. This is not a "heavy duty" reference book but gives a nice overview for people who are not very familiar with these ships.
Excellent with much detail.......2006-10-05
Osprey's two new volumes in British and German battlecruisers in the First World War present fresh insight into this important class of warships and their contributions to naval operations. German Battlecruisers 1914-18, New Vanguard 124, covers the seven German battlecruisers that operated during the First World. Unlike the volume on British battlecruisers, this volume focuses more on technical details than on operational narrative, which makes both volumes very complimentary. A number of these New Vanguard volumes of late have been rather skimpy with little or no fresh insight or detail, but happily that trend does not apply to this volume or the one on British battlecruisers. Overall, German Battlecruisers 1914-18 is an excellent volume and provides detailed coverage on this aspect of naval warfare.
After a brief introduction outlining the development of the battlecruiser concept in the Imperial German Navy, the author jumps right into to discussing each of the four class of German battlecruiser. For each class, the author's narrative consists of sub-sections on armament, armor, sea-keeping, machinery, general characteristics and changes, namesake and service record. This is an excellent approach and the author packs a considerable amount of detail into the discussion of each warship class. Detail includes cross sections of ship's armor, internal turret profiles, the amount of ammunition carried for each weapons system on the ship, cost, and a list of all ship commanders. The author provides not merely a brief overview of general ship characteristics, but makes a genuine effort to outline and assess a wide variety of factors that affected the mobility, firepower and protection of each German battlecruiser.
The author spends considerable time discussing the original German battlecruiser, the Von der Tann, which was commissioned in 1910. Von der Tann was revolutionary for the Imperial German Navy in having turbine propulsion and armored torpedo bulwarks. The Imperial Fleet followed von der Tann with improved versions, resulting finally in the "Derfflinger" class which represented the best blend of firepower, protection and mobility. Although the author does discuss each ship's operational history, this comes in second to the technical detail, particularly in regard to activities beyond the Jutland or Dogger Bank actions. The volume also has excellent color plates: Von der Tann profile, Moltke profile, Seydlitz at Dogger Bank, a cut-away of Lutzow, Seydlitz profile, Lutzow at Jutland and Derfflinger profile. The only area that disappointed me was that the author made no mention of the last class of battlecruisers that were launched during the war and mounted bigger guns - this might have meant that the Germans were migrating to the 'fast battleship' concept developed by the British.
In the concluding sections, the author makes some very good points about the `lessons learned' from the action at Dogger Bank in 1915, which resulted in vastly different performances by British and German battlecruisers at Jutland in 1916. At Dogger Bank, the Germans nearly lost the Seydlitz when its turret ammunition caught fire after a hit and the ship was only saved by self-sacrificing action by the crew. The Germans learned from this incident and made changes to their ammunition handling procedures, while the British, whose battlecruisers were hit but did not burn, took the opposite approach. This is a point well argued by the author, although his conclusion that "the German kreuzer-battleships had defeated the British battlecruisers and had fought and resisted the most modern and heavily armed battleships" is a bit too biased in favor of the Germans. While the loss of three British battlecruisers at Jutland was painful, the German battlecruisers were beaten to a pulp (with one sunk and one nearly sunk) and in no condition to claim `victory.' Furthermore, the German battlecruisers certainly came off the worse for wear against the British super-dreadnoughts at Jutland. This volume does not really address weaknesses of the German battlecruisers, but I think they had both their technical and operational problems. In technical terms, they were not always mechanically reliable, as in the incident the author mentions when Moltke lost a propeller in April 1918 and suffered a complete engine breakdown at sea. In operational terms, these beautifully-built warships really did not have a role that justified their high cost ad upkeep (same could be said for most of the German battle fleet), which accounts for the fact that they saw action on only a few occasions. Impressive as they were, the German battlecruisers of the First World War neither controlled the sea nor were capable of conduct commerce raiding, leaving them sitting on most of the war on the sidelines. On the other hand, the much-maligned British battlecruisers did control the sea and swept those seas clean of enemy merchant shipping. Who did you say won?
Book Description
The battle of Heligoland Bight was the first major action between the British and German fleets during World War I. The British orchestrated the battle as a warning to the German high command that any attempt to operate their naval forces in the North Sea would be met by strong British resistance. Heligoland Island guarded the entrance to the main German naval anchorage at Kiel. Fought on August 28, 1914, the engagement was complicated by dense fog, the piecemeal engagement of German forces, and the unexpected appearance in the area of additional British ships, which were hard to distinguish from foe. Initial British damage was significant; however, fearing that the protracted battle would allow the bulk of the German fleet to join the battle, the British brought in their battle cruiser reinforcements and won the day, inflicting heavy losses on the Germans.
The battle was significant for its political and strategic ramifications for the two sides. The Germans became reluctant to engage large forces in an attempt to gain a decisive maritime victory. After this defeat, any plans for large-scale fleet operations had to be approved by the Kaiser, which hampered the German fleet's effectiveness. This left the North Sea to Great Britain for much of the war.
Customer Reviews:
Pretty Good.......2007-01-12
The action described in this book was very confusing to the participants and it's very difficult to make it clear in a book. This book does a pretty good job, although it could have done better. Some incidents seem glossed over, others covered in more detail, so that it's somewhat difficult, for example, to glean the full OOBs and starting positions if you're trying to set up a scenario of the battle. Still, it's better than most books that cover this battle.
The First British/German Naval Battle in WW II........2006-09-27
If asked to name a naval battle between England and Germany during World War I, nearly everyone would recall the Battle of Jutland. Asked to name a second battle, and most people, even military historians would probably have to hesitate. Yet the much smaller Battle of Heligoland Bight, which was the first battle between the British and German navies. It was not a large battle. The British wanted to teach the Germans that any time their ships were at sea they were at danger from British attacks.
All in all it was a very confused battle on both sides: relatively primitive communications; unfortunate miscommunications; effective British jamming of German transmissions; poor gun accuracy; defective British ordinance (also a big problem at Jutland); inadequate German ordinance; and fog in the days before radar.
At a result of the battle however, the Germans became reluctant to engage British forces and the German Navy sat idle while the British blockade remained in place and was a major factor in ending the war.
Customer Reviews:
A Riveting Story of Brave Men.......2007-07-13
In early 1942 the Japanese were lords of the Pacific, the Zero the best fighter plane between Tokyo and London and Emperial navy seemingly unstoppable. Lundstrom's story of the first year of the Pacific War and the Navy pilots who first flew from US carriers to blunt the spread of the Empire and take the first steps on the road to victory is by far the best that I have read. As other reviewers have said, Lundstrom's research of the details of the air battles, from both the US and Japanese sides, is unrivaled. His ability to weave these details into a gripping story in which the characters come to life is just as unique. This book and his first volume about Coral Sea and Midway are the kind that you don't want to finish because they are so good.
The bravery of these American flyers comes across well, but so does the the tension (and occasional humor) of this first full year of combat in the Pacific. The F4F-4 Wildcat was a well built, strong plane but could not compete with the Zeke in manuverability or speed. Yet the "First Team" flew their Wildcats from carriers and Guadalcanal's Henderson Field, held their own or better and started the distruction of the Japanese's veteran pilot cadre.
The fact that 10 of 34 pilots from VF-5 (the carrier squadron that flew along side the Marines from Henderson in late summer/early fall '42) were killed or seriously wounded shows that the attrition rate among these pilots was high and points to their bravery and endurance.
Mechanical problems with the F4F-4, bad weather, inhospitable islands, and the endless Pacific Ocean were added to the skilled and agressive opponents to make flying a Navy fighter plane a tough occupation. These flyers were truely a special breed.
You won't find a better told tale of the first year of the Pacific War anywhere. Lundstrom focuses only on the Naval pilots and their battles for more than 500 pages mand it's a tactical story in the truest sense. If you're tired of reading military history that never gets you out of the Admiral's cabin or Washington DC and London, this is for you. "The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign" is a terrific read. Highly recommended.
One of the best books on a campaign in the Pacific War.......2007-01-10
Although this book concentrates on U.S. Navy fighter combat during the first four months of the Guadalcanal campaign, it gives so many details of associated events that it should be read by anyone interested in the entire Guadalcanal campaign itself. This book also does a great job of giving details of the Japanese side, even to the point of naming most of the individual Japanese pilots involved in combat with the U.S. Navy and Marines around Guadalcanal. The only criticism (and this is slight criticism) I have of this book is Lundstrom's strong defence, for whatever reason, of Fletcher's actions during the initial part of the campaign which have been heavily criticized by just about every other historian. But, I guess it stands to reason that at least one credible historian would find a reason to defend Fletcher.
Anyway, if I were to name the top three books about the Guadalcanal campaign, this would be one of them along with Richard Frank's "Guadalcanal, the Definitive Account" and Michael Smith's "Bloody Ridge."
First Team Scores Again!.......2007-01-03
The First Team - Pacific Naval Air Combat from Pearl Harbor to Midway
and
The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign
John B. Lundstrom
Naval Institute Press
I have been studying naval aviation combat since the early 1960s, and I have never come across a book half so comprehensive, from a historical basis - nor half so useful, from a modeling perspective - as this two-volume set recently reprinted by the Naval Institute Press. The title - "The First Team" - refers to US Naval Aviator fighter pilots who were in service at the start of World War II; a convenient way of focusing on naval fighter combat from December 7, 1941 to the end of the Guadalcanal campaign in early February, 1943. This was a time when the F4F Wildcat bore the brunt of the aerial warfare - a few F2A Buffalo fighters served in the Navy during this time-frame, but the only Buffalos that saw combat were serving with the Marines (who are outside the scope of this two-volume study).
This book covers literally every incident of aerial combat that included US Navy fighter aircraft from December 7 through the end of Guadalcanal. I mean EVERY incident, every American shoot-down (and every American shot down) and every American carrier attack on a Japanese island target fought during the first 14 months of the war in the Pacific: the Wake relief force, the Gilbert, Marshall and Marcus Island raids, the assault on Rabaul, and the attacks on Tulagi, Lae and Salamaua - and of course, Guadalcanal. The books also cover every carrier vs. carrier battle that was fought in the Pacific before 1944: Coral Sea, Midway, Eastern Solomons and Santa Cruz. In short, The First Team two-volume book is incredibly comprehensive. Maps and charts illustrate each battle, each significant combat incident, each movement of carriers and air groups - the detail is remarkable. Author John Lundstrom makes these battles come alive in ways that no other history I've read have been able to accomplish. But for all their value as pure history, these books go way beyond that.
For instance, The First Team covers combat tactics - the prime reason why the vastly-inferior F4F-4 Wildcat was able to best the incredible Japanese Zero in almost every encounter (including decisive victories at Midway and Guadalcanal). Pre-war, the US Naval air service - alone among the world's air forces - trained its pilots to successfully use deflection shooting, permitting pilots to attack from beam positions, instead of just from directly astern. To perform a deflection-shooting attack successfully, the pilot couldn't aim at the target; instead, he had to aim for where the plane would be when the bullets arrived.
Deflection shooting is a kind of lead-the-target targeting performed by duck hunters and skeet shooters; a process vastly complicated in aerial combat because both the attacker and the target are moving at several hundred miles per hour, generally in different planes. However, when successfully executed, deflection attacks are almost unbeatable. This kind of deflection shooting permitted American Naval fighter pilots to attack the enemy with limited risk of counter-battery fighter from defending aircraft. Deflection attacks were decisive in attacks on bomber aircraft, but this approach also gave U.S. Naval aviators a significant advantage over the more maneuverable and - at most altitudes - faster Japanese fighters.
Other tactical elements explored in great detail were the comparative tactical formations - American transition from four-aircraft divisions to two-aircraft divisions while the Japanese held onto the far more awkward and inflexible three-plane formations - as well as the evolution of the "Thatch Weave," a mutually-supportive defensive formation the Japanese were never able to effectively counter.
The First Team also looks - in depth - at the training of Japanese and US Naval aviators. In 1941, Japanese naval aviators were, man-for-may, the best-trained pilots in the world, yet thanks to different tactical approaches, they were consistently outfought, first by well-trained US Naval Aviators and later even by grass-green Ensigns not long out of advanced training programs. Training and organization were critical - Japanese were taught to move in units of three aircraft, and to take advantage of their aircraft's incredible maneuverability.
American Naval Aviators were trained in deflection gunnery, in pilot-wingman cooperation and in emphasizing mutually-supporting defensive tactics culminating in the unbeatable Thatch Weave - which remarkably was under development before the outbreak of the war, though "conventional wisdom" has held that Commander John "Jimmy" Thatch developed the mutual-support tactics in response to initial combat with the Japanese.
Another factor that The First Team explored which worked against the Japanese was the very different organizational structure of the two countries' carrier air groups. In the US Navy, carrier air groups were fungible organizations - new squadrons and new pilots could be shuffled through the air groups, and these groups could be shuffled from carrier to carrier as needed. By contrast, Japanese carrier air groups trained as a unit, and were permanently assigned to a specific aircraft carrier.
When a Japanese group suffered significant combat casualties, not only were the individual squadrons no longer combat-capable, but the carrier itself was out of the battle. As a result, after the bloody draw at Coral Sea, surviving Naval aviators from the sunken Lexington were able to go back into combat onboard the Yorktown at Midway - less than a month later - effectively replacing losses the Yorktowners suffered at Coral Sea with combat-tested pilots. Even though the Yorktown had been badly damaged, it was patched together and able to field a combat-ready air group that proved decisive at Midway less than a month later.
However, as explained in The First Team's assessment of Japan's carrier air group organization, the Zuikaku - which, unlike the surviving Yorktown, was undamaged but which also suffered heavy pilot losses - was unable to serve at Midway because the Zuikaku's carrier air group had been decimated, and a carrier without an air group is little more than a target. Although sufficient combat-experienced pilots from the heavily-damaged Shokaku had survived and were at least technically available, because of a long-standing organizational policy, the Japanese were unable to restore the Zuikaku's group.
Instead, both air groups had to be restored to full combat capability only after receiving infusions of trainees, which required a long work-up period. The Yorktown's presence at Midway was decisive; the absence of Zuikaku was at least potentially just as decisive. Had two Japanese carriers - Zuikaku and Hiryu - survived the first devastating US Naval attack, their return strike may have done more than just knock out the Yorktown.
The books even get into fascinating controversies, such as the odd decision to put six .50 caliber machine guns into the Navy's new folding-wing F4Fs, even though they'd add a further weight penalty that would - along with the weight of the wing-fold mechanism -cripple the Wildcat's climb, range and overall combat capabilities. The early-war fixed-wing F4F-3 carried four .50 caliber machine guns - which US Navy fighter leaders felt was sufficient to knock down unarmored Japanese bombers and fighters. However, the fixed wing took up deck and hanger space and sharply limited the number of fighters a carrier could handle. With fighter squadrons growing from 18 to 27 to 36 aircraft, the need for folding wings was essential, even though the weight penalty imposed by the folding mechanism would inevitably degrade performance.
The initial decision to go with six .50 caliber guns in a folding-wing Wildcat was made by the British Fleet Air Arm, which did not routinely face fighter-to-fighter combat - minimizing the need for high-end performance - yet rightly felt it needed the heavier firepower inherent in six .50 calibers to swiftly knock down armored and well-armed German and Italian bombers. Oddly, instead of listening to their own fighter leaders, the US Navy's "Brass Hats" listened to the Brits, and decided - in the name of production efficiency - to standardize on the British design.
The result was the F4F-4 - a sluggish, slow-climbing short-range fighter which had six .50 caliber machine guns but fewer total rounds of ammo (and, therefore, a much shorter firing time) than the older F4F-3. This plane had a harder time climbing to a decisive altitude. It had difficulty conducting CAPs of more than a couple of hours or escorting bombers farther than 175 miles; and when it did find targets, this new Wildcat all-too-quickly ran out of ammunition. When front-line Naval Aviators complained about being asked to fight what was arguably the best carrier planes in the world with an increasingly second-string fighter plane, the Navy Brass in Washington told these front-line troops to fly their Wildcats with a 2/3rds fuel load and two unloaded guns - absurd advice to pilots who knew they needed every bullet and every gallon of gas every time they went head-to-head in combat with the best-trained naval aviators in the world, the Japanese.
These limiting factors for the new F4F clearly had an impact in the loss of the Yorktown at Midway, as well as the loss of so many torpedo planes at that same battle - and these F4F deficiencies may have also contributed to the loss of the Hornet at the Battle of Santa Cruz four months later. Nobody from the greenest Naval Aviation Ensign all the way up to Admiral Chester Nimitz had a good thing to say about the F4F-4 - but it was only after the end of the Guadalcanal campaign that the General Motors-built FM-1 reverted to a four-gun armament - too late to face down the Japanese.
Yet remarkably, the US Navy seldom fought the Japanese head-to-head without coming out on the winning end. Ultimately, the Wildcat scored a three-to-one winning margin over the Japanese - not because the Wildcat was a better fighter aircraft, though it did have some advantages, but because American Naval Aviators had better tactics, from the two-plane division to the Thatch Weave.
As noted, while it had dramatically shorter range, at least a marginally lower speed at most altitudes - and it was far less maneuverable than the Zero - the Wildcat that fought the Japanese from December 7, 1941 to February, 1943 did have some significant advantages over its adversary. The Grumman was solidly built - earning for its manufacturer the affectionate nickname "Grumman Iron Works." The Grumman fighter was also well-armored (at least where it counted), and - early in the war - it began to receive functional self-sealing fuel tanks that would absorb a 7.7 millimeter (.30 caliber) Japanese machine-gun bullet.
While it was slow to climb, the Wildcat could dive like a bat out of hell - given enough altitude, American Naval Aviators could always break off combat with Japanese Zeros - and given an initial altitude advantage (hard to come by, but not impossible to achieve), the Wildcat could initiate combat - attack Zeros and other Japanese aircraft - with no recourse by the Japanese. They couldn't escape a diving Wildcat; they could turn and fight, but couldn't run away.
Further, in a head-to-head attack, the Wildcat's rugged structure and .50 caliber armament (either four-gun or six-gun) easily outmatched their Japanese adversaries. The Japanese Zero's 20 mm cannons were low-velocity weapons useful only at short range; the longer-ranged Japanese 7.7 mm (.30 caliber) machine guns had too little hitting power to ensure a quick victory over the Wildcat. On the other hand, the standard American .50 caliber Browning heavy machine guns were fast-firing, long-ranged and hard-hitting enough to knock down any Japanese fighter - or bomber - they could hit.
All of these factors were covered in fascinating detail in The First Team, making them a feast of information, insight and factual data for the historian - and the history buff.
Beyond that, the two "First Team" volumes also offer a great deal to modelers. Each book is heavily illustrated with contemporary photos which show evolving markings on US Navy fighters. Not a few of these photos will also offer modelers display and deck-handling diorama ideas.
In addition, Appendix 3 of The First Team and Appendix 4 of The First Team and the Guadalcanal Campaign each features side-view profiles of F4F fighters in use during the time periods covered by the books. Together, these let modelers authoritatively paint-and-mark virtually any F4F that fought off one of the USN fleet carriers during the first year of the war - including carrier-based planes that temporarily served on Guadalcanal. With the recent spate of new F4F Wildcat releases in 1/32nd scale (including the soon-to-be-here Trumpeter Wildcat), this kind of reference will prove invaluable to modelers.
Bottom line: These two books are remarkable. For those interested in carrier-based fighter combat during the dark early days of World War II in the Pacific, these are "must-reads." The books have been released in Trade Paperback format by the US Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland - it's also available from Amazon.com.
Another excellent job by Lundstrom!.......2006-02-28
An excellent follow-up to the "First team". Written in the same style as his previous work, this is the only book you need if you are interested in Santa Cruz, Eastern Solomons and day-to-day operations on Guadalcanal.
It is well known the Japanese were hard pressed to provide enough quantities of aircraft and qualified pilots even before the Midway operation. But Lundstrom shows just how critical this same situation was for the US during the Solomons campaign.
What is surprising is what a poor job Japanese fighter pilots did in protecting the bombers they were assigned to escort. Had they done a better job this campaign could have been much more costly for the US.
WWII Aviation Wonks - Lundstrom is your man.......2005-06-18
If you are a casual reader of World War II books, this is NOT the book for you, but if you are a wonk, then you'll love this book and John Lundstrom's companion book which covers the time period of Pearl Harbor to Midway. What sets Lundstrom apart is that he has taken the time to get to know virtually all of the pilots (on both sides) who fought in the Pacific battles in 1942. A theme that runs through both books is that each side had a small fraternity of pilots, and everybody knew each other. These pilots ("The First Team") held the line through the Guadalcanal campaign. Those that replaced them generally did not have the same level of skill.
Lundstrom is good at separating myths from the facts. He must either read Japanese or have a great collaboration with someone who does because his research through Japanese sources is the best that I've seen.
One interesting fact brought to light by Lundstrom: in terms of fighter-to-fighter combat through the Guadalcanal campaign, the A6M Zero and the F4F Wildcat effectively fought to a draw. If you see a reference on the F4F claiming a 5/1 kill ratio or something like that, it is likely based on inflated claims and claims against bombers and seaplanes. The biggest difference between the two types statistically is that a F4F pilot was much more likely to survive the downing of his plane. More of the United State's first team survived to fight again and to train other pilots to fight.
Japan made a mistake in trying to achieve air superiority over Guadalcanal from Rabaul, which is over 500 miles away. Just because the Model 21 Zero could fly that far and fight doesn't mean that it was a good idea to make it a regular practice. The distance was a big factor in the pilot attrition that eventually crippled the Japanese Naval Air Force.
I have no idea how many hours John Lundstrom put in to writing each of these books. I do know that the hours you spend reading them (and in my case re-reading them) will be well-spent.
Book Description
The authors recount the history of underwater warfare--a new type of guerrila war developed by the Italian navy toward the end of World War I and completely inplemented during World War II.
This type of warfare, conducted by frogmen with special training and prototype equipment, proved fatal to Allied civilian and military ships operating in the Mediterranean Sea.
Single frogmen, or frogmen in teams of two, four or six, sank more vessels than any other traditionally formed military entity.
It's main unit was the X Light Flotilla, whose frogmen conquered the Mediterranean and even planned an attack on the city of New York--not completed due to War coming to an end.
Customer Reviews:
Thrilling!.......2002-05-21
Outstanding book on the history of the Decima MAS (10th Light Flotilla). This naval assault unit defined the term "frogmen" who were the originators of underwater warfare. They mastered the use of the "Human Torpedo" and "Explosive Motor Boats" and wrecked havoc on Allied ships. No longer did the Allies have the luxury of feeling secure in port. When I bought this book I could not put it down. Italian war heros such as Teseo, Borghese and de la Penne all come to life in this well written book. The great pictures are also worth noting.
If you are to buy any book on Italian World War Two actions, this is it! Highly, Highly Recommended!!
Jim Heddlesten
The finest Navy commandos in History.......2002-05-09
I just received my copy of this excellent book yesterday from amazon.com, I must agree it's very well written and details the amazing missions of the 10th light comandos superbly!
It's a definite must buy if you're into military history, and it does do justice to the real exploits of this elite Italian unit that severely embarrassed and almost crippled the British Royal Navy led by Admiral Andrew Cunningham.
The latter of which led a campaign of misinformation by keeping any reference to the events detailed in this recount out of English history books in a hush hush propaganda campaign for almost 55 years now.
I've almost finished reading it am and now sadly at chapter 23 the last chapter in the book, sadly because the reader is left wanting more and one wishes thatthe Authors William Schofield and P.J. carisella would release a second volume as surely there is more to tell about the 10th light flottila (Decima mas who wore the emblem of a blue shield with a skull holding a red rose between its teeth and a large red X as its insignia) than is covered in this brilliantly written volume...
If you have'nt read this book yet then I urge you to do so ...
It's a very good read indeed!
And it details an aspect of military history that all should learn about... buy it now! it's that good!
A must for the serious reader.......1999-09-08
This book is a must for anyone who is interested in the genesis of modern naval special warfare.I knew Captain Schofield personally and he speaks with authority in this book. A real landmark work.
Underwater warfare at its best!.......1997-12-16
A very interesting book showing the exploits of the originators of modern underwater warfare: the Italian frogmen! This book will take you to each mission (in WW II) like you were there. Spine chilling details of almost fanatical dedication to triumph over any challenge! Highly recommended to anyone interested in historical diving and underwater warfare. In the minus side, the book could be improved with more and better photographs of the gear and equipment used by these early underwater wariors.
Book Description
The outbreak of World War I saw some deadly battles on the high seas in isolated areas. Germany's China Squadron, including the Scharnhorst and Gneisnau, made an epic voyage across the Pacific to attack British forces in South America. Admiral Craddock found himself outgunned by the Germans at Coronel and went down with most of his ships and crews. The Germans then advanced on the British communications and refueling station in the Falkland Islands but were sunk by a new British fleet; only a few German sailors were rescued. This tense tale also examines the issue of Britain's preparedness for naval warfare in 1914.
Customer Reviews:
A Precise Analysis.......2007-09-05
Geoffrey Bennett's 1962 book "Coronel and the Falklands" remains a naval warfare classic. The 2000 edition authoritatively presents six chapters (over 180 pages) of thorough rendering with various period black and white photos, letters, maps, an appendix (charting the captains and their ships), and an informative bibliography.
Bennett's study is accurate and convincing. He presents both World War 1 sea battles with precision, reviewing German and British battle prep, each side's tactical advantages, and how the winner won the encounter. Bennett also suggests looser responsibility. Ultimately, he says, that the British Admiralty (Churchill) is responsible for the 1914 loss at Coronel while the German High Seas Command (von Tirpitz) bears that weight for the Falklands.
Although somewhat technical, Bennett's is an informative read for anyone interested in sea battles, tactics on the high seas, and the history of the First World War. It will be a good read for you.
Craddock and Spee's loss........2007-07-02
A book detailing two naval disasters. The British naval disaster at Coronel where two British cruisers were sunk and all their crew lost. Then the reprisal battle at the Falklands where the Germans lost their two heavy cruisers and two light cruisers. In the first disaster, Winston Churchill encouraged Admiral Craddock to destroy the superior German force with an old battleship and two old cruisers. The result was the loss of the British force. The following disaster was when Graf von Spee decided to raid the Falklands and instead found superior forces there which ended up sinking four of his five ships. This defeat avenged the defeat at Coronel.
This is an interesting read about naval warfare in World War I. These actions took place in South America.
Colonel and the Falklands.......2007-02-06
This work provides a fairly complete history of the history of the Imperial German East Asiatic Squadron at the outbreak of WWI and the British efforts and final success in destroying it.
The text provides an interesting format for relaying the above history to those who do not have an extensive background in technology of the time and it's impact on naval operations. There is enough technical background on these issues to inform the reader but not to the point of becoming hard to read. There is also a brief description of the cruise of the SMS Emden as it relates to the pursuit of her and the effects of her cruise on the pursuit of the rest of the squadron.
This book also contains updates since it's original publishing that are used to clear up some minor errors.
There is comparatively little written about these battles and the changes in naval warfare brought on by them and this book deals with The Battles of Coronel and the Falklands in a clear and easy to read and understand format. A good primer for anyone wishing to read naval history of the last one hundred years.
Evening the Score.......2007-01-17
In the Preface, the author (Geoffrey Bennett) noted that within three months after the outbreak of the First World War the incomparable reputation of the Royal Navy suffered a bitter blow when a British cruiser squadron was decisively defeated by a superior force from the "new-born" German Navy.
In Part One, the text narrates the 1 November 1914 naval battle off the Chilean coast at Coronel including the events leading up to the battle. Most interesting is the text's account of the command organization of the combatants. Amazing, in August 1914 Germany's naval war plans were far more advanced and thorough that those of the Royal Naval. A major weakness of the British Admiralty was the lack of a large and efficient staff organization.
The outbreak of WWI found Germany's China Squadron off the coast of China. The squadron commanded by German Admiral von Spee included the powerful armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. Berlin had signaled von Spee "Chile is a friendly neutral"; when the Japanese entered the war with the allies, the China Squadron proceeded to the west coast of America while the light cruiser Emden was sent to the Indian Ocean where, before being destroyed by the British, Emden sank several merchant ships and conducted shore bombardment. The text provides a good but brief account of Admiral von Spee's voyage to the west coast of Chile.
The text gives a good review of the British Admiralty's indecisiveness and its tragic aftermath. British Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock was assigned command of a squadron consisting of armoured cruisers Monmouth and Good Hope (Cradock's flagship), light cruiser Glasgow and an armed liner Otranto. Cradock was ordered to engage the German China Squadron. Since Cradock's squadron would have been outgunned, his squadron was assigned the fifteen year old battleship Canopus.
The Canopus could not keep up with Cradock's cruisers so Cradock assigned it a support position south of the squadron. Though outgunned without Canopus, Cradock felt that his orders were still to engage von Spee. In late afternoon on 1 November 1914, the two squadrons met in the South Atlantic off Coronel, Chile. Admiral von Spee opened fire on Cradock at 07:00 p.m. Disaster struck the British with the Good Hope sunk with all hands including Cradock at 07:57 p.m. and the Monmouth sunk at 9:18 p.m. Though damaged, Glasgow escaped along with the armed liner Otranto.
The text gives an interesting analysis of why the disaster occurred. The Admiralty "allowed the Allied warship in Far East waters to be employed on other less vital tasks" and for deciding von Spee was heading west not east so that Cradock was not reinforced. After the war a British admiral stated that the Admiralty had lacked a large and efficient staff organization. It would seem that there was enough blame to go around for everyone.
Part Two of the text is devoted to the battle off the Falklands. The author notes that "....it must have been clear that the British would react to the news of Coronel by dispatching strong reinforcements to hunt him: the sooner the German squadron entered the South Atlantic the better would be its chances." Berlin signaled Admiral von Spee "You are advised to try and break through with all yours ships and return home." However, over thirty days passed before Admiral von Spee reached the South Atlantic and attacked the British at the Falklands. Erroneous intelligence convinced von Spee of the absence of British warships at the Falklands so von Spee's proposed to destroy the Falklands wireless station and coal docks; a fatal error. The British Admiralty's First Lord (Churchill) and the First Sea Lord (Fisher) had acted in concert to avenge the first defeat the Royal Navy had suffered in more than 100 year. While, First Sea Lord Fisher loathed Admiral Sturdee who would command the naval force at the Falklands, nevertheless Fisher assigned two modern battle-cruisers, Invincible and Inflexible, to Sturdee's command. The text gives an interesting account of the battle which began shortly after 09:00 a.m. on December 8, 1914. The Scharnhorst with all hands, including Admiral Spee was sunk at 04:17 p.m.; by 08:35 p.m. the Gneisenau, the Nurnberg and the Leipzig had all been sunk. By all accounts, this was a brilliant victory.
Unfortunately, the German light cruiser Dresden escaped. The text narrates the interesting "cat-and-mouse" game as the British sought-out the Dresden. During the night of 8th March anchored in Cumberland Bay of Mas a Tierra off the Chilean coast, the Dresden was discovered by British cruisers and sunk. Thus after more than four months, the defeat at Coronel had been avenged.
Interestingly, 35 years later in December 1939, the German pocket battleship named Graf Spee for the victor at Cornel, was scuttled off Montevideo when cornered in the South Atlantic by the Royal Navy.
Appendix II COMMUNICATIONS is most interesting. WWI navies did not have the reliable and secure communications ability with their admiralty's in London or Berlin. Few wireless shore wireless stations could broadcast messages to ships at sea without requiring them to break wireless silence. Messages were frequently handled by combinations of cable and wireless.
. This is an excellent text which both the World War I and naval buffs will find interesting.
Book Description
The only major fleet engagement of World War I, the Battle of Jutland has been surrounded by controversy ever since. The British public felt Admiral Jellicoe had failed – a reaction rooted in a hundred years of the 'Nelson cult', a conviction that anything short of a Trafalgar-style annihilation was letting the side down. True, the German Fleet had sunk more ships and suffered fewer casualties, but the British had forced them to disengage and run for port and were still cruising off Denmark spoiling for a fight. This title recounts in detail how on an early summer's evening in 1916, the two fleets clashed head to head: the events that followed would spark a polemic that still rages today.
Customer Reviews:
1916 battle off the coast of Denmark and surrounding........2007-09-26
one of the most overlooked causes of WW1,was Germany's desire to have a world class navy(which the British were determined to stop)!! This book shows how close in fact Germany was to having one.Imagine a modernized navy with all the armour,propulsion systems, and fire power but with the electronics and communications little advanced past the age of wooden ships and you have Jutland.From reading this book I wondered how much of the damage inflicted on the "enemy" was actually "friendly fire",this problem,an obvious one when one can't easily discern the opponent was never addressed in this book.Also with all of the explosive gases released by the continuous firing,there would be alot of "accidents"caused when a spark met a trapped gas pocket,not to mention crew error which becomes an even bigger factor in such confusion.This adds alot of meaning to the term "we have met the enemy and he is us".Casualty wise the Germans won,but strategically the British navy forced the Germans to limp home and concentrate more on the development of U-boats.U-boats are a poor mans catch-up weapons much like the SCUD missiles of today used by militarily weak 3rd world nations.Excellent maps and diagrams to follow although the time sequences could be questioned as well as the positions of the ships but i wouldn't have the expertise to do so,so i'll take the author's word,which is as good as the best.
Lots of Disjointed Information.......2007-01-28
I was somewhat disappointed with this book. Volumes in the Osprey Campaign Series range in quality from excellent to mediocre, but most are very good. This volume lies on the mediocre side. A huge amount of information is included in the book, but it's very difficult to decipher. The main problem is a lack of clarity and disjointedness to the writing. For example, in "Opposing Plans" section, plans are never actually discussed. We hear a lot about the direction ships intended to sail and why certain tactics were adopted (like both sides planning to lure ships over submarine cordons), but we never hear about what either side was trying to do. Were they intending to fight a major engagement on May 31, or did it just sort of happen?
There are numerous additional small issues. None of these problems are crippling, but they are all irritating. For example, an extensive order of battle is provided that lists all of the ships that took part in Jutland. However, the list does not indicate the class of each ship (dreadnaught, pre-dreadnaught, battle cruiser, etc). This is a particular problem for the German order of battle, because unlike the British whose ships are organized formations with names like "Cruiser Squadrons" (suggesting that most ships in that section were some form of cruiser), the German formations have names like "Geschwader." Because there is no master list to refer to, and because LOTS of ships involved, it is difficult to tell what kind of ship the author is talking about from one moment to the next. As another example, it is often difficult to tell what type of action is occurring in the battle descriptions; are ships firing at each other? Closing on each other? Closing and firing? etc. This is especially problematic at the start of the battle, but the authors descriptions becomes more clear as the battle progresses.
All that said, this is not really a bad book. The 2D maps are very useful (though they only come into play once the combat is well underway and none show the initial dispositions of the fleets, instead less clear 3D maps are used), there are lots of very nice photographs of WWI-era warship, and there is a lot of information about WWI fleet combat. The real loss is that this could have been a great book but it ends up being merely ok. It would likely be a very useful summary for someone already familiar with the battle, but will probably of less value to someone unfamiliar with it.
Great background, clear story.......2000-11-08
I found this book very informative and enjoyable. It reflects the British point of view, containing many facts, details and anecdotes, just what I had hoped for. The battle itself is somewhat confusing, but the excellent maps the book provides are a big help in following that portion of the story. I did note an apparent color coding error on the first battle map, but the editing is nowhere near the sloppy job done on one of the other books in the series.
As to bias, this is what an intelligent reader expects in such an endeavor. One seeks it when it does not adversely affect the inclusion of all of the facts. The reader easily copes with biased conclusions and the excessive of biased adjectives when they appear. One expects a British author to conclude that Britain won the battle. Probably her population as accepts this as fact, as the Germans also believe that they won the battle. Victory is often controversial, especially to the non-professional reader. Again the experienced reader, with the facts in hand, will draw his own (biased?) conclusion. That is part of the fun!
As to Jutland, one may award the victory according to his personal judgment. Historically, of course, it is generally considered that the tactical victor is the side that retains the battlefield.
Here, I think the world has agreed, the strategic victory belongs to Britain, as she obtained her major objectives, while Germany's surface fleet remained merely a psychological threat restricting, to some extent the use of the British home fleet.
I recommend this book as enjoyable reading to anyone with an interest in the subject.
An badly biased book is a bad book!.......2000-10-06
The author of this book claims a victory for sea control for the British, exagerates damage done to German ships and diminishes those received by British ships. Well, here are some hard facts: Number of ships: German 99; British 159 , Losses: G:11 with 61180 tons Br.:14 with 115025 tons. Personnel losses: G: 2551(6,8%), Br.:6094(11,6% ); Weight of fired shells: German: 85,9 tons , British: 201,1 tons. So, the German fleet sunk about double the battleship tonnage with less than half the metal weight killing more than double the amount of sailors! Now comes the hard question: where is the claimed British victory just somewhat smaller than Nelson's. It must be because I am dumb and German that I can't see it. In fact after the battle the British surface fleet controlled absolutly nothing in the region of Deutsche Bucht to Denmark where however the German fleet did make massive sorties out of this region! And there seemed to be no willingnes whatsoever on the British side to risk their battleships in pitched battle again. So, which sides' moral was dented? Even the best maps and photos couldn't make a book good when it trys to declare victory from defeat because of the author's nationality. So this may be just a good book if you are a: English or b: have at least one other book about the subject for comparison (and you want the good maps and pictures).
One of the Best of the Osprey Campaign Series.......2000-09-12
Author Charles London has set himself a difficult task: to write a 96-page campaign summary of the controversial Battle of Jutland in 1916. This was the only major clash of dreadnought battleships before aircraft changed naval warfare, but its uniqueness and inconclusive results provide ample fodder for competing interpretations.
On the whole, this volume repesents one of the very best of the Osprey Campaign series. The maps are excellent, and provide much better depictions of the action than the sketch maps usually provided in much lengthier works. The strategic level map on page 32 which depicts the opening moves is one of the best I have seen, including locations of all U-Boats and British submarines (unfortunately he did leave out Zeppelin patrol areas). Both the photographs and artwork are of excellent quality. This volume is a valuable visual companion to John Campbell's technical Jutland: An Analysis of the Fighting, which lacks photos and decent maps.
On the negative side, the author is rather blatantly biased toward the British. There is little or no mention of significant damage to British dreadnoughts, including the seven hits on HMS Malaya, the six hits on HMS Barham and the torpedo hit on HMS Marlborough (all three of which had close calls with sinking). On the other hand, damage to German ships is sometimes exaggerated; such as when the author claims that three German pre-dreadnoughts were hit when in fact, two were hit by one shell each (minor damage) and the third suffered one sailor killed from a shell splinter. The author alludes to the German advantage in night fighting but fails to mention that they had starshells, while the British did not.
The author makes selective use of the vast technical data available on Jutland. He notes that both sides gunnery was about the same - 3% probability of hits and that the various advantages and defects of their ship designs canceled each other out. In fact, the British obtained 2.75% hits of rounds fired versus 3.39% for the Germans. In the initial battlecruiser action, the German edge was even more lop-sided: the Germans scored 44 hits versus only 17 hits for the numerically-superior British.
Organizationally, this volume would have done better to provide strict time delimiters, to break the action into phases. Instead, the author uses the "flow" style, which gets very confusing after the initial battlecruiser action. The maps help to sort out the battle, but the text does not. One wonders also why the author included photographs of the Goeben, and ships sunk in the Falklands Battle two years prior to Jutland, but no photos of several major ships such as the Lutzow and Pommerm which were sunk there.
Finally, the author seems somewhat unsatisfied with the indecisive conclusion of Jutland, as everyone always seems to be, except perhaps the Germans. The author uses the fact that the Grand Fleet "remained on the battlefield" the next morning to claim a victory for sea control and assert that Jellicoe would have won any follow-up engagement off the Horn Reef. Here the author's bias ignores the fact that the Grand Fleet had lost all cohesion after twelve hours of fighting; most of the destroyers were separated in the night action and three dreadnoughts had wandered off 45 miles away from the main body. Certainly Jellicoe had the strength to finish off any German cripples, but any renewed battle would have witnessed a thoroughly-spread out Grand Fleet fighting in minimal visibility conditions. Any action on 1 June would likely have been a scaled-down repeat of the previous day: ships blundering into each other in the haze and quick, furtive exchanges of gun fire. More ships might have been sunk, but without radar, air support, better navigation and improved communications, the clash of dreadnoughts could not be decisive in 1916.
Despite the author's bias and certain errors, this volume is still a valuable adjunct to any Jutland collection. Just remember to keep other works handy to sort out the omissions.
Book Description
The Battle of Jutland was the greatest naval battle of the First World War, and it represented the culmination of the war on the surface of the sea between Britain and Germany, and of the preparations for naval combat that began in 1897. To this day, there is still controversy over who really won the battle. The fighting took place in the confined waters of the North Sea, just off the entrance to the Skagerrak and the Danish province of Jutland. Both Germany and Britain fielded great numbers of Dreadnought battleships, with scouting cruisers, protecting destroyers, and torpedo boats. The carnage was massive, and heavy loses were suffered - some 6,097 British seamen and 2,551 German seamen had lost their lives. Germany claimed and continues to claim victory. But, although the Royal Navy's grand fleet suffered greatly in terms of ships and men lost, the net result was that for the rest of the war the German High Seas Fleet ceased to be a threat to Allied surface shipping. Lavishly illustrated with archive photographs and paintings, this book presents the Jutland story in an engaging and accessible style.
Customer Reviews:
Naval battles and the personalties involved .......2007-05-22
An excelleny description of the Battle of Jutland, why it happended, and the consequences for naval warfare. A surprising aspect of this book, are the lifestyle situations, of the personalities involved, on both sides. Very unusual for a book of this type, and pleasantly off-sets the technicals details, necessary to describe the conflict.
Customer Reviews:
Something very different........2002-01-30
Jutland again - but a very different approach and an extremely useful tool for those studying the events that led to the loss of ships on both sides.
At the end of WW1, there was considerable public disquiet about the outcome of the Battle of Jutland. This was largely based on ignorance - but, even today, there are those who still think Admiral Jellicoe should have been court-martialled for turning his fleet away from the enemy. What few people realise, however, is that this was the first major action between two enemy fleets since the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805. During those intervening 111 years, the modern warship had evolved into a gigantic thing of steel with revolving gun turrets. Tactics, however, had never changed and "crossing the enemy's `T'" was still enshrined in concrete - as the teaching of the day. In any scenario whereby two fleets - sailing in line astern, are trying to achieve this advantage, it is also perilously important to ensure the leading ships in one's own fleet are not crossed. It was, therefore, perfectly in order for the Commander to manoeuvre his fleet either towards or away from the enemy - depending on whether he was in a position to gain this supreme advantage or ensure the enemy did not. Some say Jellicoe had very good reasons for turning away - whereas others disagree.
In order to give the British public a better idea of exactly what went on during the Battle, two Naval Officers - who had also been present at the Battle, collected together 60 accounts from those who had fought in British ships. Their purpose was to give the reader an insight into what had gone on throughout the British fleet and across the RN rank structure at this time. Suitably edited, they then placed these contributions together in the chronological order of the Battle. Politically sensitive, however, it was difficult to get the material published with only half the material finally seeing print at that time.
This book contains all the original text and also the carefully chosen photographs, sketches and charts which were so important to that first edition. Entirely re-set to make it more readable, this is an excellent book - for those contemplating a trip to the wrecks in question - and for those who are not.
NM
Average customer rating:
- Too much discussion of uniforms but none of who these men were
- Good guide for milatary modelers
- For those interested in uniforms
|
German U-Boat Crews 1914-45 (Trade Editions)
Gordon Williamson
Manufacturer: Osprey Publishing
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback
 General
| Military
| History
| Subjects
| Books
Naval
| Military
| History
| Subjects
| Books
General
| World War II
| Military
| History
| Subjects
| Books
Naval
| World War II
| Military
| History
| Subjects
| Books
Military Science
| History
| Subjects
| Books
General
| Germany
| Europe
| History
| Subjects
| Books
ASIN: 1855329409
Release Date: 1999-07-01 |
Book Description
If one single weapon in Germany's arsenal can be said to have come closest to winning the war for the Third Reich, it was without doubt the U-Boat. German U-Boat technology, training, tactics and combat successes far exceeded those of any of the other combatant nations, and even as the Third Reich was crumbling, technically advanced vessels such as the Type XXI, many years ahead of its time, were being put into volume production. Gordon Williamson provides a fascinating overview of the achievements of the U-Boat Waffe in both wars, together with a study of the uniforms and insignia worn by U-Boat crews.
Customer Reviews:
Too much discussion of uniforms but none of who these men were.......2007-09-06
Too much discussion/illustrations of what the crews wore but almost none regarding the actual men themselves. No discussion of backgrounds, motivations, training, etc. One comes away knowing their uniforms inside out but not knowing one iota about the crews serving on these boats.
Good guide for milatary modelers.......2000-09-17
It should be noted that, like many Osprey books, this book is written and illustrated for people who want to understand what soldiers of a specific nation and period looked like. People other than those making miniature models or designing costumes for cinema will find these books to be superficial and brief, but they are excellent for their intended audience.
For those interested in uniforms.......1999-06-04
This volume of the Osprey Military series might be a bit of a disappointment for some. It mainly deals with the uniforms and equipment of the German U-boat crews from 1914 for 1945. For anyone interested in uniforms this book should be a good reference. Readers interested in the organisation, training and work of U-boat crews will have to look elsewhere. The illustrations by Darko Pavlovic are good.
Book Description
Based on letters, diaries, unpublished memoirs, interviews, books and other sources, this detailed study examines the whole event from the perspective of participants on both sides and from all ranks. Relive the dramatic intensity of the battle, and the all too sad aftermath.
Customer Reviews:
Excellent history of the battle.......2006-09-10
Overall 'Jutland 1916' is an excellent overall history of the Battle of Jutland. It briefly covers events preceding the battle especially Jellico's orders and mindset then gets right into the action. The battle itself is covered in great detail with significant quotes from participants. The authors seem to be very fair and balanced in their portrayal of events and in giving the participants the benefit of the doubt. It is also very well written.
The only criticisms of the book are that it is slightly British heavy although the authors do indeed cover the German events well. While it has numerous maps I would still have preferred a few more and also a bit more detail on each especially ship and group names on all maps. Finally, the book assumes you have not only a familiarity with WW1 naval warfare but especially British naval ranks/positions and traditions.
None of these criticisms are significant and for anyone interested in the Battle of Jutland this books is a must read.
This book is not bad... not bad at all.......2006-08-02
For anyone already at least somewhat familiar with the history of the Royal Navy prior to and during World War I, this book is an excellent addition to the library. The authors presuppose that the reader already has some knowledge concerning such actions as the Dogger Bank, Coronel, the Falklands, etc., which predate the Battle of Jutland, but if one does, the narrative flows smoothly from them.
This volume answers some questions that other authors, notably John Keegan and Robert Massie, seem to have overlooked or not considered worth adding to their own works, although to be fair, Mr. Massie's amazing "Castles of Steel" is not a book solely about Jutland and should not be expected to contain the same level of detail. Mr. Keegan's "The Price of Admiralty," which contains a condensed description of Jutland, does not, in my opinion, approach either of the other books in level of detail or editing.
My personal recommendation would be for anyone interested in, but lacking knowledge of, this period of warfare first to read "Castles of Steel" and then read "Jutland 1916: Death in the Grey Wastes." The first book will give the reader all of the background to Jutland, as well as an excellent account of the battle. The latter book will then "fill in" the gaps from the first, and make the battle come alive even more fully.
Huge Steel Ships, Gray Seas and Skies, Coal Smoke, Gunflashes and Powder Smoke .......2006-06-26
I was fascinated by this book from the moment I started reading it. This book holds the reader's attention through first hand accounts by the participants and in depth analysis by the authors. Accounts range from the lowest seaman in the bowels of ships and gun turrets to the admirals and captains making the decisions during the battle. The authors have thoroughly done their homework.
Jutland has been a battle analyzed inside and out by historians and reporters from the time the battle ended until now. The battle is generaly more noted for the mistakes, errors in judgement by leaders, and the overiding decisions by both sides to not take anymore risks than were absolutely necessary.
Misters Steel and Hart bring these points to the forefront with superb detail, fast-paced action narratives, and personal eyewitness accounts of participants. The book is well interspersed with diagrams of the naval movements during key phases of the battle and excellent quality photographs of the men, ships, and action in the North Sea. Appendices of both sides major combatants with results and casualties are also well done.
I wholeheartedly recommend this book for anyone with an interest in great naval battles from any age.
Books:
- Grandfather's Tale: The Tale of a German Sniper
- Grave Surprise (Harper Connelly Mysteries, Book 2)
- History: Fiction or Science? Chronology 2 (Chronology)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
- History: Fiction or Science? (Chronology, No. 1)
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