Book Description
Renowned author Paul Carell's photo album to accompany his definitive studies on the war in Russia. Over 570 b/w and color photos from both German and Russian archives explore the entire campaign., 7" x 10"
Customer Reviews:
basically false.......2005-11-26
The pictures in this book, dealing with the most terrible war in history of mankind, have cleary been chosen with an expert eye.
Seen from a narrow, technical point of view Paul Carell's collection is downright magnificent. Every single photo connects, makes you part of the scene. A function strongly emphasized by Carell's accompanying expert comments.
However, Paul Carell's way of selecting should not be overlooked here. Even stronger, it is subject of severe criticism:
1 His book was primairily issued for German buyers, and provides a strong accent on the comradeship between the German soldiers fighting in Russia from 1941-'45.
2 My copy from 'Unternehmen Barbarossa im Bild' dates from 1967, a period when ancient 'Ostfrontkämpfer' (= Eastern front fighters) came to reflect on their memorable war-past.
3 Consequently this collection mainly shows the German war effort in a pretty enjoyable way, greatly underrating the criminal conduct by the same German soldiers towards the Russian civil population. As well as the severe persecution of Jews in the German-occupied part of the Soviet Union.
4 Don't believe the story that atrocities, genocide and war crimes towards these defenseless Russians were an exclusive affair for Hitler-fanatics. History has proven abundantly that lots of common Wehrmacht (= regular army) soldiers were involved, too. They are the grandfathers of every common German you can meet nowadays.
5 Carell strongly emphasizes on front life for the common soldier, Russian or German. Senior commanders are pictured through their eyes. In a true German style these high-ranking officers come out like icons, enjoying sincere admiration for their military skills. Right up to Hitler himself. Criticism on their conduct of the war is ommitted - though the gravest and most irresponsable military mistakes were made on their level.
6 In fairness to Carell, one finally should consider that German photo-sources on this 1941-'45 war are much richer than the Russian ones.
My final conclusion: the excellent quality of Carell's photos tends to color this war favorably. In particular to the Germans, who behaved worst.
Thus 'Unternehmen Barbarossa im Bild' basicly provides a strongy false historical view. For this I grant one star, for this war was too terrible, criminal, murderous and devastating to justify Paul Carell's way of showing.
Ausgezeichnet!.......2002-10-10
Okay, I was looking at reviews and after looking at those done by others, I just HAD to write something! Operation Barbarossa in Photographs is absolutely great!! Paul Carell is a famous German author and is a vet of the Wehrmacht too. Yes, the book has a German bent--it was written by a German who was THERE--of course he will have a different perspective than someone sitting at home in America in the 21st century. This is a MUST-HAVE book and is chock full of SO many good pictures you can't read in one or even two sittings, it just has to be broken up to absorb it all. I HIGHLY suggest this book for any student of the Eastern Front and/or the German Military of the Second World War.
Great collection of photos, but.............2001-11-23
Wow,the photos in the book were great but I have a bone to pick. The author says these were photographed by the soldiers. Then what about all the inhumane crimes committed by the Wehrmacht and all the photographs taken by its sadistic soldiers. Look no further than the book "German Army and Genocide" for them. Also, the author obviously has a pro-German bias. He describes the Russian soldiers as "Reds"- this is not the Russian civil war! One of the pictures describes the 'fanatic' resistance at Brest-Litvosk while always describing the 'heroics' of the Germans. Also he uses the German spelling for Soviet cities: Lemberg, Moskau, etc. There are also several errors by labeling General Vassili Chuikov (the hero of Stalingrad) as General Zhukov. Still the book is a great collection of photos.
Great photo collection from Paul Carell.......2000-10-25
This is by far the largest collection of eastern front photos I've ever seen. Most of the photos are never before seen snapshots taken by ordinary soldiers and this is also one of two weakest points of this book: they (photos) are not of best quality. Other weak point is captions. They are very short and mostly un-informative (caption might read for example "German soldier in trench" and nothing about where the photo was taken etc.).
This is definately not a book for eastern front enthusiast who is looking for facts about war fought in Russia, but for one who is tired of seeing same old photos we have seen during last 30 years. Quantity of photos alone makes this book worth buying.
not a history work...but a great war photo records!.......2000-06-05
This is a massive collection of photographic records of battlefield,soldiers and civilians at nazi-russia war times. It seems that most of the photos may never have been introduced or published before.They're very vivid,captions are accurate and to the point. But I think all photo captions are too brief to understand the whole process of war.Scarcely any other explanatory texts are. It makes this book not a history work but only a kind of war photo album. It may leave serious readers something to be desired,I sure. But if you have had carell's other works,this book can be a useful pictorial guide to them. Even if main text is very poor,all photos match well with military history are worth seeing.
Book Description
An in-depth account of the German invasion of Russia in summer 1941 and the massive Soviet counterattack that ensued the following winter. Combines soldiers' diaries, letters and recollections with expert analysis. Throws new light on the giant encirclement battles on the road to Moscow, including their debilitating effect on German strength. Oversized with over 100 dramatic photos. (A Main Selection of the Military Book Club.)
Customer Reviews:
Well-written Explanation of Operation Barbarossa.......2007-10-10
This book presents a fairly balanced review of the opening stages of Operation Barbarossa.
Through the use of letters from German soldiers to their loved ones back home it does so in a manner that allows the reader to obtain a good grasp of how these soldiers felt, fought, and had to live under arduous conditions, both in good (i.e., hot) and bad (i.e., cold) weather. Just reading the accounts of the long marches the Landser had to undertake (often 30km per day, day after day) to keep up with the German advance was exhausting.
The author also does a good job of explaining the logistical difficulties the Germans faced in stretching their front past the limits that the rear could reasonably supply it.
In addition, the author points out that the massive attrition rate of NCOs and other officers as the battle progressed, which losses were harder to replace than those of general infantry since the NCOs and officers received longer and more extensive training than the average soldier.
Well worth reading to any student of this period of history.
Written like a first person account.......2005-09-18
Kershaw has a masterpiece here, and this book will explain in graphic detail the difficulty faced by the Landser in a 6 month period, from the start of the invasion until the end of December of 1941 and early 1942. Much of the book highlighting the words of the soldiers themselves, who had a clarity of thought in describing the horrendous and excruciating pace in few words of the bitter fighting against a foe who often proved to be suicidally brave, inflicting casualties to a German army unprepared for the level of intensity they faced in this alien foe, in this alien land, one that went on and on forever into featureless steppe, and when slogging over the top of a hill one could look out and see many more ahead, with little else surrounding the never ending march. Tired and exhausted from continual movemment to support the Panzers as they encircled yet another number of Red Army Divisions, and without the infantry the pockets could not be collapsed. The trapped Soviets inside the circle would often charge forward in mass attacks in attempts to break out of this pocket, and their bodies piled up all around German machine gunners. Some would fight it out to the end and the result were companies depleted of both seasoned officers and NCO's from the brutal amount of resulting carnage.
Some accounts tell of Soviets fighting a desperate attack to break out of these pockets and being on the verge of breaking through thin German ranks only to suddenly stop and sit down, obeying an order given from a safer distance inside the pocket by a superior officer to instead surrender. The Germans simply had no idea they would be facing this kind of enemy, one they could not make sense of and was very hard to defeat, fighting on in hopeless situations. Soviet armor is much discussed, and had the Red Army tank crews had the German Panzer crews training and tactics they likely could have inflicted staggering losses. As it were the training of Panzer crews would usually defeat the technical superiority of their T-34 tanks.
The severity that followed the German advance (looted and burned villages) would lead to an escalation of violence by both partisans and the Red Army. Many German POW's were later found dead with genital mutilations and eye gougings. This predictably lead to a further increase of atrocities from the Wehrmacht or SS in response, and the Soviet fate was no better. Only 3 of every 100 Red Army prisoners would survive themselves, most of them starved to death.
The post that the author refers to also contains Soviet letters and diaries, much of it retrieved from the dead bodies of the Soviets and somehow this information has been preserved for posterity. The power of the speech of these soldiers, both German and Soviet, says volumes in only two or three sentences. They convey a hell that will show the reader that in the first week of December this was clearly a soon to be defeated German army. Their supply chain was served mainly by only two rail lines and non-stop Luftwaffe flights. Soon they would lose their air superiority, despite enormous early losses of Soviet aircraft in the opening months as surprise allowed thousands to be shot on the ground.
Motor convoys had to deal with seas of mud and later arctic tempatures, and horse drawn transport that saw entire companies of horses die from overwork, exhaustion and exposure. All of these reasons, to include an enemy that knew the countryside and was prepared for it, further weakened the German supply chain. Much of the Germans winter clothing was stolen from Soviet homes and POW's. Newsreels and newspaper accounts of nothing but "glorious victory" were soon looked at with skepticism from a German nation that responded to appeals from Goebbels himself for warm winter clothing, and the post from the soldiers to their families, it is their words, letters, diaries and conversations of these soldiers themselves that give the power of imagination to this book, as it is their words that describe it so well, and Kershaw uses this post quite often throughout the entire book. It is a look at war through the eyes of the Landser, often in their words, junior officers and enlisted mainly.
Army Group Centre, who's advance is usually examined, contains both the discussions of Guderian and other generals who clearly are aware of what the OKW in Berlin has no concept of: The Divisions are now mere skeletons of what they once were.
Superb book, highly recommeded.
Excellent ground-level view of the Russian Front WW2.......2004-04-24
Just finished reading this book. It is in the class of "in deadly combat", "panzer aces", "ostfront 1944" and "forgotten soldier" as THE best sources for the scale and intensity of this war. Highly recommended, especially for the moving diary entries from both sides of the battle.
Written like he was being chased by a T-34.......2003-08-12
One of the worst pieces of writing I've seen since gradeschool. Kershaw repeats phrases and quotes repeatedly. Often, he'll quote some soldier's account, then, later, use the same quote as a sub-chapter title, and still later, have the quote again as a caption to a photograph. And don't get me started on the photographs! He says most of the photos are from his own collection. Well, he should have kept his collection to himself. These are some of the worst taken pictures I've seen, so grainy that they must have been blow-ups from microscopic negatives. The only useful data was the statistical information he provides on combat unit attrition. Now, I'm off to find the source of his statistical information - that would be worth reading!
The Eastern Front in all it's utter brutality..........2003-06-05
While there are many excellent works on the Eastern front most tend to be fairly dry, the exception being some of the better first-person accounts, and those often lack strategic overview. Kershaw's book fills the need in this area quite well, at least regarding the first year of that titanic struggle. Weaving diaries, after-action reports and interviews he paints a grim picture of a year-long, unending hell for those involved.
Many books on this subject tend to make the summer of 1941 appear to be a cake-walk for the Germans. While I don't consider myself an expert, I'd always felt that '41 had to have been at least the EASIEST year for them. After reading Kershaw's book it is obvious that the Soviets provided no easy years. Although many authors have given convenient excuses for Hitler's failure to gain victory in '41, ie: the appearence of T-34/KV1 tanks, onset of winter, Hitler's bad decisions, etc. Kershaw's book makes it obvious that another factor must be considered, that is the tenacity and determination of the Soviet army.
One of the stories in the book is about a group of Russian wounded in no-mans-land, German medics attempt to provide aid, and the wounded fire at them, throw grenades and resist in any way possible. Although this behavior appears almost beyond comprehension, one must bear in mind that they were resisting an invader who to them had attacked without provocation.
As others have pointed out, much of Kershaw's accounts come from the German side, the reason for that is this IS a book about the German side of that war. That said, he provides a good amount of info and accounts from the Soviet side as well, making the book, I felt very balanced. I feel the book is a great, fast-paced read that actually puts a "face" on the brutality and horror of the first year of the greatest conflict this world has seen.
Book Description
Operation Barbarossa—as this campaign is famously called—was arguably the greatest land campaign mankind has ever fought. Hitler named his assault after the 12th-century Frederick I Barbarossa, an emperor of the First Reich. Although he succeeded in capturing almost 40 percent of European Russia, Hitler was defeated there. Exploiting newly available Soviet archives, David M. Glantz challenges the time-honored explanation that poor weather, bad terrain, and Hitler’s faulty strategic judgement produced the German defeat. He reveals how and why the Red Army thwarted Hitler’s seemingly inexorable progress.
Customer Reviews:
A must read on the initial phase of the German-Soviet war.......2007-06-17
Of the three books I have so far read from Glantz, this one is for sure the best and easiest to read. (OK, also the shortest.) I personally very much enjoyed this book, and also found a lot of new information in it.
Excellent, but very dry history.......2006-12-08
Like all of Glantz' books, this one also tells its story with authority. However, the focus is on the large scale, strategic operations and the high command, and therefore does not make for interesting reading.
A Tough Read, But Rewarding.......2006-09-28
This is not a book that goes into great detail about individual battles or skirmishes. It does, however, provide an extremely detailed account of the horrendously, seemingly impossible task Stavka faced in dealing with the German onslaught. Glantz provides readers with mind-numbinlgy detailed summaries of armies created on paper only to be slaughtered on the field, of Fronts being designated by desperate planners only to be shattered, and of Generals placed at the heads of armies only to be sacked, or worse, when they, almost, inevitably failed to win victories.
The huge amount of data Glantz provides is almost impossible to keep track of. This book was slow going for me. More maps, higher quality maps, and more charts and tables would have been welcome. The nearly frequent typographical errors were annoying. The excellent endnotes were sometimes hard to locate. I would have preferred footnotes.
Soviet reasons for failure of Barbarossa.......2006-01-08
David M. Glantz's book, Before Stalingrad rewrite the operational history of the German invasion of Soviet Union between June to December of 1941. Glantz's approach is to informed the reader that it took more then German's missteps and mother nature that determined the outcome of the 1941 campaign but the Soviet's efforts and mobilization of fresh units that also had a major hand. One of the major factors of German failure according to Glantz was the appearance of fresh Soviet reserves units that defied the German intelligence service. One point Glantz really wanted to make was that the German efforts toward Kiev wasn't an error by Hitler but an necessary objective to ensure any chance of German victory in Moscow if there was to be one. He cites the huge amount of Soviet troops trapped around Kiev, wide open flanks that the Germans will be exposing and fresh Soviet units waiting for the Germans in front of Moscow before many of them were expended in premature Soviet offensives that allowed Germans to advanced toward Moscow. I believed there is many merits to his line of arguement if we looked at German's efforts at Rostov and its consequences.
The main angle of study seem to be centered around central operation of the campaign, Soviet responses to Army Group Center seem to highlights the book's main theme. I think the author chooses this approach since this was where the campaign of 1941 was ultimately decided.
The book appears to be well written and well researched with plenty of Soviet material. Its an operational study of the 1941 campaign and looked closely from the Soviet point of view as all of Glantz's books. Its a short book and far more simply written then many of Glantz's other works. It could have used more maps and a more clearer order of battle table.
The book come highly recommended to those interested in this subject matter.
Astoundingly good book.......2005-09-09
This book will remain best account on Barbarossa:Hitler's invasion of Russia.As we know Barbarossa marked the beginning of biggest land campaign in the History of Warfare.For a long time Barbarossa has continued to fascinate Historians and layman alike.As a result it came to be shrouded in a fog of falsehoods and half-truths.Thanks to the author this stands dispelled.Author shows why Wehrmacht despite its immense qualitative edge over Red Army failed to destroy Russia;capture Moscow.
It must be remembered when Hitler invaded Russia Stavka[ General Staff] had not fully recovered from the damage inflicted upon it by Stalinist purge.Besides Red Army was in the midst of a re-organisation designed to reform its force structure,leadership,training ,equipment,tactics.Many foreign observers thought the country was saddled by a hollow,defunct military establishment and defeat appeared imminent.Against such overwhelming odds Russia survived and ultimately triumphed.Since then many academics have argued Rasputitsa[Oct rains which turn Russian countryside into a sea of mud]harsh winter combined to thwart Wehrmacht when it stood at gates to Moscow.This book,however questions this view.
Wehrmacht's unprepardeness to fight in Russian winter certainly contributed to German defeat.Primary reason leading to German failure lay in the fact Wehrmacht miscalculated Red Army's strength precisely reserves which it could bring from the depths of the country.This helped Stavka to raise fresh divisions from scratch,enabling the erection,of several lines of resistance astride invader's path,as Red Army quickly replenished its losses.New divisions launched incessant counter-attacks;for the Germans struggle started with Battle of Smolensk.Though these attacks were smashed it imposed tremendous attrition upon Wehrmachtso much so when it reached the gates to Moscow German strength ebbed,eroded considerably.Now on the approaches to Moscow Germans encountered fresh Russian resistance.Appearance of T-34 tanks in large numbers -impervious to German anti-tank guns- stunned Nazis.This shows how much they underestimated Russian colossus;exposes faulty nature of German intelligence prelude to Barbarossa.
Germans could hope overcoming this final barrier only by bringing in fresh troops,rearming and refuelling their emasculated armoured spearheads.This was not possible because of poor quality Russian roads and failure to put int operational use of Russian railway network.The errors further aggravated by Hitler's failure to moblise German economy for 'TotalWar'.Army Group Centre launched its final bid to seize Moscow without receiving any reinforcements.
Author has demolished the view of some Historians that Moscow could have been taken had Hitler not diverted Gen Guderian's Second Panzer Group toward Kiev.Fact is after reduction Smolensk pocket considerable Soviet forces remained which barred the road to Moscow.This prompted Hitler go for a easy prey.This manoeuvre in turn created conditions for a successful start of the offensive along Moscow axis[operation Typhoon]
Account of Barbarossa is incomplete without stressing the contribution of Richard Sorge,Soviet spy attached to the German embassy in Tokyo.After all where did Stalin find forces which barred German road to Moscow? Fro the Far East thanks Sorge's intelligence that Japan was going to attack US which helped Soviet leader ruthlessly denudeFar Eastern front rush Siberians to defend Moscow.Later Marshal Zhukov used Siberians divisions to launch Moscow counter-offensive.An author of Glantz's stature has remained silent about this,and I find hard to digest.
Despite this drawback this book will remain an indispensible source for those who want to know why Barbarossa ended in a fiasco.
Product Description
Clauseurtz observed Russia was a country which could only be subdued by its own weakness. To strike these vulnerable spots, Russia would have to be agitated at the very centre.
Customer Reviews:
The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations?.......2007-03-15
If I am not mistaken the contents in the online review copy is the same as the book by the title "The German Campaign in Russia - Planning and Operations (1940 - 1942) which was previously the DOA Pamphlet 20-261a
The Best Researched Book on the History of the German Campaign into Russia.......2006-09-17
Dr. R. Gordon Grant as authored arguably the best researched book on the history of the German campaign into Russia in his newest history book titled "Barbarossa the German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-42)". This is a history buffs delight; there is more depth to fully understanding that war strategy because of all the facts and information the reader is given. Seldom does a history book achieve such high standards and also remain entertaining for the reader. It is not your dull fact filled classroom history text but an energy packed insightful look at WWII.
The book also contains some useful charts, maps and lots of facts. It is well written and is easy to read. If you are someone who wants to read more about WWII and the eastern front--then there is not much better then this book. Add this to your list of must read books on the history of WWII.
Book Description
This extensively researched book illuminates many of the enigmas that have surrounded the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, offering keen insights into Stalin’s thinking and the reasons for his catastrophic blunder.
“If, after the war, the Soviet Union had somehow been capable of producing an official inquiry into the catastrophe of 6/22—comparable in its mandate to the 9/11 commission here—its report might have read a little like [this book]. . . . Murphy brings to his subject both knowledge of Russian history and an insider’s grasp of how intelligence is gathered, analyzed and used—or not.”—Niall Ferguson, New York Times Book Review
"A fascinating and meticulously researched account of mistaken assumptions and errors of judgment that culminated in Hitler’s invasion of Russia in June 1941. Never before has this fateful period been so fully documented."—Henry A. Kissinger
Customer Reviews:
Stalin is never wrong.......2007-09-12
It will come as no surprise to even the casual history buff that Stalin totally misread German intentions about Barbarossa, and the Red Army and Soviet citizens paid in blood for his error. David Murphy assembles overwhelming Soviet documentary evidence of the many sources of intelligence reporting which the Soviet military intelligence and NKVD reported on directly to the Soviet leadership leading up to June 22 1941, warning of impending German hostility. What is new is the evidence of Stalin's systematic elimination of all who had knowledge of the advance warnings he ignored, thus ensuring no one lived to tell of Stalin's fallibility. This is a sobering reminder of the immense evil that Stalin personified.
Very venomous on Stalin. Resembles cold war propaganda.......2007-01-18
Enigma behind Operation Barbarossa[Hitler's invasion of USSR]has always fascinated me.
Despite receiving intelligence warnings from several sources about an impending German assault,war began disastrously for Soviets.This happened because ,prelude to hostilities ,Stalin practised self deception on a extensive scale.Stalin's folly brought the nation on the brink of collapse.Soviet people paid dearly for their leader's mistake.More than 20 million lives were lost before Red Army managed to evict German invaders from the Soviet soil.
There is no doubt in the "war of wits" which preceded German attack,Hitler throughly foxed Stalin.German Fuehrer was able to read Stalin's mind ;latter's predispositon to a particular line of thinking.This was Nazi Germany will not invade USSR as long as Britain continued to hold out behind natural barrier:English Channel. Strange to say,Soviet leader adhered to this thought despite repeated violations of Soviet airspace by the Luftwaffe.Hitler exploited Stalin's preconception by feeding disinformation via Latvian double agent controlled by Gestapo. Fuehrer's personal correspondence telling some rogue elements in the Wehrmacht were poised to strike;however,he would do his best to stop them further deceived Stalin.
Stalin's experience shows how dangerous it is to prejudge enemy's intentions.One needs to have open mind while evaluating enemy's capabilities,plans.If not,one is bound to fall into a self- made trap.
Fact that Wehrmact also made no preparations to conceal its build-up along Soviet borders confused Stalin. He thought Soviet spies were bluffing regarding an impending German attack. That accounts for his violent outburst against Richard Sorge.
To be fair you cannot expect Stalin to be privy to Hitler's innermost thought [incredibly convoluted logic]that he can bring Britain to heel by striking down Soviet Union.Further Soviet dictator was ,I think,was correct in his thinking that Brtish intelligence schemed to entangle Soviet Union in a war with Nazi Germany.Martin Allen's book Hitler/Hess Deception has unwittingly acknowledged this fact.
Author while striving to unravel mystery surrounding Barbarossa has demonised,maligned, Stalin.He dubs Nazi-Soviet non aggression pact as a cynical move on Stalin's side.In my view it was also vaccilation,indifference of Western Allies which gave him an opening to strike a deal with Nazi Germany.
Mr Murphy is a cold war warrior. He has viewed events which unfolded in the east from this angle.
worthy reading but less than expected.......2006-06-09
The book is a very good compilation of already existing information. There is definitely a value in having it together all under the same cover. Also, there are some new tidbits here and there.
And there is no enigma to be solved: in author's view Stalin was self-deceived about Hitler's plans, which is the traditional point of view.
A good effort.......2006-01-30
Since this is more or less my 'forte' when it comes to World War II studies and especially the Eastern Front is where my concentration lies, specifically 1941, I was very pleased to get my hands on a copy of this book even before it was published (thanks to my history professor at my University). Overall it was a solid effort on the part of the author to show how much information Stalin, GRU, and in effect the Soviet Union was receiving from abroad. From Eastern to Western Europe and the US, embassies and personnel were sending information confirming the time of the invasion and detailing what the invasion itself would encompass or simply denying it as part of a German deception campaign.
When viewing this information we can see that much of the data that confirmed the invasion was in fact correct while many details were not. Bottom line being that the idea that an invasion was going to occur was most definitely right but the dates being attributed to the invasion were not.
The first messages began to arrive soon after December 1940 when Hitler has first through up of the invasion, but they were in effect useless since no troop movements had begun. The first thoughts coming into Stalin's mind were probably that it couldn't be true since Germany was still at war with England and Hitler would never make the mistake that was made in World War I when a two front war was fought and lost by Germany.
The US was also one of the first to warn Stalin but in the end why should Stalin trust them? Or Great Britain who also tried to warn him? They had interfered in the Russian civil war, sent their troops to Russian lands to kill Red Army men, and now when only England was standing up to Hitler and Germany would it not suit England's interests to get the USSR on her side? This is one thing that has to be kept in mind, most messages from foreign sources like these were ignored, even worse if they were substantiated by other sources it simply made it seem as if this information was planted.
Later on during one or two months before the invasion began an avalanche of information was forthcoming about Germany's intentions from every corner of the globe. Yet this is where the author makes a mistake, he does not in fact show all German deception that was focused on keeping the Soviet uninformed about their plans nor does he show some of the contradictory information coming in from the very same Soviet agents and sources that said Germany would attack. This is most definitely a lot to grasp and keep in mind. One example of the authors omission is from that famous spy Sorge in Tokyo, a few days before the invasion he sent a message saying "Germany might not attack or if it does it'll be at the end of June" this was sent on June 17th. I have in fact collected some of the volumes that Murphy based his work on and much of the information found in them he has omitted, this being just one example. Although in the end one cannot blame him for this, there is a wealth of information and a limited amount of space to present it all in within Murphy's book. So I commend him for what he's done in at least bringing this topic to light in English.
Now going back to some of the first details that were surfacing about the invasion, their estimates were March, and then later on mid May. March was seen as a joke since this was right after winter and before the rasputitsa would begin, thus Germany would simply be bogged down in the mud. May was more feasible but when it came and went and nothing happened, why should Stalin even consider that if they were wrong once they'd be right the next time? Mobilizing a country, any country, is a lot of work and at that time for Stalin mobilization meant war. The reasons for why he thought Hitler would first make demands are explained in the book, which I give the author credit for finding out, as well as the fact that Golikov the Chief of GRU was hiding a huge amount of information from Stalin and supplying him with what he thought Stalin wanted to see and hear.
This of course made it much harder for Stalin to believe the few pieces of information that might have slipped through or he was told about by others which did in fact confirm the invasion. Usually his estimation of what Germany would do rested with the disinformation Germany was supplying throughout Europe to keep the USSR in the clouds vis a vis German intentions toward it. Also keep in mind that when information started to pile up about German invasion plans, who would believe that such a crucial event would be massively broadcast throughout the world? It would have been believable from a few sources, but from dozens all over the world parroting the same thing? It couldn't be true, it was a deception by the British and Americans to get the USSR into war with Germany! I'm sure I'm forgetting much that was addressed and was forgotten about in this book but overall it is a good investment for those who want to understand something of why this was a surprise to Stalin and what kind of information he was receiving.
Long on detail, but short on substance........2005-10-21
The only real question is why. Why was not Stalin prepared for the German offensive? Despite a huge number of details, some interesting, and most perhaps interesting only to a professional researcher of that epoch, the author does not even attempt to answer the main question, and this is why I am rating this book so low.
Let's face it, Stalin was no idiot. For close to thirty years he was holding together his huge empire not only by the force of his cruelty, but also by the force of his determination, his strong will, his shrewdness, and his superb intellect - this admission should not turn me into his apologist.
In fact, the answer to this question can be easily found right there on page 24 of this book, in the speech that Stalin gave in 1939. According to this speech, he was going to sit out the war in the West until that time that both the British and the Germans were weakened enough. What was supposed to happen after that is fairly obvious.
By many accounts, by the early summer 1941 Stalin thought that the time was ripe, and was amassing his troops in Ukraine for a decisive strike on Romanian oil wells in the Carpathians. As is well known from military history (or pretty much any team sport), preparations for an offensive war are quite different from those for defending one's territory. And Stalin was ready for a war, but only on his own terms. This turned out to be the biggest miscalculation of his whole life, for which the people of the Soviet Empire paid dearly. Stalin did not believe that Hitler would dare to move East, but for Hitler this was the only, however slim, chance to avoid being hit from the rear.
For me as a European Jew, it is truly very painful to say so, but I strongly believe that if Hitler did not expose his policy of racial superiority toward Ukrainian and Russian peasants, he might have been victorious in that war.
Unfortunately, instead of describing the critical personalities, this book is filled with trivial details, which well describe some second-rate personalities, second rate not because of their character or abilities, but because of their influence on unfolding events.
Book Description
Of the German Army Groups that attacked Soviet Russia, Von Leeb's Army Group North, tasked with seizing the Baltic States and Leningrad, was the smallest and weakest. General Kuznetzov's Northwestern Front, however, was in an even weaker state. Despite brave counterattacks and defense by the Soviet forces, the Germans smashed through the Dvina Line, then the Stalin Line, flooded into Latvia and pressed on to encircle Leningrad. This book examines the German offensive and also the courageous Soviet attempts to halt the German spearhead, defending every possible line against overwhelming odds.
Customer Reviews:
Not Up Even to Osprey Standards.......2007-09-12
Osprey clearly presents its Campaign series books as general overviews of usually complex subjects. The Campaign series all contain a standard format: an introduction, a chronolgoy, presentation of the opposing plans, a quick look at the opposing commanders and the opposing forces, and then the bulk of the text addresses the specific campaign. All well and good -- a structured overview is promised and that is usually what Osprey delivers. The quality of the product varies, but at least a cursory understanding of the campaign is realized.
Not for Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2) Army Group North.
The principle content of the book begins with a report of the frontier battles. One map, and only one map, is available to decipher the intitial German attack and a Russian counter attack. The author's approach to the events is to rapidly and tersely present a myriad of unit names, place names, geographical locations with general comments that the Germans were advancing either with difficulty or easily. Attempting to follow these movements on the single map is, at best, difficult or, often, impossible.
The next topic is the German drive north from the Dvina to somewhere. I'm not quite sure where the Germans went because no map was included to let me envision the movement. But again, quick sentences resembling -- "And then the 99th Division pushed through rough terrain to Strombolsky on the Luchina river where it seized a bridge somewhere in the area." -- were the norm. I have no idea where the drive north went.
The author does handle fighting in Finland and the Arctic much more clearly. Three maps provide considerable assistance, although, once more, the text and the map are not always coordinated.
Given the limited space available in an Osprey Campaign book, the author's choice to spend over two pages of text and a two page map on a sideshow conquest of several Baltic islands is puzzling. The space could have been much better used.
Next the fighting approaching and around Leningrad is recounted. More maps appear, but the fragmented approach to describing operations coupled with a lack of clarity on the basic movements and consequences to those movements continue to plague the text.
Finally, right before the conclusion, two maps providing a strategic overview appear -- about 88 and 89 pages too late.
I will credit the author with an impressive abilty to mix both the Germand and Russian high commands' perceptions and decisions, the logistics difficulties, the organizational challengers, and the consequences of the leader's personalities -- and to show the impact of that mix upon the fighting. That was quite well done.
However, I found that the text lacks a basic clarity, does not always distinguish between important issues and trivial ones, and can be haphazardly organized.
Even by Osprey Campaign standards, this is sub-standard. I'd look to another source to understand Barbarossa in the North.
Hardly a comprehensive review.......2006-01-05
Considering the extremely limited scope of this book (Army Group North during the first six months of the war against the Soviet Union), this book offers only a cursory overview of its subject, and lacks significant detail. I can't help but think that Osprey squandered a great opportunity here by failing to offer any new information that can't already be found in other sources. Compounding the problem is that the maps are disappointing and too few in number. The book gives an adequate overview of Army Group North's campaign through the end of 1941, but that feat was achieved by others long before this book was published. Fortunately it's a relatively inexpensive book though, so it may be worth adding to your library if you don't already have a book on this subject. Just don't expect much more than a broad overview of the campaign.
Excellent Series.......2005-06-15
Colonel Kirchubel has done an outstanding job of synthesizing the extremely complex German invasion of the USSR. His latest book for Osprey, Army Group North, builds upon the success of the earlier Army Group South. Thousands of pages have been written on Barbarossa, so covering the massive assault in three books of 100 pages each is ambitious. One can only assume that with the anticipated completion of the trilogy we will have a good overview of the entire campaign.
Kirchubel gives valuable introductory information on the geo-political background, each side's plans, commanders and armies. However, where other authors have wasted space on generals like Wilhelm Keitel (a staff politico who didn't command anybody), Kirchubel describes in human terms the various leaders actually involved. In the heart of the volume, the actual campaign, he adroitly works within Osprey's size constraints to present a good mix of operational and tactical combat and maneuver. I found the anecdotes of small-unit actions, for example the Germans' initial difficulty defeating new Soviet armor or fighting in the land of the midnight sun, very representative. Of course Osprey is known for its graphics and Army Group North does not disappoint. Kirchubel provides a good selection of German and Soviet point-of-view photographs, artwork and maps. My favorite is the battlescene depicting Stuka ace Hans-Ulrich Rudel sinking the battleship Murat: artist Howard Gerrard brings to life a scene I'd only read about in Rudel's memoirs.
One of Army Group North's strengths is its treatment of the fighting in Finland. This is a theater often neglected in other Barbarossa histories which act like the Russian front terminated at Leningrad. Also interesting was the description of the German's joint operation against the Baltic islands-a little-known action. It is clear, however, that Kirchubel's main interest is the command and control aspect of Barbarossa. Military history amateurs (and some professionals) are guilty of idolizing German military leadership. However, among other things, Army Group North makes it clear Hitler failed to keep a tight rein on his generals, Halder was a behind-the-scenes schemer and Leeb was totally unsuited for high leadership during Barbarossa. A caveat: Readers uncomfortable with an author squarely giving credit or criticism of a general's conduct of operations my find Kirchubel a bit too willing to call a spade a spade.
On a related matter, I have no idea who comrade academician Forczyk is, but for someone who seemingly makes an avocation of trashing Osprey books he knows little about the product. Forget for a moment the unprofessional, speculative and personal-attack nature of Forczyk's reviews (describing Kirchubel as "unaware," "ignorant" and "apparently confused"). He believes eight pages on opposing armies is "insufficient:" the exact word count allowed for each section is strictly controlled by Osprey. He also wants all reinforcements mentioned in the order of battle (also subject to Osprey limits) in a campaign where OBs changed daily-a subject that could justify an entire book. However, Forczyk's shot against Osprey's "slip-shod editing" is well aimed.
With so many Osprey Campaign Series books dealing only with battles and engagements it's good to read about a real campaign. I for one look forward to Kirchubel tying together the story of Barbarossa with the final volume on Army Group Center. Army Group North¬, meant to supplement, not supplant, the "hallowed texts" of Glantz, Ziemke, et al, is a necessary addition to the library of historian and hobbyist alike.
Robert Francis
A Solid Summary .......2005-05-01
Although there are numerous books already in existence on the Eastern Front in the Second World War, Robert Kirchubel's two volumes on Operation Barbarossa - the German invasion of the USSR in 1941 - are valuable summaries of current material on the subject. In this volume, Kirchubel covers the operations of the German Army Group North (AGN) in its efforts to capture Leningrad and link up with Finnish forces, in the period June-December 1941. Kirchubel's work is primarily a synthesis product rather than relying on much original research, but he is able to incorporate some of the better sources available.
Operational Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North follows the standard Osprey campaign series format, with initial sections on the origins of the campaign, opposing leaders, opposing plans and opposing forces, as well as a campaign chronology. These sections are well written and informative, although the order of battle is rather basic (no mention of reinforcements) and lists Soviet air units, but not German Luftwaffe units. As usual, the quality of maps and color graphics is one of the main selling points for the Osprey campaign series and Operational Barbarossa 1941: Army Group North is quite successful in this area. The author provides seven 2-D maps, four of which deal with operations in Finland: frontier battles; Operation Platinfuchs (drive on Murmansk); Operation Polarfuchs; Finnish attacks in Karelia; Tikhvin/Volkhov; strategic overview Finland; strategic overview, Army Group North. There are three 3-D Maps: Soviet attacks around Staraya Russa, August 1941; German assaults on Baltic Islands, September 1941; Battles on the Luga River Line and approaches to Leningrad, August-September 1941. There were probably too many maps on Finnish operations in this volume and not enough on the actual operations of Army Group North itself. I found it difficult to follow German operations in July, since the only map that covers this is a tiny strategic overview at the end of volume. No map depicted in detail the final German lines around Leningrad, which would have been interesting (you just can't see the Duderof Heights on the 3-D map, which must be about 1:1,000,000 scale). Just as an aside, the Germans normally depicted their operations on 1:300,000 scale maps and it would be nice if Osprey could keep that in mind.
The color battle scenes are also very good: the Soviet 8th Army attempting to breakthrough the LVI Panzer Corps at the Dunaburg bridgehead, 28 June; German 269th Infantry Division using captured anti-tank guns to destroy Soviet T-34 tanks, July 1941; Hans Ulrich Rudel sinks the battleship Marat at Kronshtadt, 21 September 1941. However, Kirchubel claims that Germans were using captured ZIS-3 76.2mm anti-tank guns in July 1941, which is very doubtful, since that weapon only went into very limited production in July 1941. Kirchubel appears to be confusing the ZIS-3 with the 76.2mm F-22 USV divisional gun or the 57mm ZIS-2.
Kirchubel's campaign narrative is fair, but it tends to wander. He starts out well on the frontier battles in June 1941, then gets sidetracked into about ten pages on the Finns, then falls into a lengthy discussion about the arguments between Hitler and the OKH army staff about objectives in the Soviet Union. By the time he gets back to what Army Group North was doing, particularly in July-August, it seems like a bit of an afterthought. We know a lot today about the arguments in the Fuhrer's headquarters thanks to the diaries of Generals Halder and Warlimont, but that doesn't mean that they are always that relevant; officers like Halder tended to exaggerate their impact because they were competing for control of the Wehrmacht with Hitler. Fact is, they lost that control before the war and their role steadily diminished, no matter what their diaries say. Kirchubel's coverage of the Finns and the OKH policy debates make for a more complete picture, but given the size restraints of an Osprey volume they probable take away more than they add.
Kirchubel does add many good details into his volume about armor operations, air operations, supply issues and terrain - it is clear that he has studied the existing secondary sources carefully (particularly David M. Glantz). I do wish that Kirchubel had made some mention of Army Group North's casualties and the Soviet Northwest Front's casualties in this period - the data is available. The author concludes that the Germans failed to take Leningrad because Field Marshal von Leeb, Army Group North's commander, "conducted a flawed campaign" in that he "refused to accept the risks essential to Blitzkrieg success" and that he "did not focus on a single decisive point." These conclusions appear correct, in that AGN spread its forces too thinly and lost the initiative in July. However, it is hard to agree with Kirchubel's opinion that the Germans had "gained some valuable tactical lessons from the 1940 Western campaign, but learned all the wrong operational and strategic ones." The Wehrmacht demonstrated time and again in 1941 that they were experts at operational maneuver (it was intelligence and logistics where they were awful), particularly against the cannon-fodder Soviet armies of 1941. As for strategy, Kirchubel never asks or answers, "how would Germany have benefited from capturing Leningrad in 1941 as opposed to merely blockading it, as they did?" Hitler ordered the city blockaded, not seized, and that is precisely what AGN accomplished. Since AGN was able to impose a 900-day siege on Leningrad, I'm not sure that their campaign was a failure in 1941 - they did everything they were ordered to do but link up with the Finns, and it does not appear that a link-up would have been strategically useful had it occurred. The "so what" test is a critical determinant for historical relevancy and it does not appear that von Leeb's "flawed campaign" of 1941 contributed in any large measure to the Wehrmacht's ultimate defeat in the USSR.
Book Description
The final volume in the Barbarossa trilogy, this title completes the account of the strategic intricacies of the German campaign against Russia. Detailing the final Nazi push for Moscow, Robert Kirchubel examines the causes behind the German failure, including the inability to re-supply troops or provide reserves, and the lack of decent German winter uniforms and transport.
Full-color artwork, maps and bird's-eye views illustrate the campaign in detail, revealing how the Red Army capitalized on every German weakness in spite of its own flaws.
Customer Reviews:
Stumbles Across the Finish Line.......2007-09-14
This third volume in Robert Kirchubel's account of Operation Barbarossa, number 186 in Osprey's campaign series, is a mixed bag, with some good, some indifferent and some bad. Having written Moscow 1941, Campaign No. 167, last year, I was eager to see how this volume would complete the trilogy on the largest ground invasion in history. Unfortunately, this volume seems to be the weakest of the three the author has written and appears to falter badly toward the end.
The opening sections on origins of the campaign, opposing forces, plans and commanders is relatively short, but understandable given that this volume is third in a 3-part series. However, the author devotes 10 pages to opposing forces, without actually saying a great deal. It is clear that the author has not used the superb research by David Glantz in Stumbling Colossus, which spells out the extent of disarray in the Soviet army on the eve of Barbarossa. The author does seem to want to avoid some of the standard canards about the campaign concerning bad weather in favor of a more logistics-heavy focus (which echoes the approach I used in my own Moscow 1941), but without providing the facts to back it up. For example, he states that the 4th Panzer Division only had enough fuel to go 60 miles (96 kms) at the start of Typhoon, without any supporting data, yet it actually had enough to go 200 kms in the first few days of the offensive.
The volume has five 2-D Maps (strategic overview; Boldin counteroffensive; Timoshenko counteroffensive; Vyazma and Bryansk; German advances toward Moscow) and two 3-D BEV maps (Minsk encirclement; Operation Typhoon). The maps are problematic in this volume, for example, the map entitled "Vyazma and Bryansk" does not actually show the town of Vyazma, nor do any of the maps show railroads. How can you discuss German logistics in Operation Barbarossa if you don't show the rail lines, to which they were tied? The 3-D maps are zoomed out such that the grid lines are 50 kilometers apart, meaning they depict battle areas of 400 x 300 kilometers - meaning that terrain features are virtually indistinguishable. Trying to cover a two-month offensive involving six German armies on a single BEV was just ridiculous! On the other hand, the three battle scenes by Peter Dennis (Soviet 6th Rifle Division defends Brest-Litovsk; 7th Panzer and 29th Motorized Infantry Division link-up closing Smolensk kessel; German 137th Infantry Division assault through Moscow defenses near Voronino) are excellent - probably one of the best aspects of this volume. The author provides a fairly decent bibliography, but the omission of David Gantz's landmark Stumbling Colossus is incredible.
This narrative consists of three main set pieces: the opening border battles and Minsk-Bialystok pocket in June-July 1941; the Battle of Smolensk in July-August 1941 and Operation Typhoon in October-December 1941. The author's sources are German-heavy, although he has made efforts to include Soviet material from David Glantz. The section on the Minsk encirclement is fairly good, although a bit short and provides only the barest details on critical actions, such as the assault on Brest-Litovsk. By the time that the author gets to Smolensk, his narrative gets hard to follow. The author also begins inserting information that is incorrect or misleading. For example, on page 46 that "OKH created Fourth Panzer Army" on 2-3 July (it was not until 5 October) and on page 49, talks about Von Kluge "in his new role as a Panzer Army commander". On page 64, the author writes that, "on July 27, when von Kluge was removed from command of Fourth Panzer Army," yet Generaloberst Erich Höpner was the commander of 4th Panzergruppe from February to December 1941 and von Kluge was commander of 4th Army. About this point, I began to get a funny feeling about this volume.
By the time that the narrative moves to Operation Typhoon, I could sense that the "facts" being used herein were rather squishy. The number of Luftwaffe aircraft supporting Typhoon listed here was more than double what they actually had and claims that the Germans had broken through the entire Mozhaisk Line by 16 October are false (Mozhaisk did not fall until 18 October and Volokolomsk not till 27 October). The author says that "Hitler could not bring himself to assault Moscow frontally," but in fact, 4th Army was stopped cold at Naro-Fominsk on 20-23 October. On page 78, the author says that "one division from the Soviet Far East was arriving near Moscow by rail every two days" in late October, but actually only a few Siberian divisions went to Moscow and most went either to the Leningrad or Ukrainian fronts. The author's take on von Kluge's failure to act also seems to accept a lot of baloney (von Kluge was lying to his peers and superiors, which von Bock's diary bears out), which makes his telling incomprehensible. This final volume in the trilogy stumbles across the finish line and collapses in a disorderly heap.
Been waiting for this one .......2007-09-10
Ever since getting Operation Barbarossa 1941 (2) I've been waiting for this one to come out. And it is about time it did. It is as good as the priveious two covering operations in the North and in the South of the German invasion of the Soviet Union and the clash between the 20th Century's Two most evil empires. Why the author kept this one for last I do not know but I am glad Osprey has finally published it.
Covers operations in the move for Moscow quite well. Very well describes its actions and why it failed for the Germans even though they came so well close to Victory. Politicians should never be allowed to meddle with military decisions.
A must read for students of military history and anyone interested in WWII.
Average customer rating:
|
The Barbarossa Brothers: 16th Century Pirates of the Barbary Coast (Weintraub, Aileen, Library of Pirates.)
Aileen Weintraub
Manufacturer: PowerKids Press
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ASIN: 0823957993 |
Book Description
On 22 June 1941 The Germans launched their long-expected invasion of the Soviet Union. Codenamed "Operation Barbarossa," after the famous 12th century crusading emperor, what followed was perhaps the greatest clash of arms the world has ever witnessed, and one of the most ferocious, uncompromising conflicts in the history of modern warfare.
With the aid of specially commissioned maps, Barbarossa: The First 7 Days describes the dramatic history of the first week of the invasion of the Soviet Union. The book begins with an extensive overview of the Wehrmacht's success up until 1941, followed by chapters outlining the German High Command's plan of attack and the defensive dispositions of the Soviet forces. The author goes on to describe the opening bombardment, followed by detailed accounts of the three Army Groups' fortunes in the first week of the campaign. The book finishes with an analysis of the remainder of the campaign and the ultimate failure of the Germans to destroy the Red Army and capture Moscow.
With first hand accounts from both sides, vivid photographs, detailed fact boxes, and specially commissioned maps of the German advance and the Soviet defensive actions, Barbarossa: The First 7 Days is a comprehensive examination of the first week of the four-year war on the Eastern Front.
Customer Reviews:
Well-rounded Introduction to Operation Barbarossa.......2007-06-08
This book is a very good basic introduction to Operation Barbarossa and the war on the Eastern Front.
The author primarily provides a balanced approach to the subject matter, although at times it seems too much detail is placed on the defensive actions of the Soviets in comparison to the strategies and tactics of the advancing Germans.
The book is mainly a pictorial history but one that is very well done. The pictures are closely matched to the text so that they enhance rather than interrupt the story being told. The pictures themselves are very well reproduced and at least two dozen of them are in color. There are also many well-drawn maps and these are in color as well. In addition, the book has a number of excellently drawn full-color illustrations of soldiers, tanks, and planes relating to both sides. Interesting quotations from participants in the battles are also liberally sprinkled throughout the text. Finally, the book includes numerous fascinating sidebars on people, vehicles, and weapons. (I learned more about the German BMW R-75 motorcycle with sidecar in this book than I did in an entire book on World War II motorcycles!)
Many misstatements are made, such as the wrong number of German horses killed at one stage of the invasion, an incorrect displacement of a German Army Group at another stage, an indefensible comment that the Soviets treated German prisoners of war fairly, and the repeated assertion that none of the Germans had proper winter clothing for the first winter of this war, when in fact some, albeit not many, divisions, such as mountain troops, were properly outfitted for winter warfare. Also, the author's reliance on "Other Men's Graves," a book most historians regard as pulp fiction, is disappointing.
Nonetheless, although not a perfect book, I believe it is still deserving of at least a 4-star rating in that the writing, editing, and attention to detail easily surpasses most other books of this type.
Great imagery with text........2006-10-24
The text can be a little "dry" at times as the author shifts focus from the Germans and Soviets quickly. However, the author does a good job of describing the entire battle field situation during the first seven days. The book has so much detail, it would be tough to fully comprehend in your first reading.
The highlight of this book is the prewar and combat photos that give the reader some view into how these battles were fought. The captions and text surrounding the photos gave me the impression the book was actually written with a focus on these photos. Generous detail is given to how both sides used each other's equipment.
A beginner should definitely read this book before tackling some of the better books on the eastern front. You will understand the terrain and how this affected the larger tank battles to come. After this book pick up: Tigers In The Mud, Panzer Aces and Panzer Aces II all published by Stackpole!
NOTE: I am reviewing the edition published in 2006 by Barnes & Noble. The book appears to be 192 pages.
Nice photo history of the initial invasion of the USSR.......2006-09-01
At a little under 200 pages, this is a nice photo history of the initial invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi Germany. There have been several good books lately on this subject. Fowler's book is a nice companion book, in that the photos lead a lot to the telling of the invasion. In the book, we learn that the Soviets did put up quite a resistance, but were overwhelmed by superior leadership and German technology. This led to a lot of deaths by the Germans. All three fronts were described, with a focus on the Army Group Center.
This is a nice interesting read about the invasion. Obviously, it is not the authoritative book some readers desire, but it gives a summary history of this historic battle. The pictures are great.
Meticulous, thorough, and simply amazing.......2004-05-16
Maps and a wealth of black-and-white and color photographs extensively intersperse Will Fowler's Barbarossa: The First 7 Days, a coffee-table book describing Nazi Germany's 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union. The straightforward text informatively narrates the bloody battles in exhaustive detail. Barbarossa: The First 7 Days is a meticulous, thorough, and simply amazing scrutiny of the first week of what became an horrific and hideous battle front of no quarter given or accepted. Barbarossa: The First 7 Days is a clearly appropriate and highly recommended contribution to personal, academic, and community library World War II history collections and reading lists.
Nothing new, save your money.......2004-04-21
Nothing new presented in the book, small bibliography, and when I came upon this "Army Group South and Luftflotte 4 consisted of 3 million men, 600,000 vehicles, 750,000 horses, 3580 tanks, 7184 guns and 1830 aircraft." (pg. 144) I didn't know if it was for the Germans or Soviets, it would be overkill for either side in terms of 'men' alone. Instead of this book consider buying Glantz's "Barbarossa" or Kershaw's "War without Garlands", MUCH better than this book in ALL categories.
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