The Battle of Alamein: Turning Point, World War II

Book Description

In this superb history, two seasoned journalists unfold the decisive campaigns of the desert war that began with the Italian invasion of Egypt in September 1940 and ended with the mass surrender of Axis forces in Tunis in May 1943.

Writing with great verve and style, John Bierman and Colin Smith create a stunning panorama peopled by some of the most glamorous, dangerous and mysterious figures in the war. At the center of this sweeping narrative stand two heroes, German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the notorious "Desert Fox," and the British Lieutenant General Bernard "Monty" Montgomery, whose showdown at the little Egyptian railway stop of El Alamein is one of the great moments in military history. Bierman and Smith have interviewed scores of survivors and tracked down hitherto overlooked primary sources to craft a historic narrative that reads like a novel. Here too is the remarkable true story of the shadowy Hungarian adventurer Laszlo Almasy, the prototype for the romantic English patient of Michael Ondaatje's novel.

Triumphant tactical warfare, an exotic backdrop, wrenching personal conflicts both inside and between the armies-The Battle of Alamein has it all. This is military history at its absolute best.

Customer Reviews:

Good literary intro to the desert war.......2004-03-13

Much has been said and written about Alamein and what role this battle in the desert played in the outcome of the Second World War, but The Battle of Alamein (also known by its alternative title - War Without Hate) by John Bierman and Colin Smith is not merely another presentation of the well known story. Bierman and Smith have collaborated to produce a lucid and riveting tale of what has often been called the turning point of WWII for the Western combatants. Whether this belief is strictly true or not, it is clear that the German Army, in this case represented by the Afrika Corps (and its Italian ally), went from a victorious and seemingly unbeatable army to a broken, to a retreating and utterly spent group of soldiers discarded by their leader.

The Battle of Alamein is more than a story of the major engagements so well known and oft told, it is also a story of little known elements that played important, if somewhat side-stage, roles in this first major tactical victory for the British Army (represented by the 8th Army in this case). It is in fact this component of the book that makes it most compelling. Bierman and Smith tell, with considerable literary style, of how the British Long Range Desert Group, founded and initially lead by the 30's desert adventurer Ralph Bagnold, went through several incarnations which ultimately developed many of the most important desert warfare tactics used by the 8th in its victory over Rommel. The reader also learns about a behind the lines sabotage group formed from German Jews that caused considerable havoc to the German forces, despite considerable loss to their own little band. But the victors are not solely presented. The reader is taken down an equal number of paths that explain both well and lesser known exploits of the Afrika Corps and the Italian Desert Army.

As a chronicle of the combat itself The Battle of Alamein quite often falls short. There are a number of errors and misstatements but the background and sidestories larger make up for this deficiency. Thi is a work crafted in a way amateur historians can enjoy and have their interest piqued - professional or more serious amateurs should approach it open minded and willing to accept some "issues". If the reader wants a great one-two punch try Rick Atkinson's Army at Dawn in combination with The Battle of Alamein. The former is a 5 star effort of serious historical value and literary flair, while The Battle of Alamein, while flawed, delivers a sound and fun 4 star read.

Prepare to be entertained!.......2004-01-22

The European title of this book is far more relevant and accurate.

Alamein, war without hate.

This book proves that History can be entertaining. There are no doubt better researched and more detailed accounts of the desert war. I doubt if any come close to being this readable or have its style. Bierman and Smith prove that English belongs to the Englishman.

The authors have been able to give a general history of the whole desert war in what amounts to a "cracking read". For those who desire a concise and highly entertaining account of a very different war than that fought in other theaters, this is a must. This book will certainly fulfill the function of a first read in this sector of operations. I wouldn't take other reviews too seriously when they refer to inaccuracies in this work. It bothers me not that an MP40 is referred to as a Shmeisser etc. There is a definite place in our bookshelves for introductory histories. Once ones interest is fired up by books of this ilk, it will encourage one to seek greater detail in more comprehensive books.

One of the most pleasing aspects of this book are the delightful footnotes that appear on nearly every page that give one fascinating insights into the characters and events in the desert war. The bottom line is that the book is just so damm readable that I could not put it down. It has kindled an interest in a theater of war that has never really engrossed me.

Go out and buy it and be prepared to be entertained!!

Excellent Read.......2003-08-31

Having read numerous Eastern Front narratives recently, I felt as if I needed a change of pace. This book did the trick. The Commonwealth's troops and Rommel's Afrika Corps had somewhat of a chivalry between them. This is in glaring contrast to the hellish Russian steppe battles. As an earlier reviewer states, the authors do not use all 400+ pages to write about the actual Alamein battle. For anybody new to the North African war, this is an excellent primer. The side stories alone are quite interesting... almost Stephen Ambrose-ish. A recommended follow up book would be Rick Atkinson's "An Army at Dawn" which begins with Operation Torch, loosely where "Alamein" breaks off.

Well written, badly researched popular history.......2003-02-21

The Battle of Alamein is actually more than a retelling of that battle (hardly THE turning point of WW2; but in fairness to the authors this is the US title), rather it's an overview of the desert war. As an overview of the British and Italian armies of the period, it's acceptable: as a military history it is less successful. This work suffers from a typical problem authors encounter (usually unwittingly) when they use interviews almost exclusively. This is naturally the fallibities of human memory. After more than 50 years events can become clouded, rearranged or distorted.
Errors of fact especially regarding equipment and tactics, are rife in this work, revealing the authors' lack of research. German tanks are described as diesel-powered and superior to British equivalents-wrong on both accounts. Additionally German ranks and unit designations are flat wrong; and are ascribed to interviews with German veterans. An example: A german veteran supposedly calls his unit's weapons "Schmeissers" and "Spandaus". No German veteran would ever do so. Either he was editing for his audience, or his interview was recast for the book; both are unacceptable for a history. But the most spectacular mistake is that the authors seem to be blissfully unaware that Winston Churchill was First Lord of the Admiralty before he became Prime Minister! They also go easy on Montgomery where he is most subject to a dispassionate critique. Namely, his lackluster pursuit of Panzer Armee Afrika as it retreats across Libya. Here we read a version of the "Great Man", where Montgomery is well intentioned but badly served by his subordinate commanders, and a worn-out Eighth Army. Frankly, that IS a commander's job-to drive his forces if required to find, fix and destroy the enemy. If his forces were exhausted, then the under-fueled, under-fed and under-armed Axis forces were the walking dead.
For a casual reader the information on the Italian Army in the desert might be enlightening, however if the authors submitted this as a history paper to me I'd give them a C+. Not recommended.

History of the War in North Africa.......2003-01-30

John Bierman and Colin Smith are semi-retired journalists who live on the island of Cyprus in the Mediterranean. They collaborated on "Fire in the Night", a wonderful biography of Orde Wingate, a few years ago, and this is their second venture together. It's a very good book, with only one real criticism from me: given it's a history of a battle, it spends relatively little space discussing that battle.

The war in Libya was one of the last chivalrous conflicts in history. Almost all commentators agree that the Germans here were much less Nazi-like in the North African desert than anywhere else. The German commander, Erwin Rommel, the famed Desert Fox, wouldn't allow SS troops into the region, and insisted on treating enemy wounded and prisoners fairly and compassionately. The British generally responded in kind, and the army in Egypt was often shocked by the appearance of a soldier who'd been serving in Britain, seen houses bombed, and came out to the theater hating the Germans. The new arrivals were likewise shocked at the admiration the veterans had for the Germans.

The war went on for more than two years, if you count the British campaign against the Italians in the winter of 1940 and the Allied campaign in Tunisia in the spring of 1943. The heart of the campaign, and the book, was the year-and-a-half-or-so-long struggle between the British and their Commonwealth Allies on the one hand and the Germans and their Italian Allies on the other. The book spends a great deal of time dealing with several of the larger battles from the first part of the campaign, notably Crusader and Gazala. When you get to the Battle of Alamein itself, the book is half over.

Strangely, the battle of Alam Halfa, gets only cursory mention. This is odd, given that some people think that this was the first (or second) stage of the actual battle. Instead, the meat of the book describes "Supercharge", the British attack on Rommel's forces which finally, conclusively, defeated the Germans in the North African Desert.

One of the reviews above says that the authors are uncritical of the leadership personalities in the war. I don't think this is particularly fair: the authors spend a considerable amount of time telling you of Rommel's mistakes, and failures, and health problems. They also spend a good deal of time detailing the mistakes made by various British commanders, and Churchill comes in for his share of criticism. When we get to Montgomery, he's relatively gently dealt with, but this *was* the period of his greatest success. I've never completely agreed with the Correlli Barnett theory that Monty was completely a figment of his own fantasies, and a lousy general. Here, vain, self-promoting, and stubborn as he was, he comes across as the man who used all of these characteristics to defeat the Afrika Korps, and win the battle. It's a fair, balanced appraisal, and not that favorable, but it shows why he won the battle.

Like I said, the one criticism is the way the book is structured. The actual portion of the book that deals with the battle in the title is only 80 pages, maybe, of 400. The introduction to the war, and the early campaigns, take up individually almost as much. There are little sidebars with interesting personalities from the war, writers and poets and so forth. You learn of the woman who served in the French Foreign Legion at Bir Hacheim, the Hungarian nobleman adventurer who was the basis for the book The English Patient, and a score of other participants in the war. There is a prologue and an epilogue detailing reunions and commemoration ceremonies that are still being held with veterans from the war. This part is especially well done.

Book Description

The Allied campaign for Northwest Europe as seen from a British and Canadian perspective

A reinterpretation of the British Army's conduct in the crucial 1944-45 Northwest Europe campaign, this work examines the "Colossal Cracks" operational technique employed by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery's Anglo-Canadian 21st Army Group. Rooted in concerns about morale and casualties, "Colossal Cracks" was a cautious, firepower-laden approach that involved the concentration of massive force at points of German weakness. Hart argues that Montgomery and his two senior subordinates handled this formation more effectively than some scholars have suggested and that "Colossal Cracks" represented the most appropriate weapon the British Army could develop under the circumstances.

Customer Reviews:

Colossal Cracks.......2007-09-27

To most American's this is a great book. How many know anything about the Britsh European Army in WW2. This book begins to explain Britsh Generals', besides Monty. For that alone it's worth the price.

21st AG Operational Methods in ETO 44-45: Appropriate and Essential or Overly Cautious?.......2007-08-03

Ashley Hart's "Colossal Cracks" is a thorough and thoughtful study of the operational approaches taken by the 21st Army Group in NW Europe during 1944-45. In a very logical and quite balanced manner Hart tackles a thorny issue likely to raise dander of some. Basically his thesis was that the methods employed by 21st Army Group under the tight "grip" of General/Field Marshal B.L. Montgomery were not only appropriate but contributed significantly to the overall Allied victory in the West. Moreover, Hart argues that these methods were employed 1) because of their commanders' experiences with similar methods when commanding the British Eighth Army in N. Africa and 2) because they fit the logistical realities facing the British/Canadian Army Group at that point in the war. With respect to this latter conclusion Hart provides ample compelling evidence that the manpower shortages facing Britain and its Commonwealth forces were indeed dire with respect to infantry riflemen reserves (while US forces was certainly not close to tapping their manpower resources) and thus Monty's perceived caution, oft maligned to overly so, was a generally appropriate response to this issue. Hart does not forgive Monty for failure to take aggressive advantage of situations as they arose - a misgiving Monty is certainly guilty of - but rather tries to place Monty's actions within a larger more complete context that included not only Monty's personality traits - which often form the basis for criticism of his generalship - but also theatre level, nationalistic, and post-war projection issues. Intimately related to the manpower issue (and linked morale issues which Hart also does affine job assessing) is the issue of how Monty chose to make up for these deficiencies with what the Germans called Mater**** and Monty termed "Colossal Cracks"; namely the employment of metal rather than men. Hart makes a point for what should be obvious, and apparently was to Monty but historians have since forgotten - if you have material superiority why waste human life? By employing the combined arms strengths of the Allied forces Monty could not only save manpower he could ill afford to lose, but also maintain morale that had a positive feedback on troop performance. Hart makes clear the rationale behind this approach and places Monty's decisions to employ these tactical approaches to the theatre strategy as a whole.

In the end, "Colossal Cracks" is a fine study, a bit academic at times but still quite readable and certainly worth a read to the more serious student of WWII, whether interested in Monty and controversies surrounding him or the tactical and strategic operations of the British/Commonwealth Army Group on the Continent. Of added value is Hart's inclusion of lengthy discussions of 1st Canadian Army and Second British Army actions within the 21st AG and Monty's "grip", as well as the influence their respective commanders - Generals Crerar and Dempsey, respectively - on operations of these armies and their contributions to AG influences on theatre activities. 5 star effort of historical literature, 3.5 star effort for engaging prose; overall 4.5 stars!

[This review is of the original Praeger Press hardback version of this Stackpole production]

A Fascinating work.......2007-07-19

This author's study attempts to cut through all the focus on Montgomery's odious personality by a careful study of how his command of 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45, actually operated. There are two chapters devoted exclusively his relationships with his two army commanders, Dempsey with the British 2nd army and Crerar with the First Canadian Army. There is much rich detail in these two.

In his introduction, he outlines what problems Montgomery grappled with before the campaign began. They were: British uncertainty of Overlord's success, British war weariness after almost five years of conflict, his army was the last British field force and couldn't be lost, the morale of civilian conscript soldiers fragile viz the Germans', he couldn't sustain heavy casualties and maintain morale. As a consequence, his methods were appropriate to achieving British war aims. His goal was to obtain victory within the larger Allied effort with tolerable casualties while maintaining a high military profile. His task was not winning battles but winning the entire campaign.

Thus, Montgomery's handling of the 21st was hampered by: limited tactical abilities and mercurial morale of "unmilitaty" soldiers, weak staff officers, poor performance of Allied material, weakness of British resources--especially manpower, limited British war aims. In addition, the bitter fighting in Normandy blunted the edge of his army group. The constant hard fighting, limited space and no opportunities for divisions' rest and replacement, skilled German resistance, defensibility of bocage terrain, frequent harassing fire, motar attacks, sniper fire, marked superiority of German armor, lack of successful advances, frequency of local reverses causing troops to attack objectives they had previously conquered, steady stream of casualties destroyed small unit cohesion, severe casualties among officers wrecked effective function of units, lack of sleep, physical exhaustion and trauma of combat all wore down the armies by the end of six weeks.

In regard to poor staff work, Alan Brooke confided to his diary that the loss of so many fine officers in the first world war limited the ability of the army to have competent, experienced individuals to handle these trying positions. The fine book by John Ellis on the battle for Cassino related the British staff work was so inept it couldn't handle simple tasks like planning proper sequencing of road march approaches to battle.

Considering all these factors, the author concluded Montgomery's caution and reliance of firepower justified. The author feels he was not a "great captain" of history because he failed to exploit ruthlessly any success gained, he had serious deficiencies in fluid battles, and had limited ability to adjust his methods to changing operational situations.

Relying on the "set piece" battle, Montgomery outlined its principal components. 1. A master plan, 2. Concentration, 3. Fire-power based attrition, 4. Methodical and cautious approach. These were coupled with "alternative thrusts" to keep the enemy off balance. Other components he felt were: administration, airpower, initiation and balance. Ancillary components were: grip, surprise, flank protection, flexibility, cooperation, simplicity and the assimulation of combat lessons.

In truth, while the British army published doctrines, their actual employment rested with the idiosyncratic interest of individual commanders. There was almost no emphasis between the wars by the British army on operational art. The Germans were superb at this aspect of warfare. The author defines it as "the planning, preparation and conduct of a series of coordinated, synchronized battles by large formations (army groups down to divisions) within a given theater to achieve the objective of decisive victory set by military strategy." Hence, the only way for the British army to fight was with an attritional approach.

This book is not whitewash of Montgomery, nor is it another attack on him. The author doesn't blink at Montgomery's pettiness, glory grabbing, suspicion of everyone except Allan Brooke, impossible vanity, rudeness, and other objectional aspects of the man. But, he does look at what happened in the campaign in a relatively even-handed way. I recommend this slim volume with its extensive bibliography to anyone interested in WWII, military history in general, or wishing to better understand command.

Rommel's Afrika Korps: Tobruk to El Alamein (Battle Orders)

Average customer rating:

Useful but slightly flawed
A Good Reference Tool, but little on combat support units
Close attention to details which changed outcomes.

Rommel's Afrika Korps: Tobruk to El Alamein (Battle Orders)
Pier Paolo Battistelli
Manufacturer: Osprey Publishing
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Military | History | Subjects | Books

North Africa | Africa | History | Subjects | Books
Similar Items:

ASIN: 1841769010
Release Date: 2006-10-31

Book Description

In 1940 a British offensive in the Western Desert provoked a major Italian military disaster. By early February 1941 the whole of Cyrenaica had been lost, and German help became necessary to avoid the loss of the entire of Libya. On 14 February 1941 the first echelons of German troops hurriedly arrived at the port of Tripoli, starting the 27-month German engagement in Northern Africa. This book covers the complex and oft-changing organisation and structure of German forces in North Africa from their first deployment through to the conclusion of the battle of El Alamein, an engagement that irrevocably changed the strategic situation in the Western Desert.

Customer Reviews:

Useful but slightly flawed.......2007-09-28

This is another excellent Osprey publication. As an historical wargamer I have found the Battle Orders series of books to be extremely useful. Rommel's Afrika Korps is no exception. Following each of the German Panzer and light infantry divisions throughout the North African Campaign, this book gives the reader indespensible information on organization and equipment. The only thing that distracts is that the author chose to use the original German terms for units and equipment, rather than translating into English. While there is a good appendix in back that defines these terms, it makes the volume harder to use. I don't want to have to look up some obscure term only to find that it was the bakery platoon... Overall, I still highly recommend this book.

A Good Reference Tool, but little on combat support units.......2007-03-05

Despite its near-legendary status in military history, the actual organization and composition of the German Afrika Korps (DAK) in 1941-42 has rarely been discussed in much detail (an exception being work by George Nafziger). In Osprey's Battle Orders #20, Italian historian Pier Paolo Battistelli sets out to describe the organization, doctrine, training, tactics and equipment of the Afrika Korps. Overall, this is a very good volume and worth the price, but the Battle Orders series continues to suffer from lack of standardization. When you buy one of these volumes, you never know quite what you are going to get and Afrika Korps is no exception. First, the subtitle makes it unclear if it is covering the period from April 1941 or June 1942 to November 1942 - it actually begins with February 1941 and the bulk of the volume focuses on the first year of the Afrika Korps. Second, like several other volumes in the BO series, this volume does not provide a comprehensive order of battle for the Afrika Korps, so non-divisional assets are pretty much ignored. Despite this awkward structure, this volume does provide a very detailed look at the individual divisions that made up the Afrika Korps.

After brief introductory sections on combat mission and training, the author launches into a 30-page section on unit organization. This section consists primarily of line and block charts of the divisions in the DAK, as well as discussions of their evolutions. Several of the author's points are quite interesting. First, the divisions Germany sent to North Africa in 1941 were not elite formations, but rather ad hoc units just formed or put together from odds and ends; there was no standard organization for these units. Second, the requirements of desert warfare meant that the DAK had a much larger motorized component than a typical corps fighting on the Eastern Front. Unlike operations in Europe, the DAK could not use horses for logistics and foot infantry was near useless. Third, the DAK organized its infantry battalions with a much higher proportion of anti-tank weapons and heavy weapons than used in Europe. Some sub-units, like the motorcycle battalions (which performed superbly in the USSR in 1941) proved poorly suited for African conditions and were disbanded. Similarly, the divisional reconnaissance battalions proved far too weak for combat in North Africa and were significantly strengthened with other attachments.

The next 18 page section on tactics is supported by 10 maps (Ras el Mdauuar 30 April 1941; Sidi Rezegh 22 November 1941; Belhamed 1 December 1941; Benghazi 29 January 1942; flank march at Gazala 26 May 1942; El Mreir 21 June 1942; Alam Halfa 30 August 1942; 21st Panzer Division crossing the minefields 30 August 1942; 21st Panzer Division's defense of Deirel Taffa 30 August 1942; 15 Panzer Division at El Alamein 2 November 1942) and discusses the evolution of the DAK's tactical doctrine. While some of the maps are a bit complicated, they are well done and often display units done to battalion or brigade level. This section is fairly interesting and demonstrates that the DAK was capable of painful setbacks as well as great victories. The 13-page section on weapons and equipment focuses on tanks, infantry weapons, AT/AA guns and other vehicles used by the Afrika Korps. Unfortunately, this section is the most disappointing since there is no real discussion of artillery or engineer equipment, although they clearly played a major role at Gazala and El Alamein. The section on C3I is good, noting Rommel's dependence on SIGINT in 1941. The final sections on unit status lists armor strengths at various times.

This volume gives a good overview with some keen insight into particular aspects of the DAK, but it omits some important areas such as artillery, engineers, reconnaissance troops and supply troops. If just one of the many line and block charts had been deleted, there would have been space to discuss combat support units. Keeping in mind that the BO series has yet to produce a volume on Second World War German panzer divisions, the lack of regimental or battalion organization information is disappointing. Readers who are not familiar with German military terminology will find this book non-user friendly, since the author is a purist who prefers to use "Abteilung" to "battalion", "leichte" to "light", "nachricht" to "signal", "sanitats" to "medical", etc. In sum, this book is a handy reference tool for the military specialist or researcher, although it is far from comprehensive.

Close attention to details which changed outcomes........2006-11-05

Pier Paolo Battistelli's ROMMEL'S AFRIKA KORPS: TOBRUK TO EL ALAMEIN covers the changing organizational and approaches of German troops in North Africa from their first deployment on the continent to the end of the battle of El Amamein, which affected the outcome of the Western Desert. Charts and maps outline positions, forces, and engagements with close attention to details which changed outcomes.

Average customer rating:

An Excellent companion
Atlas of World War I
Absolutely indispensable

Atlas of World War I

Manufacturer: Oxford University Press, USA
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

General | Military | History | Subjects | Books

General | World | History | Subjects | Books

Atlases | Atlases & Maps | Reference | Subjects | Books

Historical | Atlases & Maps | Reference | Subjects | Books
ASIN: 0195210778

Book Description

"Every map, with its accompanying notes, is almost a chapter of history in itself....General readers as well as history students will value the atlas for its meticulously detailed information."-- Times Educational Supplement

This outstanding historical atlas from Martin Gilbert offers a definitive visual history of World War I. In 164 finely detailed, easy-to-read maps, it covers the origins of the war, the quarrels of the great European powers and the mobilization of 1914, plus the major battles and all the individual
campaigns--including the war at sea and in the air--putting them in the wider context of strategy. Beyond its thorough and precise military coverage, the atlas also explores the diplomatic, economic, and social aspects of the conflict, and many of the maps--such as a map of German food riots in
1916, a state-by-state map of opposition to the war in the United States in April, 1917, or a map analyzing India's manpower contribution to war--have put together normally scattered and diverse information with exceptional clarity. A final section of maps explores the political, economic, and human
aftermath of the war.
This fully revised Second Edition of The Atlas of World War I features new maps, including maps that detail the creation of Yugoslavia, and the Leipzig War Crimes Trials, and a map analyzing the manpower contribution of American soldiers, state-by-state.

Customer Reviews:

An Excellent companion.......2002-11-27

This is a terrific companion for anyone reading about World War One. The pages are filled with greatly detailed maps and footnotes that illuminate actions of armies, front line positions, withdrawls, alliances etc...
A valuable tool to reference to when reading a book that may not be mapped or with few or poorly drawn maps.

Atlas of World War I.......2001-09-04

Martin Gilbert describes his Atlas of World War One as an "introductory guide" but the reader will come away with much more than a mere introduction to the Great War. Gilbert uses 164 maps to illustrate virtually every aspect of the war from the first shots to the middle east to Africa to the final lines of the Versailles treaty. It even has maps of unfought campaigns of 1919.

Gilbert clearly has a thorough understanding of his subject and knows what makes for an effective war atlas. Color maps would have been more aesthetically pleasing, but something must remain for the eventual third edition. This book virtually eliminates any need for another rival atlas to be compiled, and any serious scholar of the war should endeavor to purchase this fine volume.

Absolutely indispensable.......1999-08-21

Whether you are a historical dabbler or a veteran, this book of maps and charts in exceptionally useful in deciphering the wordy mash that so many of the histories become. Keep it handy when reading any WW1 book.

Pendulum of War: Three Battles at El Alamein

Average customer rating:

An Excellent Military History
A Great Book on a Great Battle
AN IMPORTANT ADDITION TO MILITARY HISTORY

Pendulum of War: Three Battles at El Alamein
Niall J. A. Barr
Manufacturer: Overlook Hardcover
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover

Egypt | Middle East | History | Subjects | Books

General | Military | History | Subjects | Books

General | World | History | Subjects | Books

ASIN: 1585676551

Customer Reviews:

An Excellent Military History.......2005-12-27

Niall Barr, a professor at King's College in London, has written an excellent military history of the three battles fought at El Alamein in Pendulum of War. Barr's narrative includes far more detail about the three battles (First El Alamein, Alam Halfa and Second Alamein) that decided the seesaw struggle between the German Afrika Korps and the Commonwealth 8th Army. This history is well organized, well argued, impressively documented and abounds with new details and analysis about a well-known subject. Pendulum of War is highly recommended for military officers or historians who wish to read a good case study of how armies transform themselves in wartime.

Pendulum of War consists of 19 chapters that trace the operations of the 8th Army from the fall of Tobruk in July 1942 to the pursuit of the Afrika Korps after Operation "Supercharge" in November 1942. Four appendices cover several key 8th Army planning documents and 24 maps complement the narrative. The author is meticulous and covers virtually everything, although unlike Jon Latimer's recent book on El Alamein, Barr does not include an order of battle. However, Barr is to be commended for his even-handedness and objectivity, particularly involving his analysis of the relative contributions of the 8th Army's two commanders in this period - Auchinleck and Montgomery. Barr does not defend either man's faults (although I think he goes a bit easy on Montgomery at times) and concludes that Auchinleck's basic plans for fighting at El Alamein were sound, but his command of 8th Army was less effective and less sure than Montgomery's.

Readers will find the first half of the book, somewhat different from the standard histories that have been heretofore available on this subject. While other histories acknowledge that the 8th Army often suffered heavily at the hands of the Afrika Korps, Barr makes clear that such a view is an understatement. Operations such as "Bacon," "Splendour" and "Manhood" rarely get much mention, but Barr expertly details how these fumbling attempts by 8th Army to stop the victorious Afrika Korps ended in one disaster after another. Indeed, before the decisive Second Battle of El Alamein, 8th Army had frittered away much of its infantry in near futile small-scale counterattacks. Military professionals will be surprised to see the planning and execution of brigade-size night attacks that expected the Commonwealth infantry to advance 6-10 kilometers at night through minefields and then seize a fortified position. Amazingly, the Commonwealth forces (particularly the ANZACs) proved quite adept at night infantry attacks, but time and again they were unable to consolidate on the position before the inevitable German counterattacks. Indeed, it is hard to view the British performance in July 1942 as clumsy and it is amazing to see how often the same mistakes were repeated.

In the run up to Second El Alamein, Barr spends a gratifying amount of time examining even possible facet of the coming battle, including the engineer effort, the evolving British artillery tactics (the introduction of the coordinated corps shoot, known as a "stonk"), logistics and intelligence. Barr argues that despite its faulty tactics in the early July battles, the 8th Army evolved into a battle-wise force by October, while the Afrika Korps never adapted to its changing opponent (this is contentious, given that the Afrika Korps escaped its pursuers). Unlike most histories, Barr claims that 8th Army never actually achieved a breakthrough during the final days of "Supercharge" but that it was Axis counterattacks that finally consumed the Afrika Korps meager resources. Barr's coverage of the Axis point of view is somewhat less in this book, with more emphasis on the internal decisions within 8th Army, but he is able to convey the growing hopelessness of the Axis position. Overall, this is certainly one of the very best books on this subject available.

A Great Book on a Great Battle.......2005-06-12

The war in the desert during the Second World War has been the source of renewed interest in recent times, not just from the British, who always had great fondness for it, but elsewhere as well. A number of books have appeared but this one is the best. drawing on recent scholarship, it explains how and why this battle was fought.

The war in the desert during the Second World War has been the source of renewed interest in recent times, not just from the British, who always had great fondness for it but elsewhere as well. A number of books have appeared but this one is the very best. Drawing on recent scholarship, it explains how and why this battle was fought.

As the title says, there were three battles in 1942 around El Alamein, which was not a town but a railway stop in the desert. The first, in July 1942, is known as the First Battle of Alamein and was the battle at which the British Eighth Army halted the German and Italian advance into Egypt. The second, in August, known as the Battle of Alam Halfa, saw the defeat of Rommel's attempt to break through. The third, and most famous, in November, was the Second Battle of Alamein, in which the German-Italian Panzerarmee was defeated and forced to retreat from Egypt and Libya.

Prior to the fighting at El Alamein, the British Eight Army was spectacularly defeated by Rommel at the Battles of Gazala and Mersa Matruh. Barr explains how the Eighth Army was handicapped by poor leadership, faulty tactics and inadequate equipment. One might think that the Eighth Army turned the situation around by changing these factors but, as Barr shows, there was no time for this. The First Battle of Alamein was won in spite of these factors, through hard fighting.

Barr goes into the nuts and bolts of the fighting. He expertly explains the tactics of both sides and how these were determined by their weapons. He goes into the details of the all-important logistics, which alone explains how the two armies were able to fight in the desert. The importance of the storemen and mechanics is underlined. Nor is the important role of the air and naval forces in the fighting ignored.

He goes into the critical role of intelligence, particularly Ultra - intelligence gathered from codebreaking activities. Barr does not flinch from explaining that the Germans had broken the American codes and Rommel was receiving first rate intelligence from the American liaison officer. He also tells of the much-neglected signals intelligence - listening in to radio traffic, both friendly and enemy - and the vital edge that it gave to Rommel, at least until his signal unit was destroyed by the 9th Australian Division.

It's easy for a historian to record that Lieutenant General L. J. Moreshead's 9th Australian Division was the Eighth Army's best division but Barr explains exactly why this was the case. In writing the book, he travelled to Australia and New Zealand and was rewarded not only with detailed documents about their national forces but translations of German and Italian documents.

A curiosity of El Alamein is that the reputation of the defeated Rommel remains solid but that of the two victorious Eighth Army commanders, General Sir C. Auchinleck and Lieutenant General B. L. Montgomery, remains controversial. Barr is critical of both, as well as Auchinleck's eccentric and controversial deputy chief of staff, Major General E. Dorman-Smith. while attempting a rehabilitation of Lieutenant General W. H. E. Gott, who was killed by the Luftwaffe on the brink of assuming command of the Eighth Army.

You will not find a better account of this battle than this one.

AN IMPORTANT ADDITION TO MILITARY HISTORY.......2005-05-03

Those with an interest in and knowledge of battle history will find an eye opener in Niall Barr's account of a pivotal battle in World War II, the battle of El Alamein. A Senior Lecturer in Defense Studies at Kings College London Barr has published prolifically in the field of military history. In addition, he is respected for the tours he conducts of battlefields, among them three to El Alamein.

A prodigious researcher, he presents much original proof in support of his theses. His sources include official documents from British, Australian and New Zealand as well as translated German material. His narrative is more than just a history as it is often presented in first-person accounts, bringing the North African campaign to vivid life.

While the Alamein campaign has been presented as very much a contest between Britain's Montgomery and Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, the author posits that this approach has only muddied the true story of this campaign.

"Pendulum of War" covers the fighting in 1942 from July to November. This followed the British army's disheartening rout by Rommel's Panzerarmee Afrika at the Libyan town of Tobruk. We read that this defeat puzzled Churchill and other observers: "During May, when the two armies had confronted one another along the line of defences which the British had built stretching from Ain el Gazala near the coast to Bir Hacheim in the far desert, the odds had seemed to favour the British. Yet this was only the most recent astonishing reversal of fortune that had taken place in nearly two years of war in the desert."

Barr posits that this army learned from bitter defeats and was able to forge itself into troops capable of overcoming their enemy, the dreaded Afrika Korps. He pokes holes into some of the theories that have long been advanced re Eight Army leaders, Generals Auchinleck and Montgomery, and delves deeply into desert warfare tactics. His account is bolstered by maps, appendices, and a lengthy bibliography.

"Pendulum of War is fine reading and an important addition to the archives of military history.

- Gail Cooke

Average customer rating:

A History of Warfare
Field-Marshall Viscount of Alamein Montgomery
Manufacturer: World Publishing
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Unknown Binding
ASIN: B0000CODEI

THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHALL THE VISCOUNT OF ALAMEIN, K.G.

Average customer rating:

THE MEMOIRS OF FIELD-MARSHALL THE VISCOUNT OF ALAMEIN, K.G.

Manufacturer: Collins
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Hardcover
ASIN: B000H1U99O

El Alamein 1942: The Turning of the Tide (Campaign)

Average customer rating:

Lacks Original Research or Fresh Perspectives

El Alamein 1942: The Turning of the Tide (Campaign)
Ken Ford
Manufacturer: Osprey Publishing
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Paperback

Egypt | Middle East | History | Subjects | Books

General | Military | History | Subjects | Books

ASIN: 1841768677
Release Date: 2005-09-10

Book Description

The battle of El Alamein marked the turning point in Britain's fortunes in the Second World War. There were three separate battles between July and November 1942, all of which were fought to halt the advance of Rommel's army towards the Suez Canal. This final battle at El Alamein, fought in October and November, saw the continuous bombardment of the German line that Rommel was instructed to hold at all costs by Hitler himself. The Allies shattered the German defences, and Rommel led a westward retreat in order to salvage what was left of the Afrika Korps. This book provides an in-depth analysis of the battle that turned the tide in favour of the Allies in Africa.

Customer Reviews:

Lacks Original Research or Fresh Perspectives.......2005-11-03

Tackling a well-known subject like the Battle of El Alamein in 1942 and reducing it to a 96-page summary would be a daunting task for most military historians. Unfortunately, the task was clearly beyond author Ken Ford in Osprey Campaign #158, El Alamein 1942, which adds virtually nothing new on the subject and displays a clear lack of any attempt to provide original research or fresh perspectives. Throughout this volume, the author appears content to merely synthesize and summarize material provided by familiar accounts written 20-30 years ago, often incorporating some of the same errors from those older sources that newer research has uncovered.

The author's introductory sections are essentially boilerplate material, particularly in regard to his handling of the reputation of General Montgomery. It is interesting that the author's bibliography does not list Correlli Barnett's The Desert Generals, which while dated, gives a much better insight into the strengths and weaknesses of Montgomery and the other British senior commanders. The section on opposing armies is similar in its skimming the subject, particularly in its superficial coverage of the importance of logistics and air power (note, Martin van Creveld's Supply War is also not in the bibliography, despite his excellent material on the role of logistics in this campaign). Furthermore, given the importance of mines in the campaign, it is odd that the author never discusses the British introduction of flail tanks and new minesweepers, or the German introduction of a new type of mine. Nor does the author make any effort to describe Allied breaching tactics down at the brigade-division level. The author provides order of battles for both sides which appears based upon rather dated and misleading information, as well as omitting any data on air units in the campaign (the strength of opposing air power is never specified). An exhaustive Allied OB for El Alamein done by Dr. Graham Watson a few years ago - and freely available on the internet - reveals significant differences in the assignment of Allied units, particularly armored brigades. The volume includes four 2-D maps (8th Army retreat; First Alamein; Alam Halfa - Rommel's final offensive; Operations Lightfoot and Supercharge; 8th Army drive) and three 3-D BEV maps (Alam El Halfa; the Dog Fight; Operation Supercharge). Given the flat, featureless terrain, the BEVs really don't add anything over a conventional 2-D map, unless they had been "zoomed in" to cover only a very small area.

The volume includes three battle scenes: tanks and anti-tank guns of the Italian Ariete Division attacking south of Ruweisat Ridge; 15th Panzer attacking toward Alam Halfa; the action fought by the 3rd King's Hussars near the Rahman track. It is apparent from these battle scenes that the author has little knowledge of tanks or the specifics of Second World War armor tactics. Two of the battle scenes erroneously depict tanks firing on the move, when in fact the lack of stabilization made this a waste of ammunition. Until the advent of third generation main battle tanks in the 1980s, shoot-on-the-move was not an effective tactic. One battle scene depicts German Pz IV tanks firing both main gun and coax machineguns simultaneously, although usually gunners have a selector switch that only allows them to fire one or the other and these weapons use different sight reticules in any case. As for tactics, all three scenes depict tank charges, which by 1942 both sides had learned were virtually suicidal in the desert (although the British still tried it). One scene depicts Pz IV tanks up front, with Pz IIIs behind, in a loose gaggle; the Germans used wedge formations, with the Pz IIIs up front, and the Pz IVs in back. In the 3rd Hussars scene, three different types of tank are depicted and the text implies that the unit had all three types, but the unit was a Sherman-equipped unit, while the Grant/Lee and Crusader belonged to other battalions in the brigade (thus, they were involved in the attack, but not all in the same battalion).

The lack of original research is apparent throughout this volume. After reading Ken Ford's narrative, I went back and re-read several older accounts by Michael Carver and others and found essentially the same information presented. For example, there is no specific information about either sides' overall casualties at either First El Alamein or Alam Halfa, nor is there any effort to break down the standard Second El Alamein casualty figures by unit. A modest research effort would reveal that the Australian, New Zealand and South Africans have pretty detailed lists of their casualties in the battle. Indeed, the author does not even mention Allied tank losses at El Alamein or that about 30,000 Axis prisoners were taken. Amazingly, this author does not even bother to include that General von Thoma, the Afrika Korps commander, was captured on 4 November.

While the British should be justifiably proud of their victory at El Alamein, this author also tends to avoid some of the criticism that appears in other, better books on the subject. British tank tactics at El Alamein were generally awfully - which is not surprising given that many crews and small unit leaders were only partly trained (most of the trained British tankers having been lost at Gazala). British armor officer and author K. Macksey described the costly British tank attacks at First Alamein as "characterized by supreme gallantry and utter stupidity." Most of all, Montgomery's failure to aggressively pursue and exterminate the remnants of Rommel's forces limited the British victory to an operational, rather than strategic success. Given that the Germans were extremely short of fuel and had only one escape route, Montgomery's failure to coordinate air, land and sea (would have been a good time to land a brigade by sea behind Rommel to cut his escape) forces indicates a lack of both imagination and "killer instinct." Lacking analysis, fresh research or insights, it is hard to view El Alamein 1942 as anything but inadequate.

Mediterranean sweep;: Air stories from El Alamein to Rome,

Average customer rating:

Mediterranean sweep;: Air stories from El Alamein to Rome,
Richard Thruelsen
Manufacturer: Duell, Sloan and Pearce
ProductGroup: Book
Binding: Unknown Binding

General | Europe | History | Subjects | Books

Books:

Books Index

Books Home

Recommended Books