A detailed account of Wellington's campaign in the south of France. Drawing on eyewitness accounts and official dispatches, Ian Robertson outlines the nature of the war as well as traces the complicated maneuvering and operations of the British and French armies. He describes in detail such hard-fought actions as the Nivelle, Orthez, Toulouse, and Bayonne and throws light on some less well-known clashes, many of which were fought in the unforgiving terrain of the Pyrenees.

Between August 1813 and the end of hostilities in April 1814, Napoleon's forces were finally expelled from the Iberian Peninsula. Wellington's army invaded southern France, only halting its operations when news was received of Napoleon's abdication. The events covered in this volume include the British siege and capture of St Sebastian; the final campaigning in eastern Spain; Wellington's invasion of France; and the last actions of the war in the Battle of Toulouse and the French sortie from Bayonne. A chapter on the place of the Peninsular War in history concludes Oman's monumental work.

'If anyone wishes to know the history of this war, I will tell them that it is our maritime superiority gives me the power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so.' Wellington's remark reveals that he fully appreciated the strategic importance of the naval support for his campaign, but up to now this crucial aspect of the Peninsular War has been largely ignored, except where there were overt naval contributions to battles and sieges. As this new book amply demonstrates, the maritime dimension was far broader, and stretched from the very start of the military intervention to the final days of Wellington's invasion of southern France. The Navy not only transported the armies to the theatre - and evacuated them when required, as at Corunna - but also provided direct support to the land campaigns in terms of heavy gun crews at sieges, and also tied down large numbers of enemy troops by diversionary attacks on coastal targets. But the biggest contribution was less visible, though arguably the most significant: in order not to lose local support, Wellington refused to let his army live off the land as the French had done, so all provisions - food, clothing and arms - were supplied from the sea. This was an enormous undertaking, involving nearly 1000 ships (or about 10 per cent of the British merchant marine) which had to be convoyed and protected. Furthermore, local financial support had to be paid in hard currency, so the Navy also took responsibility for moving vast quantities of specie to the Peninsula, tying up valuable warships in the process. This important new book is the first full study of the workings of sea power in the campaign, from operations to the complexities of logistics and administration. It is significant reading for naval and military historians alike.

This book gives an unparalleled insight into the organization, day-to-day life and psychology of Wellington's army, focusing on the characters that Wellington believed could go anywhere and do anything'. Wellington's Army examines both the leaders and the led; the daily life, manners and customs of the Peninsular Army are explored, drawing on dispatches, general orders and records of court martial, and, to a greater extent, non-official information such as diaries, memoirs and letters. A great deal of literature was produced during this period, written by both commissioned and non-commissioned soldiers. For the soldiers, the campaign became a battle against the Revolution, a kind of crusade, and an attempt to thwart the triple-headed monster of Republicanism, Atheism and Sedition. The soldiers of Wellington's army were fighting for all that made life worth living - religion, morality, constitution, laws and liberty.